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The aim of this thesis is to examine the link between financial sector transformation and rising 
inequality in the USA since the 1980s. The research hypothesis states that differences in household 
balance sheet structures across the distribution influenced inequality by generating disparities in rates of 
return and leverage among households. Balance sheet heterogeneity has been shaped by the changing 
nature of financial sector operations, deregulation, securitisation, and by privatisation and labour market 
liberalisation. The contribution of this thesis is to develop a theoretical and empirical account of 
financial sector transformation, wealth distribution, and interactions between income and wealth as the 
key determinants of inequality in the 21st century. We explicitly explore the intersectional dimension of 
this relationship with gender, racial, and intergenerational inequality. We develop a three-class stock-
flow consistent model of inequality determination calibrated to the US economy to account for the 
growing wealth heterogeneity among households in the Post-Keynesian macro-models. We observe that 
differences in wealth composition in the household sector result in higher levels and more adequate 
patterns of income and wealth inequality than in scenarios without the proposed features. This finding is 
empirically supported by parametric and non-parametric approaches using data from the U.S. Survey of 
Consumer Finances between 1989 and 2013. Linear regression analysis finds that dependence on non-
financial assets and unsecured debt is associated with lower household income relative to the median, 
while greater relative holdings of business equity, high-yielding financial assets, and secured debt are 
related to higher increases in the median income ratio, although these effects are not shared equally 
across gender, race, and generations. Moreover, inequality decomposition analysis reveals that assets, 
particularly business equity, high-yielding financial assets, and housing, contribute more to inequality 
than liabilities. The thesis concludes by analysing policy responses to alleviate inequality in light of the 
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i. Motivation and aims of research 
This thesis examines the determinants of wealth and income inequality in the USA since the 
1980s. Its main purpose is to analyse how inequality has been influenced by changes in the 
operations of financial sector observed in the USA since that period. It argues that financial sector 
transformation, defined as the development of financial deregulation, structured finance, 
transformation of the role and nature of financial intermediaries, and increasing financial 
commitments of households since the 1980s, has shaped inequality by generating disparate wealth 
accumulation possibilities across the population, which has been aided by broader liberalisation 
measures in the US economy since the 1980s. 
The principal motivation to explore the relationship between finance and inequality in the 
US context arises because the USA has been characterised by some of the highest levels of income 
and wealth inequality among the advanced economies, and its financial sector is one of largest in 
the world, being at the forefront of financial deregulation and innovation since the 1980s. 
Moreover, it has one of the best available data on wealth at the household level, spanning several 
decades. Importantly, study of the USA enables exploration of the intersection of wealth inequality 
with the racial, gender, and intergenerational disparities, which have not been extensively 
integrated into the studies of inequality in Europe and have not been resolved in the US-centred 
debates. For these reasons, the USA yields itself as an informative case study of the link between 
financial commitments of households and inequality. 
The key research hypothesis of this study is that differences in household balance sheet 
composition associated with financial sector transformation have contributed to increasing income 
and wealth inequality by influencing disparities in leverage levels and returns to wealth depending 
on the absolute size of wealth holdings. This is because the accumulation of high-yielding 
financial assets and business equity have required large initial downpayments, which could only be 
afforded by households with sizeable stock of wealth. Simultaneously, low- and middle-income 
households have increasingly relied on homeownership to make up for sluggishly growing 
earnings and deepening employment insecurity, often becoming dependent on debt to finance 
expenditure. This reliance on highly leveraged homeownership has not been accidental, as 
mortgage lending constituted the basis of high-yielding securitised instruments, which have been 
accumulated by households at the top of the distribution. A vicious cycle has emerged, where both 
the demand and the supply of credit have reinforced each other, pushing many households into 
unsustainable indebtedness, which benefited the wealthy financial investors. Increasing leverage 
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levels among households towards the middle and the bottom of the distribution led to broader 
macroeconomic instability, which culminated in the Great Recession. However, while the 2007 
financial crisis brought a check on the mortgage securitisation trade, the ability of the financial 
sector to generate high returns for the narrow group of beneficiaries has not been reigned in. 
Similar securitisation mechanisms are now being reproduced in other parts of the credit market, 
this time for unsecured debt. Consequently, wealth ownership and leverage continue to define the 
prosperity and financial stability of households across the distribution. In this context, the thesis 
aims to analyse the precise mechanisms through which differences in asset and debt ownership 
across households have shaped inequality. To achieve this purpose, we intend to answer the 
following research questions: 
(1) How has financial sector transformation influenced income and wealth distribution in the 
USA since the 1980s? 
(2) How do differences in ownership of wealth shape inequality? 
(3) Which types of assets and liabilities are held by the US households at different points of 
the income distribution and how has this balance sheet composition changed over time, 
particularly in light of the 2007 financial crisis? 
In addition to these research questions, we aim to evaluate the policy implications of our 
findings. Specifically, we analyse how economic policy can effectively alleviate wealth and 
income inequality in the USA in the context of the increasing heterogeneity of household wealth 
composition resulting from financial sector transformation. 
ii. Inequality as the defining challenge of our time 
There are strong economic arguments in favour of a more equal distribution of income and wealth. 
The relationship between equality and economic growth has long been debated in the economic 
literature. For classical economists, the aggregate amount of wealth (in terms of inheritance) is 
positively related to the equality of wealth distribution (Smith [1776] 1994; Sismondi [1824] 1957; 
Mill [1848] 1965). Furthermore, inequality has been argued to impede growth and contribute to 
macroeconomic instability, as evidenced by the 2007 financial crisis. From the Kaleckian 
aggregate demand perspective, redistribution of income and wealth towards poorer households 
would contribute to higher economic growth as they consume a larger part of their income and 
wealth than the rich (Kalecki 1954; Onaran/Galanis 2014). However, with the rise of the neoliberal 
economic paradigm in the 1980s, inequality came to be seen as a necessary evil, reflecting 
differences in the marginal contribution to productivity among economic agents (Okun 1975; 
Bénabou 1996; Barro 2000). In this view, inequality is positively related to economic growth as 
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higher savings of the rich translate into investment. Consequently, this paradigm argues that 
redistributive policies aiming at reducing inequality would distort economic incentives for the 
accumulation of savings and thus impede growth.  
Empirical evidence tends to contradict the neoliberal case and support the presence of a 
negative relationship between inequality and economic growth (Alesina/Rodrick 1994; 
Persson/Tabellini 1994; Li et al. 1998; Ostry et al. 2014). Inequality has been shown to induce 
economic volatility as income concentration at the top has contributed to unsustainable household 
debt accumulation and increased the propensity to speculate, which has magnified the devastating 
impact of the Great Recession across the economy (Kumhof/Ranciere 2010; Mian/Sufi 2010, 
2013; Rajan 2010; Gurrieri/Lorenzoni 2011; Kim 2013; Mian et al. 2013; Stockhammer 2015; 
Goda et al. 2016; see Van Treeck/Sturn 2012 for a review). 
Moreover, research has shown that policies aiming to reduce inequality by limiting high 
incomes would not lower economic growth. This is because additional money does not provide 
incentives to work at such high level of pay, which challenges the neoliberal argument (Piketty 
2014:512). Rather, the incremental income and wealth at the top of the distribution constitute rents 
earned from high economic power of the rich rather than a fair reward for their contribution to the 
production process (Stiglitz 2012). Recent research by IMF (2017) finds that introduction of 
progressive income and transfer taxes would not slow down growth.  
Consequently, the concentration of power related to the rising inequality creates significant 
political costs as it is fundamentally undemocratic. This is because the doctrine of “one man, one 
vote” becomes replaced by the principle of “one dollar, one vote”, as the rich are increasingly able 
to influence the political process through campaign donations and lobbying. Empirical evidence 
has found that higher inequality reduces voter turnout and discourages political participation, 
which further undermines the democratic process (Boix 2003; Blais 2006; Solt 2008). 
In addition to these economic and political concerns, a large body of empirical evidence 
reveals considerable social costs of inequality. Unequal distribution of income and wealth is 
related to poorer public health, contributing to lower life expectancy, higher infant mortality rates, 
and greater incidence of obesity in the society (Wilkinson 1996; Marmot 2010; Offer et al. 2012). 
Furthermore, income and wealth inequality threaten social cohesion by reducing social trust and 
exacerbating discrimination and crime (Rothstein/Uslaner 2005; Pressman 2016:50-51). Moreover, 
inequality may discourage family formation, as low incomes are associated with falling birth rates 
and increased likelihood of divorce (Livingston 2011; Pressman 2016:51). Importantly, research 
shows that unequal societies suffer from low social mobility, which suggests that the costs of 
inequality are passed on to the future generations (Wilkinson/Pickett 2010). 
––– Introduction ––– 4 
Given these economic, political, and social concerns, inequality alleviation would bring real 
improvement not only to the living conditions and economic prospects of those at the bottom of 
the distribution, but also to the wellbeing of the society as a whole. Consequently, combating 
inequality should be at the top of the US policy agenda. Nevertheless, despite the former US 
president Barack Obama calling inequality “the defining challenge of our time”
1
, not enough has 
been done to boost incomes and wealth of the low- and middle-income households, reduce their 
dependence on debt, and curb the ability of the financial sector to generate high returns to wealth 
for households at the top of the distribution. The prospects for reducing inequality are further 
impeded by the subsequent administration’s commitment to cutting corporate and personal 
taxation
2
, reducing the public financing of healthcare
3
, and rolling back financial regulation 
implemented by the Dodd-Frank Act after the 2007 crisis
4
. In this context, research on the 
determinants of inequality as undertaken in this thesis is timely. It is only through understanding 
what drives inequality that adequate policy responses can be formulated to combat social injustice 
and foster economic fairness for the society today and in the future. 
iii. Contribution to the literature 
The main contribution of this thesis is to rethink the determinants of inequality in the context of 
the increasing power of the financial sector, taking the USA as the case study. Firstly, it is one of 
the few studies highlighting the need to look beyond the distribution of income towards wealth in 
order to understand rising inequality in modern times. The distinction between income and wealth 
has not been sufficiently explored in the existing literature on inequality and the two terms are 
often conflated. This study argues that there are fundamental differences between the economic 
concepts of income and wealth. It emphasises that in the context of rising financial commitments 
of households observed in the USA since the 1980s the interaction between wealth and income has 
been the key driver of economic inequality. This is because differences in wealth composition 
generated disparate leverage levels and capital income flows as returns to wealth became 
dependent on its absolute size. 
                                                   
1
 Speech to the Center for American Progress, 4
th




 https://www.whitehouse.gov/bringing-back-jobs-and-growth  
3
 https://www.whitehouse.gov/repeal-and-replace-obamacare  
4
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Secondly, at the theoretical level, this study builds on the Post-Keynesian macro-modelling 
literature to develop a new theory of inequality determination within the stock-flow consistent 
modelling framework, accounting for the heterogeneity of household wealth composition and the 
complexity of financial sector operations. It proposes a new conceptualisation of the household 
sector based on the balance sheet composition rather than income sources, introducing a third class 
of leveraged homeowners into the dominant two-class taxonomy of the Post-Keynesian macro-
models. It also incorporates the Post-Keynesian assumption of the social dependence of 
consumption, distinguishing between different motives for debt accumulation across households. 
The proposed stock-flow consistent model is calibrated to the US data, and is able to reproduce the 
patterns of income and wealth inequality observed in the real life. The model generates inequality 
endogenously through introducing disparities in wealth ownership across households, which 
generate differences in capital income receipts depending on the size of wealth holdings. It shows 
that analysis which does not account for household wealth heterogeneity cannot fully explain the 
high levels of income and wealth inequality observed in the USA.  
Thirdly, the thesis contributes to the literature by testing the implication of the stock-flow 
consistent model through an innovative applied analysis of inequality using household level data 
from the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances between 1989 and 2013. It develops stylised facts of 
the differences in household wealth composition observed in the USA since the 1980s. Moreover, 
the empirical contribution is to apply the existing methods of linear regression analysis and non-
parametric estimation to a new research problem, evaluating the relationship between income 
polarisation and wealth composition. Moreover, we extend the inequality decomposition analysis, 
which is traditionally focused on income, to examine the determinants of wealth inequality. We 
explicitly focus on the intersectional dimension of wealth heterogeneity, analysing the role of 
balance sheet composition in driving wealth and income inequality across class, gender, race, and 
generations. 
Finally, the thesis links its theoretical and empirical findings with the current policy debate 
in the literature. In addition to providing a detailed overview of the existing policy proposals to 
reduce wealth inequality, the contribution of the thesis is to evaluate the policy implications in 
light of its research findings regarding the distributional role of household wealth heterogeneity, 
considering the impact of the proposed policies on wealth disparities across class, gender, race, 
and generations. 
iv. Structure of the thesis and summary of findings 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 documents the increase in wealth and income 
inequality in the USA since the 1980s and provides a detailed account of changes in the financial 
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sector operations in this period. Based on this narrative, we develop the research hypothesis 
regarding the nexus between finance and inequality, specifying that financial sector transformation 
has contributed to rising inequality through shaping differences in household wealth accumulation 
possibilities across the distribution. The chapter illustrates this hypothesis by developing stylised 
facts of the evolution of household balance sheet composition in the USA since the 1980s across 
class, gender, race, and generations. Given the evident polarisation of income and wealth at the top 
decile of the income distribution, and among households headed by men, Whites, and those aged 
35 and above, we show that differences in balance sheet composition have generated disparities in 
income and wealth through unequal leverage levels and capital gains flows. 
Chapter 2 examines how the existing economic theory explains inequality and to what extent 
it incorporates finance and household wealth heterogeneity in analysing the determinants of 
income and wealth distribution. We distinguish between two main strands of the relevant 
literature. Firstly, we review the macroeconomic approaches to distribution, which highlight the 
role of markets (Galbraith 2012), government policy (Stiglitz 2012), relative returns to income and 
wealth (Piketty 2014), and relationship to the production process (the Post-Keynesian literature) in 
generating inequality. We argue that while these approaches appreciate the role of finance and 
socio-institutional structures in influencing income inequality, the impact of household wealth 
heterogeneity on the distribution of income and wealth is not sufficiently explored. Secondly, to 
gauge the determinants of wealth distribution we analyse the microeconomic theories of 
consumption and household portfolio decisions. We argue that while the mainstream life-cycle 
theory and the permanent income hypothesis shed light on the determinants of household wealth 
accumulation, they do not consider the socio-institutional context influencing household portfolio 
choices. Based on this literature review, we argue that the Post-Keynesian macroeconomic 
approach combined with the Post-Keynesian insights into the social dependency of household 
consumption behaviour provides the most appropriate foundation for the extension of the 
economic theory of inequality to account for the role of household wealth heterogeneity and 
financial sector transformation. 
Chapter 3 develops a stock-flow consistent model of inequality determination incorporating 
differences in household balance sheet composition and financial sector complexity. We adopt the 
stock-flow consistent modelling methodology because it incorporates both the real and the 
financial side of the economy and its integrated balance sheet analysis yields itself to the 
examination of the impact of household wealth heterogeneity on distribution. Based on the stylised 
facts developed in the balance sheet analysis in Chapter 1, we propose a new conceptualisation of 
households in the Post-Keynesian macro-models based on the balance sheet composition rather 
than income sources. The heterogeneity of wealth structures is incorporated by introducing a third 
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class of households, identified with the new middle class of leveraged homeowners emergent in 
the subprime lending boom. We assume that mortgages given to the middle class are the basis of 
the securitisation processes in the model, and are socially determined by relative consumption 
concerns. The model is solved through simulations, and is calibrated to the US data to reflect the 
conditions in the US economy. The model shows that greater household wealth heterogeneity 
owing to the financial sector complexity generates higher levels of inequality and macroeconomic 
fragility than scenarios without these features. We show that this occurs because of the emergent 
disparities in the flows of income across the household groups associated with the size of wealth 
holdings. We note that the caveat of our model is its high level of aggregation, which limits the 
ability to account for the social dimension of wealth distribution in determining inequality. 
Chapter 4 undertakes the empirical test of the model implications from the previous chapter 
using household data from the nine waves of the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances between 
1989-2013. The empirical analysis of the research hypothesis is conducted in two stages in order 
to provide a comprehensive examination of the role of wealth composition in determining wealth 
and income inequality. To address the limitation of the stock-flow consistent model, we explicitly 
analyse the social dimension of class, gender, race, and generations associated with the 
distributional impact of wealth heterogeneity.  
Firstly, we apply linear regression analysis using the pooled ordinary least squares 
estimation to examine the statistical significance of the relationship between household wealth 
composition and relative inequality, measuring the position of households in the distribution of 
income relative to the median. We find that greater relative holdings of high-yielding financial 
assets, business equity, and secured debt are associated with higher relative inequality, while 
reliance on housing and unsecured debt pushes household income towards the bottom of the 
distribution. These effects are estimated to have been generated in the subprime lending boom 
between 2001-2007, and are found to be stronger for males, Whites, and households aged 35 and 
over. As endogeneity issues and sensitivity to extreme values pose problems to the regression 
analysis, we test the robustness of these findings using the quantile regression and the non-
parametric Theil-Sen median slope estimation. We find that the majority of our results are robust 
in their sign and significance, although the magnitude of the estimates tends to be lower in the 
median quantile regression compared to the pooled OLS and the non-parametric estimation.  
Secondly, we use inequality decomposition analysis to assess the contribution of different 
assets and debt to the overall measures of income and wealth inequality between 1989-2013. We 
apply the non-parametric Shorrocks decomposition and the regression-based Fields decomposition 
to provide a robust analysis of the influence of different balance sheet items and their associated 
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income flows to inequality. Moreover, we apply the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to analyse 
which types of wealth determine inequality across class, gender, race, and generations. We thus 
explore the social dimension of the distributional consequences of wealth heterogeneity, which 
was not considered in the stock-flow consistent model in Chapter 3. Moreover, by decomposing 
the gap in income and wealth between the top 10% and the bottom 90%, and between the bottom 
20% and the top 80% of the income distribution, we test the validity of the new conceptualisation 
of households based on their wealth composition proposed in the stock-flow consistent model. 
Overall, we find that differences in capital income ownership, particularly business equity 
and capital gains, explained the largest portion of income inequality between 1989-2013, although 
the contribution of wage inequality has been increasing over time and was particularly important 
in the regression-based decompositions. Moreover, we establish that disparities in asset ownership, 
particularly business equity and primary residence, contribute more to wealth inequality than 
disparities in debt, although the latter explained a sizeable part of wealth inequality across gender. 
We also find that the contribution of financial assets, especially pension wealth, has increased over 
time. Furthermore, the analysis supports the distinction of the third class of leveraged homeowners 
from the working class, and the introduction of the rentier wage in the stock-flow consistent 
model. 
Chapter 5 discusses the policy implications of our research findings and evaluates the 
existing policy measures to reduce inequality. We review current proposals of income and wealth 
taxation, and asset-based welfare policies found in Piketty (2014), Atkinson (2015), Galbraith 
(2012, 2016), and Stiglitz (2012, 2014). Given our finding that rising heterogeneity of household 
wealth composition contributed to inequality, we support policies which explicitly target wealth 
inequality alongside income because measures that do not address the size of wealth holdings 
cannot reduce high returns earned by households at the top of the distribution. We discuss the 
social implications of the reviewed policies across gender, race, and generations, as well as 
potential obstacles to implementation. In light of our findings, we argue that effective reduction in 
wealth and income inequality can be achieved through a mix of progressive taxation of wealth 
holdings and transfers, complemented by higher marginal rates of personal and corporate income 
taxes, and policies explicitly addressing the distribution of market wealth through affordable asset 
accumulation, personal debt relief, and coordinated fiscal-monetary policy. We note that 
promoting sustainable asset ownership, extending wage income tax credits, and developing more 
inclusive social security, subsidised savings, and debt relief programs are particularly important 
for tackling wealth inequality across gender, race, and generations. The chapter concludes with an 
appeal for a proactive government policy to foster shared values of social justice in the society to 
achieve a sustainable reduction in wealth and income inequality in the USA and at the global level. 




The finance-inequality nexus 
In this chapter, we document the rise of income and wealth inequality in the USA, using the U.S. 
Survey of Consumer Finances between 1989-2013. We link the observed patterns of inequality 
with the account of changes in the nature of financial sector operations occurring in the USA since 
the 1980s. We develop the original theoretical framework of the thesis, which argues that financial 
sector transformation has influenced inequality in the USA by shaping differences in wealth 
accumulation possibilities and balance sheet fragility across households. This research hypothesis 
is illustrated by examining changes in the ownership and value of various components of income, 
assets, and debt. We show that wealth and income inequality across households was associated 
with differences in wealth composition, which generated unequal income flows depending on the 
absolute size of wealth holdings. This is because asset portfolios of households in the top of the 
income distribution consisted primarily of high-yielding assets and secured debt, while households 
towards the middle and the bottom of the distribution became reliant on leveraged 
homeownership, low-yielding assets, and unsecured debt. Consequently, they enjoyed lower 
increases in capital income and suffered from greater relative indebtedness driven by unsustainable 
accumulation of housing before the Great Recession compared to the rich. We observe that this 
had a clear social dimension, as wealth disparities deepened across gender, race, and generations. 
We conclude that wealth heterogeneity is an important determinant of inequality in times of 
financial sector transformation, arguing that analyses which do not explicitly consider wealth 
distribution cannot fully explain the rise in income and wealth inequality in the USA since the 
1980s. 
1.1. Trends in inequality in the USA since the 1980 
Measurement of inequality is a complex task and can be considered along a variety of dimensions, 
e.g. economic (measured in monetary terms) vs. social (e.g. access to healthcare), personal (among 
individuals/households) vs. functional (between factors of production, i.e. labour and capital). 
Inequality can be broadly understood as a deviation from some definition of equality, such as the 
difference between several quantitative magnitudes (cf. Cowell 2009). However, the ideas of the 
precise nature of (in)equality depend on the ideological and the social context of investigation. In 
this thesis we focus on the monetary aspect of inequality, measured in terms of the differences in 
income and wealth across households. We appreciate that monetary inequality carries a range of 
social implications. For this reason, we examine disparities in income and wealth across the 
dimensions of class, gender, race, and generations. In doing so, we aim to observe if the analysed 
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differences are larger in some of these dimensions than in others, and whether there are any 
common trends in inequality across these dimensions. We distinguish between income and wealth 
in order to precisely analyse what factors are responsible for the observed differences in monetary 
inequality in each of these dimensions.  
Analysis of the data from the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances reveals that income and 
wealth inequality in the USA increased between 1989 and 2013. The survey is conducted at the 
household level every three years and its methodological features are explained in more detailed at 
the beginning of Chapter 4. Income is reported before transfers and taxes, measured for the 
calendar year prior to the survey wave, while wealth is measured at the time of the interview as the 
difference between assets and liabilities (net worth). In the discussion below we use multiple 
inequality indicators in order to provide the most comprehensive picture of the trends in inequality 
over time. Firstly, we report changes in the distribution of income and wealth, analysing overall 
inequality indices
5
, distributional rankings using the generalised Lorenz curve
6
, and shares of 
income, assets, and debt held by various households
7
. Explicit attention is paid to measurement 
differences between income and wealth, as many of the conventional indicators of income 
inequality cannot encompass the negative and zero values often encountered in the measurement 
of net worth. Secondly, we present the corresponding changes in inequality of the various types of 
income sources, assets, and debt, in order to understand the distribution of the individual 
components of income and wealth over time. 
1.1.1. Measures of inequality 
Overall inequality indices are commonly used in the literature to summarise the distribution of 
income or wealth in a single easily comparable indicator. Below, we report the Gini coefficient, 
the Atkinson index, and half of the squared coefficient of variation. The advantage of using several 
indicators is that each of the overall inequality indices gives a distinct insight into changes at 
different points of the distribution
8
.  
The Gini index is the most sensitive to transfers between households in the middle of the 
distribution. It is based on the Lorenz curve, which represents the proportion of the variable in 
question (e.g. income) held by a cumulative share of the population ranked from the poorest to the 
                                                   
5
 The analysis was conducted using STATA module ineqdeco for income and ineqdec0 for net wealth 
developed by Jenkins (1999). 
6
 The analysis was conducted using STATA module svylorenz developed by Jenkins (2005) for income 
and manually by calculating mean of net worth across deciles for wealth. 
7
 The analysis was performed using STATA module pshare developed by Jann (2016). 
8
 Detailed equations for calculating each of these measures are included in Chapter 3, subsection 3.3.6. 
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richest (also called the Pen’s Parade; cf. Cowell 2009:25-26). The Gini coefficient measures the 
distance between the Lorenz curve and the 45-degree line of perfect equality, where each 
population share is assumed to receive a symmetrical proportion of the overall income or wealth. 
The Gini index can be thus understood as the average difference between all possible pairs of 
income or wealth in the population expressed as a share of the total (ibid.). It ranges from 0 
(perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality). The Gini index satisfies a range of desirable properties 
such as mean independence (inequality measured by the index would not change if all incomes 
were multiplied by the same constant), independence from the population size, symmetry 
(swapping incomes among population members would not change inequality), and the Pigou-
Dalton transfer rule (transfer of income from the rich to the poor reduces inequality). Importantly, 
the Gini coefficient is well-defined when negative values are present, as in the distribution of 
wealth. Nevertheless, in the presence of negative observations the index may take unusually large 
values or even exceed 1 (Jenkins/Jäntii 2005:16). A further drawback of the Gini index is that it is 
not easily decomposable (the total population Gini is not equal to the Gini coefficients of 
population subgroups) and its sensitivity to transfers in the middle of the distribution may not 
provide an accurate picture of inequality if the latter is driven by changes at either the top or the 
bottom of the distribution. 
An alternative overall inequality indicator is provided by Atkinson (1970). The Atkinson 
index constitutes a welfare-based measure of inequality, which is associated with the sensitivity 
parameter ε, typically taking values ε [0.5, 1, 2, 2.5]. The index ranges from 0 (equal 
distribution) to 1, and represents the proportion of total income which the society would have to 
forgo to achieve a more equal distribution. The higher the value of ε, the greater the sensitivity of 
the index to transfers at the bottom of the distribution and the greater the aversion to inequality in 
the society (Afonso et al. 2015). Consequently, in the analysis below we report the Atkinson index 
with ε=2. The index satisfies the principles of mean and population independence, symmetry, and 
the Pigou-Dalton transfers, and is also decomposable. However, its analytical usefulness is limited 
to income, as the index cannot account for zero or negative values, which are often associated with 
wealth (Wittenberg/Leibbrandt 2017). 
Finally, the overall inequality measure capturing the importance of transfers at the top of the 
distribution can be identified with the half of the coefficient of variation squared. This measure is 
derived from the coefficient of variation, which represents the standardised variance of the 
variable in question and is calculated by dividing the standard deviation of the variable by its 
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mean, thus satisfying the mean independence criterion
9
 (Brewer/Wren-Lewis 2016:293). Hence, 
half of the coefficient of variation squared represents the dispersion of a variable around its 
mean
10
, scaled by two for the convenience of presentation. The coefficient ranges from 0 to ∞, 
with higher values corresponding to higher inequality (World Bank 2005:99). The indicator comes 
from a family of the generalised entropy measures of inequality, which, similarly to the Atkinson 
index, are characterised by the sensitivity parameter !, typically taking values ! [-1, 0, 1, 2]. The 
higher the value of !, the greater the sensitivity of the measure to changes at the top of the 
distribution. Half of the coefficient of variation squared corresponds to the generalised entropy 
indicator with ! . The measure satisfies the above desirable properties of inequality 
measurement, and in addition it is fully decomposable and can handle negative values of wealth. 
However, its disadvantage is that it can be sensitive to very high values of the variable in question 
(Jenkins/Jäntti 2005:16). This, coupled with the lack of the upper bound of the measure, may 
render comparisons using half of the coefficient of variation squared more difficult. 
1.1.2. Changes in income and wealth inequality in the USA since the 1980s 
Figure 1.1 presents the evolution of the Gini coefficients for income and wealth between 1989 and 
2013. The data show that not only has wealth inequality been persistently higher than income 
inequality but it has also increased more rapidly over time, particularly after the Great Recession.  
The Gini index for income increased from 0.54 to 0.574 over the whole period, rising by 
6.3% between 1989 and 2007. The Gini index for wealth rose from 0.79 in 1989 to 0.85 in 2013. 
The trends in income and wealth inequality were dramatically different during the Great 
Recession. While the Gini index for income fell from 0.574 to 0.549 between 2007 and 2010, the 





                                                   
9
 This standardisation is necessary as variance itself does not satisfy the mean independence criterion – 
doubling all incomes would in fact quadruple the variance, which follows from the formula: 






 This comes from the statistical properties of the standard deviation and variance. The coefficient of 
variation CV is equal to: /0 = 1(2)
2
, where "(x) is the standard deviation of variable x and 3 is its mean. 
Thus, the squared coefficient of variation can be expressed as: /0# =
45(6)
65
, which corresponds to the 
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Figure 1.1 Change in the Gini index of before-tax income and net worth, USA 1989-2013 (source: 
U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances) 
 
Figure 1.2 compares the evolution of the Gini coefficient, the Atkinson index, and half of 
the coefficient of variation squared for income and wealth. In terms of income, trends among these 
indicators were the most disparate between 1989 and 2001. In this period, the Atkinson index 
experienced the highest rise from 0.666 in 1989 to 0.741 in 2001, mirrored by a less substantial 
increase in the Gini coefficient from 0.54 to 0.56. In contrast, half of the coefficient of variation 
squared fell over this period, from 8.7 in 1989 to 5.6 in 2001. This suggests that from the late 
1980s to the early 2000s, inequality at the bottom of the distribution widened, while inequality at 
the top declined. This picture changed in the run up to the Great Recession. As the Atkinson index 
fell to 0.67 in 2007, both the Gini index and half of the coefficient of variation squared increased 
to 0.574 and 9.31 respectively, indicating the growing importance of income disparities at the top 
for the overall changes in inequality. After the 2007 crisis, all measures experienced a similar 
trajectory, decreasing in 2010 and rising in 2013. 
In terms of wealth, we only compare changes in the Gini index and half of the coefficient of 
variation squared due to the aforementioned problems with accounting for zero and negative 
values associated with the Atkinson index. As in the case of income, the trends for wealth were the 
most disparate between 1989 and 2001. In this period, half of the coefficient of variation squared 
experienced an overall decline from 15.2 to 13.8 as the Gini index increased from 0.79 to 0.805. 
This indicates that in the 1990s wealth inequality at the top of the distribution decreased. However, 
both indicators increased between 2001 and 2013, although the Gini coefficient experienced the 
fastest increase after the crisis, between 2007 and 2010, compared to a more steady increase in half 
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Figure 1.2 Comparison of inequality indices for income and net worth, USA 1989-2013 (source: 
U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances) 
 
Overall, this analysis reveals that changes in income and wealth inequality were not uniform 
across the distribution between 1989 and 2013. Consequently, it is necessary to undertake a more 
detailed examination of income and wealth ownership across households in our sample in order to 
understand how inequality has changed in the period. For this reason, we examine the 
distributional rankings for income and wealth using the generalised Lorenz curve analysis
11
. The 
generalised Lorenz curve performs a similar task to the ordinary Lorenz curve described above, 
i.e. it ranks population from the poorest to the richest and assigns income or wealth to each 
cumulative population share. However, in the case of the generalised Lorenz curve, the mean 
income or wealth rather than its share is displayed on the vertical axis. Consequently, it allows for 
a direct comparison of the Lorenz curves with different means of incomes or wealth (Shorrocks 
1983; Thistle 1989). We are thus able to rank the distributions over time, evaluating whether they 
became unambiguously more or less equal. This is the case only when the generalised Lorenz 
curves do not intersect. If one curve lies below the other at all cumulative population shares, that 
                                                   
11
 Lorenz dominance is part of the broader literature on social welfare evaluations, which aims to 
compare distributions of uncertain prospects based on the social welfare functions (Yitzhaki 1982). 
The literature was initiated by Atkinson’s (1970) theorem of Lorenz dominance, which states that out 
of two distributions with equal means, one distribution is preferred to another by all additive and 
concave social welfare functions if its Lorenz curve lies entirely above the Lorenz curve of the second 
distribution (Thistle 1989:1). This theorem was extended to distributions with different means using 
the generalised Lorenz curves by Shorrocks (1982) and Kakwani (1984), and to S-concave social 
welfare functions by Dasgupta et al. (1973) and Rothschild/Stiglitz (1973). The stochastic dominance 
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distribution exhibits Lorenz dominance and is unambiguously more unequal (Shorrocks 1983:6). 
The height of the curve represents the level of mean income or wealth, while its convexity 
indicates the degree of inequality (Thistle 1989:1)12. Figure 1.3 presents the generalised Lorenz 
curve for income, and is accompanied by Table 1.1 to precisely rank the distribution of income 
over time. Figure 1.4 and Table 1.2 present the corresponding data for net wealth. Tables A1.1 and 
A1.2 in Appendix I presents decile boundaries for the distributions of income and net worth in the 
period studied. 
Comparison of the generalised Lorenz curves for income across the years confirms that 
income distribution in 2013 was unambiguously more unequal than in 1989. There was an initial 
decline in income inequality in the period – the distribution of income in 1992 was unambiguously 
more equal than in 1989. Since 1992, income inequality was increasing, and the distribution in 
2001 was unambiguously more unequal than in 1992 and 1995. Between 2001 and 2007, the 
individual curves intersect at various points of the distribution and it is thus not possible to 
unambiguously rank the distribution of income in the run up to the crisis. However, the 
distribution of income in 2010 was unambiguously less unequal than in 2007, indicating the fall in 
income inequality immediately after the Great Recession. It is not possible to establish 
unambiguous dominance of the 2013 income distribution due to intersecting curves.  
In terms of wealth, the ranking of its distribution over time is made more difficult by the 
presence of negative values. Specifically, it is estimated that households in the bottom 10% of 
wealth distribution have held negative wealth in the period. For these negative observations, we 
compare their absolute values, so that a higher absolute value indicates increasing inequality. We 
find that net wealth distribution in 2007 was unambiguously more unequal than in 1989. 
Moreover, the distribution of net wealth in 1995 was unambiguously more unequal than in 1992, 
and this is the case for the wealth distributions between 2001 and 1998. However, the ranking is 
ambiguous since 2001. This is primarily because of the increasingly negative net worth of the 
bottom 10% of wealth distribution and the rising wealth of the top decile.  
Furthermore, the generalised Lorenz curve analysis reveals that there is a clear polarisation 
of income and wealth between the top 10% and the bottom 90% of the distribution. This suggests 
that inequality has been driven by the concentration of resources at the top decile, as the rich have 
been pulling away further from the rest. In addition, in the case of wealth, the bottom part of the 
distribution has fared worse over time, accumulating increasingly negative wealth. In fact, the 
                                                   
12
 This is because convexity of the generalised Lorenz curve indicates its distance from the 45-degree 
line of perfect equality. 
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bottom 30% of the wealth distribution experienced a consistent decline in their mean net wealth in 
every wave since 2001. This shows the disparity of changes in net wealth across the distribution, 
and motivates our further exploration of the trends in wealth composition later in this chapter. 
Given the disparity of trends of income and wealth across the distribution revealed by the 
generalised Lorenz curve analysis, we take a more detailed look at the relative holdings of income 
and wealth across households. Figure 1.5 presents the shares of income, net worth, assets, and debt 
held by percentiles of the respective distributions, corresponding to households in the bottom 60%, 
60th-80th percentile, 80th-90th percentile, 90th-99th percentile, and the top 1%13. 
                                                   
13
 For the ease of discussion, we round the upper percentile boundaries. To be precise, the analysed 

















































Figure 1.3 Generalised Lorenz curve for income, USA 1989-2013 (source: U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances) 
 
 
Table 1.1 Coordinates of the generalised Lorenz curve for income, USA 1989-2013 (source: U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances) 
Cumulative income share 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
0.01 943.5 710.9 600.2 675.0 1,020.6 1,017.2 1,081.1 1,016.8 1,104.1 
0.02 2,454.7 2,403.0 2,189.5 2,508.8 2,666.9 2,712.9 2,989.9 2,883.3 2,754.8 
0.03 4,722.8 4,329.3 4,472.1 4,940.4 5,840.0 5,572.7 5,825.0 5,747.9 5,213.3 
0.04 8,488.5 7,531.9 7,431.1 8,260.6 9,161.2 9,222.6 9,579.1 8,854.6 8,640.5 
0.05 12,528.4 11,351.8 12,142.6 12,445.0 13,923.6 13,953.9 14,086.9 13,263.4 12,660.4 
0.06 17,263.4 16,142.6 16,642.5 18,098.3 20,326.4 19,883.1 20,102.4 18,947.9 17,950.8 
0.07 23,584.4 22,444.7 22,742.9 25,104.1 27,205.5 27,292.5 27,363.7 25,615.8 24,594.4 
0.08 32,341.5 30,625.8 30,964.1 33,334.2 37,546.9 37,023.9 36,965.6 34,566.3 33,617.0 
0.09 42,762.8 40,720.8 41,253.8 44,907.1 49,776.6 50,092.2 50,113.0 46,898.6 45,982.6 






















































Figure 1.4 Generalised Lorenz curve for net worth, USA 1989-2013 (source: U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances)	
 
Table 1.2 Coordinates of the generalised Lorenz curve for net worth, USA 1989-2013 (source: U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances) 
Cumulative income share 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
0.01 -7,146.4 -8,818.5 -9,737.2 -14,338.7 -9,936.0 -13,783.7 -15,389.4 -37,148.1 -36,736.2 
0.02 1,420.0 2,201.2 3,580.9 2,672.9 3,797.3 3,703.4 3,588.6 1,307.5 1,086.4 
0.03 10,461.0 12,412.3 15,391.2 14,722.7 18,054.0 16,859.7 17,003.9 9,355.1 8,952.8 
0.04 31,744.2 32,614.5 36,991.5 40,077.6 46,026.0 45,881.8 49,906.2 27,975.1 25,204.7 
0.05 65,644.0 62,775.3 69,426.4 78,825.3 88,294.9 88,592.1 102,148.1 61,437.3 58,724.8 
0.06 111,551.3 102,660.2 108,432.4 129,292.3 145,948.9 152,723.9 176,216.5 112,946.6 111,438.5 
0.07 174,998.1 158,721.1 160,653.3 195,698.3 235,870.8 243,140.8 275,722.5 194,621.6 193,469.3 
0.08 270,821.1 242,122.0 243,602.3 305,695.5 382,750.8 409,362.4 427,295.2 332,667.2 323,904.0 
0.09 465,412.9 398,930.2 409,003.5 521,160.2 676,239.8 745,980.3 750,211.1 654,141.5 634,822.3 
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Panel A of Figure 1.5 shows the proportion of income held by each of the above 
distributional percentiles. In the whole period, the share of income held by households in the 
bottom 60% of the income distribution fell from 22.8% in 1989 to 20.6% in 2013
14
. Similarly, the 
share of income held by households between the 60th and 80th percentile declined from nearly 20% 
in 1989 to 18.1% 2013, while the income share of households in the 80th-90th percentile remained 
approximately constant, decreasing from 14.9% in 1989 to 14.4% in 2013. In contrast, the income 
share of households in the top decile of the income distribution increased in the period. 
Households between the 90th and 99th percentile held 25.4% of income in 1989, which rose to 
27.2% in 2013, while the income share of households in the top 1% increased from 17% to 19.7% 
in the period. 1992 marks the year when the income share of the top 1% was the lowest at 11.7% 
and the remaining household groups took a higher share of income than in 1989. Moreover, the top 
1% income share declined between 2007 and 2010, as the share of each income group in the 
bottom 99% increased. Nevertheless, this was reversed by 2013 as the top 1% share of income 
increased, which corresponds to changes in the Gini coefficient for income after the Great 
Recession.  
Panel B of Figure 1.5 presents the share of net wealth held by the households at different 
points of the wealth distribution. As indicated by the above analysis of the overall inequality 
indices and the generalised Lorenz curves, wealth is more concentrated at the top of the 
distribution than income. Bottom 60% held only 10% of net wealth in 1989, which declined to just 
7.6% in 2013. Similarly, the share of net wealth accruing to households in the 60th-80th and the 
80th-90th percentile fell from 14.7% and 14.1% to 11.9% and 12.7% respectively. In contrast, the 
share of net wealth held by households in the top decile increased in the period. Households in the 
90th-99th percentile owned 34.8% of total net wealth in 1989, rising to 36.9% in 2013, while the 
wealth share of households in the top 1% increased from 26.4% to 30.9% between 1989 and 2013. 
Notably, these trends have been consistent throughout the period, and, unlike in the case of 
income, continued after the Great Recession. This was driven by the increasing share of net wealth 
held by the top decile with a simultaneous decline in the net wealth share of the bottom 60%. 
Breaking down the relative share of net wealth held by each percentile group by its 
components, we observe that the declining share of the bottom 90% of the wealth distribution has 
been associated with growing indebtedness. The shares of total assets and debt holdings depicted 
in panels C and D of Figure 1.5 respectively show that while the bottom 90% collectively held 
                                                   
14
 Note that the decline concerns relative holdings of income by this group and not the absolute size, as 
both the mean and the median income have increased over time across the distribution, albeit to a 
varying extent (see the beginning of section 1.3).  
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only ca. 40% of all assets in 1989, they owned nearly 55% of all debt that year. The share of total 
debt held by the bottom 90% peaked at an average of 58% in 1998-2004 before the Great 
Recession, declining slightly to 57% in 2013, while their share of assets continued to fall 
throughout the years despite a slight increase between 1992-1995, declining to 32% in 2013. In 
contrast, households in the top decile took an increasing share of assets over time, rising from 
34.8% to 36.9% for households in the 90th-99th percentile and from 26.4% to 30.9% for the top 
1%. Simultaneously, the share of total debt held by households in the 90th-99th percentile declined 
in the period from 33.7% to 30.1% in 2004 before the Great Recession, rising to 32.3% in 2013. 
The share of total debt owned by households in the top 1% fell between 1989 and 2001 from 
11.6% to 10.9%, but it increased to around 12% in 2004 and 2010 respectively. In 2013, the top 
1% share of total debt declined back to 11.2%, resulting in an overall decrease between 1989-
2013.  
Figure 1.5 Percentile shares of income, net worth, assets, and debt, USA 1989-2013 (source: 
U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances)  
The analysis of the percentile shares of income, net worth, and wealth components reveals 
large asymmetries across the distribution, with resources concentrating over time among 
households in the top decile, particularly the top 1%. The exploration of changes in the relative 







A. Percentile share of income






















D. Percentile share of debt
21     ––– Chapter 1 ––– 
 
important consequences for the overall observed trends in inequality. Consequently, in order to 
understand the impact of wealth composition and its associated income flows on inequality, in the 
following section we analyse the distribution of the various components of income and wealth 
available in the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances between 1989-2013. 
Before proceeding to the analysis of inequality in the components of income and wealth, we 
report findings regarding changes in the relative wealth holdings across the distribution which are 
established by earlier studies using data from sources other than household surveys. This is 
because household survey data tends to exclude the richest individuals, who may be more reluctant 
to provide sensitive information on their finances
15
. Exclusion of these individuals may lead to 
underestimation of the true degree of wealth inequality in society. Hence, by reporting the existing 
findings of the trends in wealth distribution which account for the richest individuals, we are able 
to provide a more robust insight into changes in wealth inequality since the 1980s. An alternative 
source to collecting wealth data directly through surveys is inference of wealth from tax returns 
through the so-called income capitalisation method (Kennickell 2001; Kopczuk/Saez 2004). The 
main disadvantage of this approach is that tax returns data are not readily available, require 
approval of the relevant government institutions, and often exclude other information on 
household characteristics for confidentiality reasons. Saez/Zucman (2016) combine information 
from the National Accounts Flow of Funds and the income tax returns data in the USA to estimate 
the dynamics of wealth distribution since 1913 accounting for underreporting among the richest. 
They report disparate wealth dynamics for the bottom and the top percentiles. The former 
experienced an inverted-U-shaped evolution of their wealth share, with a peak in the mid-1980s 
due to gains from pension and housing wealth, and a substantial decrease since due to 
indebtedness. In contrast, the total wealth share of the top percentiles followed a U-shaped pattern 
and rose particularly high since the 1980s owing to the dynamic growth of the top incomes and 
rising saving rates (Saez/Zucman 2016:36-37). The increase in the wealth share of the top 10% 
and the top 1% was driven primarily by the rise in wealth owned by the top 0.1%, from 7% in the 
late 1970s to 22% in 2012 (ibid.:1). Moreover, the top 0.1% accounted for the largest part of 
wealth accumulation with average real growth rate of wealth in 1986-2012 of 5% compared to 2% 
for all households. These results are consistent with our analysis of wealth, although they provide 
a longer timeframe and a more accurate insight into the wealth of the richest. 
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 This is explained in more detail in section 4.1. of Chapter 4, with application to the U.S. Survey of 
Consumer Finances. 
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1.1.3. Changes in the inequality of income and wealth components 
In this subsection, we undertake a detailed analysis of changes in inequality of the various 
components of income and wealth in order to understand their role in shaping the overall trends in 
inequality observed between 1989 and 2013. In the dataset, income is composed of wages (i.e. 
income from employment), capital income (i.e. self-employment, business, and farm ownership 
income; taxable and non-taxable interest and dividend payments; social security income and 
withdrawals from retirement accounts excluding defined benefit plans; and realised capital gains 
or losses16), as well as income flowing from transfers and other sources (such as unemployment 
benefits, food stamps, child support, alimony payments, and other miscellaneous sources).  
In terms of wealth, we distinguish between non-financial and financial assets. Non-financial 
assets consist of housing (the market value of primary residence as well as other residential and 
non-residential real estate), net equity in privately held business, as well as vehicles, consumer 
durables, and other non-financial assets. Financial assets include transaction accounts, which are 
also called liquid assets (i.e. call, checking, and saving accounts; money market deposit accounts; 
and money market mutual funds), high-yielding financial investment assets (i.e. certificates of 
deposits; savings bonds; bonds; stocks; other managed assets; pooled investment funds, i.e. non-
money market mutual funds; and other), as well as the value of retirement accounts (such as the 
Individual Retirement Accounts, Keogh accounts, 401(k), and other) and the cash value of life 
insurance plans. Liabilities consist of the amount outstanding on mortgages and home equity lines 
of credit secured by primary residence and other property, as well as unsecured debt, such as 
instalment loans (including vehicle, student, and consumer loans), credit card balances, other 
unsecured lines of credit, as well as other miscellaneous forms of debt (e.g. debt to family 
members, borrowing against insurance policies or pension accounts, margin debt, etc.). 
Table 1.3 shows changes in the Gini coefficients
17
 for the various sources of income over 
time. Out of the aforementioned types of income, social security and retirement income and wages 
                                                   
16
 Note that the dataset does not distinguish between the different types of capital gains income 
dependent on the changes in the specific asset values. 
17
 For the purpose of clarity, in the following analysis we report only the Gini coefficients. However, 
trends in the Atkinson index and half of the coefficient of variation squared for these variables are 
consistent with the Gini coefficient, with the exception of half of the coefficient of variation squared 
for business income (which declined over the period in contrast to the rising Gini index), vehicles and 
other non-financial assets and debt (in both instances half of the coefficient of variation squared 
increased, compared to the fall in the Gini index). The additional reason for not reporting these 
indicators is their sensitivity to extreme values, which are particularly likely in the presence of negative 
and zero observations encountered in measurement of the different types of capital income, assets, and 
debt in the data (see subsection 1.1.1. above). 
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are the least unequally distributed, while the distribution of business income, interest and dividend 
payments, and capital gains is the most unequal. Like total income, the Gini coefficient for all of 
these sources increased over time. The Gini coefficient for social security and retirement income 
rose from 0.427 to 0.468 between 1989 and 2013, declining in the Great Recession. Similarly, the 
Gini index for wages increased from 0.461 in 1989 to 0.52 in 2013. However, unlike income, 
wage inequality continued to increase after the Great Recession, rising from 0.504 to 0.521 
between 2007 and 2010. The Gini index for business income rose from 0.768 in 1989 to 0.796 in 
2013, with a decline in the run up to and immediately after the Great Recession. Moreover, 
inequality of the interest and dividend income rose over time from 0.835 in 1989 to 0.893 in 2013, 
continuing to increase after the 2007 crisis. The Gini index for capital gains has been the highest at 
0.864 in 1989, increasing to 0.9 in 2013, with a decline between 2007 and 2010. Lastly, the Gini 
coefficient for transfer income has been higher than for income as a whole, although in contrast to 
other sources it declined over time from 0.696 in 1989 to 0.567 in 2010, rising to 0.656 in 2013. 
Figure 1.6 shows changes in the Gini coefficients for assets and debt, estimated for all 
households in the sample as well as for asset and debt holders only. The reason for reporting both 
magnitudes is that not as many households in the sample own debt as assets
18
. Consequently, the 
large number of zero observations may inflate the Gini index for debt. Indeed, in Figure 1.6 the 
Gini coefficient for debt for holders is lower than that indicator for all households, although the 
trends of both measures are consistent over time. Since the Gini index of assets for holders among 
all households are similar in magnitude and converge over time, we describe trends in the Gini 
coefficient for asset and debt holders only. 
Table 1.3 Gini indices by the type of income, USA 1989-2013 (source: U.S. Survey of Consumer 
Finances) 















1989 0.461 0.768 0.835 0.864 0.427 0.696 
1992 0.459 0.795 0.827 0.820 0.422 0.860 
1995 0.464 0.807 0.880 0.825 0.444 0.625 
1998 0.456 0.795 0.846 0.847 0.422 0.651 
2001 0.496 0.777 0.837 0.905 0.420 0.645 
2004 0.488 0.770 0.866 0.877 0.460 0.569 
2007 0.504 0.766 0.874 0.888 0.451 0.582 
2010 0.521 0.760 0.877 0.877 0.431 0.567 
2013 0.520 0.796 0.893 0.900 0.468 0.656 
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 Detailed information on participation rates for assets, debt, and their components is provided below 
in the description of household balance sheet evolution in section 1.3. of this chapter. 
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Figure 1.6 Gini indices for asset and debt holdings, USA 1989-2013 (source: U.S. Survey of 
Consumer Finances) 
Analysis of the Gini coefficients suggests that assets are more unequally distributed than 
debt. This suggest that households at the top of the distribution own relatively more assets than 
they owe in debt and thus suffer from smaller leverage problems than households towards the 
bottom of the distribution. Moreover, the Gini indices of both variables exhibit disparate trends 
over time. The Gini coefficient for assets increased from 0.734 in 1989 to 0.781 in 2013, after an 
initial decline to 0.724 in 1995. In contrast, the Gini index for debt fell from 0.646 to 0.627 in the 
same period, with the lowest value of 0.615 in 1998 and 2001, and an increase since 2004. Overall, 
the fall in the Gini coefficient for debt over time is worrying as it indicates that households at the 
bottom of the distribution accumulated debt levels which were increasingly similar to those among 
households at the top of the distribution. 
In order to understand which types of assets and debt may be driving these trends in the 
overall inequality of asset and debt holdings over time, Table 1.4 presents changes in the Gini 
coefficients for the various types of assets and liabilities between 1989 and 2013. Among assets, 
the distribution of vehicles, consumer durables, and other non-financial assets, as well as primary 
residence was the least unequal in this period, while business equity, other real estate, and 
financial investment assets were the most unequally distributed. Inequality of the majority of 
assets increased in the period studied, apart from vehicles, other real estate, and retirement and 
insurance assets, and all these trends continued throughout the Great Recession. The Gini 
coefficient for primary residence increased from 0.65 in 1989 to 0.668 in 2013, with an initial 
decline to 0.613 in 1995. The Gini index for vehicles, durables, and other non-financial assets 
decreased from 0.642 to 0.603 in the same period. Similarly, the Gini coefficient for other real 
estate fell from 0.976 in 1989 to 0.953 in 2013. In contrast, inequality in business equity holdings 
increased slightly in the period from 0.975 in 1989 to 0.985 in 2013. Similarly, the Gini index of 
financial investment assets rose from 0.92 to 0.958 between 1989 and 2013, which constitutes the 







1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
Assets (all HHs) Debt (all HHs)
Assets (holders) Debt (holders)
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transaction accounts rose from 0.847 in 1989 to 0.872 in 2010, falling to 0.867 in 2013. Lastly, the 
Gini index for retirement and insurance assets declined from 0.861 in 1989 to 0.859 in 2013, with 
the lowest value of 0.836 in 2001. 
Among liabilities, debt secured by primary residence, instalment debt, and credit card 
balances were the least unequally distributed between 1989-2013, while the Gini coefficients of 
debt secured by other real estate, other unsecured lines of credit, and other debt were the highest. 
The latter does not necessarily signify high inequality of these holdings per se, but rather reflects 
large number of zero observations associated with the fact that few households hold these types of 
debt
19
. This assertion is further supported by the fact that these Gini coefficients exhibit little, 
almost near-zero change over time. The Gini coefficient for debt secured by other real estate rose 
from 0.967 in 1989 to 0.97 in 2013, with a peak of 0.98 in 2004. The Gini index for other 
unsecured lines of credit remained approximately constant at 0.997 in the period, while the index 
for other debt declined from 0.982 in 1989 to 0.98 in 2013. In contrast, the Gini coefficient for 
credit card debt increased from 0.79 in 1989 to 0.827 in 2010 and 2013. Similarly, the Gini index 
for instalment debt rose from 0.712 to 0.752 between 1989 and 2010, declining to 0.734 in 2013. 
The largest change over time occurred for the Gini index of mortgages secured by main residence, 
declining from 0.732 to 0.657 between 1989 and 2004 before the crisis, and increasing to 0.689 in 
2013. This suggests that households towards the bottom of the distribution held an increasingly 
greater share of this type of mortgages over time. 























1989 0.650 0.976 0.642 0.975 0.847 0.920 0.861 
1992 0.635 0.953 0.609 0.976 0.834 0.921 0.855 
1995 0.613 0.951 0.609 0.984 0.856 0.934 0.846 
1998 0.617 0.947 0.614 0.983 0.824 0.927 0.838 
2001 0.633 0.956 0.593 0.979 0.824 0.930 0.836 
2004 0.641 0.954 0.622 0.982 0.849 0.936 0.847 
2007 0.642 0.949 0.605 0.983 0.841 0.943 0.842 
2010 0.650 0.951 0.600 0.982 0.872 0.951 0.857 
2013 0.668 0.953 0.603 0.985 0.867 0.958 0.859 
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 See the methodological explanation of the Gini coefficient in presence of zero or negative values in 
subsection 1.1.1. above. 
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(Table 1.4 continued)    Debt 
 
Furthermore, in order to understand how these different types of income and wealth are 
concentrated across the distribution, Table 1.5 reports shares of the above income sources and 
assets held by households in the top 10%. The top decile is broken down into the 90th-99th 
percentile and the top 1%. Among income sources, the top 10% has held the highest share of 
business income, capital gains, interest and dividend payments, and transfer income, while their 
share of wages and social security income has been relatively the lowest. However, the wage share 
of the top decile increased between 1989 and 2013, as did the share of capital gains and interest 
and dividend payments. In contrast, the top 10% share of transfer income, business income, and 
social security and retirement income declined in this period.  
The top 10% share of wages increased from 39.9% in 1989 to 46.3% in 2013. Importantly, 
this increase was driven by the top 1%, whose share of employment income rose from 10.8% to 
15.2% in this period. During the 2007 crisis the wage share received by the top 10% of households 
declined slightly, but this seems to have been redistributed within the top parts of the population. 
This is suggested by the observed increase in the wage share of households in the 90th-99th 
percentile from 28.6% to 30.8% between 2007 and 2010, as the top 1% share of wages fell from 
15.9% to 15.7%. 
In terms of capital income, the top 10% share of interest and dividend income increased 
from 88.7% to 99.1% between 1989 and 2013, and the trend continued throughout the Great 
Recession. As in the case of wages, this was driven by an increase in the share of the top 1% from 
45.5% to 67.9%, while the share of the 90th-99th percentile declined from 43.2% to 31.1%. Similar 
trends can be observed for capital gains income. Due to the presence of negative values across the 
distribution, the share of capital gains earned by the top 10% exceeded 100%, increasing from 
103.7% to 105.9% between 1989 and 2013. However, this was concentrated among households in 
the top 1% whose share rose from 86% to 96.3%, while the share of the 90th-99th percentile fell 















1989 0.732 0.967 0.712 0.790 0.995 0.982 
1992 0.723 0.971 0.733 0.777 0.994 0.975 
1995 0.703 0.976 0.724 0.755 0.994 0.982 
1998 0.677 0.971 0.748 0.790 0.992 0.983 
2001 0.681 0.975 0.728 0.789 0.996 0.984 
2004 0.657 0.980 0.734 0.782 0.997 0.980 
2007 0.667 0.969 0.734 0.799 0.996 0.978 
2010 0.672 0.970 0.752 0.827 0.996 0.979 
2013 0.689 0.970 0.734 0.827 0.995 0.980 
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62.5% to 64.7% while the share of percentile 90th-99th declined from 41.9% to 34.9%, leading to 
an overall decrease in the top 10% share of business income from 104.4% in 1989 to 99.6% in 
2013. Moreover, while the share of retirement and social security income of the top decile 
declined in the period from 63.4% to 60.6%, the top 1% increased their share from 15.1% to 
15.6%, while the portion accruing to households in the 90th-99th percentile fell from 48.2% to 45%. 
An opposite trend was experienced by the top decile share of transfer and other income, which 
declined from 88.9% in 1989 to 81.7% in 2013. However, this was distributed within the top 
decile as the decrease in the share of transfer income held by the top 1% from 49% to 40.8% was 
accompanied by a rise in the share of the 90th-99th percentile from 39.9% in 1989 to 54.5% in 
2007, reaching 40.9% in 2013.  
In terms of asset ownership, the top decile has held the highest share of business equity, 
financial investment assets, and other real estate, followed by transaction accounts and retirement 
accounts, with relatively lower shares of primary residence, and vehicles and other non-financial 
assets. The top 10% share of financial investment assets experienced the fastest increase between 
1989 and 2013, rising from 87.1% to 95.6%. This was driven by gains of the top 1% whose share 
increased from 45.6% to 58% in the period, compared to the decline of the relative holdings of 
households in the 90th-99th percentile from 42.2% to 37.6%. A comparable increase was observed 
for the top 10% share of primary residence holdings, which rose from 44% in 1989 to 47.9% in 
2013. Once again, the top 1% experienced the fastest increase in its share from 10.8% to 14.1%, 
compared to a modest rise in the share of households in the 90th-99th percentile from 33.1% to 
33.8% (which was preceded by a decline to approximately 31.8% before the 2007 crisis). A 
smaller increase from 76.5% to 78.9% was observed for the top 10% share of transaction accounts, 
although this was led by an increase in the top 1% share from 39.9% to 43.8% between 1989-
2013, as the portion of holdings accruing to households in the 90th-99th percentile declined by 
10.6%.  Similarly, while the top decile’s share of business equity remained approximately constant 
at 99.9% over the period, the relative holdings of the top 1% rose from 64.1% to 76.7%, while the 
90th-99th share declined from 35.8% to 23.3%.  
In contrast, while the overall top 10% share of other property increased from 94.8% to 
96.4% between 1989 and 2013, the top 1% reduced their share from 51% in 1989 to 48.8% in 
2013, as households in the 90th-99th percentile claimed an increasing portion of holdings rising 
from 43.8% to 47.7%. Similarly, in the case of retirement and insurance assets the share of 
households in the 90th-99th percentile expanded from 45.8% to 46.6%, while the top 1% share 
declined from 30% to 28.2%, resulting in an overall decrease of the top decile share from 75.9% to 
74.8%. Finally, the only asset whose relative holdings saw a uniform decline among the top decile 
was vehicles and other non-financial assets, falling from 50% in 1989 to 46.3% in 2013. 




Overall, the analysis of the overall inequality measures and the top shares of income, wealth, and 
their components reveals that capital income and assets are more unequally distributed than wages 
and debt. However, examining changes in these indicators over time we observe that wage 
inequality increased between 1989 and 2013. Moreover, the ownership of assets tended to 
concentrate at the very top of the distribution among the top 1%. Lower and decreasing inequality 
of debt, particularly mortgages secured by main residence, is especially troubling given the 
increase in asset inequality over time, revealing leverage problems for households towards the 
bottom of the distribution. In the section below, we argue that these trends in wage, asset, and debt 
inequality (driven by mortgages) have not been accidental, but constituted a direct outcome of 

















      
 





Percentile 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
Percentage change 
1989-2013 
Wages           
90-99 29.17 29.22 28.44 27.74 27.28 28.32 28.56 30.77 31.06 12.54 
99-100 10.80 10.67 12.06 11.35 15.48 13.71 15.91 15.69 15.22 40.95 
Sum 39.96 39.89 40.50 39.10 42.76 42.02 44.47 46.46 46.27 15.79 
           
Business income           
90-99 41.91 40.54 35.49 36.46 37.78 39.98 40.73 42.65 34.93 -36.24 
99-100 62.52 62.02 66.74 64.54 64.08 61.53 58.52 57.89 64.65 3.40 
Sum 104.44 102.56 102.23 101.01 101.86 101.51 99.25 100.54 99.58 -4.65 
           
Interest and dividend income          
90-99 43.20 44.32 30.47 40.96 40.84 36.18 35.47 34.11 31.12 -78.78 
99-100 45.45 44.16 63.62 52.26 52.21 60.13 60.84 64.11 67.94 49.47 
Sum 88.65 88.47 94.09 93.22 93.05 96.31 96.30 98.22 99.05 11.73 
           
Capital gains           
90-99 17.74 22.85 19.81 23.68 15.05 14.68 14.77 14.52 9.57 -133.68 
99-100 85.98 92.65 85.29 77.67 90.02 100.11 89.01 156.95 96.29 11.99 
Sum 103.72 115.50 105.10 101.35 105.08 114.80 103.79 171.47 105.86 2.06 
           
Social security and retirement income         
90-99 48.23 48.45 50.00 50.69 48.19 48.15 47.02 47.08 44.96 -14.35 
99-100 15.12 14.90 14.73 14.35 14.66 15.81 16.31 13.81 15.61 3.26 
Sum 63.35 63.35 64.73 65.04 62.85 63.97 63.33 60.89 60.57 -4.39 
           
Transfer and other income          
90-99 39.86 18.18 53.05 48.18 50.68 54.35 54.50 48.16 40.94 6.70 
99-100 49.01 78.09 35.44 45.35 43.44 33.65 31.22 28.06 40.78 -16.79 





















Percentile 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
Percentage change 
1989-2013 
Primary residence           
90-99 33.13 31.25 29.48 30.50 31.79 31.81 31.65 33.26 33.77 2.70 
99-100 10.84 11.26 10.19 11.08 12.50 13.30 13.40 12.96 14.10 30.06 
Sum 43.98 42.51 39.67 41.59 44.28 45.11 45.04 46.22 47.87 8.87 
           
Other real estate           
90-99 43.83 40.61 47.37 45.14 44.08 44.94 49.65 47.45 47.69 12.64 
99-100 50.96 53.66 47.46 48.71 52.51 51.23 45.37 47.91 48.75 -4.34 
Sum 94.79 94.27 94.83 93.85 96.59 96.17 95.01 95.35 96.44 1.74 
           
Business equity          
90-99 35.82 32.14 21.75 24.51 28.56 24.29 23.92 26.05 23.32 -98.08 
99-100 64.05 67.54 78.18 75.40 71.23 75.62 75.98 73.86 76.68 19.71 
Sum 99.87 99.68 99.93 99.91 99.79 99.91 99.90 99.91 99.99 0.13 
           
Vehicles and other non-financial assets         
90-99 27.44 27.90 25.19 27.67 25.78 26.93 26.24 27.07 25.89 -9.93 
99-100 22.67 18.34 20.74 18.59 19.34 20.77 19.99 18.52 20.44 -9.84 
Sum 50.11 46.24 45.93 46.26 45.12 47.70 46.22 45.59 46.33 -7.55 
           
Transaction accounts         
90-99 36.59 40.46 32.71 37.86 36.49 36.83 38.48 38.07 35.19 -10.55 
99-100 39.88 33.70 44.88 35.18 39.45 39.28 37.08 42.59 43.75 9.69 
Sum 76.47 74.16 77.58 73.04 75.94 76.11 75.56 80.66 78.94 3.23 
           
Financial investment assets          
90-99 42.20 41.00 36.32 36.19 37.98 36.56 36.89 38.18 37.61 -32.41 
99-100 45.61 46.55 53.72 51.94 51.26 53.78 55.09 55.73 58.01 27.21 
Sum 87.81 87.56 90.04 88.13 89.24 90.34 91.99 93.91 95.62 8.90 
           
Retirement and insurance assets          
90-99 45.76 46.63 45.34 43.59 46.06 48.27 45.77 49.23 46.61 4.63 
99-100 30.10 27.67 27.80 27.67 25.29 25.03 26.19 25.91 28.17 -6.42 
Sum 75.86 74.30 73.13 71.26 71.34 73.31 71.96 75.14 74.78 -1.42 
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1.2. Financial sector transformation 
In the previous section we showed that income and wealth inequality increased since the 1980s, 
which was driven mainly by the concentration of resources, particularly capital income and assets, 
at the top of the distribution. The increasing wage and asset inequality coupled with the fall in debt 
inequality driven by mortgages suggested a build-up of financial fragility among households 
towards the bottom of the distribution. In this thesis we argue that these changes were explicitly 
determined by the transformation in the nature of financial sector operations in the USA since the 
1980s.  
The role of changes in the operations of the US financial sector in shaping household wealth 
accumulation and stability has been discussed in the recent literature inspired by the 2007 crisis. 
The transformation of financial intermediation (i.e. channelling of funds between lenders and 
borrowers by bank and non-bank intermediaries in a financial system), often described by the 
umbrella term “financialisation”, is an extremely complex process occurring at a variety of 
dimensions. Although the most pronounced in the USA, financial sector transformation has also 
taken place in various aspects and at different points since the 1980s in Europe (cf. Passarella 
Veronese 2013). 
Financialisation finds its roots in the persistently high inflation and high interest rates in the 
late 1960s, which induced many non-financial companies to turn to financial markets in addition 
to banks to fund investment (Krippner 2005)20. This realigned firms’ objectives away from long-
term investment towards short-term profitability, making them more involved in financial 
activities (such as issuing shares), which raised the importance of financial over real profits 
(Fig.1.7) (Palley 2007:18). These changes in corporate behaviour contributed to the growing share 
of the financial, insurance and real estate sector (FIRE) in the economy at the expense of 
manufacturing (Fig.1.8). 
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 In this thesis, we focus exclusively on changes in financial sector operations (primarily the 
development of structured finance and subprime lending) and their impact on the economy occurring 
since the 20
th
 century. However, the processes of financialisation related to the development of credit, 
money, financial instruments, and interest rates have been argued to take place for as many as 5,000 
years (cf. Graeber 2011; Sawyer 2013). Consequently, financialisation is not limited to any particular 
time or place, can take a variety of forms, and at times may also go in reverse (cf. Sawyer 2017). For 
this reason, the preferred term used in this thesis is financial sector transformation, which refers to the 
processes of financial liberalisation and deepening in the USA since the second half of the 20
th
 century. 
Financial deepening refers to increasing provision of financial services, diversity of financial 
instruments, and a greater number of financial institutions (cf. Shaw 1973). 





Figure 1.7 Sectoral shares of domestic corporate profits, USA 1980-2016 (source: National 
Income and Product Accounts) 
 
Figure 1.8  Sectoral shares of national income, USA 1980-2016 (source: National Income and 
Product Accounts) 
 
The processes of financial sector transformation gained steam in the 1980s under policies 
promoting market liberalisation and retrenchment of the state from public service provision 
(Sawyer 2013:13). Firstly, labour market liberalisation and the associated rolling back of the 
minimum wage, unemployment protection, and union-oriented policies resulted in a sluggish wage 
income growth lagging behind productivity increases (Fig.1.9). Simultaneously, provision of 
pensions, housing, and public goods such as education and healthcare was increasingly delegated 
from the state to the private sector. With stagnant wages and diminishing state provision, 
households found themselves in need of additional financing of their living standards through 
borrowing. Consequently, the proportion of credit given to households relative to GDP increased 
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Figure 1.9 Quarterly growth of productivity and employee compensation and labour share in the 
non-farm business sector, USA 1980-2012 (source: Bureau of Labor Statistics) 
 
Figure 1.10 Total credit to non-financial corporations and households and non-profit institutions 
serving households (NPISHs) as a percentage of GDP, USA 1980-2016 (source: Federal Reserve 
Economic Data, St. Louis Fed) 
 
The rising credit demand was paralleled by the massive proliferation of financial 
instruments and the development of structured finance. The aforementioned turn of non-financial 
companies towards financial markets resulting from high borrowing costs in the 1960s and the 
1970s led financial intermediaries to seek additional sources of revenue in the household sector 
and through innovation of new financial products (Dymski 2009:157). An increasing volume of 
financial obligations — primarily mortgages and consumer debt— was transformed into securities 
in a process of securitisation, forming collateralised debt obligations (CDOs). These were issued 
by the Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs), which pooled financial instruments of varying risk and 
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Based on this risk profile, CDOs were divided into tranches, which were classified into different 
degrees of seniority in terms of the payment of interest to their owner and the degree of losses 
incurred. The highest payment priority was assigned to senior tranches, which were rated between 
AAA and A by the credit rating agencies, followed by the mezzanine and junior tranches (rated 
between BBB and B), and equity tranches, which were of the highest risk. The lower the tranche, 
the higher was the amount that needed to be covered by its owner in case of any asset losses 
(Marcantoni 2014:7). 
Paralleling the development of the CDOs, the establishment of credit default swaps (CDS) 
and derivatives on existing products allowed investors to bet against the default of any financial 
instrument, leading to the transformation of the traditional lending relations based on 
intermediation towards an “originate and redistribute" model, where default risk became 
“originated" by creditors and then spread across the financial system through securitisation. The 
actors of this new lending model were not only registered banks, transformed into highly 
consolidated “megabanks” as a result of an intense merger activity, but also non-bank 
intermediaries, which played a role similar to that of formal banks but were outside the central 
bank’s jurisdiction in obtaining liquidity (Pollin/Heintz 2013:115; cf. Pozsar et al. 2010; 
Gorton/Metrick 2013)21,22. This whole process was validated by increasing financial deregulation 
measures such as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 in the USA, which allowed commercial 
banks to engage in financial investment activities. 
The combination of the demand factors (stagnant earnings, privatisation of public services) 
and the supply factors (securitisation, deregulation) led the US households to become more 
involved in the financial market. On the supply side, financial intermediaries were eager to include 
more households in their services partly to compensate for the diminishing deposits from non-
financial firms (banks) and partly to generate more underlying assets for CDOs to keep pace with 
                                                   
21
 From the perspective of the endogenous money theory discussed in Chapter 2, unlike commercial 
banks, non-bank intermediaries, also called shadow banks, do not create money. This is because their 
liabilities cannot be used to pay for goods or services (Michell 2016). While commercial banks are 
involved in ‘initial finance’ by creating new purchasing power through lending, shadow banks can be 
classified as a part of the circuit of ‘final finance’, circulating money created by the commercial banks 
(Fontana/Sawyer 2016, 2017). Instead, liabilities of shadow banks are near-monies, serving as liquid 
short-term stores of wealth rather than the universal means of payment (ibid.; cf. Michell 2016; 
Gabor/Vestergaard 2017). 
22
 The precise definition of shadow banks has been debated based on the types of their institutions (cf. 
Pozsar et al. 2010) or their activities (cf. Lysandrou/Nesvetailova 2015). The Financial Stability Board 
(2017) compiles a “narrow” definition of shadow banking including both dimensions, specifying their 
five economic functions. These include management of volatile collective investment schemes (EF1), 
lending and intermediation of short-term funds (EF2 and EF3), facilitating credit creation (EF4), and 
credit intermediation based on securitisation (EF5). 
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the rapidly growing demand for securitised instruments among financial investors (bank and non-
bank intermediaries) (cf. Goda/Lysandrou 2013). In the process, many non-bank intermediaries 
took advantage of lax financial regulation and engaged in predatory lending practices by offering 
“subprime” mortgages at extremely harsh conditions (high interest rates and penalties) to social 
groups previously excluded from access to credit, such as the young, women, and racial minorities 
(cf. Dymski et al. 2013). Those subprime mortgages formed a lion share of the securitised 
instruments such as the asset-backed securities (ABS) and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) 
demanded by financial investors (Fig.1.11). In result, growth in homeownership rates among 
households at the bottom of the distribution spiked between 1989 and 2004, and fell sharply in the 
aftermath of the Great Recession, which reflected the price bubble in the US housing market 
between the late 1990s and mid-2006 (Fig.1.12). Securitisation and tranching of subprime loans 
and other instruments into CDOs created an unequal hierarchy of monetary claims, giving priority 
to the interests of the senior (and wealthy) financial investors and diminishing the possibilities of 
debt renegotiation and forgiveness in case of financial distress for the low-income borrowers (cf. 
Mian/Sufi 2013).  






























































































Figure 1.12 Expansion of homeownership in the USA, 1980-2016 
 
This unequal hierarchy of financial interests led to a build-up of leverage in the household 
sector, which increased the financial sector’s fragility and induced macroeconomic instability, 
culminating in the Great Recession. In the wake of the 2007 crisis, unsustainable leverage levels of 
the subprime homeowners resulted in a wave of foreclosures, evictions, and bankruptcies for the 
low-income borrowers (cf. Newman/Schafran 2013; Dufour/Orhangazi 2016). Given the gender, 
racial, and generational profiling of the subprime borrowers, the burden of the crisis was spread 
unequally between different race, gender, and age groups (cf. Young 2010). This uneven impact 
continued to affect minorities after the Great Recession. In 2012, the foreclosure rate in 
communities with majority non-White households was 17 foreclosed houses per 1000 properties, 
with an average of $2,200 wealth losses per household (Henry et al. 2013). In contrast, in majority 
White communities 10 per 1000 houses were foreclosed, with an average wealth loss of $1,300 per 
household (ibid.).  
Despite the visible intersectional dimension of increasing inequality, the debate over the 
extent to which racial/ethnic discrimination and segregation is responsible for wealth and income 
disparities is unresolved. The main point of contention is the equality of access to assets, 
particularly housing and non-exploitative housing finance. There is substantial textual and 
empirical evidence that discriminatory processes are at work (Darity Jr. et al. 2006; 
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risks or government policy imperatives (Calomiris/Haber 2014) might explain these apparent 
disparities. As Dymski (2006) argues, this explanatory difference depends on the importance of 
missing variable bias, which cannot be dismissed, and is unresolvable.  
Moreover, the impact of gender disparities on income inequality has been studied 
extensively, focusing on labour markets, earnings, and family structure (cf. Albelda/Tilly 1999) 
and their macroeconomic implications. Nevertheless, the issues of gender have been largely absent 
from the Post-Keynesian approach to macroeconomics and income distribution (Jenninngs 1994; 
Danby 2004; Todorova 2009; Austen/Jefferson 2010; Fukuda-Parr et al. 2013; Spotton Visano 
2016). Moreover, the discussion of the role of gender in wealth inequality has been less developed 
(cf. Pahl 2001; Sierminska et al. 2010), primarily due to limited individual-level data on wealth 
across gender. Consequently, in this thesis we contribute to the discussion of the disparities in 
wealth across gender of households, acknowledging that this does not shed light on the intra-
household distribution of wealth.  
The debate of intergenerational inequality in economics has been focused on the transfer of 
income and wealth through inheritance and asset ownership (Tomes 1981; Piketty 2000; 
Bowles/Gintis 2002), while economic sociology has analysed intergenerational mobility across 
social classes (Becker/Tomes 1979; Atkinson et al. 1983; Erikson/Goldthorpe 2002). In these 
approaches, intergenerational inequality is argued to be one of the key determinants of rising 
income and wealth inequality in advanced capitalist economies. Economic geography has 
contested this view of intergenerational inequality, emphasising the structural role of economic 
inequality, which is instead manifested and reproduced through the emergence of intergenerational 
disparities in income and wealth (Christophers 2017). 
Given these unresolved debates on the intersectional dimension of wealth and income 
inequality with race, gender, and generations, in this thesis we are not be able to surpass the 
explanatory limits to the identification of cause-effect linkages. However, we are able to shed 
substantial light on an element that has received little attention in these debates, i.e. financial 
sector transformation, and to put forth strong evidence that this transformation, insofar as it has 
affected household balance sheets at all points of the income and wealth distribution, has played a 
key role in the dynamics of wealth and income polarization. 
In light of the increased economic instability related to the processes of securitisation and 
subprime lending, empirical evidence has found that financial deepening (measured as the size of 
the financial sector relative to GDP) significantly affects income inequality (measured either as the 
Gini coefficient or the labour share of income). Zalewski/Whalen (2010), Assa (2012), Kus 
(2012), Arestis et al. (2013), Lin/Tomaskovic-Devey (2013), Van Arnum/Naples (2013) have 
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found a significant negative effect of financial deepening on inequality in the USA and in a panel 
of advanced economies. In earlier work, this author finds a significant positive impact of the GDP 
shares of the stock market, bank income, and private credit on the top 10% share of income in 16 
OECD countries between 1995-2009 (Szymborska 2016). However, pre-crisis studies by Beck et 
al. (2004), Clarke et al. (2006) and others reviewed by Demirgüç-Kunt/Levine (2009) find that 
financial deepening reduces inequality, while Nikoloski (2013) argues that the relationship is non-
linear. This disparity in results stems from the fact that the majority of these studies use 
macroeconomic aggregates to measure both inequality and financial sector transformation. We 
argue that the aggregate analysis of inequality obscures much of the mechanisms behind the 
relationship in question. This is because it doesn’t explore the importance of balance sheet 
dynamics occurring at the household level in generating inequality and macroeconomic instability.  
The key argument of this thesis is that the heterogeneity of household balance sheet 
composition generates wealth and income inequality as returns on wealth increase with its absolute 
size. This is because large wealth holdings enable access to profitable wealth management 
services, financial securities markets, purchases of corporate shares, and accumulation of secured 
debt, all of which require large initial downpayments. As will be shown in the next section, the 
middle- and low-income households rely more heavily on illiquid non-financial assets such as 
primary residence, low-yielding financial assets, and greater relative indebtedness dominated by 
unsecured debt, making their balance sheets more vulnerable to financial shocks (cf. Wolff 2014). 
In contrast, households at the top of the distribution hold diversified portfolios composed of 
various types of real estate, business equity, profitable financial investment assets (including the 
securitised financial instruments), and private pension wealth. These diversified assets serve as 
collateral for the accumulation of secured debt, which faces better conditions and lower rates than 
the unsecured types of credit. Figure 1.13 shows that interest rates on mortgages were lower than 
the terms of credit for consumer loans and credit card debt. Consequently, not only do households 
at the top of the distribution earn higher returns on their asset holdings than households towards 
the bottom of the distribution, but their high incomes and assets far outweigh their holdings and 
repayments of debt. 
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Figure 1.13 Commercial bank monthly rates by loan type, USA 1994Q4-2017Q2 (source: Federal 
Reserve Data, G.19 release and St. Louis Fed) 
 
These stylised facts on household balance sheet composition across the distribution indicate 
how the interplay between the dynamics of wealth and income before and after the 2007 crisis 
contributed to inequality. The fact that the richest households directed a large part of their wealth 
into profitable business equity and financial assets meant that their annual rates of return were 
comparatively higher than for households relying on leveraged homeownership and other low-
yielding and illiquid forms of wealth (Wolff 2014:30-31). Crucially, these dynamics of household 
balance sheet structures were directly related to the political economy of securitisation and 
household indebtedness outlined above. Consequently, a powerful case for the impact of 
financialisation on inequality emerges from the disparities of wealth holdings and leverage across 
households. 
1.3. Evolution of household balance sheet structures in the USA since the 1980s  
In the previous section, we showed that the transformation of financial sector operations since the 
1980s had clear consequences for income and wealth distribution, and contributed to rising 
financial fragility. In this section, we show that changes in housing wealth induced by the asset 
price movements and the housing market collapse shortly before the Great Recession shaped the 
patterns of wealth accumulation for the low- and middle-income households. We argue that the 
emergent differences in the asset and debt composition across the distribution generated disparate 
returns to wealth depending on the size of wealth holdings, which is gauged by the analysis of 
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Figure 1.14 presents the mean and median values of income and net worth between 1989 
and 2013
23
. Data show great disparities in trends of before-tax income and net worth in the period. 
Between 1989 and 2013, the median income stagnated. It rose from $46,500 in 1989 to its peak of 
$53,300 in 2004. However, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the median income fell from 
$53,100 in 2007 to $46,700 in 2013. Similarly, the median net worth increased from $84,800 in 
1989 to its peak of $135,400 in 2007, plummeting by 40% after the crisis to $81,200 in 2013, 
which is below its 1989 level. 
In contrast, mean income increased by 28.8% from $73,400 1989 to its peak of $94,600 in 
2007. After the 2007 crisis, mean income suffered less than the median, falling by 7.8% to 
$87,200 in 2013. Furthermore, mean wealth more than doubled between 1989 and 2007, growing 
from $336,100 in 1989 to $626,300 in 2007. Since the 2007 crisis, mean net worth decreased to 
$534,600 in 2013.  
These disparate trends in the mean and median values highlight the need for an individual 
consideration of wealth and income. Over the whole period, not only was the mean-to-median 
ratio for net wealth consistently higher than the ratio for income, but it also increased more rapidly 
between 1989 and 2013. Moreover, as in the case of the overall inequality indices analysed in 
section 1.1.2., the ratio between the mean and median wealth and income experienced different 
trends during the crisis, with the mean-to-median ratio for net worth increasing and the ratio for 
income falling between 2007 and 2010. The mean-to-median ratio of income increased from 1.58 
in 1989 to 1.78 in 2007, declining to 1.72 in 2010 before increasing to 1.87 in 2013. 
Simultaneously, the mean-to-median ratio for net worth rose from 3.96 in 1989 to 4.63 in 2007, 
and continued to increase to 6.58 in 2013.  
Figure 1.14 Median and mean values of before-tax family income and net worth, USA 1989-2013 











                                                   
23
 All magnitudes estimated from the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances which are presented in this 
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We argue that these changes in income and wealth were induced by differences in the 
accumulation of various assets and liabilities. To understand this wealth heterogeneity, Table A1.3 
in Appendix I presents trends in asset and debt accumulation over time, distinguishing between the 
different types of non-financial and financial assets
24,25,26.  
The decline in the median net wealth over 1989-2013 can be explained by the faster growth 
of the median value of debt than assets. Moreover, debt holdings decreased by 20% in the 
aftermath of the recession, which is less than the decline in asset holdings of 28.5% between 2007 
and 2013, although the percentage of households holding debt fell by 3.2% between 2007 and 
2010. During the 2007 crisis, the mean values of both assets and debt decreased by less than the 
median. However, over 1989-2013 and between 1989 and 2007, the conditional median debt 
holdings increased more rapidly than the mean, indicating growing indebtedness of the median 
household.  
Looking into the different components of wealth, we observe a rapid increase in the mean 
value of primary residence between 1989-2007, followed by a massive drop after the Great 
Recession. This was paralleled by a rise in the value of mortgages, which more than doubled 
between 1989-2007, declining to a smaller extent after the 2007 crisis than the holdings of real 
estate. This suggests increasing financial fragility of homeowners in the aftermath of the crisis. 
Moreover, we note substantial increases in the mean value of business equity, financial investment 
                                                   
24
 Note that due to the specific survey design, questions about respondents’ gross values of income and 
net worth were asked separately to questions regarding the ownership of individual components of 
income, assets, and debt (see Codebook for 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances). Consequently, 
estimates of the mean and median values of income and wealth components may not always add up to 
the estimated means and medians of the total income and net worth. This could be the case either when 
the respondent miscalculated any of the individual component’s value relative to the total income or 
wealth reported, or because of item nonresponse i.e. if they refused to answer the question on the 
individual component while still reporting their overall income or wealth (cf. Korinek et al. 2006). In 
order to provide the most representative picture of income flows and net wealth holdings in the sample, 
unless indicated we do not restrict the data presented here to complete observations (where the reported 
component values add up to the total). 
25
 We report only the mean values of the income sources and the detailed balance sheet components. 
The main reason for this is that due to low asset and debt ownership rates across the lower income 
groups, there is not enough observations to calculate the median values of these variables for the same 
sample of households. Thus, in order to provide a consistent comparison of income sources and wealth 
components across all subgroups, we limit our analysis to the mean values only, keeping in mind their 
sensitivity to outliers. However, wherever possible, we prefer to compare the median values (such as in 
the case of total assets, total debt, and the leverage ratios). 
26
 Note that we report conditional values for holders of assets and debt only. This is because by 
limiting the calculation of mean to holders we are able to provide more accurate estimates of the mean 
values, which would otherwise be underestimated due to the large number of zero observations for 
non-holders.  
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assets, and private pension wealth in the period, with the latter rising after the Great Recession. 
Similar trend can be observed for the mean holdings of instalment loans, which, unlike the other 
types of debt, continued to increase between 2007-2013. This indicates that households 
compensated for the falling mortgage holdings by taking on unsecured debt. 
Overall, the observed differences in the values and trends of the mean and median income 
and wealth indicate that income growth and wealth accumulation have not been equal across the 
distribution. We argue that this is because of the differences in balance sheet composition across 
households, which generated unequal flows of capital income and debt repayments dependent on 
the absolute size of wealth holdings. In the next subsection, we analyse changes in the detailed 
components of income, assets, and debt across the quintiles of income distribution, with the top 
quintile broken down into households in the 80th-90th percentile and the top 10%
27
. 
1.3.1. Evolution of balance sheet composition by income group 
In the previous subsection we showed that disparities in the mean and median income and wealth 
were driven by the heterogeneity of wealth composition and its associated income flows across 
households. To illustrate this argument, in this subsection we analyse the trends in income and 
wealth across the income distribution between 1989-2013, finding that income and net worth grew 
systematically faster for rich households at the top of the distribution. We argue that the dramatic 
disparities in the growth and values of income and wealth across the distribution were determined 
by differences in the accumulation of various assets and debt. These influenced the returns to 
wealth earned by different households depending on the size of the accumulated wealth. This is 
reflected by the analysis of capital income flows and debt payments associated with ownership of 
the different types of wealth. To demonstrate this distributional impact of wealth composition, we 
analyse the cumulative structure of asset portfolios and liabilities, relating it to the emergent 
differences in leverage across households. 
                                                   
27
 The rationale for analysing balance sheet composition of households across the distribution of 
income rather than wealth is theoretical. Firstly, it reflects the analysis of class, which is often 
conceptualised in terms of income differences in the theoretical literature on inequality reviewed in 
Chapter 2 and extended in the theoretical model developed in Chapter 3. Moreover, by limiting the 
scope of analysis to the examination of wealth structures across the distribution of income, we 
highlight the inherent conceptual differences between income and wealth, which are often conflated in 
the literature on inequality and in popular discourse. Simultaneously, however, we are able to show the 
interrelation between both concepts. In fact, the shape of the balance sheet composition across wealth 
deciles is consistent with wealth structures among income groups reported in this thesis. Consequently, 
the approach taken here emphasises the dialogue with the existing literature and introduces the concept 
of wealth heterogeneity in the field dominated by the analyses of income. In the future, similar analysis 
can be extended to examine income composition and wealth structure across the distribution of wealth, 
but this is not undertaken in the present work. 
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Table A1.4 in Appendix I presents the median and mean values of before-tax family income 
and net worth across income groups between 1989-2013. The second, third, and fourth quintile 
experienced the slowest mean and median income growth over the period, largely due to the 
negative effects of the financial crisis since 2007. In particular, the median and mean income 
growth of the middle quintile was practically wiped out during the Great Recession, declining by 
0.1% and rising by merely 0.7% respectively over the whole period. In contrast, the top decile 
experienced the fastest growth of the mean income of 29.4% over the period. Furthermore, the 
impact of the financial crisis on income of the top quintile was weaker compared to the middle 
quintiles.  
The bottom 20% of households experienced moderate increases of 25.5% and 23.3% in their 
mean and median incomes respectively between 1989 and 2013. However, the mean and median 
net wealth of this group was expanding the fastest before the crisis compared to the rest of the 
distribution, rising by 188% and 166.3% respectively between 1989 and 2007. Nevertheless, some 
of these gains in wealth turned out to be illusory, as the median and mean net worth of the bottom 
quintile saw large declines of 38% and 26.4% respectively in the aftermath of the Great Recession. 
Net wealth losses were the most striking for the second and third quintile, with a staggering 
decline in the median net worth of 51.6% and 18.6% respectively between 1989 and 2013 due to a 
large fall in the value of the median net wealth between 2007 and 2013 of 48.9% and 37.6% 
respectively. Households in the fourth quintile and in percentile 80th-90th experienced a similar fall 
in their median net worth of 31.1% and 25.4% respectively between 2007 and 2013. In contrast, 
the rate of wealth accumulation of the top decile was higher than among households between 20th 
and 90th percentile, particularly in terms of the mean net wealth, which expanded by 104.2% over 
1989 and 2007. Moreover, net wealth losses were the smallest for the top 10% after the Great 
Recession, with the mean and median net worth falling by 12.5% and 9.6% respectively between 
2007 and 2013. Thus, unlike in the case of income, the richest households suffered the smallest 
losses in terms of wealth compared to the rest of the distribution.  
We argue that these changes in income and wealth across the distribution were driven by 
disparities in asset and debt accumulation. Table A1.5 in Appendix I presents trends in asset 
holding across income groups between 1989-2013. We observe that asset accumulation has been 
uneven across the distribution, with mean asset holdings increasing systematically faster than the 
median.  
The bottom quintile saw the largest growth in asset holdings in terms of the percentage of 
households owning assets from 78.8% in 1989 to 92.2% in 2013. This was driven by an increase 
in households owning primary residence (32.3% rising to 41.6% between 1989 and 2007, and 
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falling to 37.5% in 2013, which constituted the largest increase in homeownership rate across the 
distribution), transaction accounts (55.3% in 1989 increasing to 78.9% in 2013, which is the 
highest among all types of assets for this group), as well as vehicles and other non-financial assets 
(53.3% increasing to 63.1% over 1989-2013). In the similar period, however, there was a fall in 
the percentage of households in the bottom quintile owning other property (6.1% in 1989 rising to 
7.5% in 2007, but declining after the crisis to 4.4% in 2013, which is the lowest participation rate 
for this group together with business equity), and financial investment assets (19.9% in 1989 
falling to 18.3% in 2013, with an increase before the Great Recession).  
Between 1989 and 2007 asset holdings of the bottom 20% increased the most rapidly 
compared to the other households, with the median value rising from $14,099 in 1989 to $26,610 
in 2007 and the mean holdings more than doubling in that period from $62,284 to $152,383. 
Despite that, households in the bottom 20% saw the slowest overall growth in their median asset 
value of 6.5% over 1989-2013. This is because these households experienced the greatest declines 
in their asset value relative to the rest of the distribution in the aftermath of the 2007 crisis.  
Between 2007 and 2013, the median asset holdings of the bottom quintile declined by 
43.6%, compared to an average decrease of 29% for households in percentile 20th-90th, and a 8% 
fall for the top 10%, while the mean asset value fell by 23.6% compared to an average 23.5% 
decline for households in percentile 20th-80th, and an average fall of 11% for the top 20%. These 
trends were driven mainly by changes in the holdings of real estate, particularly primary residence, 
which more than doubled between 1989 and 2007, rising from $28,971 to $72,285, but declined by 
30% to $50,710 in 2013. Similarly, the mean value of other property held by households in the 
bottom quintile increased from $4,597 in 1989 to $31,108 in 2010, but it fell dramatically to 
$6,857 in 2013. While the mean values of financial investment assets and business equity have 
also increased over time for the bottom quintile (from $9,493 to $17,989 and $6,160 to $23,204 
respectively between 1989 and 2013), the percentage of households owning these assets was low 
relatively to the other types of assets, averaging 22.4% and 4% respectively. 
In terms of households in the middle of the distribution, increases in their asset holding rates 
were more stagnant between 1989-2013 compared to the households in the bottom and at the top. 
Moreover, the second quintile saw the greatest losses in the median value of assets of -11.8% over 
the whole period, and a sluggish growth of 6.5% in their mean assets, with the Great Recession 
virtually wiping out the value of assets accumulated between 1989 and 2007. These trends were 
driven by the falling values of business equity and transaction accounts (which was also the case 
among households in the third quintile), which declined by 59.9% and 24.9% respectively over 
1989-2013. In contrast, holdings of real estate and retirement accounts expanded the most rapidly 
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between 1989 and 2007 for households in the 20th to 90th percentile, followed by more moderate 
increases in financial investment asset and vehicles holdings.  
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, between 2007 and 2013, the value of all types of 
non-financial asset holdings declined across all income groups. However, these decreases tended 
to be the highest for households in the middle of the distribution, particularly in the middle three 
quintiles. Moreover, households in 20th-80th percentile experienced losses in the value of their 
financial assets, which was driven by the declines in financial investment assets and retirement 
account holdings between 2007 and 2013 as transaction accounts continued to increase. 
Furthermore, in terms of asset participation rates, there was a decline in the percentage of 
households owning business equity and retirement accounts after the Great Recession, as well as 
an overall decrease in the proportion of households holding financial investment assets and other 
real estate between 1989 and 2013.  
The top decile of the income distribution experienced the largest increases in the value of 
their asset holdings between 1989 and 2013, as well as the smallest asset losses in the aftermath of 
the 2007 crisis compared to the rest of the distribution. Both the median and the mean asset 
holdings nearly doubled between 1989 and 2007, rising from $853,900 to $1,525,200 and from 
$1,935,700 to $4,062,800 respectively. This was driven by increases in the value of retirement 
accounts, business equity, and financial investment asset holdings, which rose by 190.6%, 127.7%, 
and 124.8% respectively over 1989-2007. Moreover, increases in the mean holdings of real estate 
were also substantial, with the value of primary residence expanding by 95.4% and other real 
estate increasing by 50.6% in the period. Between 2007 and 2013, the median and mean value of 
assets among the top decile fell by 8.2% and 11.1% respectively, compared to an average decline 
of 31.9% and 20.8% for the bottom 90%. The fall was the smallest for the mean holdings of 
vehicle and other non-financial asset holdings, decreasing from $82,965 to $78,512 over 2007-
2013, as well as financial investment asset, which fell from $903,163 to $831,500. Other real 
estate, business equity, and primary residence holdings experienced the largest declines in the 
period, falling from $488,424 to $362,340, from $1,126,670 to $875,360, and from $802,643 to 
$640,610 respectively. In contrast, transaction accounts holdings increased from $150,033 to 
$193,261 over 2007-2013, as did the mean value of retirement and insurance assets, rising from 
$498,445 to $569,300. 
In terms of the asset ownership rates, there were substantial declines in the percentage of 
households in the top decile holding financial investment assets, other real estate, and business 
equity between 1989 and 2013, which fell by 18.9%, 8.9%, and 5.4% respectively. This indicates 
the growing concentration of these assets among fewer rich households, with an average of just 
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37.6% households in the top 10% owning business equity, 47.9% holding other real estate, and 
81.7% owning financial investment assets in the period, compared to the above 90% average 
participation rates for the other types of assets. The overall declines in the ownership rates of these 
assets were the largest during and after the Great Recession, particularly for business equity which 
fell by 13% over 2007-2013, offsetting the 8.8% increase between 1989 and 2007. In contrast, the 
percentage of households in the top 10% owning retirement accounts and insurance assets 
continued to expand throughout the Great Recession, resulting in an overall increase of 5.6% 
between 1989 and 2013.  
Overall, asset accumulation was the most rapid between 1989 and 2013 for households in 
the top 10% of the income distribution. Nevertheless, asset holdings, particularly in terms of 
primary residence, also expanded substantially among households in the bottom 20%, albeit at 
lower median and mean values. Increases in asset ownership were the most sluggish for 
households in the middle of the distribution, particularly between the 20th and 80th percentile. This 
was driven primarily by large wealth losses in the aftermath of the Great Recession for this group. 
Asset holdings of households in the bottom quintile also suffered, mainly due to decreases in the 
value of primary residence and other real estate. In contrast, the top decile experienced the 
smallest losses of their wealth between 2007 and 2013, unlike in the case of income, where losses 
were somewhat more equally distributed across households.  
The fact that households in the top 10% accumulated more high-yielding assets in the period 
meant that they had more collateral to access debt at lower interest rates and more favourable 
conditions than households towards the bottom of the distribution (see Figure 1.13 above). Table 
A1.6 in Appendix I shows changes in the mean and median values of total debt holdings as well as 
participation rates and holdings of the different types of liabilities across the distribution. Debt 
accumulation rates were varied across the distribution between 1989 and 2013. While all 
households increased their debt holdings over time, the rise was the highest towards the bottom of 
the distribution and continued throughout the Great Recession for the bottom 40%. In contrast, 
debt holdings of the top 60% declined between 2007 and 2013. Moreover, there was an overall 
increase in the percentage of households in the bottom 80% holding debt, particularly for the first 
and the second quintile, whose debt ownership rate increased from 47.1% to 52.1% and 59.5% to 
66.9% respectively. Given their higher asset holdings serving as collateral, the top 20% of 
households were the most indebted in the period, both in terms of the value of debt holdings and 
participation rates. Nevertheless, the percentage of households in the top quintile holding debt 
decreased between 1989 and 2013, from 93.7% to 87.2% for households in the 80th-90th percentile, 
and from 87.6% to 84.5% for the top 10%. 
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Households in the bottom 20% saw the most rapid debt accumulation over the period, with 
the mean and the median debt holdings increasing more than threefold from $9,523 to $37,739 and 
from $3,073 to $11,000 respectively between 1989 and 2013. The peak of debt accumulation for 
this group, as well as for the second and third quintile occurred in 2010, suggesting that during the 
crisis in 2007 households in the bottom 60% of the distribution continued to accumulate debt, 
perhaps to refinance debt payments on previous loans. Increases in debt holdings of the bottom 
quintile between 1989 and 2010 were driven mainly by secured debt, particularly debt secured by 
primary residence, which rose from $3,717 to $27,331. The proportion of households in the 
bottom 20% holding mortgages secured by primary residence increased from 7.5% in 1989 to 
14.7% in 2010, peaking at 15.7% in 2004. Moreover, debt secured by other real estate increased 
substantially from $366 to $4,583 between 1989 and 2010, although the participation rate 
remained low, averaging approximately 1% over the period.  
Furthermore, unsecured debt holdings increased over time among households in the bottom 
quintile. Between 1989 and 2007, the mean instalment debt holdings increased from $4,194 to 
$8,632, while credit card balances rose from $304 to $1,897. The proportion of households in the 
bottom quintile owning credit cards doubled between 1989 and 2004 from 15% to 30.4%, 
decreasing thereafter to 19.5% in 2013, while the ownership rate of instalment debt fell from 
33.4% in 1989 to 27.1% in 2004. After the Great Recession, instalment debt holdings expended 
significantly rising to $15,945 in 2013 as the holdings of credit card balances and secured debt 
declined. This increase in the mean value of instalment loans was paralleled by a rise in the 
proportion of households in the bottom quintile owning this type of debt from 27.8% in 2007 to 
32.4% in 2013, peaking at 34.1% in 2010. Moreover, immediately after the crisis between 2007 
and 2010, households in the bottom 20% increased their holdings of other debt and other 
unsecured lines of credit, which rose from $518 to $787 and $370 to $2,854 respectively. 
However, while the average percentage of households owning these types of liabilities increased 
slightly in 2010, it remained low at 4.2% and 1.3% respectively compared to the other forms of 
debt. The increased accumulation of unsecured debt by the bottom 20% after the Great Recession 
signifies that they compensated for the falling holdings of mortgages to afford the repayments of 
existing loans. 
Households in the middle of the distribution experienced similar trends over time in their 
holdings of secured debt, instalment loans, and credit card balances compared to the bottom 
quintile, although their ownership rates and values of debt were higher. Accumulation of mortgage 
debt was the most rapid among the third and fourth quintile, and these households reduced their 
holdings of secured debt the most in the aftermath of the Great Recession compared to the other 
households. This reflects that debt accumulation of these households was directly related to the 
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processes of securitisation and subprime lending described in section 1.2. Moreover, in contrast to 
the other income groups, households in the third and fourth quintile did not increase their 
instalment loans holdings between 2007 and 2013. Importantly, the ownership rate of unsecured 
debt was the highest among households in the middle of the distribution compared to households 
in the bottom and the top, particularly in terms of instalment debt ownership for households in the 
40th-90th percentile, as well as credit card balances, other debt, and other unsecured lines of credit 
for households in the 80th-90th percentile. 
Similarly to the rest of the distribution, households in the top decile increased their debt 
holdings over time, particularly between 1989 and 2010. In that period, the mean value of debt 
holdings of the top 10% rose from $187,676 to $403,305, while the median increased from 
$133,760 to $286,357. The median debt holdings of the top 10% continued to rise during and after 
the 2007 crisis, increasing from $265,429 in 2007 to $271,000 in 2013, while the mean value of 
debt declined from $387,700 to $358,225 in that period. Households in the top decile had the 
highest albeit declining ownership rate of secured debt in the period compared to the other income 
groups, averaging 74.2% and 18.2% for debt secured by primary residence and other property 
respectively, which reflects their greater ability to use assets as collateral. Moreover, reliance on 
unsecured debt among the top 10% was lower than for the other households, as their accumulation 
rate of unsecured debt between 1989 and 2013 was comparatively the slowest, particularly in 
terms of instalment loans and credit card balances. 
Overall, the observed disparities in asset and debt accumulation across the distribution 
reflect the influence of financial sector transformation on inequality described in section 1.2. This 
is highlighted by the dependence of net wealth accumulation on housing among households in the 
bottom and the middle of the income distribution. The emergence and the subsequent burst of the 
housing bubble induced by the processes of securitisation and subprime lending generated 
substantial volatility of wealth accumulation by the low- and middle-income households. This 
resulted in slower growth of their overall net wealth compared to households at the top of the 
distribution, which indicates deepening wealth inequality. We argue that these differences in the 
accumulation of various assets and liabilities influenced income inequality by generating disparate 
income flows across the distribution related to the absolute size of wealth holdings. 
To gauge this impact of wealth distribution on income inequality, we analyse changes in the 
receipts of various types of income across the distribution. As in the analysis of the trends in 
inequality in section 1.1, we distinguish between wage, capital, and transfer income, assuming that 
higher capital income flows reflect greater returns to wealth.  
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Table A1.7 in Appendix I reveals that while the bottom 90% of households experienced 
decreases in mean inflows of the majority of income sources, households in the top 10% saw most 
of their types of income increase, particularly in terms of wages, business income, and transfer 
income. Wage receipts of households in the bottom 80% decreased in real terms between 1989 and 
2013, which was driven by a fall throughout the 2000s. In contrast, wages of households in the top 
20% increased over time, and the growth was particularly rapid at 41.5% for the top 10% between 
1989 and 2007. This rise in wage inequality can be explained by the increasing compensation 
among financial sector executives identified with households at the top of the distribution (cf. 
Kaplan/Rauh 2010; Philippon/Reshef 2012; Arestis et al. 2013)  
Importantly, while wage income declined after the Great Recession, capital income inflows 
for the top 10% increased in the most recent wave of the data between 2010 and 2013. Households 
in the bottom 60% experienced capital losses around the time of the Great Recession, which we 
expect is driven by losses in home values given the declining house prices (see Figure 1.12 above). 
Conversely, households in the top 20% earned positive albeit diminishing capital gains throughout 
the whole period, picking up between 2010 and 2013. Furthermore, the top 10% saw their business 
income inflows nearly double between 1989 and 2007, declining slightly over 2007 and 2010, and 
recovering by 2013. In contrast, households in the bottom 90% experienced declines in their 
business income inflows in the whole period, apart from the bottom quintile whose mean business 
income grew substantially albeit averaging only $254 over the whole period. Similarly, interest 
and dividend income inflows decreased for the majority of income groups between 1989 and 2013, 
apart from the bottom 20%, for whom the amounts earned were nevertheless unsubstantial, 
averaging only $325 in the period. In contrast, social security and retirement income was the only 
income source which increased for all households across the distribution between 1989-2013, 
although the growth rate was declining towards the bottom of the distribution.  
Similarly, there was an overall decrease in the mean inflows of transfer income across all 
households between 1989 and 1995, increasing thereafter for the bottom 90%, and continuing to 
fall for the top 10%. However, in the aftermath of the 2007 crisis the inflow of transfer income 
more than tripled for households in the top 10%, compared to a more modest average increase of 
33% between 2007 and 2013 for the bottom 90%. In fact, households in the bottom 20% saw an 
overall decline in their transfer income from $3,412 in 1989 to $2,915 in 2013. This suggests that 
social transfers did not target those households towards the bottom of the distribution that were the 
most in need of income support.  
Overall, not only did the top decile experienced more rapid increases in wages between 1989 
and 2013 than the rest of the distribution, but their capital income receipts also grew systematically 
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faster. Importantly, these differences in capital income inflows across the distribution reflected 
disparities in wealth accumulation and the respective returns earned on different assets. In addition 
to affecting capital incomes, these wealth disparities translated into income inequality by 
influencing the amount of debt repayments across households. This is because the extension of 
subprime mortgage lending described in the previous section was characterised by higher interest 
rates charged to low-income borrowers. High debt repayments continued after the Great 
Recession, as holdings of unsecured debt, characterised by higher interest rates than mortgages, 
increased towards the bottom of the distribution.  
This is highlighted by Table A1.8 in Appendix I, showing changes in the annual debt 
payments on mortgages, revolving credit (i.e. payments on credit cards), and consumer debt (i.e. 
payments on instalment loans) across the distribution. We observe that increases in debt payments 
between 1989 and 2013 were the highest for households in the bottom quintile. Mortgage 
payments for this group rose from $525 to $1,153 in this period, peaking at $1,626 in 2010, while 
revolving debt payments increased from $58 in 1989 to $568 in 2010, falling to $197 in 2013. 
Apart from a 7.3% rise for the top decile, consumer debt payments decreased over time for the 
bottom 90% of households. Nevertheless, immediately after the Great Recession, the mean 
consumer debt payments of households in the bottom 20% increased from $765 in 2007 to $1,054 
in 2010. Furthermore, we observe that here are much smaller disparities in debt payments among 
households than they are in terms of income, suggesting that households towards the bottom of the 
distribution bear a greater burden of their debt holdings relative to their income. 
In order to understand how differences in asset and debt holdings translated into disparities 
in capital income flows and leverage across the distribution, Figure 1.15 presents the cumulative 
asset and debt composition of households in the bottom quintile, the 20th-90th percentile, and the 
top 10% between 1989-2013
28
. Across all households non-financial assets contributed more to the 
asset portfolio than financial assets. Importantly, the share of non-financial assets (particularly 
primary residence) in total assets peaked before the 2007 crisis and declined since. 
Asset holdings of the bottom 20% were composed primarily of non-financial assets in the 
period studied. Vehicles, consumer durables, and other non-financial assets were the largest 
component of total assets, although their share declined initially from 32% in 1989 to 26.9% in 
2001, before rebounding to 33.6% in 2013. The share of principal residence in total assets 
increased before the 2007 financial crisis from 30.4% in 1989 to 34% in 2004 and 2007, falling to 
                                                   
28
 This graph is restricted to complete observations only, including households who provided responses 
to all types of assets and debt. 
51     ––– Chapter 1 ––– 
 
30.6% in 2013. Financial asset holdings of the bottom quintile were focused around the ownership 
of low-yielding transaction accounts, contributing between 20% and 22% to total assets over the 
whole period. 
Similarly, balance sheets of the middle-income households relied heavily on primary 
residence, whose contribution to total assets increased from 40.8% in 1989 to 44.3% in 2004, 
before falling to 40.2% in 2013. Vehicles and other non-financial assets were the second largest 
component of the asset portfolio of households in the 20th-90th percentile, rising steadily from 
21.8% in 1989 to 24.1% in 2013. Among financial assets, retirement and insurance assets 
contributed the most to the overall portfolio, and this share increased from 8.2% in 1989 to 14.4% 
in 2013. Transaction accounts contributed between 8-9% of total assets over the whole period, 
while the share of high-yielding financial investment assets decreased systematically from 10.2% 
in 1989 to 5.2% in 2013. 
In contrast, the asset portfolio of the top 10% was much more diversified compared to the 
rest of households. In 2013, financial assets contributed 43.5% to the overall asset holdings of the 
top decile, up from 33.8% in 1989. Among financial assets, the largest contribution came from 
high-yielding retirement and insurance assets (23% share of total assets in 2013), as well as 
financial investment assets, which accounted for 13.5% of the total asset portfolio in 2013. Among 
non-financial assets, the contribution of business equity and other residence to total assets was the 
largest compared to the other income groups, accounting for around a fifth of the total portfolio 
between 1989 and 2013. Moreover, the share of principal residence in total assets of the top 10% 
decreased from 39.2% in 1989 to 33.3% in 2013. 
Given these disparities in the asset composition, we observe clear differences in the structure 
of liability holdings across the distribution. Households in the bottom quintile relied on unsecured 
debt holdings, primarily instalment debt (whose share in total debt decreased from 61% in 1989 to 
35% in 2001 before rising to 52.3% in 2013) and credit card debt (which became more important 
in the run up to the crisis, increasing from 18% in 1989 to 33% in 2001, before reaching its earlier 
level of 18% in 2013). The extension of mortgages to low-income households in the period raised 
the contribution of mortgages secured by principal residence, increasing their share in total debt 
from 12.7 % in 1989 to 27% in 2001 and 23.6% in 2013. Furthermore, debt accumulated by 
households in the 20th-90th percentile between 1989-2013 was composed mainly of debt secured 
by primary residence, instalment debt and credit card balances. The latter two became less 
important over time, and their shares in total debt decreased before the Great Recession, reaching 
34.8% and 14.8% respectively in 2013. The share of debt secured by primary residence in total 
debt increased rapidly for this group from 39.6% in 1989 to 50.4% in 2004. Importantly, it kept 

























rising during the 2007 crisis to 51.7% in 2010, before declining to 45% in 2013. In contrast, debt 
holdings of households in the top decile were dominated by debt secured by primary residence and 
other real estate, whose share in total debt was ranging between 75% and 82% over the whole 
period. 
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These differences in portfolio composition show that balance sheets of the middle- and low-
income households were composed primarily of low-yielding assets between 1989-2013 and were 
thus volatile to property price movements. This is highlighted by the earlier argument that the 
housing market collapse shortly before the Great Recession generated a larger drop in net wealth 
for the middle- and the low-income households, and deepened wealth inequality. The volatility of 
balance sheet positions to financial shocks among these households arose due to their reliance on 
greater relative indebtedness driven mainly by unsecured types of debt and subprime mortgages. In 
contrast, the top 10% had access to more diversified financial assets with higher returns. 
Moreover, greater holdings of mortgages than unsecured debt towards the top of the distribution 
meant that these households faced more favourable borrowing conditions than households at the 
bottom of the distribution. 
To illustrate this argument, Figure 1.16 shows changes in the conditional median of various 
measures of leverage across the distribution, including the debt-to-asset ratio, the debt-service-to-
income ratio
29
, and the debt-to-income ratio. Over the whole period, households in the middle of 
the distribution had the highest leverage, although the bottom 20% experienced large growth in 
their leverage ratios, particularly in the run up to and immediately after the Great Recession. 
Between 1989 and 2010, the debt-to-asset ratio of the bottom quintile increased from 9.1% to 
18.3%, while the ratio for households in the 20th to 90th percentile rose from 15.6% to 24.7% 
(Panel A in Fig.1.16). The increase in the debt-to-asset ratio of the top 10% was substantially 
lower compared to the rest of the distribution, rising from 8.4% to 9.8% in the period. After the 
crisis, between 2010 and 2013 the debt-to-asset ratio of the top 10% and households between 20th-
90th percentile declined to 8.4% and 23.5% respectively, while the ratio of the bottom 20% 
continued to increase to 18.6%. 
The increase in leverage for the bottom 20% was particularly large in the case of the debt-
service-to-income ratio, which rose from 15.3% in 1989 to 19.5% in 2004 (Panel B in Fig.1.16). 
The ratio among the other households rose less rapidly before the Great Recession, from 16% in 
1989 to 19.5% in 2007 for households in the 20th to 90th percentile, and from 11.9% to 12.8% for 
the top 10% between 1989-2004. After the Great Recession, all households experienced declines 
in their debt-service-to-income ratio, and the fall was the highest among the bottom quintile, 
although in 2013 the debt-payments-to-income ratio among this group remained higher than the 
ratio of the top 10%. In contrast, the top decile experienced the highest levels of the debt-to-
                                                   
29
 Here, the debt-service-to-income ratio is defined as the ratio of total monthly debt payments to total 
monthly income. The remaining two indicators are defined in terms of total debt, total assets, and total 
income. 
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income ratio, while the ratio of the bottom 20% was the lowest across all income groups in the 
period (Panel C in Fig.1.16). This is expected given the higher value of assets held at the top of the 
distribution, which serve as collateral and allow for accumulation of greater debt levels relative to 
income. Nevertheless, the bottom quintile experienced the most rapid increases in their debt-to-
income ratio over time. Moreover, while all income groups experienced a rise in their debt-to-
income ratio before the Great Recession, the ratio for households in 20th to 90th percentile and in 
the top decile declined between 2010 and 2013. In contrast, the debt-to-income ratio was rising 
steadily for the bottom quintile from 32% in 1989 to 83.2% in 2013. The sustained increase in the 
debt-to-income ratio and the debt-to-asset ratio for the bottom 20% suggests that these households 
did not deleverage after the Great Recession and their balance sheet position became increasingly 
fragile.  
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the distribution increased their homeownership, this was underpinned by high levels of debt. This 
credit was eagerly provided by subprime lenders and banks, who transformed these loans into 
profitable securitised instruments. This in turn benefited households at the top of the distribution, 
who accumulated an increasing amount of high-yielding financial investment assets and business 
equity in the same period. Despite increasing their debt holdings, households in the top decile were 
able to afford multiple types of real estate and business equity, building a diverse portfolio of 
assets. This had direct consequences for the returns to wealth earned through capital income flows 
and the stability of household financial positions across the distribution, and thus influenced 
wealth and income inequality. 
As indicated in the previous section, the impact of financial sector transformation on 
inequality had specific gender, racial, and generational effects, as subprime lending targeted 
women, minorities, and the young. Table A1.9 in Appendix I compares the socio-economic 
characteristics of households in the bottom 20% and the top 10% of the income distribution. The 
intersectional dimension of inequality is evident, as between 1989-2013 the top decile was 
composed mainly of married households headed by White men. The proportion of Blacks and 
Hispanics in the top 10% averaged 3% and 2% respectively between 1989 and 2013, and the 
percentage of female-headed households decreased in the period from 5.3% to 4.2%. Moreover, 
households in the top decile are found to be highly educated at the college level, with the majority 
being employed, and around a third being self-employed, while only an average of 10% and 11% 
is found to be retired or out of labour force respectively. In contrast, we observe the bottom 
quintile to be more ethnically diverse, with an average of over a third of Black and Hispanic 
households. Moreover, female-headed households constituted the majority of households in the 
bottom 20% at an average of 57% in the period. Around a fifth of households in the bottom 
quintile was single in the period studied. An average of only 6% was self-employed, while more 
than a half of households in the bottom 20% were retired or out of labour force in the period 
studied. Furthermore, while on average a third of households in the bottom quintile were below 35 
years old, this proportion was substantially lower among the top decile. The percentage of 
households in the top 10% aged less than 35 was 10.9% in 1989, and it almost halved in the period 
studied falling to 5.3% in 2013. 
Overall, there are vivid disparities in the socio-economic characteristics of households along 
the distribution. These are particularly striking in terms of the gender, racial, and generational 
composition of the top decile, which is dominated by households headed by White males. In the 
next subsection, we examine the evolution of household balance sheet composition across these 
characteristics, in order to analyse the role of the heterogeneity of wealth composition on the 
trends in income and wealth accumulation across gender, race, and generations. 
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1.3.2. Evolution of balance sheet composition by gender 
In the previous section we showed that differences in balance sheet composition across the income 
distribution influenced wealth and income inequality by generating disparities in capital income 
flows and leverage depending on the size of wealth holdings. We observed that the richest 
households who own the most diversified asset portfolios were characterised by a specific racial, 
gender, and generational profile.  
Figure 1.17 compares trends in income and net worth across male and female-headed 
households. Table A1.10 in Appendix I presents the distribution of households across gender and 
the remaining social categories. Figure 1.17 shows that both the median and mean income of 
males was consistently higher than the mean and median income of females. The disparity 
between the mean and median income was higher among men than women, indicating greater 
inequality within this group. Growth of the mean income between 1989 and 2013 was similar 
across gender at around 17%, increasing from $90,500 in 1989 to $105,945 in 2013 for males and 
from $32,400 to $37,858 for females in the period. In contrast, the median incomes of male 
households rose from $58,500 to $59,900 between 1989-2013, while the median income of 
female-headed households increased in the period from $22,600 to $27,400. Moreover, in the 
aftermath of the Great Recession, male-headed households experienced greater losses in their 
median and mean income of 10.6% and 8.1% respectively, compared to the corresponding 
declines of 3.1% and 5.5% for women. Nevertheless, the ratio of male to female income did not 
change dramatically over time – while the median ratio decreased from 2.6 to 1989 to 2.2 in 2013, 
the mean ratio rose from 2.79 to 2.8 in the period, peaking at 2.9 in 2007. 
In terms of wealth, disparities among men and women have increased over time, particularly 
in regard to the mean net worth. The median and mean net worth of female-headed households 
increased by 18.1% and 38.1% respectively between 1989 and 2013, rising from $25,400 to 
$30,000 and from $129,300 to $178,500. In that period, the mean net worth of male households 
expanded at a faster rate of 56.8%, increasing from $425,700 in 1989 to $667,300 in 2013. In 
contrast, the median net worth of male households decreased in the whole period from $117,400 in 
1989 to $113,600 in 2013. This larger gap between the mean and the median net wealth for males 
indicates that wealth disparities were greater among male-headed households than among females. 
However, the Great Recession brought larger net wealth losses for women. Both the median and 
mean net worth of female-households fell at a greater rate of -44.8% and -30.2% respectively than 
the net worth of males, which declined by 34.6% and 12.9% in terms of its median and mean value 
respectively. In result, the ratio of male to female net worth increased after the Great Recession, 
rising from 3.2 in 2007 to 3.8 in 2013 in terms of median net worth and from 3 to 3.7 in terms of 
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the mean. Consequently, there was an overall increase in the mean male-to-female net worth ratio 
in the period up from its 1989 value of 3.3, while the median ratio declined from 4.6 in 1989. 
Moreover, since both the mean and the median ratios for net worth were higher than for income, 
wealth inequality across gender was higher than income inequality. 
Figure 1.17 Median and mean income and net worth by gender, USA 1989-2013 (source: U.S. 
Survey of Consumer Finances) 
As in the case of the income classes, we argue that income and wealth inequality across 
gender was influenced by differences in wealth composition, inducing unequal capital flows and 
leverage. To analyse the impact of wealth heterogeneity on gender income and wealth inequality, 
we analyse changes in holdings of assets and debt across male and female households, followed by 
the examination of differences in capital income receipts and debt payments.  
Table A1.11 in Appendix I presents trends in the total asset holdings and their components 
across gender over time. Between 1989 and 2013, a smaller proportion of female households held 
assets compared to the average of 98.3% of males, although the ownership rate for females 
increased from 87.1% in 1989 to 95.8% in 2013. This is explained mainly by the higher proportion 
of women holding primary residence (an increase from 45.1% in 1989 to 53.6% in 2013), vehicles 
and other non-financial assets (a rise from 64.1% to 74.3% in that period), transaction accounts 
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contrast, the proportion of female households holding other real estate and financial investment 
assets declined between 1989 and 2013, from 10.3% to 8.8% with a peak of 12.1% in 2007 in 
terms of other property, and from 39.2% to 27.5% with a high of 45% in 1998 for financial 
investment assets. Moreover, while the ownership rate of business equity among females increased 
slightly in the period, the percentage of female households holding this asset was low, rising from 
4.6% in 1989 to 5.1% in 2013. 
Furthermore, there were large disparities in the values of asset holdings across gender 
between 1989 and 2013, with men holding approximately three times more assets than women in 
terms of both median and mean values. Between 1989 and 2007, asset holdings of female-headed 
households increased by more than holdings of males, rising from $59,650 to $122,609 in terms of 
the median and from $167,626 to $316,570 in terms of the mean value, compared to a 
corresponding increase from $180,848 to $311,598 and $496,659 to $912,296 for male 
households. This was driven by greater increases in the value of primary residence, business 
equity, and retirement and insurance assets among female-headed households. Primary residence 
holdings of women increased by 90% from $75,247 in 1989 to $142,860 in 2007 compared to a 
84.5% rise from $148,513 to $274,056 for men. Business equity holdings of females more than 
doubled in the period, rising from $8,762 to $30,409, while holdings of males increased by 88% 
from $100,606 to $189,250. Similarly, holdings of retirement and insurance asset holdings among 
female-headed households more than doubled from $10,018 in 1989 to $35,607 in 2007, and 
continued to rise to $39,392 in 2013, while holdings of male households increased from $43,168 in 
1989 to $120,949 in 2007 and $134,434 in 2013. In contrast, holdings of financial investment 
assets, transaction accounts, and vehicles and other non-financial assets increased to a smaller 
extent for women compared to men. 
Despite higher increases in the overall asset accumulation between 1989 and 2007, female 
asset holdings declined by more during and after the Great Recession compared to males. The 
median asset holdings of women fell by 41.3% between 2007 and 2013 reaching $72,000 that 
year, while the mean holdings decreased by 26.7% to $232,033. In comparison, the median asset 
holdings of male households declined by 29.3% to $220,190 in 2013 as mean holdings fell by 
13.8% to $786,823. This difference is explained by greater relative declines in the holdings of 
primary residence (32.6% fall for women to $96,310 in 2013 compared to a 25.3% fall to 
$204,835 for men), other real estate (50.1% decline for females vs. 20.4% for males, leading to an 
overall decline from $20,401 in 1989 to $14,528 in 2013 for women), business equity (59.7% fall 
for women to $12,265 in 2013 compared to a decline of 20.3% to $150,896 for men), and financial 
investment assets (19.5% decline for females from $54,693 in 1989 to $44,022 in 2013 vs. a 10% 
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fall for males from $159,823 to $143,861). Moreover, increases in holdings of transaction 
accounts and retirement and insurance assets after the crisis were lower for women than men.  
Overall, higher asset ownership among male households allowed them to accumulate more 
secured debt than women, thus facing more favourable borrowing conditions. Table A1.12 in 
Appendix I examines differences in the liability holdings across gender between 1989-2013. 
Despite higher overall ownership rates and holdings of debt among males, female-headed 
households accumulated increasingly more debt between 1989 and 2013. While the debt 
ownership rate among males oscillated between 78% and 81% in the period, the proportion of 
female households holding debt increased substantially from 57.5% in 1989 to 66.2% in 2013, 
with a peak of 67.2% in 2010. This was driven mainly by an increase in the percentage of women 
holding mortgages secured by primary residence (rising from 20.2% in 1989 to 33.2% in 2007 
before falling to 29.2% in 2013), and credit card debt (increasing from 30.9% to 34.1% in 2013, 
with a peak of 44.1% in 2004). Moreover, the proportion of women holding instalment loans 
increased from 38.6% in 1989 to 40.4% in 2013, with an initial decline to 31.4% in 1998. On the 
whole, more women held unsecured debt than mortgages in the period, while this proportion was 
more even among men. Furthermore, the percentage of female households owning debt secured by 
other real estate, other unsecured lines of credit, and other debt was small compared to men, with 
an average ownership rate of 2.1%, 1.5%, and 5.5% for women vs. 6.2%, 2.3%, and 8.2`% for men 
respectively for each of these types of debt. 
In addition to the increases in the debt ownership rate for female households, the value of 
their liabilities rose dramatically faster compared to men. The median value of debt for female 
households increased from $7,953 in 1989 to $32,151 in 2010, while the mean debt holdings rose 
from $29,118 to $79,292 in that period. In contrast, the median debt holdings of male households 
nearly tripled from $37,218 in 1989 to $94,315 in 2007, while their mean debt value increased 
from $75,770 in 1989 to $163,211 in 2007. This is explained by higher increases in the value of 
mortgages secured by primary residence among female-headed households – $18,179 in 1989 
rising to $57,743 in 2010, compared to an increase from $52,519 in 1989 to $121,385 in 2007 for 
men. In contrast, male households experienced faster growth in the mean value of debt secured by 
other property and credit card debt. Both groups decreased their holdings of other unsecured lines 
of credit over time. Furthermore, the growth rate of instalment debt holdings between 1989 and 
2007 was similar across gender at approximately 34%. However, the mean value of instalment 
debt increased more rapidly for female households since the Great Recession, rising by 31% from 
$9,267 in 2007 to $12,140 in 2013, with a peak of $12,293 in 2010, compared to an increase of 
7.5% from $16,094 in 2007 to $17,303 in 2013 for men. Moreover, while holdings of other debt 
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declined among male households, they increased for females, although the average mean value of 
female holdings of other debt was only $626 in the period.  
These differences in the timing of the maximum value of debt holdings across gender (2010 
for female vs. 2007 for males) suggest that throughout the 2007 crisis female households 
continued to accumulate debt (perhaps to repay the existing debt obligations), deleveraging only 
between 2010 and 2013, while male debt holdings continued to decrease in 2010 and 2013. The 
holdings of debt among male households declined by more than of women particularly in terms of 
mortgage debt and credit card balances, while female households continued to accumulate more 
instalment loans and unsecured lines of credit than men.  This suggests that the debt burden 
continued to be higher among women after the Great Recession. 
These disparities in asset and debt accumulation across gender influenced income and 
wealth inequality by generating differences in capital income flows and debt repayments 
dependent on the size of wealth holdings across these groups. To illustrate this argument, Table 
A1.13 in Appendix I presents the patterns of the receipts of the various types of income over time 
across male and female households.  
The widening of the gender income gap was particularly striking in the case of capital 
income, specifically business income. While receipts of this type of income increased from $9,984 
to $14,846 for male-headed households between 1989-2013, women saw a decline from $4,432 to 
$2,088 in the period. Moreover, women experienced a greater fall in their receipts of interest and 
dividend income than men – a 61% decline from $2,704 to $1,060 between 1989-2013 compared 
to a 35.5% decrease from $5,759 to $3,717 for men. Similarly, the rise in the inflows of social 
security and retirement income between 1989 and 2013 was lower for women than for men – a 
69.3% increase from $5,587 to $9,459 compared to a 84.4% rise from $6,464 to $11,920 for male 
households. Moreover, while receipts of capital gains income among female-headed households 
declined in the period to a smaller extent than for males – a 2.3% decrease between 1989-2013 
compared to a 4.7% fall for men – male-headed households earned nearly nine times more in 
capital gains compared to women in 2013 – $5,294 for males vs. $602 for females.  
Furthermore, we observe large disparities in wage income across gender. While wages were 
the principal source of income for both subgroups in the period studied, the employment income of 
male-headed households was around three times higher than that of females. However, women 
experienced slightly greater growth rate in wage receipts over time – a 22.5% increase from 
$18,630 in 1989 to $22,814 in 2007 compared to a 20% rise from $62,166 to $74,729 for men. In 
the aftermath of the 2007 crisis, between 2007 and 2013, wages of females fell by less than those 
of males – a 7.3% decline to $21,140 in 2013 compared to a 10.4% decrease to $66,997 for males. 
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Nevertheless, the gender wage gap remained substantial, with males earning more than triple the 
amount of wages earned by female households. 
Furthermore, we observe dramatically different trends in the receipts of transfer income 
across gender. While male households saw their transfer income inflows rise from $1,399 in 1989 
to $2,948 in 2013, transfer income of women declined from $6,149 to $3,407 in this period. Given 
large gaps in all the other sources of income, this suggests that the policy of social transfers in the 
period was not sufficient to alleviate the gender income gap between 1989-2013. Table A1.15 in 
Appendix I shows that this is particularly worrying given that female-headed households in our 
sample are predominantly single (an average of 98% in the period compared to the average of 20% 
for males), more likely to be out of labour force (40% average in the period compared to the 
average of 22% among males), and with dependents (an average of 63 children per 100 single 
female-headed households compared to the average of 18 children per 100 single male 
households). Moreover, there is a degree of intersectionality within the social dimension of 
inequality, as on average a third of female-headed households between 1989-2013 were Black or 
Hispanic, compared to 18% of male households. This indicates that female-headed households 
constitute a particularly vulnerable group in terms of their income receipts and wealth 
accumulation possibilities. 
In addition to differences in capital income flows, the disparities in wealth accumulation 
ownership influenced debt repayments across gender. Table A1.14 in Appendix I shows that debt 
payments increased particularly rapidly among female households in terms of mortgage 
repayments, rising from $1,924 in 1989 to $4,317 in 2010 and falling to $3,368 in 2013. In 
contrast, mortgage payments among males grew at a slower rate, increasing from $7,009 in 1989 
to $11,661 in 2007, and declining more compared to female households after the Great Recession, 
reaching $8,604 in 2013. Trends in payments on revolving debt were similar across gender in the 
period. Similarly, both groups decreased their payments on non-revolving consumer debt between 
1989 and 2013, although the decline was smaller for women. Overall, given the increasing 
disparities of income documented above, these faster increases in debt payments among female-
headed households indicate their rising debt burden. 
Overall, these observed disparities in debt payments and capital income flows across gender 
can be understood by examining the composition of assets and debt among male- and female-
headed households. Figure 1.18 shows trends in the cumulative balance sheet composition for 
male and female households between 1989-2013. Asset portfolios of both groups were dominated 
by non-financial assets, although women relied more on vehicles and other non-financial assets, 
which contributed approximately 23% to the overall asset holdings in the period, with a low of 
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19% in 1998 (Panel C). The share of primary residence in total assets of female households 
increased over time from 36% in 1989 to around 39% before the 2007 crisis, reaching 37% in 
2013. Business equity and other real estate holdings constituted around 6% of female asset 
holdings in 1989, decreasing to 3% in 2013. In contrast, the asset side of men’s balance sheets 
(Panel A) was composed to a greater extent of other real estate and business equity, which 
accounted for around 12% of the total asset holdings in 1989, falling to 9% in 2013. Moreover, 
primary residence constituted a greater share of total asset holdings among men than women, with 
the contribution increasing from 42% in 1989 to 43% before the 2007 crisis, and decreasing to 
39% in 2013. In addition, the share of vehicles and other non-financial assets was lower for males 
than for female households, although it increased over time from 20% in 1989 to 22% in 2013. 
Among financial assets, transaction accounts contributed a greater portion to women’s balance 
sheets, which was approximately stable over time at 16%. In contrast, the contribution of 
transaction accounts to male households’ asset holdings increased over time from 8.5% in 1989 to 
9.4% in 2013. Moreover, the share of retirement and insurance assets was higher for men, rising 
from 9.5% in 1989 to 15% in 2013, compared to an increase from 7% to 13% among female 
households. Lastly, financial investment assets initially contributed more to women’s asset 
holdings – 12% compared to 8.5% for men – but by 2013 the share fell to 6% for both groups. 
In terms of debt composition, female-headed households relied more on unsecured debt than 
men. Instalment loans and credit card debt contributed 45% and 20% respectively to the total debt 
of females in 1989, compared to a 34% and 12% share for male households. However, the 
contribution of unsecured debt to total liabilities decreased over time among both groups, with the 
share of credit card debt in total debt peaking at 28% in 2001 among female households. In 
contrast, the contribution of mortgages to total debt increased over time for both men and women, 
although the share was higher for male households. Debt secured by primary residence accounted 
for 46.5% of the male debt holdings in 1989, increasing to 56.6% in 2007, and falling to 52% in 
2013. For female households, this type of debt contributed 28% to total debt holdings in 1989, 
rising to 43% in 2010, and declining to 38% in 2013. The share of debt secured by other real estate 
was higher for males, averaging approximately 4% between 1989-2013, compared to the average 
contribution of 2% to total debt holdings of female households. The average share of other types 
of debt (other debt and other unsecured lines of credit) averaged approximately 3.5% and 4% in 
the period for male and female households respectively. 
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Figure 1.18 Cumulative balance sheet composition by gender, USA 1989-2013 (source: U.S. 
Survey of Consumer Finances) 
 
Overall, we find that wealth portfolios of male households were more diversified than of 
females. This was related to the greater share of retirement assets, business equity, real estate, and 
secured debt in the balance sheets of males compared to females. In contrast, reliance on low-
yielding or illiquid non-financial assets and transaction accounts, as well as the greater share of 
unsecured debt in women’s balance sheets translated over time into increasing leverage of female 
households. Figure 1.19 shows changes in the median debt-to-asset ratio, debt-service-to-income 
ratio, and debt-to-income ratio conditional on holding debt across gender. While leverage was 
lower among female households than for males in the period, females experienced substantially 
faster increases in all indicators of leverage, particularly before the Great Recession. The debt-to-
asset ratio of female households rose from 2.5% in 1989 to 14.5% in 2013, with a peak of 17% in 
2010. In contrast, the ratio for males increased from 15.5% in 1989 to 21.6% in 2013. Importantly, 
while the debt-to-asset ratio among males declined in the aftermath of the Great Recession, falling 
from 23.3% in 2007 to 21.6% in 2013, the ratio for female households continued to rise in this 
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Moreover, due to larger increases before the Great Recession, the debt-service-to-income 
ratio for female households caught up with the ratio of males by 2010, rising from 12% in 1989 to 
18% in 2010. The debt-payments-to-income ratio for males increased from 15.9% to 18.2% in the 
period. Both male and female households experienced similar decreases in their debt-service-to-
income ratios in 2013 to 16% and 15.4% respectively. Similarly, the debt-to-income ratio 
increased faster for women than men, rising more than three-fold from 34% in 1989 to 109% in 
2010. In contrast, the ratio for male households increased from 57% to 122% in the period. As in 
the case of the debt-service-to-income ratio, the debt-to-income ratio declined for both men and 
women between 2010 and 2013 to 113% and 87% respectively. 
Figure 1.19 Leverage by gender, USA 1989-2013 (source: U.S. Survey of Consumer 
Finances) 
 
In sum, we observe clear differences in the structure of wealth ownership and income 
receipts across gender. Rising inequality was particularly vivid in the case of asset ownership. Not 
only did fewer women hold assets compared to men, particularly in terms of business equity, 
financial investment assets, and real estate other than main residence, but the values of their 
holdings were also persistently lower than for men. Moreover, while more female households 
became homeowners in the run up to the Great Recession, this was associated with increasing 
indebtedness of this group. Consequently, female households did not deleverage in the aftermath 
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of females were smaller than those of male households, indicating growing leverage as well as 
increasing debt burden on incomes. Thus, balance sheet heterogeneity emerges as a substantial 
determinant of wealth and income inequality across gender since the 1980s. 
1.3.3. Evolution of balance sheet composition by race 
In this subsection, we explore the role of wealth heterogeneity in driving the changes in income 
and wealth across race. This is because we observed a distinctive racial dimension of wealth and 
income inequality, as the top decile of the income distribution was found to consist almost 
exclusively of Whites.  
We distinguish between four ethnic groups of the household head – White, Black, Hispanic, 
and other. Figure 1.20 shows trends in income and net worth across race, while Table 1.6 presents 
the mean and median ratios of income and wealth between White households and the other ethnic 
groups. We observe large disparities in both income and wealth across race, which tended to 
decrease over time in the median terms, but increase for mean values. All types of racial disparities 
analysed below increased in the aftermath of the Great Recession. The largest differentials are 
observed between White and Black households, as well as between Whites and Hispanics. 
In terms of income, the median White household earned $54,681 in 1989, which was 2.6 
times more than $20,741 earned by the median Black household. This ratio declined to 1.8 in 
2013, as the median incomes of White and Black households rose to $54,788 and $30,436 
respectively. The mean ratio of White to Black income increased from 2.38 to 2.41 between 1989-
2013, as mean income of White households rose from $85,084 to $101,731, while Black 
households’ mean income increased from $35,788 to $42,208 in this period. Similarly, the White-
to-Hispanic median income ratio declined from 2.1 in 1989 to 1.7 in 2013, as the median income 
of Hispanics increased from $26,398 to $32,465. In contrast, the mean income ratio between 
Whites and Hispanics increased from 2.1 to 2.2 between 1989-2013, with the mean income of 
Hispanic households rising from $40,371 to $45,420. Conversely, the median and the mean 
income ratio between Whites and households from other ethnic groups averaged approximately 1 
in the period, suggesting little income differentials between these groups. The median and mean 
income of other ethnic groups increased from $41,482 to $58,842 and from $60,256 to $92,203 
respectively between 1989-2013. Furthermore, White households had the greatest differentials 
between the mean and median income over time, indicating higher intra-group inequality 
compared to the remaining ethnic groups. Overall, income increased across all races between 1989 
and 2013. However, while White households experienced the slowest growth of the median and 
mean income between 1989 and 2007, their income losses in the aftermath of the Great Recession 
were comparatively the lowest.  
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Differences in net wealth across ethnic groups in the period were more pronounced than for 
income. The ratio of the median net worth of White households to Black fell from 16.8 in 1989 to 
12.2 in 2013. White households increased their median wealth from $130,471 to $134,230 and the 
median net worth of Blacks rose from $7,773 to $11,030. In contrast, the mean White-to-Black net 
wealth ratio increased from 5.6 to 7.1, as mean net worth of White households rose from $418,124 
to $678,737 between 1989-2013 compared to an increase from $75,008 to $95,262 for Blacks. 
Similarly, the ratio of the median net worth of White to Hispanic households decreased from 14.4 
to 9.8 in this period, with the median net wealth of Hispanics increasing from $9,038 to $13,730. 
In turn, the mean ratio rose from 5.1 to 6.1, as the mean net worth of Hispanic households 
increased from $81,761 in 1989 to $112,227 in 2013. In contrast, wealth differences between 
Whites and other ethnicities were smaller compared to Blacks and Hispanics and declined over 
time. Between 1989 and 2013, White households held on average 1.3 and 1.8 times more wealth in 
the mean and median terms respectively than households from other ethnic groups. On the whole, 
all groups experienced increases in their net worth between 1989 and 2013, decelerating after the 
Great Recession. The mean net worth of White households, as well as the median and mean wealth 
of households from other ethnic groups increased at the highest rates. This was largely due to 
greater wealth losses among Black and Hispanic households during and after the 2007 crisis, 
which offset the net worth increases for these groups between 1989 and 2007. Furthermore, as in 
the case of income, disparities between mean and median net worth were the largest among White 
households, which indicates that within-group wealth inequality was the highest among this ethnic 
group. 
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Table 1.6 Income and wealth ratios by race, USA 1989-2013 (source: U.S. Survey of 
Consumer Finances) 
 
We argue that these trends in income and wealth contributing to higher racial inequality, 
particularly in the mean terms, were shaped by the differences in wealth accumulation across race. 
Table A1.16 in Appendix I shows trends in asset ownership across ethnic groups. We observe 
substantial disparities in asset holdings across race, with Whites and households from other ethnic 
group owning systematically more assets than Blacks and Hispanics. Between 1989 and 2013, the 
percentage of Black households holding any asset increased dramatically from 76.7% to 93%. 
Similarly, the proportion of Hispanic households owning assets rose from 86.5% to 95.6% in the 
period. Asset ownership rates were higher among White and other households, averaging 99% and 
97% respectively.  
The increases in asset ownership among Blacks and Hispanics were driven primarily by a 
rise in the proportion of households owning vehicles and other non-financial assets (rising from 
57.6% in 1989 to 73.7% in 2013 for Blacks, and from 77% to 81% for Hispanics), transaction 
accounts (an increase from 56.7% to 83.3% for Blacks, and 63.5% to 85.4% among Hispanics), 
and, to a smaller extent, retirement and insurance assets (ownership rate of 33% in 1989 rising to 
44.4% in 2013 among Blacks, and 26% increasing to 28.7% for Hispanics, with higher values in 
the 1990s), as well as primary residence. The homeownership rate was the lowest among 
Hispanics compared to the remaining ethnic group, increasing from 42% in 1989 to 49.2% in 2007 
before declining to 44% in 2013. The homeownership rate of Black households rose from 42.4% 
in 1989 to 50.2% in 2004 before the crisis, falling to 44% in 2013. In contrast, the homeownership 
rate of White households increased from 70.5% in 1989 to 75.8% in 2004, decreasing to 73% in 
2013, while among other ethnic groups the rate rose from 53.9% in 1989 to 60% in 2013, with a 
peak of 63.4% in 2007.  
 Income  Net worth 
 White-to-Black  White-to-
Hispanic 
 White-to-Other  White-to-Black  White-to-
Hispanic 
 White-to-Other 
 Median Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean 
1989 2.64 2.38  2.07 2.11  1.32 1.41  16.79 5.57  14.44 5.11  1.99 1.41 
1992 1.76 1.85  1.76 1.92  1.11 1.02  7.04 4.63  10.27 4.12  1.88 1.13 
1995 1.88 2.15  1.52 1.57  0.94 1.05  7.03 5.74  6.14 4.10  2.47 1.22 
1998 1.85 2.03  1.61 1.86  0.95 1.07  6.13 5.23  9.67 3.87  2.15 1.26 
2001 1.76 2.06  1.83 2.02  1.29 1.32  6.35 6.35  10.47 5.30  2.09 1.29 
2004 1.71 2.04  1.85 2.03  0.96 1.02  6.67 5.02  8.81 4.39  0.96 1.47 
2007 1.67 2.07  1.43 1.99  0.76 1.07  9.55 5.02  7.77 3.64  1.05 1.18 
2010 1.70 2.10  1.50 1.77  0.94 0.91  7.92 6.43  8.23 5.78  1.81 1.22 
2013 1.80 2.41  1.69 2.24  0.93 1.10  12.17 7.12  9.78 6.05  1.47 1.18 
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Moreover, while the percentage of Black and Hispanic households owning business equity 
increased over time from 5.5% to 6.3% and from 4.8% to 6.1% respectively, the proportion 
remained small, especially relative to White and other households, whose business equity 
ownership rate averaged 15% and 14% respectively between 1989-2013. In contrast, the 
percentage of households owning financial investment assets and other real estate decreased 
between 1989 and 2013 across all ethnic groups. The average ownership rate of other real estate 
among Blacks and Hispanics was 11% and 9% respectively, which constituted approximately half 
of the average ownership rate among Whites and other households of 21% and 17.5% respectively 
in the period. Similarly, the percentage of households owning financial investment assets averaged 
25.7% and 18.7% among Blacks and Hispanics respectively, compared to the average rate of 55% 
among Whites and 44.5% for households from other ethnic groups. 
These differences in asset ownership rates race were mirrored by disparities in the value of 
asset holdings. While increases in the median and mean asset value were the highest for Black, 
Hispanic, and other households, they experienced the greatest asset losses in the aftermath of the 
Great Recession compared to Whites. Moreover, the value of asset holdings among Blacks and 
Hispanics was systematically lower than that of Whites and other ethnic groups. The median asset 
value of Blacks increased from $48,497 in 1989 to $76,013 in 2007, declining to $44,120 in 2013, 
while the mean value rose from $124,000 to $245,352 between 1989-2007, falling to $157,722 in 
2013. The median asset value of Hispanics increased from $29,283 in 1989 to $79,303 in 2007, 
declining to $39,870 in 2013, and the mean value rose from $137,535 in 1989 to $322,496 in 
2007, decreasing to $175,513 in 2013. In contrast, the median value of asset holdings among 
Whites surpassed the mean of both Hispanics and Blacks at $179,727 in 1989, rising to $295,744 
in 2007 before falling to $231,500 in 2013. Moreover, mean asset holdings of Whites increased 
from $477,934 to $881,188 between 1989-2007, declining to $786,532 in 2013. Similarly, the 
median asset holdings of other ethnic groups rose from $87,306 in 1989 to $328,755 in 2007, 
decreasing to $190,200 in 2013, while the mean value increased from $364,556 to $804,212 
between 1989-2007, falling to $717,768 in 2013. 
The growth of asset holdings among Blacks and Hispanics is explained by increases in the 
value of primary residence, retirement and insurance assets, and business equity. Between 1989 
and 2007, Blacks increased their mean holdings of primary residence from $61,636 to $124,715, 
while the holdings of Hispanics rose from $72,630 to $159,945. However, the value of homes 
among these groups declined substantially after the Great Recession, to $70,605 for Blacks and 
$86,779 for Hispanics in 2013. In contrast, the mean value of primary residence among Whites 
and other ethnic groups increased from $143,957 to $263,465 and from $127,826 to $289,684 
respectively between 1989-2007, decreasing to a smaller extent after the crisis, reaching $202,566 
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and $254,371 respectively in 2013. Furthermore, despite rapid increases of retirement and 
insurance asset holdings among Blacks and Hispanics, the rise was higher for Whites and other 
ethnic groups. The mean holdings of retirement and insurance assets increased from $10,408 to 
$36,434 for Blacks between 1989-2007, and from $10,427 to $24,872 for Hispanics, declining to 
$23,003 and $13,521 respectively in 2013. In contrast, the value of holdings for Whites rose from 
$40,837 in 1989 to $139,925 in 2013, continuing to expand during and after the 2007 crisis, while 
the mean holdings of other ethnic groups increased from $21,351 to $85,450 in that period, 
peaking at $112,941 in 2010. Similarly, while the mean holdings of business equity expanded the 
most among Blacks and Hispanics, their value was substantially lower than that of Whites and 
other ethnic groups. The mean value of business equity of Blacks increased from $5,070 to 
$22,449 between 1989-2013, with a high of $23,397 in 2004, while holdings of Hispanics rose 
from $6,224 to $31,185 in these years, peaking at $41,219 in 2007. In contrast, the mean value of 
business equity among Whites increased from $91,127 in 1989 to $176,695 in 2007 before falling 
to $139,222 in 2013, while holdings of other ethnic groups rose from $106,673 to $195,360 
between 1989-2007, decreasing to $151,040 in 2013. 
Moreover, increases in the value of financial investment assets holdings were substantial 
among Hispanics before the 2007 crisis, rising from $5,414 in 1989 to $21,150 in 2004, but they 
fell steeply after the Great Recession to $9,072 in 2013. The holdings among Blacks rose from 
$9,445 in 1989 to $17,171 in 1998, declining thereafter to $9,135 in 2013. In contrast, holdings of 
financial investment assets among Whites nearly doubled from $86,848 to $155,005 between 
1989-2013, while the mean holdings among other ethnic groups increased from $19,505 in 1989 to 
$80,510 in 2013, peaking at $109,219 in 2010. Furthermore, while Blacks and Hispanics 
experienced increases in the value of other real estate between 1989-2007, large losses in the 
aftermath of the Great Recession resulted in an overall decline in the value of these holdings in the 
whole period. The mean value of other real estate among Blacks expanded from $17,790 in 1989 
to $29,492 in 2007 before declining to $13,429 in 2013, while the holdings of Hispanics grew 
from $23,124 to $59,107 between 1989-2007, falling to $14,058 in 2013. In contrast, the post-
crisis losses in the value of other real estate were relatively lower among Whites and other ethnic 
groups, leading to an overall increase in these holdings between 1989 and 2013. The mean value 
of other real estate among Whites rose from $62,837 to $77,794 in 2013, peaking at $91,271 in 
2007, while the holdings of other ethnic groups increased from $56,937 to $81,478 between 1989-
2013, with a high of $115,014 in 2007. 
Similarly, Whites and other ethnic groups saw larger increases in the value of transaction 
accounts compared to an overall zero and negative growth for Blacks and Hispanics respectively. 
The mean holdings of Whites rose from $28,046 to $43,544 between 1989-2013, while the 
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holdings of other ethnic groups increased from $13,008 to $41,099 in the period. In contrast, the 
mean value of transaction accounts for Blacks was $6,534 in 1989, rising to $7,515 in 2007 before 
declining to $6,558 in 2013. The holdings among Hispanics decreased over the period from $8,365 
to $5,949 between 1989-2013, with a peak of $13,321 in 1998. Moreover, due to large losses in 
the Great Recession Blacks experienced an overall decrease in their holdings of vehicles and other 
non-financial assets from $13,116 to $12,543 between 1989-2013, peaking at $15,570 in 2007. In 
contrast, the holdings of Hispanics rose from $11,330 in 1989 to $18,921 in 2004 before falling to 
$14,949 in 2013. In addition, vehicles and other non-financial assets holdings among Whites and 
other ethnic groups increased between 1989 and 2013 from $24,282 to $28,477 and from $19,256 
to $23,820 respectively, with comparatively smaller reductions in the value of these assets after the 
Great Recession. 
The above disparities of asset holdings influenced debt accumulation possibilities across 
race. Table A1.17 in Appendix I presents changes in debt holdings across ethnic groups. The 
percentage of households owning debt was more uniform across race than in terms of assets. The 
debt ownership rate among Blacks increased the most compared to the remaining ethnic groups, 
rising from 65% in 1989 to 77.2% in 2007, and declining to 75.4% in 2013. Similarly, the 
proportion of White households holding debt increased in the period from 73.2% in 1989 to 77.9% 
in 2004, falling to 75% in 2013. In contrast, the percentage of Hispanics and households from 
other ethnic groups holding debt decreased between 1989 and 2013, which was driven by declines 
after the Great Recession. The proportion of Hispanics owning debt rose from 72.4% in 1989 to 
74% in 2007, declining to 70.6% in 2013, while the debt ownership rate for other ethnic groups 
rose from 76.6% in 1989 to 82.6% in 2007 before decreasing to 72.5% in 2013. 
The increase in the percentage of Blacks holding debt between 1989 and 2013 is explained 
by higher proportion of these households holding mortgages secured by primary residence (an 
increase from 24.8% in 1989 to 38.2% in 2007, declining to 30% in 2013), instalment debt (47.4% 
ownership rate in 1989 increasing to 55.7% in 2013, with a low of 39.3% in 1998), and credit card 
balances (33.4% rising to 52% in 2001 before declining to 36.1% in 2013). The expansion of debt 
ownership among Hispanics can be attributed to rapid increases in the percentage of households 
owning credit card debt (34.7% in 1989 rising to 41.8% in 2013, with a peak of 56% in 1995), and 
mortgages secured by main residence (31% increasing to 37.9% between 1989-2010 before 
declining to 29% in 2013). In contrast, the proportion of Hispanics holding instalment debt 
declined in the period from 52% in 1989 to 43% in 2013. Similarly, ownership of instalment loans 
decreased over time for Whites and households from other ethnic groups, from 49.3% to 46.1% 
and 51.6% to 45.5% respectively. In addition, Whites and other households decreased their 
ownership rate of credit card debt between 1989 and 2013, from 41.4% to 38.6% and 36.9% to 
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29% respectively. In contrast, the percentage of Whites and households from other ethnic groups 
holding mortgages increased over time. The ownership rate of debt secured by primary residence 
among Whites rose from 43% in 1989 to 51.8% in 2007, declining to 47.9% in 2013, while the 
rate among other ethnic groups increased from 36.6% to in 1989 to 51.9% in 2007 before falling to 
40.4% in 2013. Moreover, the ownership rate of debt secured by property other than main 
residence increased for both groups, from 5.8% to 6.1% for Whites between 1989-2013, and from 
5.7% in 1989 to 6.1% in 2010 for other ethnicities, falling to 5.7% in 2013. In contrast, the 
ownership rate of debt secured by other real estate averaged just 3% for both Blacks and Hispanics 
in the period. Lastly, the ownership rate of other unsecured lines of credit averaged approximately 
2% across all races between 1989-2013, while the average ownership rate of other debt averaged 
7% for all groups. 
Despite similarity of debt ownership rates across race, the value of debt holdings of Blacks 
and Hispanics was lower between 1989 and 2013 than for Whites and other ethnic groups. The 
value of debt holdings increased for all ethnicities in the period, with Blacks and Hispanics 
deleveraging more than Whites and other ethnic groups in the aftermath of the Great Recession. 
Debt holdings of Black households increased rapidly in the period, with the median value rising 
from $9,038 in 1989 to $32,561 in 2007, decreasing to $25,540 in 2013, and the mean value 
increasing from $30,972 to $98,621 between 1989-2007 before declining to $68,216 in 2013. 
Similarly, the median debt holdings of Hispanics rose from $15,943 in 1989 to $58,835 in 2007, 
falling to $25,000 in 2013, while their mean holdings increased from $51,347 to $131,971 between 
1989-2007, decreasing to $78,706 in 2013. Among White households, the median debt holdings 
expanded from $34,037 to $89,379 in 2010, indicating continued debt accumulation immediately 
after the 2007 crisis, falling to $80,000 in 2013. The mean value of debt for White households rose 
from $71,275 in 1989 to $153,565 in 2010, decreasing to $135,831 in 2013. Moreover, the median 
debt holdings of other ethnic groups rose from $19,883 to $109,313 between 1989-2010, falling to 
$83,000 in 2013, while the mean value of debt increased from $76,441 in 1989 to $202,027 in 
2010, declining to $184,280 in 2013. 
Increases in debt holdings among Blacks and Hispanics were driven primarily by the rising 
value of credit card debt and mortgages secured by main residence. The rise in the mean value of 
credit card balances was particularly high among Hispanics, increasing from $1,585 to $4,343 in 
2007 before falling to $2,512 in 2013. The holdings of Blacks rose from $1,967 to $3,666 in 2007, 
but declined to $1,667 in 2013, resulting in an overall decline in the period. Similarly, other ethnic 
groups experienced an overall reduction in the value of their credit card debt between 1989 and 
2013, decreasing from $2,263 to $1,884, with a peak of $4,775 in 2004. In contrast, the holdings 
of credit card balances increased over time among Whites, from $1,864 in 1989 to $3,323 in 2013, 
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peaking at $5,249 in 2007. Furthermore, the mean value of mortgages secured by primary 
residence among Blacks rose from $18,785 in 1989 to $73,885 in 2007, decreasing to $45,820 in 
2013, while holding of Hispanics increased from $36,133 to $92,607 between 1989-2007 before 
falling to $60,810 in 2013. Similarly to the other types of debt, the value of mortgages secured by 
main residence was higher among Whites and other ethnic groups. The mean holdings of Whites 
increased from $49,049 in 1989 to $99,886 in 2013, peaking at $114,438 in 2010, which suggests 
continued accumulation of mortgages by Whites immediately after the Great Recession. The 
holdings of other ethnic groups rose from $54,723 to $159,398 between 1989-2007, falling to 
$149,089 in 2013. 
Moreover, the value of mortgages secured by other real estate among Blacks and Hispanics 
grew rapidly between 1989 and 2007, but it declined substantially in the aftermath of the Great 
Recession. Moreover, the overall value of these holdings was small compared to the other types of 
debt. The mean value of mortgages secured by other property increased from $1,442 in 1989 to 
$8,166 in 2007 among Blacks, falling to $4,586 in 2013, while the holdings of Hispanics rose 
from $3,582 to $18,568 between 1989-2007 before declining to $3,369 in 2013. In contrast, these 
holdings increased for Whites and other ethnic groups between 1989 and 2013, rising from $5,506 
to $13,169 and from $8,890 to $14,832 respectively, with a high of $15,862 for Whites and 
$21,540 for other ethnic groups in 2010. 
Furthermore, the mean value of instalment loans increased across all ethnic groups over 
time, although the increases were the fastest among Blacks and Hispanics. Holdings of instalment 
debt among Blacks rose from $8,448 in 1989 to $15,720 in 2013, peaking at $16,861 in 2010. 
Similarly, the mean holdings of instalment debt among other ethnic groups increased from $9,710 
to $16,480 between 1989-2007, with a high of $19,114 in 2010. The continued rise in instalment 
debt holdings between 2007 and 2010 among Blacks and other ethnic groups indicates that they 
may have accumulated this type of unsecured debt to compensate for the falling value of 
mortgages and credit card balances. In contrast, while the holdings of instalment loans among 
Hispanics increased from $7,879 in 1989 to $13,948 in 2007, they declined steadily after the Great 
Recession to $11,278 in 2013, suggesting that these compensation effects were weaker among this 
group. Moreover, White households experienced a steady increase in the value of their instalment 
loans between 1989-2013, rising from $11,635 to $16,701. Lastly, the mean value of other 
unsecured lines of credit was particularly small relative to the other types of debt across all racial 
groups, averaging $950, $396, $238, and $106 among Whites, other ethnic groups, Hispanics, and 
Blacks respectively between 1989-2013. Moreover, the value of other debt holdings decreased in 
this period among all groups, and averaged $2,230 for Whites, $1,616 for other ethnic groups, 
$972 for Hispanics, and $705 for Blacks. 
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The above differences in wealth accumulation across race influenced income inequality by 
generating disparate capital income flows and leverage dependent on the size of wealth holdings. 
Table A1.18 in Appendix I presents trends in wages, capital income, and transfer income across 
race. We observe that income from capital gains increased over time among Whites and other 
households, rising from $5,456 in 1989 to $5,525 in 2013, with a peak of $8,118 in 2007 for 
Whites, and from $298 to $1,340 in 2013 for other ethnic groups, with recorded mean capital 
losses of $326 in 2007. In contrast, capital gains receipts declined for Black households in this 
period, from $185 in 1989 to $141 in 2013, with a pre-recession peak of $1,003 in 2007. Similarly, 
Hispanic households experienced decrease in their realised capital gains inflows from $587 in 
1989 to $53 in 2013, with a peak of $796 in 2007 followed by capital losses of $520 in 2010. 
Furthermore, Blacks and Hispanics experienced smaller increases in their receipts of social 
security and retirement income in the period, rising from $4,479 to $7,446 and from $1,925 to 
$3,384 respectively between 1989-2013, while White households recorded an increase from 
$7,147 to $13,649 in the period.  
In contrast, Blacks and Hispanics experienced greater increases in their business income 
receipts than White and other households, although at substantially lower magnitudes. Business 
income inflows for Black households rose from $689 in 1989 to $3,759 in 2007, declining to 
$2,096 in 2013, while Hispanics saw an increase from $2,911 in 1989 to $4,694 in 2013, with a 
peak of $5,780 in 2001. The receipts of income from business ownership were substantially higher 
among White and other households, rising from $10,238 to $14,156 and from $9,787 to $10,585 
respectively between 1989-2013. Similarly, the inflows of interest and dividend income were 
higher for White and other households, decreasing from $6,232 in 1989 to $4,004 in 2013 for the 
former, and rising from $1,756 to $2,215 for the latter. In contrast, Black households received 
$435 in interest and dividend payments in 1989, declining to $319 in 2013, while the mean value 
of the receipts among Hispanic households fell from $1,298 in 1989 to $58 in 2013.  
Furthermore, we observe that Whites and households from other ethnic groups experienced 
greater increases in their wage income between 1989-2007 and lower losses after the 2007 crisis 
compared to Black and Hispanic households. Wages of White households rose from $55,449 in 
1989 to $65,072 in 2007, declining to $60,838 in 2013, while wages of other ethnic groups 
increased from $44,486 to $79,931 between 1989-2007, falling to $71,540 in 2013. In contrast, 
wage receipts of Black households rose from $28,706 to $38,978 in 2007, decreasing to $29,033 in 
2013, while wages of Hispanics increased from $34,887 to $43,698 between 1989-2007, falling to 
$35,259 in 2013. This volatility indicates greater degree of employment insecurity among minority 
households. 
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Lastly, transfer income inflows were more uniform across the analysed ethnic groups, with 
the highest values recorded in 1992. Hispanic households experienced the largest increase in their 
transfer income receipts, rising from $1,445 in 1989 to $2,116 in 2013. Similarly, transfer income 
of White households increased from $2,734 to $3,254 in the period. In contrast, Black households 
saw their transfer income receipts fall between 1989 and 2013, from $2,973 to $2,835, as did 
households from other ethnic groups, whose inflows decreased from $4,345 to $3,404. Given large 
disparities in the other sources of income, this indicates that policy of social transfers in the USA 
in the period did not do enough to alleviate racial disparities in income, particularly for Blacks. 
Apart from the disparities in capital income flows, balance sheet composition influenced the 
amount of debt repayments across race. Table A1.19 in Appendix I presents trends in payments on 
various types of debt by race. Mortgage payments constituted the largest source of debt payments 
across all groups. Black households experienced the fastest increases in mortgage repayments, 
which nearly tripled form $2,513 in 1989 to $6,883 in 2007, declining to $3,970 in 2013. 
Mortgage payments of Hispanic households more than doubled in that period, rising from $3,963 
in 1989 to $8,275 in 2007, before falling to $4,421 in 2013.  Similarly, other ethnic groups 
increased their payments on mortgages more than twofold from $6,410 in 1989 to $13,925 in 
2007, falling to $10,096 in 2013. Mortgage payments of White households increased to a smaller 
extent in the period, rising from $6,200 in 1989 to $7,983 in 2013, with a peak of $9,971 in 2007. 
Furthermore, revolving debt payments increased between 1989-2013 for Whites and Hispanics, 
but declined among Blacks and other households, Moreover, there was an overall decrease in the 
mean consumer debt payments across all ethnic groups, with a rise between 1989-2007 for 
Hispanics and other households. Overall, the disparities in debt payments across ethnic groups 
were substantially lower than the differences in income. This indicates that the debt burden was 
higher for Blacks and Hispanics, whose incomes were systematically lower than those of White 
and other households. 
The above differences in debt payments and capital income flows across ethnic groups stem 
from the disparate composition of asset and debt holdings across race. Figure 1.21 shows the 
cumulative balance sheet composition of the analysed ethnic groups. Between 1989 and 2013, 
asset holdings of Black and Hispanic households relied more on vehicles and other-non-financial 
assets compared to Whites and other ethnic groups. These assets comprised 26% of the total assets 
of Blacks in 1989 increasing to 30% in 2013, and the average of 37% of total assets of Hispanics 
(with a low of 33% in 2007), compared to the average share of 18% and 21% for White and other 
households respectively. In contrast, asset holdings of Whites and households from other ethnic 
backgrounds were composed in greater part of business equity, other real estate, and financial 
investment assets. The share of business equity and other real estate declined over time from 11% 
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to 8% for Whites and from 12% to 8.7% for other ethnic groups, compared to an average 
contribution of 5% for both Blacks and Hispanics between 1989 and 2013. Similarly, the share of 
financial investment assets fell from 11% to 7.5% between 1989 and 2013 for Whites, and 
averaged 7.5% in the period for other ethnic groups, compared to an average contribution of 3% 
for Hispanics, and a share of 6% decreasing to 3% for Blacks.  
Moreover, primary residence accounted for more than a third of total assets across all 
groups. The share of primary residence in total assets was the highest among Whites and other 
households, averaging 41% and 36% respectively between 1989 and 2013, with a peak of 43.7% 
in 2004 for Whites and 40.5% in 2007 for other ethnic groups. The contribution of primary 
residence was the lowest among Hispanics, falling from 36.8% in 1989 to 32.5% in 2013 
(increasing before the Great Recession to 37.6% in 2004), as well as for Blacks, declining from 
40.5% in 1989 to 32.1% in 2013, with a pre-crisis peak of 38.7% in 2004. In contrast, the share of 
transaction accounts increased over time for Blacks and Hispanics, rising from 11.4% to 16.5% 
and from 12.6% to 15% respectively between 1989 and 2013, while this contribution declined for 
Whites and other households in this period, from 9.8% to 9.6% and 18% to 13.7% respectively. 
Lastly, the share of retirement and insurance assets increased for all ethnic groups between 1989 
and 2013. The rise was the highest for Whites and other households, from 9.4% to 16% and 5% to 
12% respectively. For Blacks, the contribution increased from 9% to 13%, while for Hispanics it 
rose from 6% to 8%, with the highest proportion between 1995 and 1998 for Black, Hispanic, and 
other households. 
On the liability side of household balance sheets, Blacks and Hispanics relied more on 
unsecured debt holdings. Instalment debt accounted for 50% of the total liabilities of Blacks in 
1989, falling to 33% in 1998, while for Hispanics the share decreased from 43% in 1989 to 29% in 
1995. In the later waves of the data, the contribution of instalment debt rebounded among Blacks 
and Hispanics, rising to 50% and 37% respectively in 2013. The share of instalment loans in total 
debt of White households declined from 33% to 24.5% between 1989-2004, increasing to 27.8% 
in 2013, while the share for other ethnic groups fell from 40.8% to 24% between 1989-2007 before 
rising to 34.7% in 2013. Conversely, credit card balances contributed 18.6% and 14.7% to total 
debt of Blacks and Hispanics respectively in 1989, increasing to 23.4% and 23.7% in 2001 before 
declining to 11.6% for Blacks and 22.1% for Hispanics in 2013. The share of credit card balances 
in total debt of Whites declined between 1989-2013 from 12.8% to 11.5%, with a peak of 16.6% 
in 1995, while the share for other ethnic groups increased initially from 14.3% in 1989 to 21.6% in 
1992 before decreasing to 11% in 2013. 
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In contrast, debt holdings of White and other households in the period studied consisted 
mainly of mortgages. Debt secured by primary residence accounted for 46% of all liabilities of 
Whites in 1989, rising to 54% in 2013, with a peak of 57% in 2010. For other ethnic groups, the 
contribution increased from 37% in 1989 to 56% in 2007 before falling to 49% in 2013. Moreover, 
the share of mortgages secured by other property in total debt averaged 3.5% in the period for 
Whites, declining from 5% to 3% for other ethnic groups. The contribution of mortgages secured 
by primary residence to total debt was lower among Blacks and Hispanics. For Blacks, the share 
increased from 28% to 43% between 1989 and 2004, declining to 33% in 2013, while among 
Hispanics the contribution rose from 35% in 1989 to 45.5% in 2010 before falling to 36% in 2013. 
Furthermore, the share of debt secured by other real estate averaged only 2% for both Blacks and 
Hispanics. Lastly, other types of debt (i.e. other debt and other unsecured lines of credit) 
contributed 4% on average to total liabilities across all ethnic groups between 1989 and 2013. 
Figure 1.21 Cumulative balance sheet composition by race, USA 1989-2013 (source: U.S. Survey 
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This heterogeneity of balance sheet composition across race had a direct impact on the 
degree of leverage among ethnic groups. Figure 1.22 shows changes in the median debt-to-asset 
ratio, debt-service-to-income ratio, and debt-to-income ratio by race between 1989-2013, 
conditional on holding debt. Blacks and Hispanics experienced rapid increases in their leverage in 
the run up to the Great Recession. The debt-to-asset ratio of Hispanics rose from 23.5% in 1989 to 
27.8% in 2007, while the ratio of Black households nearly quadrupled in the period, rising from 
7.7% in 1989 to 29.2% in 2007. The increase in the debt-to-asset ratio was also substantial among 
households from other ethnic groups, rising from 14.9% to 26.3% in that period, while the ratio 
among White households increased to a smaller extent, from 11.8% in 1989 to 18.1% in 2007. 
However, trends in the median debt-to-asset ratio were drastically different across race in the 
aftermath of the Great Recession. Notably, while Black households initially deleveraged, reducing 
their debt-to-asset ratio to 23.3% in 2010, their leverage increased in 2013 as the debt-to-asset 
ratio rose to 31.4%, surpassing its 2007 level. Similarly, the ratio of households from other ethnic 
groups decreased initially to 19.4% in 2010 before rising to 20.2% in 2013, which was 
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initially increased to 21.9% in 2010, it declined to 18.3% in 2013. Lastly, the ratio of Hispanic 
households declined steadily in this period, reaching 22.8% in 2013. 
The increases in leverage for Blacks and Hispanics were also substantial in terms of the 
debt-service-to-income ratio, which rose from 14.8% to 19.5% between 1989 and 2007 for Blacks 
and from 18.4% to 21.1% in that period for Hispanics. However, after the Great Recession the 
ratio fell for these groups, to 14.2% and 15.8% respectively in 2013, resulting in an overall 
decrease between 1989 and 2013. In contrast, the ratio of both Whites and other ethnic groups rose 
from approximately 15% in 1989 to ca 19% in 2007, declining to 16% in 2013. Furthermore, 
Whites and other ethnic groups had the highest levels of the debt-to-income ratio in the period, 
increasing from 52.3% to 140.5% between 1989 and 2010 for other ethnic groups, and from 56% 
to 130% for Whites. This is explained by greater asset holdings serving as collateral among Whites 
and other households, which allowed for larger debt accumulation. Despite the overall lower level, 
Blacks experienced one of the most rapid increases in the debt-to-income ratio before the Great 
Recession, rising from 27% in 1989 to 86.7% in 2007. Moreover, the ratio for Hispanics nearly 
doubled between 1989 and 2007, rising from 66.4% to 107.2%. 
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In sum, the analysis of changes in the value and composition of wealth across race over 
time, as well as the corresponding trends in income and debt repayments reveals that Blacks and 
Hispanics were systematically disadvantaged in terms of the size of their asset holdings and 
income receipts compared to Whites and other ethnic groups. Moreover, they experienced the 
largest losses of income and wealth in the aftermath of the Great Recession. Greater reliance on 
low-yielding or illiquid assets and unsecured debt among Blacks and Hispanics, coupled with the 
sluggish growth of income and rising mortgage repayments, translated into increasing fragility of 
their financial positions before and after the Great Recession. This was directly related to the 
expansion of subprime credit by financial intermediaries, leading to unsustainable increases in 
homeownership and subsequent losses in their asset values due to the collapsing housing market 
and foreclosures. Consequently, financial sector transformation contributed to racial inequality of 
income and wealth by shaping the aforementioned differences in asset and debt ownership among 
ethnic groups. Thus, based on the above examination of the data, in the remaining analysis in this 
thesis we cluster ethnic groups into two categories – White/Other and Black/Hispanic – due the 
similarity of their experiences between 1989 and 2013. 
1.3.4. Evolution of balance sheet composition by age group 
Lastly, since many of the subprime borrowers targeted by financial intermediaries in the run up to 
the Great Recession were young, we examine changes in wealth composition and income receipts 
across age groups to understand their role in raising intergenerational inequalities. We distinguish 
between six age groups: households below 35 years old, those aged 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 55 to 64, 65 
to 74, and those 75 years old and above
30
. As we are inherently interested in changes among the 
youngest group of households, the analysis below is focused mainly on households aged less than 
35. However, by looking at all the age profiles, we are able to gauge any potential life-cycle 
effects across households. These effects are based on the life-cycle theory of consumption, which 
postulates an inverse U-shaped relationship between age and income/wealth
31
.  
Figure 1.23 presents trends in the median and mean before-tax income across age groups 
between 1989 and 2013. Households above 75 years old had the lowest median income in the 
period (Panel A of Fig.1.23), increasing from $24,512 in 1989 to $28,407 in 2013. Until 2010, 
                                                   
30
 Note that the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances is a repeated cross section rather than a panel (see 
Chapter 4, section 4.1. for methodological details). Consequently, the analysed age groups are not 
continuous over time as they would be in a longitudinal setting. Thus, we are comparing how each age 
group has fared over the years of the survey, rather than following the evolution of incomes and wealth 
across the age profile of a household. 
31
 Further description as well as empirical evaluation of the life-cycle theory of consumption is 
presented in Chapter 2, section 2.2. 
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these households also had the lowest levels of mean income in the sample rising from $46,211 in 
1989 to $49,138 that year, but their mean income of $50,728 in 2013 surpassed the value for 
households below 35 years old (Panel B of Fig.1.23). The youngest group experienced a fall in 
both the median and the mean value of income. This was driven by large losses in the aftermath of 
the Great Recession. The median income of households younger than 35 increased initially from 
$37,711 in 1989 to $43,203 in 2001, declining to $35,509 in 2013, while their mean income rose 
from $50,420 in 1989 to $58,100 in 2007 before falling to $48,700 in 2013. Households between 
45 to 64 years old earned the highest levels of the median and the mean income in the period, 
followed by households aged between 35 and 44. Households between 65 and 74 years old 
initially had one of the lowest income levels across all age groups ($30,169 median and $64,620 
mean income in 1989), but substantial income growth of this group allowed them to catch up with 
the richest households by 2013, particularly in the mean terms. Overall, we seem to observe a non-
linear hump-shaped relationship between age and income, confirming the presence of the life-
cycle effects. However, these had become less clear-cut over time, with uneven income growth 
across age groups in the period studied. Moreover, we observe that the youngest households in the 
earlier waves of the data, corresponding to the baby boomers born between the mid-1940s to the 
mid-1960s, faced better income prospects compared to their peers in the later waves of the data. 
Figure 1.23 Income by age group, USA 1989-2013 (source: U.S. Survey of Consumer 
Finances) 
These trends were somewhat different in the case of wealth. Figure 1.24 shows changes in 
the median and mean net worth by age group between 1989 and 2013. In this case, households 
below 35 years old lagged behind the other age groups, and this wealth gap increased over time. 
The median net worth of the youngest group initially rose from $14,696 in 1989 to $17,511 in 
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1989 and 2007 (Panel B in Fig.1.24). However, large losses around the time of the Great 
Recession led to an overall decline in the median and the mean net worth of the youngest group to 
$10,460 and $75,432 respectively in 2013. Furthermore, households between 35 and 64 years old 
experienced an overall decrease of their median net worth in the period, following a peak in the 
mid-2000s. This suggests that as the young households got older, their median wealth 
accumulation decreased relative to their peers in the previous waves of the survey. In the case of 
mean net worth, households aged between 35 and 64 experienced sluggish increases in their 
wealth. Overall, the highest levels of median and mean wealth in the period were observed for 
households aged 55-74. Moreover, unlike in the case of income, households aged 75 and above 
had one of the highest median and mean values of wealth relatively to the other age groups. This 
suggests that the life-cycle effects were less pronounced for wealth, with net worth increasing 
somewhat with age in the period studied. 
Figure 1.24 Net worth by age group, USA 1989-2013 (source: U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances) 
We argue that these differences in income and wealth across age groups were related to 
disparities in asset and debt ownership between 1989-2013. Table A1.20 in Appendix I presents 
trends in the ownership of various assets by age groups between 1989 and 2013. The percentage of 
households owning assets was high and exceeding 90% across all age categories. The youngest 
group experienced the largest increase in their asset ownership rate before the Great Recession, 
rising from 92.3% in 1989 to 97.1% in 2007. However, after the 2007 crisis there was a substantial 
decline in the percentage of households below 35 owning assets, reaching 92.2% in 2013. In 
contrast, the proportion of households owning assets among the other age groups increased over 
time, reaching 100% among households aged 45 and above by 2013. 
The rise in the asset ownership rate of households below 35 years old was driven by an 
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to 41.6% in 2004, with a notable fall after the Great Recession to 35.6% in 2013), transaction 
accounts (80.2% rising to 90.2% in 2013), and retirement and insurance assets (38.5% increasing 
to 42.6% between 1989-2013, with a peak of 51.6% in 1995). Nevertheless, the youngest group 
had the lowest ownership rates for all types of assets in the period compared to the other age 
groups, averaging 7% for other real estate and 82.6% for vehicles and other non-financial assets. 
Moreover, the percentage of households below 35 owning business equity and financial 
investment assets decreased between 1989 and 2013 from 10.3% to 6.5% and from 43.6% to 
28.3% respectively. In contrast, the ownership rate of primary residence, transaction accounts, and 
financial investment assets was increasing with age in the period, while the percentage of 
households owning other property, business equity, retirement and insurance assets, and vehicles 
and other non-financial assets was the highest among households aged between 35 and 74. 
This relatively low asset ownership among the youngest group was paralleled by the 
systematically lower values of asset holdings compared to the other age categories. The median 
value of assets among households below 35 decreased from $36,513 in 1989 to $29,520 in 2013, 
peaking at $51,478 in 2001, while the mean value fell from $147,260 to $143,166 in the period, 
with a peak of $220,011 in 2007. The median asset holdings of households between 35 and 54 
years old also decreased over time, while their mean holdings expanded, as did the mean and 
median holdings of households older than 54. All age groups experienced decreases in the mean 
and median values of assets in the aftermath of the Great Recession, although the losses were the 
highest for households younger than 54.  
The increase in the value of asset holdings among the youngest group was driven primarily 
by the rising value of main residence, from $63,879 in 1989 to $109,782 in 2007. Growth in the 
value of other real estate and business equity was also substantial for this group, but the magnitude 
of their holdings remained low compared to primary residence. The mean value of other real estate 
among households aged below 35 increased from $8,862 to $15,533 between 1989 and 2007, and 
the value of business equity rose from $27,588 in 1989 to $42,731 in 2007. Moreover, the value of 
financial investment assets increased for the youngest group between 1989 and 2001, from 
$18,107 to $32,428. However, after the Great Recession households aged below 35 experienced 
substantial losses in their asset holdings, leading to an overall fall in the value of primary 
residence, business equity, and financial investment assets in the period, which declined to 
$61,443, $21,277, and $14,414 respectively in 2013. Holdings of the other types of assets also 
decreased among this group after the 2007 crisis, but the losses were relatively smaller. In the 
whole period the value of retirement and insurance assets among the youngest group expanded 
from $8,424 in 1989 to $12,697 in 2013, peaking at $21,740 in 2001, while holdings of other real 
estate reached $9,169 in 2013. Moreover, transaction accounts increased from $6,364 to $9,365 
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between 1989-2013, and the mean holdings of vehicles and other non-financial assets rose from 
$14,036 to $14,800 in this period, peaking at $19,102 in 2007. 
This experience of the youngest group was dramatically different from trends in the value of 
assets among older households, whose holdings rose over time. Increases in holdings of all types 
of asset were particularly rapid for households aged 55 and above, especially in the value of 
profitable financial investment assets, retirement and insurance assets, and other real estate (except 
for the other real estate holdings of households aged 55 to 64). Overall, these trends suggest that 
younger households faced lower asset accumulation possibilities than the older households and 
their peers from the earlier waves of the data. Moreover, the Great Recession had uneven 
consequences for wealth across age groups, with a particularly damaging impact on asset 
accumulation possibilities of the young generation in the recent years. 
These differences in asset holdings across age groups translated into disparities in the 
ownership of debt. Table A1.21 in Appendix I shows trends in debt ownership by age between 
1989 and 2013. The proportion of households aged below 35 holding debt increased rapidly before 
the Great Recession, rising from 80% in 1989 to 83.6% in 2007. After the crisis, there was a large 
drop in the proportion of young households owning debt, to 77.1% in 2013. In the whole period, 
the debt ownership rate was the highest among households aged 35 to 54, declining steeply with 
age after that threshold. Nevertheless, the percentage of households aged 55 and above holding 
debt increased substantially between 1989 and 2013, which can be explained by low returns on 
pension wealth and annuities due to the prevalence of low interest rates (Ismail Ertürk, personal 
communication, 20th October 2017). The rise was particularly remarkable among households older 
than 64, whose debt ownership rate continued to increase after the Great Recession, unlike for 
households below 65. 
These trends in the debt ownership rates across age groups were paralleled by changes in the 
value of liability holdings. Growth in the mean and median value of debt was rising with age over 
time, with the largest increases recorded for households aged between 55 and 74. Nevertheless, 
disparities in the value of debt holdings across age groups were significantly lower than the 
differences in asset holdings. Despite rapid growth, the value of debt holdings was the lowest 
among older households, particularly before the Great Recession and among those aged 65 and 
above. The highest value of the median and mean debt holdings in the period was observed among 
households between 35 and 64 years old, followed by those aged below 35 before the Great 
Recession. Households in the youngest group increased their median debt holdings between 1989 
and 2013 from $20,642 to $31,000, peaking at $42,793 in 2010, which suggests continued debt 
accumulation immediately after the 2007 crisis. Moreover, the mean value of debt for this group 
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rose from $57,531 in 1989 to $113,110 in 2007, declining to $82,506 in 2013. The reduction in the 
value of debt in the aftermath of the Great Recession was the largest for households below 35, 
although debt holdings decreased also among households between 35 and 74. In contrast, 
households aged 75 and above continued to accumulate debt immediately after the crisis, reducing 
their holdings only in 2013, resulting in an overall increase in the value of debt between 2007 and 
2013. 
The increase in the value of debt among the youngest group between 1989 and 2013 was 
driven by the rising value of mortgages secured by primary residence, and instalment debt. The 
mean value of debt secured by main residence among households below 35 increased from 
$42,607 in 1989 to $83,445 in 2007, falling to $52,728 in 2013. In contrast, the mean value of 
instalment debt continued to rise after the 2007 crisis, rising from $10,920 in 1989 to $23,713 in 
2013. There were also substantial increases in the value of mortgages secured by property other 
than main residence, and credit card balances among the youngest group, but the magnitude of 
these holdings was significantly lower than for the other types of liabilities. The mean value of 
debt secured by other real estate rose from $1,399 in 1989 to $5,364 in 2007, declining to $3,898 
in 2013. Moreover, holdings of credit card balances among the youngest group increased from 
$1,900 to $3,351 between 1989 and 2007 before falling to $1,626 in 2013, resulting in an overall 
decrease in credit card debt in the whole period. In addition, the value of other types of debt, i.e. 
other unsecured lines of credit and other debt, decreased between 1989 and 2013 among the 
youngest group, averaging $230 and $563 respectively. In contrast, increases in the value of debt 
holdings among older households were driven mainly by the rising value of mortgages (secured by 
all types of property), and credit card balances. 
We argue that these changes in asset and debt accumulation across age groups influenced 
the intergenerational income inequality by generating disparities in capital income flows and debt 
repayments. Table A1.22 in Appendix I shows changes in income sources by age group between 
1989 and 2013. Over time, there was a decrease in the receipts of wages, capital gains, and interest 
and dividend income among households below 35. The decline in wages was driven by large 
losses after the Great Recession, as wage receipts initially increased for this group from $46,592 in 
1989 to an average of $52,000 between 2001-2007, declining to $42,362 in 2013. The mean 
receipts of interest and dividend income declined steadily over time among this group, from $535 
in 1989 to $149 in 2013, while inflows of capital gains fell from $1,642 to $486. In contrast, 
receipts of business income, transfer income, and social security and retirement income increased 
over time for households below 35. Business income rose from $1,900 in 1989 to $3,845 in 2007, 
falling to $2,723 in 2013, while transfer income increased steadily in this period from $2,031 to 
$3,146. Receipts of social security and retirement income for the youngest group rose from $262 
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to $357 between 1989 and 2013, remaining low compared to the magnitudes of inflows of the 
other income sources of this group. In contrast, wage receipts of the older households increased 
over time, particularly for households aged between 35 and 74, as did their inflows of business 
income, social security income, and transfer income. All age groups experienced declines in the 
mean value of interest and dividend income between 1989 and 2013. Moreover, households aged 
75 and above increased their receipts of capital gains and social security income. 
Moreover, the intergenerational income inequality was exacerbated by the relatively high 
magnitude of debt holdings among the youngest group, coupled with declining asset values and 
incomes among households below 35. Table A1.23 in Appendix I presents changes in debt 
payments across age groups between 1989 and 2013. The aforementioned trends in debt holdings 
across age groups were mirrored by changes in the amount of debt repayments between 1989 and 
2013, with a rapid rise in mortgage repayments among the youngest group before the 2007 crisis. 
However, due to substantial decreases after the Great Recession, debt payments of households 
below 35 declined in the whole period. Between 1989 and 2007, mortgage payments of the 
youngest group increased from $5,074 to $6,984, falling to $3,915 in 2013. Payments on 
instalment loans rose from $3,439 in 1989 to $3,599 in 2007, decreasing to $2,921 in 2013, while 
payments on revolving debt (i.e. credit cards) increased from $582 to $887 between 1989 and 
2007 before declining to $428 in 2013. In contrast, households older than 35 increased their 
payments on mortgage and revolving debt between 1989-2013, and the rise was particularly rapid 
among households aged 65 and above. The latter also experienced an increase in their consumer 
loans repayments in the period. This can be explained by the increasing incomes of the older 
households and the corresponding rise in their debt ownership rates. 
Overall, we observe clear disparities in the trends of income and wealth between the 
youngest households and the rest related to the differences in wealth accumulation. Thus, in the 
subsequent analysis we cluster age groups into two categories, comparing households below 35 
years old and those aged 35 and above. To understand how the differences in asset and debt 
accumulation across generations contributed to the aforementioned disparities in capital income 
flows and leverage, Figure 1.25 presents the cumulative asset and debt composition across the two 
age groups. While approximately 70% of asset holdings of both groups was composed of non-
financial assets, households younger than 35 relied more on vehicles and other non-financial assets 
whose share in total asset holdings increased from 35.4% in 1989 to 39.6% in 2013 (Panel A in 
Fig.1.25). Primary residence accounted for 28.7% of the total assets of the youngest group in 1989, 
declining to 24.5% in 2013, with a peak of 30.7% in 2004. In contrast, assets of households older 
than 35 consisted primarily of main residence, which constituted 43% of their total assets in the 
period, peaking at 45.5% in 2004 before the crisis (Panel C in Fig.1.25). Moreover, asset holdings 
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of older households were composed to a greater extent of business equity and other real estate, 
accounting for 11.5% of total assets in 1989 before falling to 8.3% in 2013. In comparison, this 
contribution was 7% for the youngest group in 1989, declining to 3.7% in 2013. In terms of 
financial assets, households below 35 relied more on low-yielding transaction accounts, which 
contributed 13.1% to total assets in 1989 before increasing steadily to 18.6% in 2013, while this 
contribution averaged approximately 9% for older households. Furthermore, the share of 
retirement and insurance assets in the total asset holdings of the youngest group increased initially, 
from 7.2% in 1989 to 11.6% in 2001, but it declined to 9% in 2013. In contrast, this contribution 
rose for households older than 35, from 9.5% in 1989 to 15.9% in 2013. Moreover, assets of the 
older group consisted in larger part of financial investment assets, albeit the contribution fell from 
10.5% to 6.7% between 1989 and 2013. Similarly, the share of financial investment assets in total 
asset holdings of the youngest group decreased over time from 8.5% in 1989 to 4.6% in 2013.  
In terms of debt holdings, the youngest households relied increasingly on unsecured debt, 
particularly instalment loans, which accounted for 43.6% of the total debt holdings of this group in 
1989, rising to 55% in 2013 (panel B in Fig.1.25). In contrast, this contribution declined for the 
older households, from 32.9% to 26.2% between 1989 and 2013, driven mainly by the reduction 
before the 2007 crisis (panel D in Fig.1.25). Moreover, mortgages secured by main residence 
contributed an increasing proportion to the total debt of the youngest group before the Great 
Recession, rising from 35.9% to 40.3% between 1989 and 2004, but it declined substantially since 
2007, reaching 30.7% in 2013. The contribution of mortgages secured by other real estate to total 
debt of the youngest group was minimal, averaging 1.4% in the period. In contrast, liability 
holdings of households aged 35 and above consisted mainly of mortgages secured by main 
residence, whose contribution increased from 45.3% to 53.8% between 1989 and 2013, peaking at 
57.8% in 2007. The share of mortgages secured by other property averaged 4% of the total debt of 
households aged 35 and above in that period. Moreover, both groups experienced a decline in the 
contribution of credit card debt to total liabilities between 1989 and 2013, from 14.6% to 10.3% 
for the youngest group, and from 13.3% to 13.2% for households aged 35 and above, with both 
shares peaking in 1995. Lastly, the share of other types of debt (including other debt and other 
unsecured lines of credit) declined for both groups over time, reaching approximately 3% in 2013. 
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Figure 1.25 Cumulative balance sheet composition by age group, USA 1989-2013 (source: U.S. 
Survey of Consumer Finances) 
Overall, we find that the balance sheets of households below 35 relied on illiquid non-
financial assets and low-yielding financial assets, which was related to the high proportion of 
unsecured debt, particularly instalment loans, in their total liabilities. In contrast, asset portfolios 
of households aged 35 and above consisted to a greater extent of more valuable real estate and 
business equity, as well as high-yielding financial investment assets and retirement accounts. 
Consequently, their liabilities were composed primarily on mortgages. 
These differences in the balance sheet composition across generations led to disparities in 
their leverage levels. Figure 1.26 shows changes in the median debt-to-asset ratio, debt-service-to-
income ratio, and debt-to-income ratio across age between 1989 and 2013, conditional on holding 
debt. Households aged below 35 had higher leverage than those aged 35 and above, particularly 
before the Great Recession. The debt-to-asset ratio of the youngest group increased more rapidly 
in the period than the ratio of the older households, rising from 35.1% in 1989 to 45.7% in 2013, 
with a peak of 51.6% in 2013 (Panel A in Fig.1.26). In contrast, the debt-to-asset ratio of 
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15.9% in 2010. Moreover, the debt-service-to-income ratio for the youngest group increased less 
rapidly before the 2007 crisis compared to the other leverage indicators, rising from 16% in 1989 
to 18% in 2007 (Panel B in Fig.1.26). The increases were greater for households aged 35 and 
above, with the ratio rising from 13% to 17.8% between 1989 and 2007. Both groups experienced 
declines in their debt-service-to-income ratio after the 2007 crisis, declining to 13.7% for the 
young and to 15.2% for the older group in 2013. Furthermore, similar trends were observed across 
both age groups in their debt-to-income ratios, with the ratio for younger households exceeding 
that of the older group (Panel C in Fig.1.26). The debt-to-income ratio for households below 35 
rose from 56.2% in 1989 to 111.6% in 2010, while the ratio for households aged 35 and above 
increased from 38.8% to 110.5% in that period. Both groups reduced their debt-to-income ratio 
between 2010 and 2013, to 100.7% for the younger group and to 97.4% for the older households. 
Figure 1.26 Leverage by age group, USA 1989-2013 (source: U.S. Survey of Consumer 
Finances) 
 
In sum, the above analysis of the differences in income, wealth, and leverage across 
generations between 1989 and 2013 suggests that the baby boomers (i.e. those born between the 
mid-1940s and the mid-1960s) fared better over time compared to the younger generation in the 
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indicate lower wealth accumulation possibilities in the future for this group compared to their 
peers in the past. Consequently, rising intergenerational disparities in one period perpetuate the 
overall wealth and income inequality in the subsequent years. Given the substantial differences in 
asset and debt holdings across age groups examined above, the heterogeneity of wealth and 
leverage emerges as an important determinant of the intergenerational wealth and income 
inequality. 
1.4. Summary 
This chapter developed the theoretical link between financial sector transformation and rising 
inequality observed in the USA since the 1980s. We documented increasing inequality of income 
and wealth between 1989 and 2013, analysing the overall inequality measures, the Lorenz 
dominance of the respective distributions, and the top decile shares of various types of income and 
assets. We observed disparate trends of falling income inequality and rising wealth inequality 
during the Great Recession, which motivated our explicit focus on the distribution of wealth in 
analysing inequality. Furthermore, we found that capital income was more unequally distributed 
than wages, although wage inequality increased over time. Moreover, inequality of assets was 
found to be higher and increasing in the period compared to the distribution of debt, which was 
lower and decreased over time. We noted that this signified growing leverage levels among 
households.  
Figure 1.27 summarises the argument developed in this chapter. We connected these 
patterns of income and wealth inequality to the changes in the financial sector operations observed 
in the USA since the 1980s. We argued that financial sector transformation generated inequality 
by shaping differences in asset and debt accumulation across households in the process of 
securitisation and subprime lending. We illustrated this hypothesis by analysing trends in income, 
wealth, and their components across the income distribution between 1989-2013. We showed that 
there are substantial differences in asset and debt ownership in the US society, which translated 
into disparities in capital income receipts and leverage. We noted that households at the top of the 
distribution owned more diversified portfolios of assets, and experienced higher increases in 
wealth and income in the period and smaller losses after the 2007 crisis compared to households in 
the middle and the bottom of the distribution. This occurred because they had greater access to 
high-yielding financial investment assets, business equity, and retirement and insurance assets. In 
addition, greater contribution of real estate to their balance sheets allowed them to accumulate 
more secured debt compared to the other groups, thus facing lower repayment rates. In contrast, 
households towards the bottom of the distribution relied on illiquid or low-yielding assets, and 
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their debt holdings became dominated by unsecured debt, increasing their balance sheet fragility 
measured in terms of the debt-to-asset ratio and the debt-service-to-income ratio. 
Moreover, we observed that the rising concentration of wealth and income at the top 10% of 
the income distribution had a clear intersectional dimension. We found that households headed by 
women, Blacks, Hispanics, and those below 35 years old experienced decreases or at most 
sluggish growth of their net wealth and income, driven primarily by large losses in the aftermath 
of the Great Recession. We noted that the increasing wealth of households aged 35 and above 
suggested that asset accumulation possibilities were more favourable for the generation of baby 
boomers compared to the young in the later waves of the data, particularly after the Great 
Recession. 
We argued that asset accumulation among the vulnerable groups of low-income households, 
and those headed by women, Blacks, Hispanics, and the young was determined mainly by 
increases in the value of primary residence, which reduced their net worth as the housing market 
collapsed in the wake of the 2007 crisis. The increase in homeownership among these groups was 
enabled by the expansion of indebtedness, particularly mortgages and instalment loans. We noted 
that the sustained financial fragility and low capital income receipts among these vulnerable 
groups contributed to rising wealth and income inequality. Moreover, since the low-income 
households, ethnic minorities, women, and the young were targeted by the subprime lenders before 
the Great Recession, we observed a direct connection between financial deregulation and rising 
wealth inequality across these groups since the 1980s.  
In sum, the original contribution of the analysis undertaken in this chapter is to demonstrate 
that there is an interplay between income and wealth influencing the inequality levels in the USA 
in the context of financial sector transformation since the 1980s, which generated high returns for 
a limited group of households while making others dependent on illiquid assets and debt 
accumulation. The examination of a variety of leverage measures shows the importance of 
analysing both the flows of income and holdings of assets and debt in understanding the impact of 
wealth heterogeneity on personal financial instability and inequality. We thus conclude that 
analyses that do not explicitly consider the heterogeneity of wealth composition cannot fully 
account for the rise in wealth and income inequality observed in the USA since the 1980s. In the 
next chapter, we analyse how these factors have been incorporated into the existing economic 
theories of inequality. We thus aim to understand what determinants of inequality have been put 
forward in the current literature and to what extend they account for the role of household wealth 



















Sustained accumulation of diversified wealth 
↑ access to high-yielding assets 
Secured debt 
Top 10% of income distribution 
Male households 
Whites/Other ethnicities 
Households aged 35+ 
  ↑ wage income 
Financial sector executives 
High capital income inflows 
Different types of property 
Business equity 
Financial investment assets 




Lower interest rates 
Leveraged wealth accumulation 
Dependence on house prices 
Subprime mortgages 
Unsecured debt (particularly post-2007) 
Bottom 90% of income distribution 
Female households 
Blacks/Hispanics 
Households aged < 35   Stagnant wage income 
  ↓ or stagnant transfer income 
Low capital income inflows 
Primary residence 
Transaction accounts 




Higher interest rates 
↑ WEALTH INEQUALITY 
↑ INCOME INEQUALITY 














Labour market liberalisation 
↓ unionisation 
↓ minimum wage & unemployment protection 
 
­ credit demand of households ­ credit supply to households 
 
 
Figure 1.27 Finance – inequality nexus – a summary 




Economic theory of inequality determination 
In the previous chapter we established the link between financial sector transformation and the 
observed increase in wealth and income inequality in the USA since the 1980s. We argued that the 
processes of securitisation and subprime lending, coupled with broader privatisation and 
liberalisation measures, influenced inequality by shaping differences in the structures of wealth 
accumulation across households. The heterogeneity of household balance sheets contributed to 
wealth and income inequality by generating disparities in leverage and capital income flows across 
the distribution. We argued that this occurred because wealth heterogeneity related the returns 
earned on wealth to the absolute size of wealth holdings. Moreover, we noted that the relationship 
between wealth composition and inequality had a distinct intersectional dimension, influencing the 
distribution of wealth and income across gender, race, and generations. We thus argued that the 
consideration of household wealth structures arising due to financial sector transformation is 
indispensable to fully account for the rise in income and wealth inequality in the USA since the 
1980s. In this chapter, we review how the existing economic theories explain income and wealth 
inequality, and whether they consider the factors of wealth distribution and financial sector 
transformation highlighted above.  
To analyse the current approaches to inequality determination, we divide the literature into 
two strands based on the type of analysis, distinguishing between the Keynesian and the classical 
equilibrium approaches to income and wealth distribution. Firstly, we analyse the Keynesian 
macroeconomic theories of inequality associated with Galbraith (2012), Stiglitz (2012), Piketty 
(2014), political economy, and the Post-Keynesian school of thought. These approaches are based 
on the work of Keynes (1936) and emphasise the key role of fundamental uncertainty, the non-
neutrality of money, and aggregate demand in shaping economic processes32. We argue that while 
the theories of Galbraith and Stiglitz account for the socio-institutional structures of inequality 
                                                   
32
 Because economic agents do not have perfect information about the economy, their economic 
expectations are subject to uncertainty. In relation to this, Keynes (1936) argues that money is not 
neutral, so that economic output and employment are affected by changes in the stock of money. In this 
setting price adjustments are slow in the short run, which induces the economic equilibrium to adjust 
through changes in the demanded quantity of goods at a point where involuntary unemployment exists 
(Fontana 2009:2; Snowdon/Vane 2005:65). Consequently, aggregate demand has a leading role in 
economic growth by inducing investment. This stands in stark contrast to the classical view of well 
informed, rational, optimising agents, who don’t suffer from money illusion, so that monetary 
expansion does not affect real economic values and there is automatic tendency towards full 
employment equilibrium in the short and the long run (ibid.:38)   
93     ––– Chapter 2 ––– 
 
associated with the financial sector transformation, they do not sufficiently explore the role of 
wealth, often conflating it with income. In contrast, Piketty’s theory explicitly analyses inequality 
as an outcome of the differences in the dynamics of aggregate wealth and income. However, his 
proposition does not consider the role of finance in generating these disparities or the 
heterogeneity of changes in income and wealth across household. We find that these aspects have 
been integrated in the contemporary Post-Keynesian economic theory. This approach explicitly 
incorporates household heterogeneity, which is based on Kalecki’s (1954; 1971) distinction 
between workers and capitalists, into the analyses of functional income distribution. 
Financialisation is argued to increase inequality by raising the capitalist share of income at the 
expense of workers. Firstly, this occurs because of changes in the corporate governance favouring 
the maximisation of shareholder value, which reduces the wage share of output (Hein/Van Treeck 
2010). Secondly, the endogenous creation of money by commercial banks, and its circulation 
through the economy by other financial institutions, allows capitalists to monetise their profits as 
they are creditors in net terms (Graziani 2003; Fontana 2003). We argue that what the Post-
Keynesian approach has not yet done is to examine how this dichotomous division of households 
has been complexified by the processes of financial sector transformation and the associated 
increase in the heterogeneity of wealth composition across households. 
Secondly, to understand the theoretical determinants of wealth distribution and the 
differences in wealth accumulation across households we analyse the theories of household 
portfolio decisions. We identify these with the classical equilibrium theories of the life-cycle 
theory of consumption of Modigliani/Brumberg (1954), and the permanent income hypothesis of 
Friedman (1957). These approaches are based on the efficient-market perspective focused on the 
optimising behaviour of a representative economic agent33. They see inequality as the expected 
outcome of the intertemporal utility maximisation by households managing their wealth to smooth 
consumption across their life-cycle. These theories predict a hump-shaped relationship between 
age and wealth accumulation through saving, but this has been generally contradicted by empirical 
evidence. The empirical challenges have been addressed by incorporating factors impeding the 
accurate formation of future income expectations, such as liquidity constraints in credit markets, 
precautionary saving, bequest motives, and asset price increases. Consequently, financial 
innovation and subprime credit expansion have been seen as relief to credit-constrained 
households, allowing for a more optimal distribution of economic resources. We argue that the 
                                                   
33
 In the efficient markets view prices reflect all available information and are equal to the marginal 
costs of production so that no agent has market power and thus all economic agents within a particular 
sector (firms, households) are identical (cf. Gravelle/Reese 2012). 
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life-cycle theory and the permanent income hypothesis cannot fully explain high inequality levels 
in the modern advanced economies. This is because they neglect the socio-institutional structures 
of financial sector transformation and the impact of uncertainty on breakdowns in market 
efficiency. Thus, to understand the consumption and saving behaviour underpinning wealth 
distribution it is necessary to consider that markets generate endogenous economic fragility. We 
note that this is recognised in the Post-Keynesian analyses of consumption behaviour and 
indebtedness, found in Robinson (1956), Pasinetti (1981), Eichner (1986), Nell (1992), and Arestis 
(1992). Consequently, the Post-Keynesian literature is taken as a point of departure for the 
development of a theoretical model of inequality determination in the next chapter. 
2.1. Keynesian approaches to distribution 
According to the mainstream economic theory, income inequality is a natural outcome of market 
processes as it reflects the marginal contributions of each individual to production, rewarding 
those with high or scarce skills (Stiglitz 2012:37). Skill-biased technological change, differences in 
human capital, and trade openness increasing the supply of low-skilled workers are seen as the key 
determinants of inequality (Galbraith 2016:74). This approach has been largely dismissed by 
contemporary Keynesian economists researching inequality in high-income countries. This 
criticism has been made on the grounds that the mainstream view ignores the structural factors of 
the modern advanced economies related to market forces (Galbraith 2012), decreasing bargaining 
power of workers (the political economy approach), and economic policy (Stiglitz 2012), which 
have contributed to the unequal distribution of income and wealth. 
Based on empirical research, Galbraith (2012) puts forward financial liberalisation as one of 
the main institutional determinants of inequality in the USA since the late 1970s, generating larger 
disparities in capital income than wage earnings. In his view, rising inequality has been caused by 
changes in capital income at the top rather than differences in wages at the middle or bottom of the 
distribution (ibid.:135). He argues that financial liberalisation boosted capital incomes of the rich 
through stock ownership, which is highly skewed towards the top of the distribution (Galbraith 
2012:40,126). These changes were driven primarily by macroeconomic factors of booms and 
busts, which became dominated by financial sector activity in the run up to the 2007 crisis. While 
Galbraith recognises the importance of finance for increasing the top incomes through financial 
asset ownership, he does not consider its role in debt accumulation among the low- and middle-
income households. As discussed in Chapter 1, through financial deregulation and the 
development of structured finance balance sheet stability of these households became dependent 
on financial market performance, which had powerful implications for deepening wealth 
inequality. Consequently, financial liberalisation has played a complex role in redefining 
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economic institutions to favour wealth accumulation among the rich and diffuse financial 
instability towards the middle and the bottom of the distribution. 
The political economy approach explains the growing wedge between wage and capital 
income by the shifting balance of power between labour and capital (Stockhammer 2017). The 
main reason behind the declining bargaining power of workers is identified with global 
redistribution of rents owing to globalisation and capital mobility (Rodrick 1997), as well as 
retrenchment of the welfare state associated with privatisation of social services (Kristal 2010) and 
weakening of unions (Bengtsson 2014). While worsening of the workers’ bargaining position 
cannot readily explain wealth disparities, the emphasis on the uneven distribution of power in the 
political economy approach is instrumental in understanding the structural forces generating 
inequality in modern capitalist societies.  
Stiglitz (2012) highlights the role of government policy in shaping these institutional 
structures conducive to increasing income inequality in the USA. From a New Keynesian 
perspective34, he argues that through privatisation, labour market liberalisation, as well as 
regressive taxation and social expenditure policies, the US government generated market forces 
that eroded the bargaining power of workers. This reduced the equality of outcomes in terms of the 
size of income and wealth, and raised the inequality of opportunity by increasing the costs of 
investment in human capital. Stiglitz argues that much of the increase in inequality owes to rent 
capture rather than wealth creation, which has arisen through the exploitation of market 
imperfections (Stiglitz 2012:40,51). An important factor in this rent seeking behaviour generating 
inequality is the lack of market transparency, as in the case of the derivative trading before the 
2007 crisis, and the ability of the financial sector to lobby the government against policies 
alleviating informational asymmetries between financial institutions and borrowers. Stiglitz (2016) 
puts forward a similar mechanism to explain rising wealth inequality, which he argues is caused by 
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 The New Keynesian school of thought is concerned with the role of micro-founded market 
imperfections in driving macroeconomic processes. These include inter alia asymmetric information, 
credit rationing, liquidity constraints, and sticky prices, which prevent optimal equilibrium adjustments 
(Lavoie 2014:15). While they acknowledge the role of demand and uncertainty in driving economic 
dynamics towards the possibility of involuntary unemployment in the short run, the core assumption of 
this approach is that the behaviour of economic agents is determined by rational optimisation subject to 
perfect information, so that any imperfections are eliminated and full employment is restored in the 
long run (Fontana 2009:3). The New Keynesian views became the basis of the New Consensus 
macroeconomics, prioritising monetary policy based on market laws over fiscal policy (Arestis/Sawyer 
2002). It stands in stark contrast to the Post-Keynesian view, which emphasises the role of liquidity 
preference and the distributional conflict in driving economic processes, which lead to inherent 
instability of the capitalist system and the persistence of involuntary unemployment in the long run, 
and invalidate the analysis of economic behaviour in terms of optimisation (Lavoie 2014).   
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the growing disparities in unproductive rents arising from the increased control over resources and 
productive capital. 
The analysis of the link between inequality and financial sector transformation in the 
previous chapter supports Stiglitz’s view that the increasing complexity and opacity of the 
financial sector operations has undermined the ability of regulators to control the rent seeking 
opportunities associated with the exploitation of market power by the rich financial investors. 
However, we contest the New Keynesian view of market imperfections highlighted by Stiglitz, 
seeing them as a symptom rather than a cause of the distributive forces generated by the financial 
sector. This is because they are endemic in the design and operations of the modern financial 
markets. Given the large stocks of wealth held in the financial sector and the increasing transaction 
volumes among financial institutions since the 1980s, financial markets are bound to violate the 
conditions of competitive markets and are prone to market power concentration among few 
players35. Financial deregulation culminating in the repeal of the Glass-Steagall act in 1999 
resulted in the rise of megabanks, who were not only able to capture large returns on financial 
wealth, but they also became the source of economic instability. Consequently, the analysis of 
inequality in the USA in the context of financial liberalisation since the 1980s needs to go beyond 
market imperfections towards understanding of the exact channels through which the economic 
power associated with the ownership of wealth influences inequality. 
The economic theory which puts the largest emphasis on the importance of wealth for 
inequality is found in the seminal work of Piketty (2014). The main premise of his Capital in the 
Twenty-First Century is that inequality is driven by the accumulation of persistently higher returns 
to wealth (r) relative to the growth of income (g), historically averaging at 5% and 1% 
respectively. Compounding of the aggregate returns to wealth over time generates higher income 
flows for wealth holders and their inheritors (identified with the top 0.1-1%) than for the rest of the 
society. In turn, higher capital income allows for greater saving, which facilitates further wealth 
generation and perpetuates inequality. Consequently, there is an interconnectedness between the 
aggregate levels of income and wealth which influences inequality. In other work (Piketty/Zucman 
2014) it is emphasised that due to its high concentration and the aforementioned accumulation 
dynamics, wealth distribution is more important for the overall structure of inequality in the 21st 
century than it was in the post-war era. Piketty/Zucman (2014) argue that saving and consumption 
propensities are not enough to predict inequality levels in advanced countries. This is because 
                                                   
35
 This can be understood through the lens of Kalecki’s concept of the degree of monopoly, as market 
power of financial institutions allows them to influence prices and set high mark-ups over costs, which 
reduces the wage share of output (cf. Rugitsky 2013). 
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capital gains (often driven by housing wealth) are found to account for around 40% of the increase 
in inequality measured by the national wealth-to-income ratios between 1970 and 2010 
(Piketty/Zucman 2014:1288). 
In line with our argument in Chapter 1, Piketty’s insight regarding the interplay between 
income and wealth and its impact on inequality is particularly relevant in the age of financial 
sector transformation. We showed that financial innovation and securitisation influenced 
inequality by generating differential returns and degrees of volatility across the distribution. Large 
wealth holdings of the rich allowed them to invest in high-yielding financial instruments (often 
requiring large initial payments, which could only be afforded at high levels of net worth), which 
generated higher returns to wealth through sizeable capital income inflows compared to the rest of 
the distribution. Moreover, the rich were able to use their economic power to secure higher wages, 
particularly when employed as financial executives (cf. Foster/Holleman 2010). 
Despite the importance of its general conclusions, Piketty’s theory suffers from several 
drawbacks. The most relevant criticisms for our analysis concern the weakness of Piketty’s 
theoretical explanation and insufficient emphasis on household debt and the heterogeneity of 
household wealth in contributing to inequality
36
.  
While Piketty’s empirical work is to be applauded, his theoretical explanation for inequality 
based on “r > g” relies on the expectation that trends observed in the past would continue in the 
future (Pressman 2016:159). Hence, Piketty does not provide any explicit theoretical explanation 
for why returns to wealth should always exceed the growth of income. Consequently, despite the 
relevance of his conclusions, there is no formal link between inequality and financial sector 
transformation in Piketty’s framework. Moreover, his argument relies on comparing the average 
growth rates of wealth and income. However, as shown in Chapter 1 there is substantial variability 
in income and wealth across the distribution, which is particularly important in understanding the 
impact of financial sector transformation on inequality. The analysis of household balance sheet 
structures across the distribution suggests that there is a positive relationship between the returns 
to wealth and its absolute size – richer households tend to earn higher returns on their assets than 
households with smaller wealth holdings. The impact of this heterogeneity on inequality is not 
explored by Piketty. 
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 Other criticism of Piketty’s theory highlighted in the literature include the lack of a distinction 
between capital and wealth (Blume/Durlauf 2015), the use of pre-tax data (Burtless 2014), the neglect 
of capital depreciation in the theoretical argument (Krusell/Smith 2014), the use of house prices rather 
than rental prices to measure wealth (Bonnet et al. 2014; Rognile 2015), and spreadsheet errors in data 
analysis (Giles 2014). See Pressman (2016) for the overview. 
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The alternative body of theoretical literature identified with the Post-Keynesian functional 
distribution approach explicitly takes into account the link between financialisation and household 
heterogeneity. Highlighting the inherent instability of the capitalist system, this literature focuses 
on the macroeconomic impact of the increasingly unequal functional distribution of national 
income between two factors of production – capital and labour – which are associated with higher 
propensity to save and consume respectively (cf. Kalecki 1971). Workers are assumed to rely on 
their labour to maintain their living standards, and to consume most of their wage earnings. While 
they are often assumed to consume all their income, savings by workers are incorporated into the 
Post-Keynesian framework by assuming that their savings rates are lower compared to capitalists, 
and thus do not influence income distribution (Kaldor 1956a; Pasinetti 1962). In turn, capitalists 
are assumed to derive their income from profits. A distinction can be made between capitalists as 
entrepreneurs, who realise variable profit income dependent on the difference between expected 
and actual investment, and more passive rentiers, who receive fixed income in the form of 
unproductive rents based on their ownership of companies and financial institutions (Hayes 2006; 
Toporowski 2015). In the context of financial sector transformation and the existence of derivative 
trading, the capitalist class can be analysed as including both entrepreneurs and rentiers, who 
pursue capital returns through investing in financial markets and ownership of financial assets 
(Toporowski 2001). 
The distributive forces of financialisation in the Post-Keynesian framework are seen as the 
maximisation of shareholder value, proxied by a higher rentier (i.e. capitalist) income share, which 
is related to the increasingly short-term orientation of firm operations and their preference for 
financial rather than real investment, which skewed the corporate governance power towards 
shareholders (cf. Hein 2008, 2015; Hein/Van Treeck 2010; Palley 2012, 2013; Van Treeck 2009). 
Moreover, from the perspective of the endogenous money theory, financial sector complexity 
contributes to the redistribution of money created through the commercial bank loans to 
households (Michell 2016). This is because income gets transferred from debtor/worker 
households to creditors/rentiers through loan repayments (Palley 2002). Moreover, the existence of 
securitisation furthers the transfer of income towards rentiers through high returns on securitised 
instruments (Sawyer/Passarella Veronese 2017:17).  
The Post-Keynesian functional distribution models are explicitly concerned with the 
macroeconomic implications of income inequality. They often draw from the Bhaduri/Marglin 
(1990) argument that the macroeconomic effects of income transfers between wage and profit 
earners hinge on whether the economy is wage- or profit-led. Onaran et al. (2011) establish that 
the majority of advanced economies are wage-led, which in the Bhaduri/Marglin framework 
signifies that the lower wage share resulting from the financial sector transformation has a 
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negative impact on aggregate demand and growth by undercutting the effective investment 
demand. This is because resources are taken away from those who are more likely to spend them 
to those who are more likely to hoard them.  
However, what this theoretical approach has not yet done is to examine how the 
transformation in the nature of financial intermediation has complexified the social division into 
the two distinct categories based on their income sources. Both groups of workers and capitalists 
have become more heterogeneous, which complicates their analytical application. As shown in 
Chapter 1, in the course of financial sector transformation workers became the recipients of capital 
income through homeownership and participation in private pension schemes (due to the 
privatisation of public housing and state pensions), while capitalists became the recipients of the 
highest wages in the economy as financial executives. Consequently, not only are there large 
disparities in the aggregate characteristics of households within each category but also the 
boundaries between the two have become less clear. 
Moreover, the Post-Keynesian macro-models are traditionally focused on investment as the 
most important variable for economic growth, treating savings and consumption as residual and 
passive (Setterfield/Kim 2013:2). However, since the 1980s consumption has become much more 
volatile and thus more important as an independent source of aggregate demand (ibid.). As 
indicated in Chapter 1, this is largely due to the increasing financial commitments and the massive 
expansion of credit to households, leading household spending to become increasingly 
disconnected from income. 
Similar drawback can be identified in Piketty, who does not consider the role of household 
debt for wealth distribution and inequality. As shown in the balance sheet analysis in Chapter 1, 
while the top 10% experienced rapid growth in their income and net wealth over the past decades, 
wealth gains of the middle- and the low-income households were illusory as they were 
underpinned by the housing price bubble and large relative debt holdings. Consequently, 
differential degrees of leverage across the population turned to be an important driver of 
inequality, particularly during the 2007 recession. It is not only the access to financial resources 
but also the stability of that access over time across the population that has implications for 
inequality. For instance, financial investors owning a diversified portfolio of securitised assets 
with return guaranteed by the seniorage of their claims due to tranching are better able to bear 
financial losses than households whose portfolios are based on housing equity withdrawal. In the 
latter case, price deflation of collateralised assets before the Great Recession prevented further 
withdrawal of equity to cover outstanding loan repayments, generating higher volatility of their 
balance sheet positions relative to the rich households. Consequently, despite higher magnitudes of 
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debt holdings among the rich, there is a disproportionate impact of borrowing on financial stability 
of households in the bottom and the middle of the distribution due to differences in interest rates 
and borrowing conditions associated with subprime and unsecured debt (see Figure 1.13 in 
Chapter 1; cf. Pressman/Scott 2009). Consequently, as shown in Chapter 1 debt payments of the 
lower income households increased rapidly before the Great Recession. When debt payments are 
considered, a smaller portion of income is available for consumption and hence inequality is 
deepened. 
Importantly, the problem of overindebtedness was not eliminated during the Great 
Recession. The balance sheet analysis in Chapter 1 showed that households have not deleveraged 
their massive debt levels after the 2007 crisis. Scott/Pressman (2015) argue that the declines in the 
monthly debt payments and the debt-payments-to-income ratio in the most recent years have been 
illusory, reflecting low interest rates and an increasing share of households filing for bankruptcy 
since 2010 rather than a real reduction in debt. Consequently, because households have not 
deleveraged properly after the Great Recession, there have been no increases in consumption and 
saving allowing for reduction in income and wealth inequality. 
The issue of debt highlights the need for an explicit consideration of wealth in the economic 
theory of inequality. However, the theoretical literature has often conflated wealth with income, in 
the sense that they do not explicitly distinguish between these two concepts. However, in the 
analysis in Chapter 1 we noted that income inequality was not proportionally associated with 
wealth inequality. We argue that although income and wealth inequality share some common 
features, the analysis of wealth has certain distinct aspects distinguishing it from the analysis and 
measurement of income distribution such as the possibility of negative net worth (Cagetti/De 
Nardi 2008:286; Cowell/Van Kerm 2015). As argued in Chapter 1, unlike income, which is lower 
bound by zero, in its most analytically used definition of net worth a large part of wealth 
distribution can take negative values. Furthermore, while income reflects current living conditions, 
wealth provides an additional insight into their past levels (if savings are seen as excess income 
over consumption) and future possibilities, determining the capacity for investment in education 
and the quality of life (Cowell et al. 2012:1). This further emphasises the need for an explicit 
theory of what determines the distribution of wealth. 
To identify the current theoretical analyses of wealth distribution, we turn to the economic 
theories of consumption. In the next section we review the theoretical insights seeking to 
understand household portfolio decisions due to their crucial implications for the analysis of 
wealth inequality. 
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2.2. Classical equilibrium theories of household portfolio decisions 
In the previous section we argued that the Keynesian approaches to inequality tended not to pay 
explicit attention to the theoretical determinants of wealth distribution. We noted that while Piketty 
(2014) distinguished between the dynamics of income and wealth in generating inequality, he did 
not consider the heterogeneity of income growth and the returns to wealth across households. To 
understand the theoretical explanations of differences in wealth accumulation, in this section we 
analyse the theories of household consumption and portfolio decisions. 
The empirical examination of the household balance sheet dynamics in the USA since the 
1980s in Chapter 1 revealed that the composition of household portfolios underwent large changes 
over the past few decades. However, the developments in economic theory seeking to explain 
household portfolio decisions have not caught up with these pronounced shifts in household 
portfolio structures. On the one hand, despite the centrality of the consumption function for utility 
maximisation in the New Keynesian/New Consensus economics, the underlying theory of 
consumption has seen little review since the 1950s. On the other hand, as argued in the previous 
section, the Post-Keynesian functional distribution approach analysed the issue of consumption to 
a smaller extent, being traditionally focused on investment and the productive sector (Lavoie 
1994:539). It is only in the recent years that household sector behaviour sparked more interest 
among researchers due to its key role in inducing the macroeconomic instability culminating in the 
Great Recession. 
We identify two strands of the relevant economic theory seeking to understand the dynamics 
of wealth through examining household consumption and saving decisions. The first strand is 
associated with the classical quantitative general equilibrium models. This approach is dominated 
by the life-cycle theory of consumption (LTC), originating in Modigliani/Brumberg (1954), and 
the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) developed by Friedman (1957)37, as well as their 
extensions analysing the wealth effects of asset price movements, liquidity constraints, 
precautionary savings, and bequest motives on household consumption spending. The second 
strand of the literature is associated with the contemporary Post-Keynesian insights into household 
                                                   
37
 Both Modigliani and Friedman represent the neoclassical Chicago school of economics, which 
evolved from monetarism and the new classical economics. This school of thought emphasises the 
supply-side determination of economic dynamics and is focused on developing the microfoundations 
of macroeconomics based on the efficient market perspective. The intertemporal optimisation of the 
representative agent is based on rational expectations, which state that agents use all publicly available 
information so that subjective expectations coincide with the actual mathematical expectations of 
economic variables. Together with the New Keynesian focus on market imperfections, the neoclassical 
school formed the new neoclassical synthesis in macroeconomics (cf. Snowdon/Vane 2005).  
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consumption behaviour found in Robinson (1956), Pasinetti (1981), Eichner (1986), Nell (1992), 
and Arestis (1992). This approach emphasises the social dependence of consumption and finds its 
roots in the works of Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry (1949). 
To the proponents of the quantitative general equilibrium models, deepening wealth 
inequality and rising household debt are expected phenomena explained by households optimising 
their consumption spending. The microfoundations of these theories correspond to the behavioural 
assumptions of the standard microeconomic consumer theory, namely completeness, reflexivity, 
transitivity, and non-satiation of preferences, which yield a continuous, quasi-concave, and 
differentiable consumer utility function, and a unique solution to the utility maximisation problem 
(cf. Gravelle/Reese 2012:12-19)38. Consequently, consumer preferences are stable and 
exogenously determined by these consumption rankings. 
The first generation of these wealth inequality models can be divided into the dynasty and 
the overlapping generation models (OLG). The former have been gradually replaced by the latter 
in the analyses of wealth due to their unsolvable empirical challenges. Specifically, the dynasty 
models assume ex ante identical infinitely living agents who hold a buffer stock of assets to insure 
against shocks to their labour income (Cagetti/De Nardi 2008:293). Inequalities in wealth are 
caused solely by random income shocks and imply that low-income households should have a 
higher saving rate than the rich as they need larger buffers to accommodate earnings fluctuations. 
Despite various extensions to the basic model (e.g. entrepreneurship, heterogeneity of 
preferences)39, this class of models has been dismissed empirically, as saving rates have been 
documented to be the highest among the richest households (ibid.:295) 
In contrast to such infinite horizon models, OLG models incorporating LTC and PIH assume 
finite living agents. According to LTC, households endowed with perfect information about the 
distribution of their lifetime income choose the optimal consumption path over their life-cycle in 
order to maximise their utility subject to the inter-temporal budget constraint (Debelle 2004:2). 
                                                   
38
 Given three bundles of goods x, x’, and x’’, the strict preference ( ) and indifference ( ) relations 
across these bundles are assumed to be reflexive (if x x consumer is indifferent between the same 
bundle), complete (either x x’ or x’ x, so that preferences can always be ranked due to perfect 
information), transitive (if x x’ and x’ x’’ then x x’’), and non-satiated (if x is greater than x’ then x x’ so 
that consumer always prefers a bigger bundle). These allow for a formation of a utility function, which 
is assumed to have a unique optimisation solution. Based on these assumptions, price changes result in 
stronger substitution effects between goods rather than income effects, i.e. changes in the level of 
expenditure. 
39
 In these extensions, wealth inequality is increased by assuming that agents choose whether to 
become entrepreneurs and save more or not, and by introducing the degree of patience in consumption, 
whose higher value leads to greater savings (cf. Cagetti/De Nardi 2008).  
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The constraint is given by the present discounted value of household labour income and its current 
net worth. The intertemporal income allocation is directly related to their current income 
expectations relative to the average lifetime income level. Households engage in consumption 
smoothing to avoid large fluctuations in consumption over their life-cycle, borrowing or running 
down assets in periods of lower-than-average income (when young), paying off loans, saving, and 
accumulating assets in periods of higher-than-average income (associated with productive years), 
and dissaving (consuming out of accumulated savings) on retirement (Bertola et al. 2006:6). 
Friedman’s PIH augments LTC by stating that consumption and saving decisions of 
households depend on the future income expectations rather than the current income levels 
(Bewley 1977; Bertola et al. 2006:4). Specifically, households undertake their spending decisions 
in reference to their permanent income, defined as the expected long-run average income 
(Friedman 1957:20). This implies that current income fluctuations may not influence current 
consumption expenditure if permanent income is expected to increase in the future (Karacimen 
2013:5). Hence, households choose to borrow whenever they expect their future income to rise, 
and accumulate savings and assets when they expect their future income to fall. The main 
conclusion of PIH is that credit levels and saving rates should be non-linearly related to income 
and be the highest among low-income households. i.e. the young (Cagetti/De Nardi 2008:295). 
Moreover, socio-demographic characteristics related to income expectations matter for consumer 
behaviour — e.g. college graduates should borrow more than blue-collar workers when young as 
their permanent income is relatively higher (Bertola et al. 2006:6). These predictions have been 
generally rejected by empirical evidence (ibid.). Specifically, Fredriksen (2012) dismisses the 
hump-shaped evolution of net worth and financial assets holding along the life-cycle, finding 
instead a steady increase with age. This is consistent with our analysis of the trends in net wealth 
across age groups in Figure 1.24 in Chapter 1. In addition, Fredriksen (2012) finds that other 
socio-demographic characteristics matter little for explaining wealth inequality. Instead, he 
suggests that there are different determinants of wealth accumulation for the upper and the bottom 
ends of the distribution. While returns on assets and tax conditions are more important for the 
former, balance sheet composition is more relevant for the latter (ibid.). Moreover, Deaton (1986) 
and Dynan et al. (2004) reject the dependency of savings on the position in the life cycle. 
Furthermore, as shown in Chapter 1 at any point in time it is the wealthy households who take on 
more debt in terms value and participation, which contradicts the prediction of PIH that debt levels 
should be the lowest among these households. 
Due to these empirical problems, the LTC/PIH framework has seen numerous extensions 
aiming to improve its explanatory power. The most relevant additions include the presence of 
liquidity constraints, precautionary savings, and bequest motives. Firstly, imperfections in credit 
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markets, namely the presence of asymmetric information, moral hazard, and adverse selection on 
part of the borrowers may restrict access to the desired amount of borrowing for certain 
households, which could explain why lower income households don’t borrow as much as their 
higher income counterparts (cf. Gross/Souleles 2002). Importantly, this implies that financial 
deregulation and innovation in financial products should bring relief to credit-constrained 
households as it would ensure more optimal credit allocation and allow households to achieve their 
desired consumption smoothing patterns (Barba/Pivetti 2009:119, cf. Elul 1995). The second 
extension introduces uncertainty into household behaviour, and states that to insure against 
unexpected events (such as illness, divorce, natural disaster) households accumulate precautionary 
savings, which distorts the spending behaviour predicted by the standard theory. Hence, even if 
future income increases are expected, households may choose to save, which could explain why 
households borrow despite relatively high incomes (cf. Carroll 1997). Finally, the bequest motive 
accounts for the intergenerational wealth transfers, stating that “abnormal” household behaviour 
may result from altruistic motives to accumulate resources for the future generations. 
Further attempts at improving the LTC/PIH framework incorporate the impact of changes in 
wealth (both actual and perceived) arising from asset price fluctuations on consumption spending, 
i.e. the wealth effects. This literature has been centred on the stock market and housing wealth, 
which underwent price bubbles in the 1990s and from the early until the mid-2000s respectively. 
The evidence of welfare increases from asset price inflation is ambiguous. Mehra (2001) estimates 
an empirical aggregate LTC model accounting for the stock market wealth effects in the USA 
between 1959-2000, finding strong predictive channels from equity wealth to future consumption. 
In contrast, Ludvigson/Steindel (1999) find that stock market wealth effects in the USA between 
1953-1997 were unstable, arguing for contemporaneous rather than future relationship between 
changes in wealth and consumption spending. For housing, Duca et al. (2012) incorporate 
financial innovation and liberalisation into a credit-augmented life-cycle model, finding stronger 
housing wealth effects associated with household equity withdrawal defined as the difference 
between secured net borrowing and spending on housing. Moreover, they argue that financial 
sector transformation since the 1980s generated larger consumption increases and drops in booms 
and busts respectively than predicted by the traditional LTC. Sierminska/Takhtamanova (2007) 
compare the relative stock market and housing wealth effects to establish that wealth effects of 
housing are larger than those of financial assets in Canada, Italy, and Finland. Furthermore, they 
report that wealth effects are stronger for older households, which they argue is consistent with 
LTC/PIH. However, Debelle (2004:7) finds that while the positive effects of house price increases 
on the aggregate consumption have been empirically documented, the evidence is unclear at the 
microeconomic level. Similarly, Shen et al. (2015) show that wealth effects were asymmetrical in 
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14 OECD countries between 1975-2013, generating larger gains in consumption from price 
increases than drops from price falls. Additionally, they argue that the housing wealth effects were 
unequal between homeowners and renters. This arises because house price increases have two 
offsetting effects. On the one hand, the higher value of housing allows for more borrowing when 
the house serves as collateral. However, it also raises the expenses of house maintenance and 
creates greater costs for renters and first-time buyers, generating unequal wealth gains across the 
distribution. Consequently, the attempts to improve the explanatory power of LTC/PIH by 
accounting for price changes have largely been inconclusive. 
Another criticism of LTC/PIH is that it does not pay enough attention to the macroeconomic 
implications of wealth inequality. However, as highlighted in the introduction, many researchers 
identify unsustainable household indebtedness as one of the causes of the 2007 crisis. In fact, the 
LTC/PIH framework cannot encompass the concept of over-indebtedness and unsustainability of 
household consumption decisions. Firstly, this is because growth of indebtedness is interpreted as 
the prediction of future income rises (Bertola et al. 2006:33). Secondly, borrowing is seen as a 
rational response to changing income expectations and is assumed to generate a future flow of 
funds matching any amount of debt. Hence, in theory no household should experience problems in 
loan repayment and no debt can be excessive. Default is only possible in case of external shocks to 
income, which are unexpected by households. For instance, Debelle (2004) argues that high levels 
of debt per se do not cause aggregate consumption to fall (which is associated with the recession) 
but they do magnify the effects of other shocks. Excessive indebtedness may increase household’s 
sensitivity to the interest rate and income shocks, making consumption decisions more related to 
future income expectations. Consequently, in this framework any solvency problems for 
households are ultimately due to exogenous shocks (Bertola et al. 2006:18). The rise in household 
debt since the 1980s is seen as a rational outcome of easing liquidity constraints associated with 
financial deregulation and low interest rates. In light of our analysis of the link between financial 
sector transformation and inequality in section 1.2 of Chapter 1, we argue that the LTC/PIH 
framework is not suitable for the analysis of wealth distribution since the onset of the financial 
sector transformation in the 1980s. 
Furthermore, none of the microeconomic models reviewed above explicitly considers the 
heterogeneity of assets and liabilities in household portfolios along the distribution highlighted in 
Chapter 1. Hence, the LTC/PIH-based models have not analysed the implications of the disparate 
rates of return and leverage associated with differences in the balance sheet composition for wealth 
inequality. Moreover, the liquidity constraints models put the “blame” of wealth inequalities on 
households, who exploit their information advantages and are “impatient” in their consumption by 
requesting credit in excess of their repayment capacities. This argument is devoid of understanding 
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of the institutional changes in financial markets outlined in Chapter 1 and ignores the massive 
expansion of credit via predatory lending practices induced by the high demand for securitised 
assets among financial investors. Lastly, despite the various extensions of the standard LTC/PIH 
framework, its basic premise of the rational optimising agents carefully planning their 
consumption patterns over the lifecycle remains. This obscures the complexity of household 
portfolio decisions in the age of active financial markets and thus renders this approach unsuitable 
to explain the mechanisms of wealth distribution in the 21st century.  
2.3. The Post-Keynesian analyses of consumption 
The above weaknesses of the LTC/PIH approach are addressed by the Post-Keynesian insights 
into household consumption behaviour. This is because they highlight the socio-institutional 
determinants of household portfolio choices, allowing for a more realistic examination of the 
mechanisms of wealth distribution in the USA since the 1980s. The Post-Keynesian analyses of 
consumer choice are based on radically different assumptions about consumer behaviour than the 
standard microeconomic theory underpinning the LTC/PIH. These have foundations in the work of 
Robinson (1956), Pasinetti (1981), Eichner (1986), Nell (1992), and Arestis (1992) (Lavoie 
2014:95-96). Importantly, the conventional assumptions of substitutability, transitivity, and non-
satiation are rejected in favour of social dependence, hierarchical ordering, and satiability of 
consumption choices. 
The first assumption referring to the social dependence of consumption rejects the standard 
neoclassical notion that consumer preferences are consistent across all bundles of goods (i.e. are 
transitive) and respond in a predictable manner to price changes (i.e. that substitution effects 
dominate consumption responses). Rather, it states that preferences are socially shaped, which 
renders consumer choices inconsistent with the standard neoclassical assumptions as they do not 
respond to changes in prices of goods in a way predicted by the neoclassical consumer theory 
(Nell 1992:396). This idea draws from the relative income hypothesis (RIH), which emphasises 
the importance of the socio-institutional context in influencing household behaviour. Although the 
term originally refers to Duesenberry (1949), in the recent literature it encompasses a group of 
studies analysing the social aspects of consumption, many of which are on the brink of economics 
and sociology (Lavoie 2014:103). This strand of the literature is underpinned by Veblen’s (1899) 
concept of conspicuous consumption (also referred to as positional or aspirational consumption) 
according to which the primary aim of consumption expenditure is a public display of the 
accumulated wealth levels to express economic power and association with a particular social 
status. Veblen stressed the importance of emulation of consumption behaviour of the upper classes 
by the lower (Barba/Pivetti 2009:126). Based on this concept, Duesenberry (1949) developed a 
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theory in which household consumption decisions are made not subject to individual income 
conditions but in reference to the incomes of others. From this framework, the contemporary Post-
Keynesian analyses of consumption state that in the world of uncertainty consumer preferences are 
socially constructed rather than shaped by the absolute measures of living standards or individual 
characteristics (Cynamon/Fazzari 2008). This is because the visibility of consumption enhanced by 
mass media, advertising, trends, and repeated social interactions leads to the development of the 
social norms of consumption, which makes household spending preferences endogenously 
determined by the behaviour of peers and upper classes (ibid.). This stands in stark contrast with 
the exogenously given preferences in LTC/PIH. 
Insights from RIH have been incorporated into the recent theoretical models in a variety of 
ways. Barba/Pivetti (2009) propose a class-determined aggregate consumption function accounting 
for the relative consumption effects between the lower-, middle-, and upper-income classes. Palley 
(2010) develops a combined “relative permanent income” theory of consumption, where 
consumption spending is negatively related to household permanent income which is determined 
by the relative consumption concerns. Kim et al. (2013) develop a Keynesian aggregate 
consumption model underpinned by RIH, explaining the accumulation of household debt. 
Cynamon/Fazzari (2008) study the formation of consumption norms arising from financial 
innovation, group identity, and the associated habit creation, which affect the consumption 
expenditure behaviour. From the institutionalist perspective40, Frank (2005) discusses the 
“positional externalities” of consumption, arguing that choices of each consumer generate 
externalities in the consumption of others, which influences their spending decisions. Frank et al. 
(2014) develop a theory of expenditure cascades, in which the reference group determining 
household consumption is the next higher income group rather than the rich or the population 
mean. 
According to the recent empirical evidence, analyses based on the RIH have proved to be 
more realistic than the LTC/PIH. This is because the institutional changes associated with the 
financial sector transformation and active engagement of consumers in financial markets generated 
behaviours which cannot by contained in the optimising framework of LTC/PIH 
(Cynamon/Fazzari 2008:2). As early as 2003, Morgan/Christen identified growing income 
disparities in the USA as a cause of the ballooning consumer credit demand at the bottom of the 
distribution in the attempt to “keep up with the Joneses” and maintain social position. 
                                                   
40
 Institutional economics emphasises the role of evolutionary processes and economic institutions in 
determining the behaviour of economic agents (cf. Lavoie 2014). 
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Krueger/Perri (2006) observe that inequality in consumption in the USA between 1980-2003 has 
grown less than income inequality due to the greater borrowing possibilities. Cynamon/Fazzari 
(2016) document systematic increases in the consumption-to-income ratio in the USA until the 
Great Recession, particularly for the bottom 95% of the population. This is consistent with RIH 
and suggests that the desire to maintain consumption norms, matched by the expansion of credit 
supply due to financial innovation, was an important factor behind the rising consumption share of 
income. In light of the slow income growth for the bottom 95% of the distribution, the rise in the 
consumption-to-income ratio was driven by the swelling share of debt in income, which led to the 
concentration of financial fragility at the bottom of the distribution during the Great Recession 
(ibid.:4). Furthermore, Bertrand/Morse (2013) find that consumption of the middle-income 
households in the USA was strongly responsive to consumption levels of high-income families 
(supporting RIH) but not to their future income expectations, asset price inflation, or the wealth 
effects associated with housing equity withdrawal (which rejects PIH), indicating that this was 
enabled by financial innovation and liberalisation policies since the 1980s. Carr/Jayadev (2014) 
find evidence for the relative consumption effects in the USA between 1999-2009, establishing 
that leverage grew the most rapidly among households with low relative income. However, 
empirical research on consumption has an important caveat, namely the difficulty in obtaining 
reliable consumption expenditure data (Steven Fazzari, personal communication, 18th June 2015; 
cf. Cynamon/Fazzari 2017). This is because certain expenditures are ambiguously categorised in 
the microeconomic data, e.g. spending on housing may be counted as either consumption or 
investment. Consequently, it is difficult to achieve a precise quantitative evaluation of the relative 
consumption effects. 
An importantly feature of the social dependency of consumption is its ability to explain how 
financial sector transformation has influenced household portfolio decisions. Research by Dos 
Santos (2009), Barba/Pivetti (2009), Fitoussi/Stiglitz (2009), Fitoussi/Saraceno (2010), 
Guttmann/Plihon (2010), and Karacimen (2013) lays out specific institutional causes behind the 
increasingly unsustainable household indebtedness in the USA stemming from financial sector 
transformation. Debt is argued to have served as a substitute for falling incomes in result of the 
worsening income distribution, which was associated with wage growth lagging behind 
productivity growth, retrenchment of the welfare state, and unequal tax burden, as well as financial 
liberalisation easing credit constraints for the lower income groups. This was sustained by the 
loose monetary policy of low interest rates, which promoted asset price inflation. 
Furthermore, the assumption of the social dependence of consumption supports the evidence 
of wealth inequality between different gender, racial, and age groups. Montgomerie (2011) 
emphasises the key role of the “politics of abandonment” of social responsibilities by the 
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government in inducing slow income growth, changing liability structures, and greater debt 
servicing costs for low-income, young and retired, subprime households in the USA. 
Montgomerie/Büdenbender (2015) discuss the asset-based welfare policies in the UK focused on 
homeownership promotion as a driver of unequal wealth accumulation and financial volatility for 
racial minorities, lower social classes, and women. Young (2010) argues that financial innovation, 
deregulation, and the subprime crisis led women and minorities to be “last in, first out” in access 
to financial services through leveraged homeownership. This resulted in an asymmetric dispersion 
of systemic risk and financial fragility to these groups, and the concentration of gains among 
financial investors. Consequently, the evidence from the above literature highlights that the Post-
Keynesian assumption of the social dependence of consumption can explain a range of socio-
institutional factors influencing household portfolio decisions in times of financial sector 
transformation. 
From the assumption of the social dependence of consumption follows the second tenet of 
the Post-Keynesian analyses of household portfolio behaviour, namely the separation and 
subordination of consumption needs. Since certain goods are observed to be more desirable than 
others, households order their consumption needs in a hierarchy, which leads them to reduce their 
consumption after a certain threshold level is reached (Robinson 1956:251,354; Pasinetti 1981:73). 
Thus, the traditional substitution effect resulting from price changes is rendered invalid. Instead, it 
is argued that income effects are more powerful, inducing households to spend even more in times 
of perceived income increases (Eichner 1986:159; Arestis 1992:124). This further implies that 
consumption needs can be satiated so that once satisfied, they expand to incorporate new goods. 
Constant growth in consumption needs induced by the rising social norms in consumption makes 
it impossible to capture household utility in a single measure, undermining utility maximisation as 
the main motive of household portfolio decisions (Lavoie 2014:98-99). 
Importantly, due to these assumptions the Post-Keynesian analyses of rising household debt 
are characterised by a drastically different outlook on its nature and consequences. They are able 
to provide a theoretical justification for growing wealth inequality since the 1980s in the 
institutional context of stagnant wages, privatisation of social services, and securitisation. Together 
with the insights of the functional income distribution literature as well as Hyman Minsky’s (1986) 
financial instability hypothesis emphasising the endogenous limits to borrowing capacities (cf. 
Cynamon/Fazzari 2016), the macroeconomic consequences of rising household indebtedness are 
explained theoretically, unlike in LTC/PIH. Importantly, household insolvency carries a range of 
indirect personal, psychological and social costs, which remains unrecognized in the LTC/PIH 
approach (DeVaney/Lytton 1995:138). Thereby, the Post-Keynesian analyses of consumption 
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highlight the unsustainability of household finances since the 1980s and are more insightful to 
analyse the dynamics of wealth inequality dynamics in this period. 
In sum, the Post-Keynesian approach to wealth distribution emerges as the most suitable 
theoretical framework to develop a formal theory of inequality determination in times of financial 
sector transformation. Such theory is needed for two reasons. Firstly, the Post-Keynesian insights 
into household consumption behaviour have not yet been formalised. Secondly, as mentioned in 
section 2.1 the issue of wealth heterogeneity has not been fully explored by the Post-Keynesian 
functional distribution theory, which we argued provided the most comprehensive framework of 
inequality in times of financial sector transformation. Consequently, we notice a gap in the 
existing literature on inequality determination, and propose a new approach in the next chapter. 
This new theory is informed by the Post-Keynesian analyses of the social dependence of 
consumption and Piketty’s interplay between the returns to wealth and income growth. We 
propose to unify these two approaches in the Post-Keynesian macro-modelling framework, which 
analyses the consequences of inequality for economic stability. Based on the stylised facts of 
household balance sheet structures developed in Chapter 1, we argue that the explicit consideration 
of household wealth heterogeneity would provide a more in-depth view into the causes of 
inequality under financial sector transformation than the current Post-Keynesian macro-models 
based on the dichotomous division of households into workers and capitalists. 
2.4. Summary 
In this chapter, we analysed the determinants of income and wealth inequality put forward by the 
existing economic literature. We distinguished between the Keynesian approaches to distribution, 
analysing economic processes from the perspective of fundamental uncertainty and effective 
demand, and the microeconomic theories of household portfolio decisions, focused on the 
optimising behaviour of representative agents in the economy. We argued that the macroeconomic 
theories of Galbraith (2012) and Stiglitz (2012) and the political economy approach considered the 
role of financial sector transformation and power shifts in determining income inequality, but they 
did not account for the role of wealth disparities documented in Chapter 1. We showed that Piketty 
(2014) explicitly introduced the dynamics of wealth as the determinant of inequality alongside 
income, but he did not analyse the disparities in these dynamics across households. We noted that 
these aspects had been incorporated into the Post-Keynesian economic theory, which considered 
household heterogeneity in analysing the functional distribution of national income. We argued 
that the Post-Keynesian approach had not yet examined the distributional implications of wealth 
heterogeneity among workers and capitalists arising due to financial sector transformation. 
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Consequently, we turned to the theories of household portfolio decisions in order to analyse the 
existing theoretical explanations of the determinants of wealth distribution. 
We found that the analysed classical equilibrium approaches identified with the life-cycle 
theory of consumption of Modigliani/Brumberg (1954), and the permanent income hypothesis of 
Friedman (1957) did not fully explain the rise in wealth and income inequality observed in the 
USA since the 1980s. This is because they neglected the socio-institutional context of household 
wealth accumulation decisions associated with financial sector transformation. We argued that this 
weakness resulted from the assumption of perfect information and efficient markets inherent in 
these approaches, and the associated view of inequality as the expected outcome of the optimising 
behaviour of representative agents at different stages of their life-cycle. We noted that the presence 
of fundamental uncertainty leading to breakdowns in market efficiency had been incorporated into 
the Post-Keynesian analyses of consumption behaviour, found in Robinson (1956), Pasinetti 
(1981), Eichner (1986), Nell (1992), and Arestis (1992). These insights highlighted the social 
nature, hierarchy, and satiability of household consumption choices, rendering utility 
maximisation inconsistent with the socio-institutional structures of the modern financialised 
economies. Together with the macroeconomic functional income distribution theory, the Post-
Keynesian approach explained the determinants and consequences of unsustainable debt 
accumulation and the associated increases in homeownership among low-income households, 
women, ethnic minorities, and the young before the Great Recession. These portfolio dynamics 
were argued to act as a compensation mechanism for the falling wage share of national income, 
the decreased bargaining power of workers, and the reduced state support. 
Based on this literature review, we argued that the Post-Keynesian approach to distribution 
accounting for the social dependence of household portfolio choices constituted the most 
appropriate starting point for the development of a formal theory of inequality determination in 
times of financial sector transformation. The need for such theory was motivated by the existing 
gap in the Post-Keynesian literature on functional distribution, which had not yet explored the 
distributional consequences of the impact of financial sector transformation on the differences in 
household wealth composition, which complexified the social division into workers and 
capitalists.  In the next chapter, we develop a new theory of inequality determination accounting 
for wealth heterogeneity and financial sector complexity. This theory is rooted in the Post-
Keynesian macro-modelling framework, and unifies Piketty’s argument of the relative rates of 
return to wealth and income with the Post-Keynesian assumption of the social dependence of 
consumption. 




A stock-flow consistent model of inequality determination 
In the previous chapter we argued that there was a gap in the existing literature on inequality. On 
the one hand, the Keynesian approaches identified with Galbraith (2012), Stiglitz (2012), Piketty 
(2014), and the Post-Keynesian economic theory considered the impact of the socio-institutional 
structures on inequality. However, they had not yet incorporated the role of household wealth 
heterogeneity in generating inequality. On the other hand, the classical equilibrium theories of 
household portfolio decisions identified with the life-cycle theory of consumption by 
Modigliani/Brumberg (1954), and the permanent income hypothesis by Friedman (1957) 
explained differences in wealth accumulation across households. However, because of their 
assumption of efficient markets and optimising representative agents, and their neglect of the 
macroeconomic dynamics, these theories provided an inaccurate insight into the role of finance in 
generating unsustainable indebtedness and uneven wealth accumulation opportunities. We argued 
that the Post-Keynesian analyses of consumption emphasising the social dependence of household 
portfolio decisions were more suitable to understand rising inequality in the modern financialised 
economies, considering the dimensions of class, gender, race, and the intergenerational 
inequalities. Thus, we argued that due to its explicit focus on household heterogeneity and the 
consequences of income distribution for macroeconomic stability, there was a scope for the 
development of a new theory of inequality determination within the Post-Keynesian macro-
modelling framework. Such theory would account for the role of financial sector transformation in 
generating disparities in wealth ownership, unifying Piketty’s argument of the relative rates of 
return to wealth and income with the Post-Keynesian assumption of the social dependence of 
consumption.  
In this chapter, we develop a Post-Keynesian theory of inequality determination based on 
the determinants and implications of wealth heterogeneity among households. Such theory 
incorporating wealth inequality into the Post-Keynesian functional distribution literature is needed 
to understand the dynamics of inequality in times of financial sector transformation. Given the 
pivotal role of rising inequality in generating macroeconomic instability, which was outlined in the 
Introduction, the inclusion of the wealth distribution channel in macroeconomic models enriches 
the analysis of the dynamics of the modern capitalist economies. The most original feature of our 
model is to incorporate the increased heterogeneity of household wealth by introducing a third 
social class into the Post-Keynesian macro-modelling approach based on the stylised facts of 
household balance sheet composition in Chapter 1. We argue that this can account for the fact that 
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the analytical categories of workers and capitalists have become more complex in result of the 
financial sector transformation. Moreover, by considering the Post-Keynesian assumption of the 
social dependence of consumption we can account for different wealth accumulation motives 
across the distribution in a structural macro framework. Consequently, distinguishing between the 
differences in wealth accumulation and leverage levels across the three household groups allows 
for a more precise identification of the points of financial fragility defining macroeconomic 
stability. This is particularly important considering the changing features of the financialised 
economies in the post-crisis era, such as the increasing accumulation of unsecured debt among 
low-wealth households and the restructuring of the housing market, which creates a deep divide in 
wealth accumulation opportunities and the resulting income flows between homeowners and 
renters. In this context, wealth ownership emerges as a powerful channel of distribution, which 
contributes to macroeconomic instability in new ways than before the Great Recession. 
The macroeconomic model of inequality determination developed in this chapter aims to 
complement the existing literature by explicitly incorporating wealth inequality into the Post-
Keynesian macro-modelling framework. We propose a three-class stock-flow consistent model 
with a complex financial sector calibrated to the US data to explain the observed trends in 
inequality in the USA, and to account for the disparate wage growth, unequal returns to wealth, 
and differences in leverage across households. The main contribution of the model is to provide a 
new conceptualisation of the household sector in the Post-Keynesian framework based on the 
balance sheet composition rather than the income sources received by each group. We propose to 
incorporate the heterogeneity of wealth composition across households by introducing a third class 
identified with the leveraged middle class of homeowners emergent due to the subprime lending 
boom before the Great Recession. Moreover, we incorporate the Post-Keynesian assumption of the 
social dependence of consumption, distinguishing between different motives for household 
indebtedness, i.e. necessitous borrowing of the low-wealth class, the relative consumption 
concerns of the middle class, and credit as an investment strategy for the high-wealth class. The 
distributional channels in the proposed model emerge through the transfer of wealth and income to 
the high-wealth class due to the securitisation of mortgages of the middle class, rental payments on 
housing by the low-wealth class, leverage levels of the two groups and consumption emulation of 
the middle class determining the interest rate paid on loans by these households. 
The choice of the stock-flow consistent modelling method (thereby SFCM) is motivated by 
its integrated analysis of balance sheet composition across the real and the financial sector. This 
feature yields itself to the examination of the role of household wealth heterogeneity in generating 
inequality. Moreover, this method has been widely used in the Post-Keynesian macro-modelling 
literature on the distributive consequences of financialisation. Consequently, we are able to engage 
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in a dialogue with the existing models, introducing the elements of Piketty’s (2014) insights 
regarding the interplay between income and wealth into the Post-Keynesian functional distribution 
framework. This is achieved by incorporating the differences in household balance sheet 
composition and securitisation, which are associated with different returns to wealth and leverage 
conditions. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Firstly, we motivate the choice of the SFCM 
methodology in developing the theory of inequality determination in this thesis, and review the 
existing stock-flow consistent models accounting for financial sector transformation and relative 
consumption concerns. Secondly, we propose a new conceptualisation of the household sector in 
the Post-Keynesian macro-modelling framework, introducing a new definition of the middle class. 
We then present the structure of our model and analyse its simulation results calibrated to the US 
data, comparing the simulation outcome accounting for household wealth heterogeneity and 
securitisation with the alternative scenarios without these features. To test the robustness of our 
results to the parameter choices, we conduct a univariate and a multivariate sensitivity analysis. 
We find that household wealth heterogeneity leads to higher inequality levels than scenarios 
without the new elements proposed in our model. This result is robust to the parameter choices, 
particularly in the long run, although the magnitudes of the simulated inequality levels are 
sensitive to the assumed values of the wage share, the profit retention ratio of firms, household 
lending conditions, and the marginal propensities to consume. 
3.1. Stock-flow consistent methodology 
The reason for choosing the SFCM method to analyse the impact of financial sector transformation 
and household wealth heterogeneity on inequality is twofold. Firstly, the choice is motivated by its 
explicit focus on the integrated analysis of balance sheets of the real and the financial sector. 
Consequently, we are able to precisely identify the distributional channels arising from financial 
sector transformation and the differences in balance sheet composition across households. The 
methodology of SFCM yields itself to the consideration of the reinforcing dynamics between the 
stocks of wealth and the flows of income à la Piketty. Moreover, the SFCM approach has been 
widely used in the existing Post-Keynesian macro-models of financialisation and distribution. 
Thus, by adopting this methodology we can maintain dialogue with the existing literature on the 
distributive impact of financialisation. 
Originating in Copeland (1949) and in the works of Tobin and Godley in the 1980s, the 
SFCM framework has recently been formalised by Godley/Lavoie (2007). It constitutes a 
macroeconomic tool integrating stocks and flows across the real and the financial sectors in the 
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economy in a consistent fashion. It is based on the quadruple-entry system, which necessitates that 
every inflow has a corresponding outflow in the system (Caverzasi/Godin 2013).  
The majority of the SFCM studies are based on the dichotomous division into workers and 
capitalists/rentiers, earning income from labour and ownership of capital respectively. Several 
recent contributions in the SFCM literature on financialisation take into account some elements of 
household wealth into the analyses of growth and macroeconomic stability (Zezza 2008; 
Caverzasi/Godin 2013; Setterfield/Kim 2013; Nikolaidi 2015; Sawyer/Passarella Veronese 2017; 
Dafermos/Papatheodorou 2015). Most commonly, the aspects of wealth distribution are included 
by allowing for borrowing by workers. As indicated by the endogenous money theory, these loans 
and the corresponding debt repayments are transferred to the capitalist class in the form of 
financial assets. Wealth of rentiers is usually divided into firm equities and bank deposits. The 
allocation of wealth between these two assets depends on their relative rates of return, and is often 
modelled according to the Tobinesque portfolio principle (Caverzasi/Godin 2015:16). In addition, 
Zezza (2008) presents one of the first attempts to include a housing market in the SFCM, assuming 
that capitalists, identified with the top 5% of the income distribution, receive additional income 
from renting houses to part of the workers. Furthermore, Sawyer/Passarella Veronese (2017) and 
Nikolaidi (2015) incorporate securitisation into the SFCM framework, assuming that the shadow 
banking sector increases the capital income inflows of rentiers. Moreover, 
Dafermos/Papatheodorou (2015) link personal and functional income distribution in the SFCM 
approach, distinguishing between five groups of households depending on their employment 
status, skill level, and the type of income earned. In addition, Caverzasi/Godin (2013), 
Setterfield/Kim (2013), Kapeller/Schuetz (2015), and Detzer (2016) develop Post-Keynesian 
macro-models accounting for the emulation of rentier consumption by workers.  
We argue that the current SFCM analyses have not yet explicitly captured the impact of 
financial sector transformation and the differences in household balance sheet structures on the 
endogenous inequality determination. With the exception of Dafermos/Papatheodorou (2015), 
most of the SFCM studies reviewed above do not explain distribution within the model. Moreover, 
few account for wage earnings among the top income group, or consider differences in household 
portfolio decisions in macroeconomic dynamics. This arises because of the dominance of the 
dichotomous division of households in these models, which does not sufficiently encompass the 
rising heterogeneity of wealth structures along the distribution. Furthermore, apart from 
Sawyer/Passarella Veronese (2017) borrowing is restricted to workers. However, as shown in 
Chapter 1, in the USA it is the rich who are indebted the most both in terms of value and 
participation. Consequently, the model proposed in this chapter attempts to fill the emergent gap in 
the literature by developing the analysis of endogenous determination of income and wealth 
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inequality, accounting for household wealth heterogeneity and financial sector complexity. This is 
achieved by introducing the third class of households corresponding to the middle class defined by 
its balance sheet structure dependent on leveraged housing. The household sector is thus redefined 
according to the differences in asset ownership and leverage levels rather than the type of income 
received. 
3.2. New conceptualisation of the household sector 
Based on the literature review in Chapter 2, and the analysis of changes in household balance sheet 
structures in Chapter 1, the stock-flow consistent model developed in this thesis aims to account 
for the increased heterogeneity of the categories of workers and capitalists encountered in the Post-
Keynesian macro-modelling literature, arising due to changes in their wealth ownership structures. 
We propose to incorporate the growing wealth heterogeneity in the Post-Keynesian macro-models 
by providing a new conceptualisation of the household sector based on differences in the balance 
sheet composition. For this purpose, we introduce a third group into the conventional dichotomous 
distinction between workers and capitalists in the Post-Keynesian functional distribution theory. 
This new group is identified with the middle class, defined as the new class of leveraged 
homeowners formed in the subprime lending boom. The introduction of this class allows us to 
distinguish between different motives for debt accumulation across households based on the Post-
Keynesian assumption of the social dependence of consumption discussed in Chapter 2. 
We acknowledge that the definition of the middle class can be considered along a variety of 
dimensions. In monetary terms, the middle class is often defined relatively as the middle 60% of 
income earners, with incomes typically ranging from 75% to 125% of the median income41. 
Atkinson/Brandolini (2011) develop a wealth criterion to qualify the income definition of the 
middle class. They classify the rich as agents having net wealth at least 30 times larger than mean 
income. The middle class is defined as holding enough assets to be safe from the risk of falling 
into poverty for a certain period of time, e.g. 6 months, if income suddenly falls. 
Atkinson/Brandolini (2011) argue that asset-poor individuals may need to be excluded from the 
middle class even if their income exceeds the poverty threshold.  
Furthermore, the middle class can be defined according to the social criteria such as class 
consciousness, social status, lifestyle, and type of employment, which influence the individual 
economic security and prospects (cf. Savage 2013). 
                                                   
41
 Some studies extend the upper limit to as much as 300% of the median income because the 125% 
cut-off places a disproportionately large portion of the population in certain countries into the top 
category (cf. Pressman 2007). 
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In the Post-Keynesian macro-modelling literature, Palley (2015) constitutes one of the first 
attempts at formalising the middle class. He models a Goodwinian three-class economy, with the 
household sector divided into the upper, middle, and working class according to the type of 
employment. The upper class is identified with the richest 1% of the population, corresponding to 
the top managers. The middle class is defined as the next 19%, consisting of middle managers. 
Hence, it is much smaller than typically envisaged in the literature described above and does not 
contain the median household. The working class corresponds to the bottom 80% and includes 
non-supervisory production workers. Palley’s model introduces a complex class struggle, where 
the middle managerial class has conflicts with both the upper and the working class. Managerial 
pay is seen as a deduction from surplus in line with Kalecki (1971), as the top managers receive a 
share of firms’ profit. In contrast, pay of middle managers’ is treated as non-managerial wage and 
forms part of the wage bill. Hence, it constitutes the cost of production based on which the mark-
up prices are determined. Moreover, while non-managerial workers are paid hourly based on their 
exogenously determined bargaining power, employment rate, and working hours, the middle 
managers are assumed to receive a salary. Consequently, the middle and the top managers save 
part of their income, while workers consume all their wages. Hence, since middle managers own 
part of the capital stock they simultaneously benefit from a higher profit share (which aligns their 
interests with those of the top managers) and from a higher wage share (creating a common 
interest with the working class). Consequently, class conflict is complexified as the middle class is 
simultaneously in conflict with the top managers and workers over the share of profits and wages 
respectively. The political alliance of the middle class will ultimately depend on which source of 
income – wages or capital – is preferred (Palley 2015:240). Similar proposition regarding the 
simultaneous capitalist and non-capitalist nature of the middle class has been put forward by 
Wright (1997, 2009). 
While Palley’s model constitutes an important contribution to the literature, its conclusions 
concern the functional distribution of income rather than wealth. The middle class is seen to have 
contradicting interests and be in conflict with both the upper- and the lower-income groups. 
However, as argued in Chapter 1, the processes of financial sector transformation harmed wealth 
accumulation of the middle-income households, making their fate more similar to the working 
class in terms of their high leverage levels. Since the task of our analysis is to incorporate wealth 
into the examination of inequality in times of financial sector transformation, our original 
contribution to the Post-Keynesian macro-modelling literature is to incorporate the middle class 
into the analysis of the household sector based on a new conceptualisation. In our model, 
households are defined by their balance sheet characteristics related to the securitisation processes 
and differences in wealth accumulation motives rather than their wage/profit shares. 
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3.3. Model specification 
The aim of the model presented in this thesis is to account for household wealth heterogeneity in 
explaining income and wealth inequality in a financialised economy. The model is simulated and 
calibrated using the US data. We analyse the evolution of various overall inequality measures for 
income and wealth. We focus on the personal distribution of wealth and income, treating the 
functional income distribution as given by assuming an exogenous wage share. Table 3.1 presents 
the balance sheet matrix of our model, while Table 3.2 shows the integrated transaction flow 
matrix. The model considers a closed economy with no government, and consists of five sectors: a 
three-class household sector, firms, and a three-tier financial sector comprising of commercial 
banks, special purpose vehicles (SPVs)/underwriters, and institutional investors. This definition of 
the financial sector aims to capture the increased complexity of modern financial institutions by 
introducing securitisation into the model dynamics. Apart from income transfers through the 
repayments of loans from commercial banks, inequality is influenced by securitisation, which 
transfers wealth of the middle-income group to the upper class through differences in asset 
ownership. 
3.3.1. The household sector 
In contrast to the existing Post-Keynesian macro-models, the household sector in our analysis is 
defined not by the type of employment but by the balance sheet characteristics. As argued 
previously, this allows for understanding the endogenous determination of wealth and income 
inequality in times of financial sector transformation. Moreover, it links the theory of Piketty 
(2014) with the Post-Keynesian functional distribution framework, highlighting the interplay 
between wealth ownership and income flows for overall inequality. We also account for the Post-
Keynesian assumption of the social dependence of consumption by considering differences in debt 


















      
 
 

















Working class Middle class Rentier class 
Deposits +Mw +Mm +Mr  –Mw–Mm–Mr   0 
Loans –Lw –Lm –Lr  +Lw+LmNS+Lr +LmS  0 
Capital    +K    +K 
Houses  +phHm +phHr +phHU    +phH 
Equity   +E –E    0 
MBS      –MBS +MBS 0 
Institutional 
investors shares   +SH    –SH 0 




















Table 3.2 Transaction flow matrix 
 
Households 






class Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital 
Consumption –Cw –Cm –Cr +Cw+Cm+Cr          0 
Investment    +I –I       0 
Wages +Ww +Wm +Wr –W        0 
Firm profits   +DP –TP +RP       0 
Bank profits   +FB   –FB      0 
Financial 
profits 
  +FI       –FI  0 
Coupon 
payments 
       –COUPAY  +COUPAY  0 
Interest on 
deposits 
+rm*Mw +rm*Mm +rm*Mr   –rm*M      0 
Interest on 
loans 
–rw*Lw –rlm*Lm –rl*Lr   
+rw*Lw+rl*Lr 
+rlm*LmNS 
 +rlm*LmS    0 
Rent on 
housing 
–R  +R         0 
Δ Deposits –ΔMw –ΔMm –ΔMr    +ΔM     0 
Δ Loans +ΔLw +ΔLm +ΔLr    
–ΔLw–ΔLr 
–ΔLmNS 
 –ΔLmS   0 
Δ Capital    +ΔK –ΔK       0 
Δ Houses  –ph*ΔHm –ph*ΔHr  
+ph*ΔHm 
+ph*ΔHr 
      0 
Δ Equities   –pe*ΔE  +pe*ΔE       0 
Δ MBS         +ΔMBS  –ΔMBS 0 
Δ Inst. inv. 
shares 
  –ΔSH        +ΔSH 0 
Δ Net worth ΔVw ΔVm ΔVr 0 ΔVf 0 ΔVb 0 ΔVs 0 ΔVI ΔV 
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The working class 
Classification of the working class in our model is conceptually close to the category of workers 
encountered in the Post-Keynesian literature. In line with Kalecki (1954), this group is assumed to 
have the highest propensity to consume. Additionally, we assume that they are the most leveraged 
group. Based on the analysis of household balance sheet structures in Chapter 1, we identify this 
group with the bottom 20% of the income distribution in the USA, who experienced rapid 
increases in net wealth holdings before the Great Recession, followed by large losses since 2007. 
We assume that they do not carry enough wealth and income that would allow them to take out 
mortgages and hence that all working class households rent houses. Consequently, it is assumed 
that credit to the working class households consists of unsecured short-term consumer credit and 
payday loans. As shown in the balance sheet analysis in Chapter 1, this has been particularly 
relevant in the recent years as unsecured debt and payday borrowing have been on the rise after the 
2007 crisis (cf. The Pew Charitable Trust 2012; PwC 2015). 
Because of low wealth holdings, the working class is assumed to rely primarily on wage 
income. In our model, real disposable income of the working class consists of wages and interest 
earned on deposits, less interest paid on loans and house rental payments to rentiers (equation 3.1). 
Gross income is defined as wages and interest on deposits without considering loan repayments 
(equation 3.2). We assume that the working class takes on debt to finance consumption. 
Households consume part c1 of their gross income as well as proportion c4 of their wealth, and 
store the remaining savings after loan repayments as bank deposits (equations 3.3–3.4)42. We 
assume that the propensity to consume out of wealth c4 is the same for all households. 
Assuming simple adaptive expectations43, borrowing by the working class is determined by 
their past consumption level, adjusted by parameter βw, as well as the debt-service-to-income ratio 
(equation 3.5). βw captures household borrowing norms as well as lending norms in the financial 
sector (Setterfield/Kim 2013:10). We assume that βw for the working class is lower compared to 
the other households. In this way, we are able to indirectly account for the borrowing constraints 
of workers, reflecting commercial banks’ attitude towards the creditworthiness of borrowers. We 
                                                   
42
 This corresponds to the assumption of the “pecking order” in Setterfield/Kim (2013) stating that 
households treat savings as a “luxury that is foregone first” in the presence of debt repayments. 
43
 In contrast to the rational expectations hypothesis assuming that agents utilise all available public 
information, the theory of adaptive expectations states that expectations are based on the past values of 
an economic variable (Snowdon/Vane 2005:227). While a weakness of this backward-looking 
approach to the formation of expectations is the possibility of systematically erroneous predictions if 
the economic variable is unstable, we prefer the adaptive expectations hypothesis to the rational 
expectations due to the presence of fundamental uncertainty in the economy. 
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assume βw to be high during a boom, as in the early 2000s when lending norms were lax due to the 
perceived minimisation of credit risk through securitisation. In times of recessions, βw can be 
thought of as low as lenders are more concerned about creditworthiness, leading to stricter lending 
norms. Because workers are assumed to have higher leverage, they are constrained in their access 
to credit as their demand for loans is adjusted by the debt-service-to-income ratio, capturing the 
repayment capacity on past loans.  
Net wealth of the working class is accumulated entirely in deposits less loans (equation 3.6). 
Rental payments on housing are defined in equation 3.7 as a proportion ! of the value of houses 
owned by rentiers and the price of housing. ! depends positively on the change in the rentier 
demand for housing (equation 3.8). At this stage of the analysis it is not endogenously explained 
why households in each group chose to rent or own their house, although the earlier discussion in 
Chapter 1 explained how financial innovation and the subprime lending expansion generated 
opportunities for low-income households to get onto the housing ladder and become the new 
middle class of leveraged homeowners. In the present model we do not analyse such between-class 
movements endogenously. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the differential degrees of leverage across the distribution 
became important contributors to inequality in the USA in the context of financial sector 
transformation. One of the most innovative features of our model is to examine the exact dynamics 
of household leverage and inequality. As financial distress is often measured simultaneously by a 
variety of indicators in the current literature (cf. DeVaney/Lytton 1995, Boushey/Weller 2008, 
Ampudia et al. 2014), we include three measures of leverage to account for financial fragility in 
the most complete way possible. Firstly, the debt-to-asset ratio is provided (equation 3.9), 
capturing the value of loans relative to the value of gross wealth. Secondly, the debt-to-income 
ratio (equation 3.10) constitutes a measure of the stock of loans to the flow of disposable income 
in each period. Finally, the debt-service-to-income ratio (equation 3.11) shows how much of gross 
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The middle class 
As suggested previously, the definition of the middle class in our model differs sharply from 
Palley’s (2015) analysis. We define the middle class according to their balance sheet composition 
based on the stylised facts established in the analysis of trends in household wealth composition in 
the USA in Chapter 1.  
Importantly, the middle class is defined as a group whose balance sheets depend on housing. 
This definition encompasses population between the 20th and the 90th percentile and thus includes 
the median household. Their wealth was rising in the 1990s and the 2000s due to the increasing 
house prices, allowing them to refinance their mortgages by taking on more credit and engage in 
home equity withdrawal, a strategy which was only feasible in the house price bubble. When the 
growth of house prices reversed in July 2006, these households saw their wealth gains largely 
eroded. For these reason, the middle class is assumed to have high leverage ratios. As argued in 
Chapter 1, the expansion of credit wasn’t accidental as household loans, primarily mortgages, 
constituted the basis for asset-backed securities. Consequently, the existence of the middle class is 
strongly linked to the financial sector transformation due to the incentives of financial institutions 
to generate as many household loans as possible to satisfy the growing demands of financial 
investors for securitised instruments. 
Separation of this group from the working class is important to account for the impact of 
homeownership on inequality. As shown in Chapter 1, unlike households in the bottom 20% of the 
income distribution, the middle-income households, particularly those in the second and third 
quintile experienced large wealth losses in the past decades. This was due to the falling value of 
housing around the time of the Great Recession. Moreover, the middle class is different from the 
top income group because of the disparate returns to wealth documented in Chapter 1 emergent as 
the middle-income groups received lower capital income flows than the top group due to less 
diversified asset composition. 
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Because the middle class is assumed to account for 70% of households in our analysis, 
issues associated with heterogeneity of this group need to be acknowledged. Currently, the middle 
class in our model includes both subprime mortgage borrowers, whose incomes and wealth 
resemble those of the working class, and middle managers in the 80th-90th percentile of the income 
distribution, whose trends in income and wealth are closer to the rentier households.  
We argue that heterogeneity issues cannot be avoided in analysing the household sector. The 
three-class division adopted here is superior to the two-class conceptualisation of the household 
sector in the Post-Keynesian macro-modelling literature because it allows for a more intricate 
examination of household balance sheets and leverage in times of financial sector transformation, 
which altered the traditionally envisaged economic relationships. There is a possibility of 
extending the division of households even further, which has been done by 
Dafermos/Papatheodorou (2015). Such detailed division is not necessary in the present model for 
two reasons. Firstly, it would introduce a considerable degree of complexity to an already 
elaborate model of heterogeneous households and financial institutions. Secondly, in the aggregate 
framework of SFCM, it would be difficult to meaningfully break down the social classes into 
upper/lower groups and introduce a drastically different picture of balance sheets than that already 
provided in the three-class model. This is because at the aggregate level the most important 
distinctions in wealth accumulation possibilities are already made.  
In the model, real disposable income of the middle class consists of wage income and 
interest earned on bank deposits less interest payments on loans (equation 3.12). Gross income is 
defined as wage and interest income plus capital gains on housing
44
 (equation 3.13). We assume 
that the middle class accumulates mortgage debt to finance part of their consumption. Thus, a 
fraction of wealth and gross income is consumed (equation 3.14). We assume that the residual 
disposable income after the repayment of loans is saved as deposits (equation 3.15).  
Borrowing of the middle class depends on their target consumption adjusted by β (which is 
analogous to the parameter βw in the workers loan demand function) and their debt burden 
measured as the debt-service-to-income ratio (equation 3.16). We assume that the parameter β 
reflecting household lending norms is the same across the middle class and rentiers. The target 
consumption of the middle class is set based on the past consumption level (due to the simple 
adaptive expectations), and relative to the consumption of rentiers adjusted by the emulation 
parameter η (equation 3.17). η is the exogenous Ravina emulation parameter (cf. Ravina 2007).  
                                                   
44
 This resembles the Haig-Simon income specification, where capital gains enter into the disposable 
income equation (Godley/Lavoie 2007:392). 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, consumption emulation has recently emerged as a potentially important 
driver of borrowing (cf. Cynamon/Fazzari 2008, Pressman/Scott 2009), leading to lower levels of 
consumption inequality than income inequality (cf. Krueger/Perri 2006). However, while in the 
existing SFCM studies emulation is applied to low-income workers, we restrict relative 
consumption to the middle class. We deem this approach more appropriate as emulation motives 
are more likely to be relevant among more affluent households belonging to the middle class, who 
can afford necessities such as owning their house. In contrast, the working class is more concerned 
with maintaining their living standards in light of the rising living costs (i.e. rent payments). Their 
demand for loans is thus more likely to be driven by necessitous borrowing concerns (cf. Pollin 
1988) rather than their desire to follow the celebrity lifestyles of the rich. It would be possible to 
introduce emulation of the middle class consumption by the working class, which would be in line 
with the expenditure cascades theory where each group emulates consumption of the one just 
above it in the distribution (Frank et al. 2014). However, we believe that due to sluggishly 
growing incomes and increases in house prices, the rising credit demand of the low-income 
households is motivated primarily by sustaining a constant standard of living rather than the 
achievement of a particular social status. 
Net wealth of the middle class is composed of the value of bank deposits and houses, less 
loans (equation 3.18). We therefore assume that the middle class households are owner-occupiers 
of their property (and hence that they do not rent out their houses). We assume that loans to the 
middle class consist exclusively of mortgages. Demand for houses by the middle class is defined 
positively by their disposable income and the change in the provision of mortgages from the 
previous period, and is defined negatively by their current consumption and the debt-to-income 
ratio, all adjusted by the price of housing (equation 3.19). As in the case of the working class, 
different measures of financial fragility for the middle class are presented, including the debt-to-
asset ratio (equation 3.21), the debt-to-income ratio (equation 3.22) and the debt-service-to-income 
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The rentier class 
In our model, households in the top group are defined as the top 10% of the income distribution. In 
contrast to the other household groups, they saw the fastest increases in their income and wealth 
since the 1980s and the smallest wealth losses after the 2007 crisis, as evidenced by the analysis in 
Chapter 1. Moreover, their balance sheets are assumed to be more diversified and rely primarily on 
high-yielding financial investment assets and business equity rather than housing, which 
differentiates this group from the middle class. Because we do not analyse the dynamics of 
investment expectations and realisation among entrepreneurs, we narrow down the definition of 
the capitalist class to rentiers. 
The existing Post-Keynesian studies often treat the rich as pure rentiers, who derive their 
income solely from capital ownership. This is also envisaged by Piketty – as wealth becomes 
inherited and the compounding returns to wealth gradually exceed the growth of income over time, 
the rich abandon work as they are able to live off the returns to their wealth. While this was true in 
the pre-Fordist era and seems to be a plausible scenario in the future, it doesn’t describe the 
realities observed since the post-war period. Keister/Lee (2014) show that inheritance in the USA 
accounts for a small portion of the existing wealth of the rich. Moreover, as shown in the analysis 
of trends in inequality in Chapter 1, the top 10% captured an increasing share of wages between 
1989-2013. This stems from the extremely high salaries paid to financial sector executives (cf. 
Kaplan/Rauh 2010; Philippon/Reshef 2012). To account for the growing wage inequality, we 
include wages in the rentier income in our model. In this view, the capitalist class can be thought 
of as “working rentiers”. This complements the traditional Post-Keynesian view of the capitalist 
class. We assume that rentiers engage in work not because of necessity (as is in the case of the 
working and the middle class) but because the institutional conditions make employment an 
“investment strategy” for the rich, as they are able to use the economic power associated with their 
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high wealth to influence their earnings. Consequently, unlike the working and the middle class, 
they do not rely on their wages to maintain their living standards. 
Furthermore, in contrast to most of the SFCM studies including debt, we allow for 
indebtedness of the rich. This is because the analysis of household balance sheet composition in 
Chapter 1 revealed that the top decile accumulated sizeable debt between 1989-2013, constituting 
the most indebted income group in terms of the ownership rates and the amount of debt. 
Consequently, in our model it is assumed that rentiers borrow from banks to consume and invest in 
excess of their wage and capital income. Rentier borrowing depends positively on their wealth, 
which serves as collateral. What is different about the indebtedness of the rich is their debt 
accumulation motives. We assume that rentiers take on debt as an investment strategy to 
accumulate more assets. Because of lower interest rates on loans and higher returns to the 
diversified asset portfolio, the debt-service-to-income ratio and the debt-to-asset ratio of the top 
decile are assumed be the lowest among all households. Conversely, based on the analysis in 
Chapter 1 we expect the debt-to-income ratio to be the highest for rentiers reflecting their large 
asset holdings, which allow for high debt accumulation relative to their income flows.  
Rentier disposable income consists of wages (treated as part of the wage bill and including a 
wage premium over the other employees), interest on deposits, a proportion of profits of firms and 
commercial banks, as well as return earned on business equity and shares of institutional investors, 
and housing rental payments by the working class, less interest paid on loans (equation 3.24). 
Gross income is defined as the above plus the amount of debt repayments and capital gains on 
housing and business equity (equation 3.25 and 3.34-35). Rentiers consume a fraction of their 
gross income and wealth, although their propensity to consume out of income is assumed to be the 
lowest among all households (equation 3.26). Residual savings after debt repayments are stored in 
the form of deposits (equation 3.27).  
Borrowing of rentiers (equation 3.28) depends on their past consumption and their debt-
service-to-income ratio, and does not include the relative consumption concerns. It should be 
mentioned, however, that relative consumption motives are bound to be especially strong among 
the richest 10%, who engage in luxury goods consumption and aim to elevate their social status 
and pursue “celebrity lifestyles”. This is evidenced by the analysis of the top shares in Chapter 1, 
which highlighted that much of the increase in the top 10% share of income and assets was driven 
by the rising share of the top 1%. However, high aggregation of the SFCM and the elaborate 
character of the current model prevent us from modelling such precise consumption behaviour of 
the different income groups within the top decile.  
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It is assumed that the allocation of rentiers’ wealth (equation 3.29) between houses, equities, 
institutional investors’ shares and deposits, which are treated as a buffer stock (equations 3.30–
3.32), follows the Tobinesque portfolio principle, i.e. it depends on the relative rates of return 
offered on these assets. We assume that rentiers own all firm equity. Return on housing considered 
by the rentiers is given by the ratio of rent payments by the working class and capital gains on 
housing to the value of housing in the previous period (equation 3.33). 
Equations 3.36 to 3.38 provide the leverage measures of the rentier households, i.e. the debt-
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3.3.2. Firms 
The firm sector in our model is deliberately simple. Firms are assumed to follow the standard 
Kaleckian behaviour, setting prices as a mark-up over costs. We assume that there is no inflation 
and that the price of output is unity, so that the nominal and real values coincide. Profits are 
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residual (equation 3.39) and the profit share is determined as a mark-up over unit labour costs. We 
assume that firms invest in housing and produce a single capital good on demand so that capital 
inventories are not taken into account. Firms retain part of their profits (equation 3.40) and 
distribute the rest to the rentiers (equation 3.41).  
The output of the modelled economy is given by the consumption spending of households 
and investment in productive capital and housing (equation 3.42). The wage bill is set through the 
bargaining process and is defined according to an exogenously given wage share of output 
(equation 3.43). The wage rate of the working and the middle class depends on the share of each 
group (Nw and Nm respectively) in total population. Importantly, wages paid to rentiers are linked 
to a variable remuneration dependent on firm profits. The rentier wage rate (equation 3.44) is 
given by an exogenous premium mw > 1 over the other workers’ wage rate, as well as the profit 
sharing element gℎ, and an exogenous parameter g  (0,1) reflecting the relative importance of 
profit remuneration in the rentier wage rate determination (Dafermos/Papatheodorou 2015:13).  
Because the focus of the model is on introducing complexity into the household and the 
financial sector, firms’ investment behaviour is highly simplified. Investment is assumed to 
expand at a constant rate and is defined by the growth of capital stock at an exogenous rate gk 
(equations 3.45-3.46). A fraction x of investment spending is financed by issuing equity (equation 
3.47). Return on equity is given in equation 3.48, while the value of equities outstanding is defined 
in equation 3.49. The capacity utilisation rate (equation 3.50) is given as the ratio of the actual to 
the potential output (equation 3.51). 
Apart from productive capital, firms invest in housing, which depends on the difference 
between housing demanded by rentiers and the middle class and the available housing supply in 
the previous period (equation 3.52). In every period, a stock of houses remains unsold (equation 
3.53), depending on the change in the supply and the demand for housing among the middle class 
(note that the Tobinesque portfolio equation implies that all houses demanded by rentiers are sold). 
Change in the price of housing is given by the difference between the change in the demand for 
housing by rentiers and the middle class and the change in the supply of housing by firms 
(equation 3.54). 
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3.3.3. Commercial banks 
Financial sector in our model comprises of three institutions – commercial banks, special purpose 
vehicles/underwriters, and institutional investors. The advantage of the SFCM method is its ability 
to illustrate the different functions of the various financial institutions in the economy 
(Sawyer/Passarella Veronese 2017). Based on the theory of endogenous money, we assume that 
commercial banks in our model have a distinct role of creating money through loans, which is 
circulated through the economy by the remaining financial institutions.  
Since the aim of our model is to account for inequality determination in the age of financial 
sector transformation, commercial banks are envisaged as active profit-seeking entities rather than 
passive intermediaries between debtors and creditors. Profits of the commercial banks are 
generated by charging higher interest rates on loans than offered on deposits. A constant interest 
rate on deposits is assumed for all households, defined as an exogenous premium z1 over a given 
central bank interest rate (equation 3.56). The interest rate on loans is set by charging an 
exogenous premium z2 over the deposit rate (equation 3.57). Thus, the commercial bank profits 
are defined as the sum of the interest payments on non-securitised mortgages of the middle class 
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(equation 3.64), consumer loans of the working class, and loans to rentiers, less interest payments 
on deposits to households (equation 3.55)45. All profits are transferred to the rentiers, who are 
assumed to own commercial banks and the remaining financial institutions. This, together with the 
assumption that assets of rentiers outweigh their debt holdings, leads to the assumption that 
rentiers in our model remain creditors in net terms. This is because their debt payments are 
ultimately returned to them in the form of bank profits. 
Commercial banks accept deposits from the household sector. However, each household 
group faces a different rate of interest depending on the perception of their creditworthiness by 
banks. The interest on loans to the working class is higher than the rate charged to the middle class 
and rentiers by a premium { (equation 3.58). This risk premium depends on the exogenous 
parameters {0 and {1, capturing the institutional conditions in the financial markets, as well as the 
debt-to-income ratio and the debt-service-to-income ratio of the working class (equation 3.59). 
Loans to the middle class are subject to a mortgage rate (equation 3.60), defined as a spread 
over the commercial bank lending rate (equation 3.61). The mortgage spread depends positively 
on parameter {0, the debt-service-to-income ratio, and the debt-to-income ratio of the middle class, 
adjusted by an exogenous parameter {2, and negatively on the rate of return on mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS), adjusted by an exogenous parameter {3.  
Importantly, part of the mortgages to the middle class is securitised and sold to underwriters 
and their SPVs (equation 3.62), and the rest is kept on the commercial bank balance sheets 
(equation 3.63). The share of securitised loans (equation 3.64) depends on an exogenous parameter 
s0 (capturing institutional conditions such as the degree of financial regulation) and the target yield 
on MBS (given by the past yield under the assumption of simple adaptive expectations), adjusted 
by an exogenous parameter s1. The redundant equation of the model is given in equation 3.65
46. 
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45
 The simulated steady-state value of the interest rates on mortgages to the middle class is 6.8%, while 
the interest rate on loans to the working class is 8.8% (base interest rate on loans is 3%, Appendix II). 
46
 The redundant equation is logically implied by the remaining model equations (Godley/Lavoie 
2007:42). 
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3.3.4. SPVs/underwriters 
The main role of the sector of SPVs and underwriters is to transform the securitised mortgages 
bought from the commercial banks into MBS (equation 3.66). It is assumed that the 
SPVs/underwriters pay no administrative fees to the commercial banks for this transaction. 
Consequently, the role of SPVs/underwriters is to circulate money created by commercial banks. 
We assume that all MBS are sold to institutional investors in the form of coupon payments 
without any fee (equation 3.67) at a coupon rate determined by an exogenous spread over the 
mortgage rate (equation 3.68). Consequently, the SPVs/underwriters sector accumulates no profits. 
Importantly, the issued MBS are assumed to be of the single “pass-through” type rather than 
consisting of various pooled MBS (cf. Nikolaidi 2015:4). 
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3.3.5. Institutional investors 
The sector of institutional investors includes entities such as pension funds, mutual funds, hedge 
funds, insurance companies, and investment banks (cf. Davis 2003). Similarly to 
SPVs/underwriters, liabilities of institutional investors are not accepted as the means of payment in 
the economy, but reflect the circulation of money created by commercial banks. Institutional 
investors accumulate profits equal to the coupon payments from the SPVs/underwriters, which are 
entirely distributed to the rentiers (equation 3.69). Return on the institutional investors’ shares is 
given as the ratio of their profits to the shares demanded by the rentiers in the previous period 
(equation 3.70). Institutional investors earn revenue from holding MBS and finance their 
operations by issuing shares, which are purchased by the rentiers. For simplicity, a constant price 
of shares equal to $1 is assumed. Demand for MBS follows the portfolio principle (equation 3.71), 
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where the return on MBS (equation 3.72) depends on the yield (equation 3.73) and the capital 
gains on MBS (equation 3.74). 








                   (3.71) 
-M}| = ÄÅJIM}| +
sSäãå
uäãå,QRM}|QR




                   (3.73) 
76M}| = 2]>01(AM}| − AM}|,01)                  (3.74) 
3.3.6. Simulations 
The model is calibrated to the US economy47. Table A2.1 in Appendix II shows the chosen 
exogenous parameter magnitudes, while Table A2.2 presents the initial values of stocks in the 
model. The main objective of the simulation exercise is to examine the impact of the proposed 
model setup on inequality patterns. Specifically, we analyse how the increased complexity of 
household balance sheet composition affects the quantitative measures of income and wealth 
inequality such as the Gini index (equation 3.75), the Atkinson index for income (with inequality 
aversion parameter ê=2 in equation 3.76), and the squared coefficient of variation (equation 3.77). 
This follows the benchmark exercise outlined in Dafermos/Papatheodorou (2015). 
As mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 1, the Gini and the Atkinson indices range 
between 0 and 1, while the squared coefficient of variation ranges from 0 to infinity. In all indices, 
a higher value indicates higher inequality level. The choice of these three inequality measures is 
motivated by their different sensitivity to transfers at different moments of the distribution (the 
middle, the bottom, and the top of the distribution respectively). In addition, in order to compare 
the inequality dynamics of income and wealth, we calculate the Gini index and the squared 
coefficient of variation for wealth48 (equations 3.80-3.81). 
                                                   
47
 Calibration is performed based on three criteria. Firstly, the latest available record common to the 
largest number of variables is identified with 2014. Secondly, if no data is available, parameter values 
are taken from previous studies or are assumed by the author based on economic intuition. Thirdly, for 
securitisation parameters, we take a pre-2007 average to simulate the securitisation boom scenario. 
48
 As noted in Chapter 1, the Atkinson index cannot encompass the possible negative values of net 
wealth (cf. Cowell 2009:72). 
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We expect that the proposed balance sheet heterogeneity among households should produce 
more acute long-run polarisation of income and wealth than simulated otherwise. Moreover, 
wealth inequality levels are expected to be higher than for income. This is because the inclusion of 
wealth heterogeneity in the model creates forces which pull the upper class even further away 
from the rest of the distribution, drowning the middle and working class in debt. In our model, 
these forces are identified with the securitisation of mortgages to the middle class (an indirect 
transfer of income and wealth from the middle to the rentier class, see Figure 3.1), the payments of 
housing rents by the working class, and the holdings and payments of debt (an indirect transfer of 
income from the working and the middle class to the rentiers). The latter is determined by the 
debt-service-to-income ratio determining the interest rate charged on loans to the middle and the 
working class. Furthermore, the inclusion of the relative consumption concerns allows us to 
distinguish between different motives for debt accumulation across households and examine their 
implications for macroeconomic stability. 
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Firstly, we simulate the full model outlined above for 100 periods. For clarity, the simulation 
results are presented from period 20 onwards to allow for adjustment of the system to a steady 
state. The steady state is defined as a situation where all variables in the economy grow at the 
same rate given by the exogenous growth rate of capital gk. We present results for the Gini 
coefficient and the squared coefficient of variation for income and wealth, as well as the Atkinson 
index for income. Additionally, we report the three measures of leverage for each household group 
and the debt-to-income ratio for the whole economy to gauge the impact of wealth distribution on 
macroeconomic fragility. 
Secondly, we compare the above results of the full model with the reduced form 
specifications without the novel feature introduced here, namely the middle class, as well as the 
rentier wage, relative consumption concerns, and securitisation. This allows us to gauge the impact 
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 Note that N is the total number of households: N = Nw+Nm+Nr. 




3.4.1. The baseline model 
Simulations of the full model produce a consistent result of increasing inequality according to all 
measures, shown in Figure 3.2. We observe higher levels of wealth inequality than income 
inequality, which corresponds to the inequality patterns observed in the data in Chapter 1 (see 
Fig.1.1). The simulated value of the Gini index for income tends towards 0.6, which is close to the 
actual value recorded in the USA (see Chapter 1). Similarly, the simulated Gini index of wealth is 
close to the observed value, tending towards 0.74. The simulated value of the Atkinson index is 
lower in the model at 0.45, compared to the observed values of 0.7-0.8. Moreover, the simulated 
coefficient of variation squared for income tends towards 1.21, while the value of the measure for 
wealth is simulated to reach 1.7. These magnitudes are lower than those observed in the U.S. 
Survey of Consumer Finances50. Moreover, we observe lower and more empirically accurate 
magnitudes of the Gini index and the Atkinson index for income in our model, as well as slightly 
higher value of the coefficient of variation squared for income that the simulated values of income 
inequality in Dafermos/Papatheodorou (2015), which range between 0.9 and 1.1 in their model. 
Furthermore, the simulated values of the leverage measures are consistent with the empirical 
observations in Chapter 1. The middle class emerges as the most leveraged in terms of the debt-
service-to-income ratio, which is simulated to reach 7.7% for this group, 5.1% for the working 
class, and 3.8% for rentiers. This ordering is consistent with the data analysis in Chapter 1, 
although the simulated magnitudes are lower. This can be explained by the fact that we are only 
considering one type of debt payments at a time (either consumer debt or mortgages). Moreover, 
the debt-to-asset ratio is simulated to be the highest for the working class at 59.3%, compared to 
the simulated value of 42.8% for the middle class, and 31.5% for rentiers. These values are higher 
than observed in the data, where the middle-income households were found to have the highest 
debt-to-asset ratios (see Fig.1.16 in Chapter 1). The greater weight given to the workers’ debt-to-
asset ratio may be explained by the lack of housing on the asset side of their balance sheets in our 
model. Lastly, as expected from the data analysis in Chapter 1, rentiers are simulated to have the 
highest debt-to-income ratio of 141.2%. This arises from the greater holdings of assets serving as 
collateral for this group, which allow for higher debt accumulation relative to income flows. The 
ratio for the middle class is simulated to be close to the rentiers at 136.7%, which is explained by 
                                                   
50
 Note that we infer this information based on the analysis of the half of the coefficient of variation 
squared in Chapter 1. The reason for reporting the squared coefficient of variation in the SFC model is 
to maintain comparability with Dafermos/Papatheodorou (2015). 
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Note: Time periods on the horizontal axis. 
their ownership of houses as collateral. The debt-to-income ratio for the working class is simulated 
to reach 66.9%. We also report the debt-to-income ratio of the whole economy, which settles at 
107.4%51. Overall, the simulated magnitudes of the debt-to-income ratio are slightly lower albeit 
close to the empirically observed values in Chapter 1.  
Figure 3.2 Simulation results – full model 
                                                   
51
 This is slightly higher than the observed value of approximately 100% for the household debt to 
GDP in the USA around the time of the Great Recession (source: Federal Reserve Economic Data, St. 
Louis). 
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3.4.2. Comparison with reduced specifications 
To evaluate the contribution of the proposed conceptualisation of households based on balance 
sheet heterogeneity, we compare the full model results with simulations of the reduced form 
scenarios without the introduced new features. We consider four alternative specifications. Firstly, 
we analyse the inequality and leverage levels simulated in a specification with a pure capitalist 
class, which derives income solely from capital ownership and profits, and thus receives no wages. 
Secondly, we simulate a scenario without the relative consumption concerns determining the 
demand for loans among the middle class. Thirdly, we analyse a specification without the 
securitisation process, restricting the financial sector to include only commercial banks and 
considering only the circuit of money creation. Lastly, to analyse the impact of introducing the 
third class of households on inequality, we simulate a specification without the middle class, 
corresponding to the traditional dichotomous division between workers and capitalists52.  
Table 3.3 compares the simulation results across the full model and the reduced 
specifications, comparing the long-run steady state values of inequality and leverage. We find that 
in the pure capitalist specification, the simulated levels of inequality are lower in terms of all 
measures. The Gini index for income falls to 0.47, while the index for wealth declines to 0.69. The 
Atkinson index decreases slightly to 0.43. Moreover, the squared coefficient of variation for 
income and wealth is simulated to fall to 0.77 and 1.47 respectively. In terms of leverage, the 
simulated magnitudes across household groups are close to the full model results, being only 
marginally lower. In contrast, the debt-to-income ratio for the whole economy is lower than in the 
full specification at 97.1%. Hence, we conclude that the introduction of the rentier wage 
contributes to higher inequality due to greater disparities in wages across households, and leads to 
larger macroeconomic fragility. 
Similarly, in the specification with no relative consumption concerns, we find the simulated 
inequality levels to be lower than in the full model, although the difference between the simulated 
magnitudes is smaller than in the pure capitalist specification. The long-run steady state value of 
the Gini index for income declines to 0.59, while the index of wealth remains at 0.74. The 
Atkinson index falls slightly to 0.44. Moreover, the squared coefficient of variation for income and 
wealth decrease to 1.16 and 1.67 respectively. Furthermore, the simulated leverage levels for the 
working class and the rentiers are similar to the full model results. In contrast, the leverage ratios 
are found to decline for the middle class. The debt-service-to-income ratio is simulated to reach 
                                                   
52
 We assume that in the specification without the middle class there is also no securitisation. The 
working class is assumed to represent the bottom 90% of the income distribution). 
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6.2%, while the debt-to-asset ratio and the debt-to-income ratio decline to 36.5% and 112.1% 
respectively. Similarly, the debt-to-income ratio for the whole economy is lower in this reduced 
specification compared to the full model at 100.6%. This signals that the social dependence of 
consumption decisions of the middle class increases their debt levels and leverage, which deepens 
inequality and raises macroeconomic instability. 
Furthermore, the simulated long-run values of inequality and leverage in the specification 
without securitisation are found to be close to the full model results. Nevertheless, we observe 
marginally lower values of the Gini coefficient for income at 0.59, and the squared coefficient of 
variation for income and wealth, reaching 1.19 and 1.69 respectively. Similarly, the simulated 
values of the leverage measures are observed not to differ substantially from the full model results, 
although the steady-state value of the debt-to-income ratio of the whole economy is marginally 
lower at 106.3%. Nevertheless, the slight decrease in the simulated magnitudes of the inequality 
indicators suggest that the securitisation processes have an impact on the distribution of income 
and wealth, and macroeconomic fragility in the proposed framework. 
Lastly, we observe substantial reductions in the simulated steady state values of inequality 
and overall leverage in the economy when the middle class is excluded from the model. The Gini 
index for income is lower at 0.31, while the coefficient for wealth reduces to 0.47. Similarly, the 
squared coefficient of variation for income declines to 1.08. In contrast the squared coefficient of 
variation is higher at 2.55 because of the increased polarisation of wealth at the top of the 
distribution. The decrease in the simulated value of the Atkinson index is lower compared to the 
other inequality measures at 0.43. Moreover, we observe that the debt-to-income ratio for the 
whole economy is simulated to be lower in the scenario without the middle class at 87.1%. Thus, 
we show that the traditional dichotomous division of households into workers and capitalists 
cannot fully explain the high levels of income and wealth inequality observed in the USA since the 
1980s and leads to lower simulated fragility of the economy in terms of the debt-to-income ratio. 
In sum, the comparison of the reduced specification results with the full model shows that 
the heterogeneity of household balance sheets along the distribution matters for inequality. Firstly, 
factors rarely considered in the existing Post-Keynesian macro-modelling literature, such as the 
rentier wage and securitisation, have an important impact on inequality measures, as is shown by 
the generally higher values of all inequality indicators in the full model compared to the reduced 
specifications with the pure capitalist class and without securitisation. Secondly, the new 
conceptualisation of households based on the introduction of a third class distinguished by wealth 
composition leads to higher and more realistic levels of inequality than the traditional dichotomous 
classification, and contributes to greater macroeconomic instability. Importantly, we find that the 
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social dependence of household consumption decisions, which is incorporated into the middle 
class in our model, increases the demand for credit among the middle class and raises their 
leverage, which contributes to higher inequality and macroeconomic instability. Furthermore, our 
results reveal that due to the disparities in debt accumulation motives across households arising 
because of the social dependence of their portfolio decisions, household leverage needs to be 
analysed holistically. This is because each measure of financial fragility captures a different aspect 
of indebtedness and thus does not represent the true capacity of households to handle financial 
distress when analysed by itself. Consequently, the results of our model show that the theory of 
inequality in the 21st century in the context of financial sector transformation needs to consider 
differences in the balance sheet structures across households, and their associated implications for 
financial distress and macroeconomic stability. This can be achieved by the adoption of the three-
class taxonomy of households proposed in our model. 
Table 3.3 Comparison of simulation results 
Note: The pure capitalist specification excludes rentier wage. Specification with no relative consumption 
excludes rentier consumption from the target consumption of the middle class. Specification with no 
securitisation excludes the sector of SPVs/underwriters and institutional investors. Specification with no middle 
class also excludes securitisation. 
 
 Specification  











Gini index         
Income 0.61  0.47  0.59  0.59 0.31 
Wealth 0.74  0.69  0.74  0.74 0.47 
         
Atkinson index (income) 0.45  0.43  0.44  0.45 0.43 
         
Squared coefficient of variation         
Income 1.21  0.77  1.16  1.19 1.08 
Wealth 1.7  1.47  1.67  1.69 2.55 
         
Debt-service-to-income ratio         
The working class 5.1%  5%  5.1%  5.1% 5% 
The middle class 7.7%  7.4%  6.2%  7.8% (omitted) 
Rentiers 3.8%  3.9%  3.8%  3.8% 3.8% 
         
Debt-to-asset ratio         
The working class 59.3%  58.5%  59.3%  59% 58.4% 
The middle class 42.8%  41.9%  36.5%  42.6% (omitted) 
Rentiers 31.5%  31.1%  31.5%  31.6% 31.5% 
         
Debt-to-income ratio         
The working class 66.9%  66.1%  66.8%  66.9% 65.9% 
The middle class 136.7%  132.9%  112.1%  134.6% (omitted) 
Rentiers 141.2%  142.8%  141.4%  141.1% 141.4% 
Whole economy 107.4%  97.1%  100.6%  106.3% 87.1% 
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3.5. Sensitivity analysis 
In order to test the robustness of our finding that greater household balance heterogeneity increases 
inequality and macroeconomic instability, a range of sensitivity test is performed to examine the 
volatility of our results to the choice of specific parameter values. We identify 20 parameters as 
crucial to the model results, reflecting the underlying assumptions about economic behaviour. Two 
types of sensitivity analysis are conducted. Firstly, we perform a univariate test, where the full 
model scenario is re-run by changing only one parameter at a time and leaving the others constant. 
Secondly, a multivariate test is conducted, where the variation in the full model results is assessed 
by changing all parameter values simultaneously. The model outcome is seen as robust if the 
values of the key variables of interest (i.e. inequality and leverage measures) do not change 
significantly despite the variation in parameter calibration. 
3.5.1. Univariate sensitivity test 
Table A2.3 in Appendix II presents the 20 key parameters and their sensitivity analysis values. 
The choice of these values is motivated by changes in the economic conditions in the USA after 
the 2007 crisis. All parameter values are subsequently shocked in period 50. 
One of the key distributional variables in our model is the central bank interest rate rcb, as it 
constitutes the baseline for the interest rates on loans and deposits set by the commercial banks. In 
the sensitivity analysis, the central bank interest rate is shocked to increase from 0.25% to 0.5%. 
This corresponds to the actual change in the interest rate level adopted by the Fed at its December 
2015 meeting. Thus, apart from assessing the robustness of the model result, this exercise also 
allows us to examine the impact of monetary policy on inequality levels in the modelled economy. 
In addition, we consider an increase in the deposit rate spread α1 from 0.75% to 1%, and a rise in 
the spread of the lending rate α2 from 2% to 4%. We expect that increases in the interest rate and 
the spread should raise leverage levels and income and wealth inequality. 
Another parameter relevant for the interest rate level is {0, reflecting the institutional 
conditions in the lending market. A higher level of {0 indicates stricter lending standards among 
commercial banks, contributing to a larger transfer of income from the working and the middle 
class to the rentiers via the banking sector. In the sensitivity analysis, the value of {0 is increased 
from 0.03 to 0.04. 
Furthermore, the exogenously given share of wages is important for distribution as it 
determines the portion of national income going to the working and the middle class. The wage 
share parameter sw is decreased from 57% to 50%, additionally allowing us to analyse the impact 
of the falling wage share on the overall inequality indicators. Moreover, we consider the impact of 
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an increase in the rentier wage premium mw from 1.6 to 1.8 and a fall in the parameter ρ from 0.3 
to 0.2, which indicates preference of rentiers for wage income. 
We also examine the impact of the change in the degree of emulation of rentier consumption 
by the middle class. The Ravina emulation parameter η is increased from 0.29 to 0.4, reflecting 
increase in the middle class relative consumption. We expect that this should increase inequality 
and leverage of the middle class by raising the demand for loans. 
Another parameter crucial to the model dynamics is s0, which captures the institutional 
conditions in the financial markets in the equation defining the share of securitised mortgages 
(equation 3.64). The greater the proportion of securitised mortgages the higher the transfer of the 
middle class wealth to rentiers via securitisation. s0 is decreased from 0.6 to 0.4, reflecting 
slowdown in the mortgage securitisation market after the 2007 crisis.  
A further parameter influencing the distribution of income in our model is the firm profit 
retention rate sf. A higher value of this parameter is likely to prevail in the recessionary period as 
firms are more credit constrained.  In the sensitivity test, the value of sf increases to 0.5, which 
corresponds to its observed post-crisis value in the USA.  
Additionally, we assess the sensitivity of the full model results to the Tobinesque portfolio 
parameters. Parameter λ30, reflecting the rentier preference for the institutional investors’ shares, is 
decreased from 0.33 to 0.22. Importantly, due to the adding-up constraint requiring that λ10, λ20, 
and λ30 sum to unity (cf. Godley/Lavoie 2007), the fall in λ30 necessitates a simultaneous rise in one 
of the remaining two values. It is assumed that λ10 increases to 0.44. The rise in the value of λ10 
indicates greater preference for firm equities among rentiers and hence smaller demand for 
securitised assets among institutional investors. The choice of these parameters is once again 
motivated by the fall in the demand for MBS after the 2007 crisis.  
In addition to the above parameters directly affecting the distribution of income and wealth 
in our model we consider several parameters important for the overall model dynamics. Firstly, we 
test the model’s sensitivity to parameter βw capturing the lending norms for the working class, and 
the corresponding parameter β for the middle class and the rentiers. β is decreased from 0.1 to 
0.05, and βw is reduced from 0.05 to 0.025, reflecting more stringent lending conditions after the 
2007 crisis. Secondly, the propensity to consume out of wealth c4 is reduced from 0.1 to 0.05, 
maintaining the assumption that each household group consumes the same proportion of its 
wealth. Moreover, we simulate an increase in the marginal propensity to consume out of income of 
the working class c1, rising from 0.9 to 0.95, and an increase in this propensity for the middle class 
143     ––– Chapter 3 ––– 
 
c3, from 0.75 to 0.8. In addition, we consider a fall in the marginal propensity to consume out of 
income for rentiers c5 from 0.6 to 0.5, indicating an increase in their saving
53. Thirdly, parameters 
h1 and h2 are decreased from 0.5 to 0.1, indicating a slowdown in the supply of housing by firms, 
and a brake on the house price growth respectively. Finally, parameter ö10 in the institutional 
investors’ portfolio equation is decreased from 0.3 to 0.1, suggesting falling demand of 
institutional investors for MBS.   
Figure A2.1 in Appendix II shows that overall the univariate sensitivity analysis shows that 
the full model results are robust to changes in most of the key parameters. When the values of mw 
and ρ are shocked in period 50, the model outcome exhibits no variation from the baseline full 
model specification. Similarly, following the shock to the values of s0, ö10, h1, h2, and λ30 the 
model results do not change their long-term steady state values, experiencing only slight variations 
in the short-run. 
Changes in the values of several parameters have an impact on the long-run levels of 
inequality. The fall in the wage share sw, and the increase in the lending rate spread α2 lead to 
higher steady-state levels of inequality, with increases in the squared coefficient of variation and 
the Gini index for wealth and income, as well as the Atkinson index. This is because the changes 
in these parameters have a disproportionate negative effect on incomes of the working and the 
middle class. Moreover, the increase in the profit retention rate sf results in lower long-run steady-
state values of wealth and income inequality. This occurs as the lower levels of distributed profits 
reduce rentier income and wealth. In addition, changes in the values of parameter	{0 in the risk 
premium function, parameter β reflecting lending norms, and the marginal propensities to consume 
out of wealth c4 and income c1, c3, and c5 lead to higher steady-state levels of wealth inequality in 
the long-run, both in terms of the Gini index and the squared coefficient of variation. This is 
because these parameters influence the demand for loans, and disproportionately reduce net worth 
of the working and the middle class. 
Furthermore, the simulated values of the leverage measures are sensitive to the values of 
several parameters. Changes in the central bank’s interest rate rcb, the deposit rate spread α1, and in 
α2 result in overall increases in the steady-state value of the debt-service-to-income ratio across all 
households. In addition, the increase in α2 reduces the debt-to-income ratio in the long run for all 
groups and in the whole system, as well as the debt-to-asset ratio for rentiers. This arises because 
of the increased interest rate influencing debt repayments, which additionally lowers debt 
accumulation among rentiers (since their debt motives are assumed to be neither necessitous nor 
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 The increase in the saving rates of the rich is observed by Saez/Zucman (2016). 
––– Chapter 3 ––– 
 
144 
emulation-driven). Furthermore, the fall in c4 leads to a decline in the steady-state value of the 
debt-to-asset ratio across all households due to the falling demand for loans. 
Moreover, the decrease in the lending norms parameter βw results in a decline in all leverage 
measures for the working class, while the fall in β reduces the leverage ratios for the middle class 
and the rentiers. This is due to the decreased demand for loans. In addition, the rise in {0 leads to 
an increase in the debt-service-to-income ratio for the working and the middle class due to the rise 
in the mortgage rate of the middle class. Furthermore, the increase in the marginal propensity to 
consume out of income for the working and the middle class raises the steady-state value of their 
debt-to-asset ratio, while the fall in the marginal propensity to consume out of income for rentiers 
reduces their debt-to-asset ratio in the long run. This is because of changes in the demand for loans 
across these groups. Lastly, the increase in the degree of consumption emulation by the middle 
class η leads to a long term increase in the leverage measures of the middle class. 
Overall, our results correspond to the findings of the existing SFCM studies including 
securitisation and consumption emulation. The decrease in the wage share in Nikolaidi (2015) is 
simulated to raise the debt-to-asset and the debt-payments-to-income ratio among working 
households, which is observed in our model in the short run. Similarly, a cut in the wage rate in 
Sawyer/Passarella Veronese (2017) leads to an increase in leverage (measured as the loans to 
wealth ratio) and income inequality (measured as the ratio of rentier to worker income). In our 
model, the decrease in the wage share also results in a rise in income inequality. In contrast, the 
increase in the degree of securitisation s0 in Nikolaidi (2015) leads to higher leverage among 
working households (measured as the debt-to-asset ratio and the debt-service-to-income ratio), 
while it does not alter the leverage measures in our model. Moreover, a rise in the demand for 
derivatives in Sawyer/Passarella Veronese (2017) increases income inequality and workers 
leverage, while in our model the rise in the preference of institutional investors for MBS ö10 does 
not influence inequality or household leverage. Furthermore, an increase in consumption 
emulation in Zezza (2008) and Caverzasi/Godin (2013) leads to a rise in the aggregate debt-to-
income ratio. While in our model we do not observe changes to the model results following the 
shock to the Ravina emulation parameter η, the comparison of results of the full model with the 
reduced specification without emulation shows that the presence of relative consumption concerns 
leads to higher macroeconomic volatility measured by the debt-to-income ratio. Lastly, a decline 
in the central bank’s discount rate and the associate fall in the commercial bank lending rate lead 
to a lower debt-to-income ratio in Zezza (2008), while in our model we observe an increase in the 
debt-to-asset ratio but not the debt-to-income ratio following the rise in the deposit and the lending 
rate spreads α1 and α2 and the central bank’s interest rate rcb. 
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In sum, the simulation results of the full model tend to be robust to changes in most of the 
parameter values. The sensitivity of the inequality and leverage measures is the highest to 
parameters influencing the demand and the repayment of loans across households, the marginal 
consumption propensities out of income and wealth, as well as the wage share and the profit 
retention rate. This suggests that both wealth and income channels are important in determining 
the levels of inequality and leverage in our model. 
3.5.2. Multivariate sensitivity test 
Having examined the sensitivity of the model results to changes in the individual parameter 
values, we proceed to analyse its sensitivity to changes in all chosen parameters simultaneously. 
Since at the present stage of the analysis the choice of sensitivity values for different parameters is 
not random, one multivariate scenario corresponding to the post-crisis conditions in the USA is 
considered, maintaining consistency across parameter changes. 
Figure A2.2 in Appendix II presents the multivariate sensitivity test results for the SFC 
model developed in this chapter. By introducing shocks to parameter values in period 50, the 
model is able to reproduce the overall trends in the economic dynamics experienced in the USA 
after the 2007 crisis. Firstly, the changes in parameter values are associated with a recession in the 
model. The steady state growth rate of output initially falls from 2.5% to -10% and gradually 
returns to its pre-shock level after around 20 periods.  
Secondly, two out of three income inequality measures indicate falling income inequality in 
the periods following the shock. The Gini index and the squared coefficient of variation for 
income settle at lower steady state levels after approximately 10 periods. In contrast, the Atkinson 
index for income increases after the shock. This suggest that changes in income inequality after the 
crisis in our model are different across the various household groups. The sensitivity of the 
squared coefficient of variation and the Gini index to transfers at the top and at the middle of the 
distribution respectively indicates that the post-recessionary fall in income inequality in the model 
is driven by its decrease among the top income group, and less so by the middle. Conversely, the 
sensitivity of the Atkinson index to changes at the bottom of the distribution suggests that the 
simulated income inequality increases occur during the recession as the lowest income groups 
experience a larger fall in their incomes than the rest.  
Furthermore, the multivariate sensitivity test of the model reproduces the fact observed in 
Fig.1.1 in Chapter 1 that, unlike income, wealth inequality measured by the Gini index and the 
squared coefficient of variation increased after the crisis, reaching a higher steady-state value in 
the long run. 
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Moreover, we simulate that all leverage measures experience an initial increase when the 
shock is introduced apart from the debt-to-asset ratio for rentiers, which declines. The rentier and 
the middle class deleverage after the recession in terms of the debt-to-asset and the debt-to-income 
ratio. The working class is also observed to reduce their debt-to-income and the debt-service-to-
income ratio albeit to a smaller extent than the remaining households. Moreover, the long run 
value of the debt-to-asset ratio of the working class returns to its pre-recessionary value. This 
indicates that the working class households do not deleverage substantially after the crisis, which 
corresponds to the actual observation for the bottom quintile of the income distribution after the 
Great Recession in Chapter 1. 
Overall, the sensitivity analysis shows that the model results presented in the previous 
section are robust to changes in most of the key parameters, particularly in the long run. The 
sensitivity of the model outcome to changes in the wage share, the profit retention ratio, 
parameters influencing household lending norms and interest rates, as well as the marginal 
propensities to consume out of income and wealth suggest inequality in our model is determined 
by the interaction of the dynamics of income and wealth. Importantly, we show that the greater 
heterogeneity of household balance sheets induces macroeconomic instability and is associated 
with an acute recession. In sum, the proposed model set out, emphasising the balance sheet 
heterogeneity of the household sector by introducing a third class to the Post-Keynesian macro-
modelling framework, does well in explaining the observed trends in income and wealth inequality 
in the USA before and after the 2007 crisis. Conversely, approaches which do not consider the 
differences in household wealth composition may underestimate the analysed levels of inequality 
and macroeconomic fragility. 
3.6. Summary 
The model presented here constitutes one of the first attempts to develop a theoretical model of 
inequality in the age of financial sector transformation accounting for household wealth 
heterogeneity. The SFCM framework is adopted to incorporate the interactions between the 
financial and real sector and their impact on the distribution of income and wealth in a 
financialised economy. The main original features of the proposed model compared to the existing 
Post-Keynesian macro-modelling literature is the interpretation of inequality in terms of the 
differences in balance sheet structures among households and the introduction of a three-class 
household sector. The three-class taxonomy of households including the middle class of leveraged 
homeowners produces more accurate levels of inequality and higher macroeconomic fragility that 
the traditional two-class division. Moreover, we include securitisation, and the relative 
147     ––– Chapter 3 ––– 
 
consumption concerns in the model to account for the endogenous determination of household 
portfolio decisions, which reflects differences in the debt accumulation motives across households. 
We show that the proposed model provides a more suitable approach to analysing inequality 
in times of financial sector transformation. The reason why the three-class classification of 
households produces higher inequality and financial fragility is because the dichotomous division 
of households into workers and capitalists predominant in the Post-Keynesian macro-models does 
not fully explore their increasing heterogeneity. As shown in Chapter 1, since the 1980s, low- and 
middle-income households have become actively involved in the financial markets through the 
proliferation of subprime credit and asset-backed securities. Simultaneously, the rich have 
captured an increasing share of income and wealth due to the high returns to their wealth enabled 
by financial innovation and deregulation, as well as the high salaries earned by the financial sector 
executives. Thus, the further innovation of our model is to reinterpret the groups of workers and 
rentiers based on their balance sheet structures rather than income sources and to introduce the 
rentier wage as an “investment strategy” for the richest household group in the context of financial 
sector transformation. 
The main distributional channels in our model emerge through the provision of credit to the 
working and the middle class, the housing sector, and the social dependence of the consumption 
decisions of the middle class. Firstly, this is because debt payments by these groups are ultimately 
received by the rentiers in the form of bank profits. Secondly, the process of securitisation 
transforms the mortgages held by the middle class into wealth of the rentiers through derivative 
financial instruments sold to institutional investors, who issue shares purchased by the rentiers. 
Moreover, the housing sector in our model influences inequality directly through rent payments by 
the working class received by the rentiers, and indirectly through the interest payments on 
mortgages. Furthermore, the introduction of the relative consumption concerns for the middle class 
and the subsequent distinction between different motives for debt accumulation across households 
contributes to macroeconomic instability. 
An important caveat of the proposed stock-flow consistent model is its high level of 
aggregation. The integrated analysis of the sectoral balance sheets allows for the development of 
an endogenous theory of inequality based on the differences in household wealth composition. 
However, the aggregated nature of the model and its complexity limit its scope for analysing the 
impact of wealth heterogeneity on the social dimensions of inequality across gender, race, and 
generations highlighted in the data analysis in Chapter 1 and by the Post-Keynesian assumption of 
the social dependence of consumption discussed in Chapter 2.  
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Overall, the model shows that inequality between households in the model arises because 
the receipts of capital income flowing from the returns to wealth ownership depend on the absolute 
size of wealth. This occurs because of the differences in balance sheet composition across 
households. Rentiers, who own a diversified portfolio of assets serving as collateral and face lower 
leverage due to the accumulation of secured debt and smaller interest rates, capture an increasing 
portion of aggregate income and wealth in our model. The introduction of the middle class 
exacerbates inequality and deepens financial fragility by generating disparities in income and 
leverage between homeowners and renters, identified with the middle and the working class 
respectively. To strengthen this conclusion, future extension of the model could incorporate 
securitisation of consumer debt, heterogeneity in the propensities to consume out of wealth across 
households, and endogenously determined movements of households between the defined classes.  
In sum, the key testable implication of the stock-flow consistent model developed in this 
chapter is that the heterogeneity of household balance sheet composition induces higher inequality 
levels because returns to wealth depend on its absolute size. This is an important finding because 
the inclusion of the wealth distribution channel in the model contributes to macroeconomic 
instability. The model scenario calibrated to the post-crisis conditions in the USA generates an 
acute recession and leads to deeper increases in wealth inequality compared to income. 
Consequently, this shows that the explicit consideration of wealth distribution is essential in 
understanding the rising levels of inequality and financial fragility in the USA. In the next chapter, 
we undertake an empirical examination of the key model finding using the household survey data 
from the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances between 1989 and 2013. To account for the limitation 
of the proposed model in analysing the intersectional dimensions of wealth distribution, the 
empirical analysis in the next chapter explicitly considers the impact of household wealth 
heterogeneity on inequality across gender, race, and generations.  
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Chapter 4 
Empirical analysis of the impact of household wealth heterogeneity on 
inequality 
In the previous chapter, we developed a formal model of inequality determination in times of 
financial sector transformation. Its main contribution and original feature was to account for the 
role of wealth distribution within the household sector in generating inequality and financial 
fragility. The disparities in household wealth structures were analysed by proposing a new 
conceptualisation of households in the Post-Keynesian macro-modelling framework. We argued 
that this was necessary to consider the impact of the increasing heterogeneity of the conventionally 
analysed groups of workers and capitalists on distribution and macroeconomic stability. 
Consequently, we defined households not in terms of the type of income received (wages vs. 
profits), but according to their balance sheet composition. This conceptualisation was based on the 
stylised facts established by the household balance sheet analysis in Chapter 1. To account for the 
increasingly capitalist features of the lower income households, we introduced a third group into 
the household sector, identified with the middle class of leveraged homeowners emergent in the 
subprime lending bubble in the 2000s. To develop an endogenous mechanism of household wealth 
accumulation, we incorporated securitisation, as well as the Post-Keynesian analysis of 
consumption behaviour highlighted in Chapter 2, introducing the relative consumption concerns, 
and distinguishing between different debt accumulation motives among households. By combining 
the Post-Keynesian macro-modelling approach with the Post-Keynesian assumption of the social 
dependence of consumption, we accounted for the interaction between endogenous wealth 
accumulation and macroeconomic instability. In result, the model reproduced some of the trends in 
income and wealth inequality observed in the analysis of the US data in Chapter 1, generating 
higher levels of inequality and leverage compared to scenarios without the third class of 
households, rentier wage, consumption emulation, and securitisation. However, the high 
aggregation of the SFCM did not allow us to explicitly consider the role of wealth heterogeneity in 
determining the gender, racial, and intergenerational inequality. 
The main testable implication of the stock-flow consistent model developed in the previous 
chapter is that the complexity of household wealth holdings generates inequality because capital 
income flows and debt payments depend on the absolute size of wealth. The aim of this chapter is 
to empirically test this conclusion and assess the statistical significance and the contribution of the 
disparities in household balance sheet composition to income and wealth inequality. This is 
undertaken in two stages, using the household survey data from the U.S. Survey of Consumer 
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Finances between 1989 and 2013. Firstly, we use linear regression analysis to establish statistical 
significance of the relationship between household wealth structures and inequality. Secondly, we 
apply the inequality decomposition analysis to evaluate the contribution of different assets and 
liabilities to income and wealth disparities across households. To address the caveat of the 
aggregate stock-flow consistent model, we explicitly analyse the impact of household wealth 
composition on inequality across gender, race, and generations. Moreover, we test the validity of 
the balance sheet classification underpinning the three-class taxonomy of households proposed in 
the stock-flow consistent model by analysing the contribution of balance sheet variables to the 
relative and overall measures of inequality across the distribution. 
In line with the proposed set-out of the stock-flow consistent model developed in Chapter 3, 
we find that greater reliance of household balance sheets on housing, low-yielding financial assets, 
unsecured debt, and higher leverage has a statistically significant impact on inequality because low 
returns and high debt burden push household income towards the bottom of the distribution. 
Conversely, greater ownership of business equity, high-yielding financial assets, and debt secured 
by real estate raises households’ position in the income distribution due to higher capital income 
flows and lower debt repayments, although these effects are not shared equally across the 
distribution, gender, race, and generations. Moreover, we find that income inequality between 
1989-2013 was driven by disparities in capital income, although the contribution of wage 
inequality increased overtime, while wealth inequality was determined by differences in the 
holdings of primary residence, business equity, and private pension wealth. Balance sheet 
composition is also found to explain a large portion of the inequality across its social dimension of 
gender, race, and generations. These results correspond to Piketty’s idea of the interplay between 
wealth structures and income flows driving inequality, which was incorporated in our stock-flow 
consistent model, and validate the proposed conceptualisation of the household sector. 
4.1. Data 
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis of the implication of the stock-flow model from 
Chapter 3, it is necessary to discuss the methodological features of the chosen dataset. This is 
because despite providing the most in-depth information on household finances over time, the 
measurement of income and wealth in the household survey data such as the U.S. Survey of 
Consumer Finances faces several difficulties. Some of these were already indicated at the 
beginning of Chapter 1, such as non-response among the richest households. These 
methodological issues may potentially lead to inaccuracies in the measurement of income and 
wealth, and to underestimation of the true levels of inequality in the society. 
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The U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances (thereby SCF) was initiated by the Federal Reserve 
in the early 1960s and has been conducted triennially since 1983. The main difference between 
this and other household surveys such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) in the USA 
is that the SCF pays greater attention to the information on household finances such as the 
ownership of real and financial assets, and different types of liabilities. Furthermore, it represents a 
repeated cross-section as it does not track the same individuals over time like PSID (Bastagli/Hills 
2013:25). In fact, the survey sample size has almost doubled in the period covered, increasing 
from over 3,000 respondents in 1989 to approximately 6,000 in 2013 (Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1 Characteristics of the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances 
 *For confidentiality reasons, 11 observations corresponding to very high net worth individuals were removed 
from the public dataset in 2013, reducing the total number of observations to 6,015. Sources: Bricker et al. 
(2014); Bricker et al. (2012); Bucks et al. (2009); Bucks et al. (2006); Aizcorbe et al. (2003); Kennickell et al. 
(2000); Kennickell et al. (1997); Kennickell/Starr-McCluer (1994); Kennickell/Shack-Marquez (1992). 
The primary economic unit (PEU) of the survey is a household, defined as an economically 
dominant single individual or a couple (married or unmarried) over 18 years old, together with all 
individuals in the household who are financially dependent on that individual or couple. All 
responses are given by the head of a household. In the case of the PEU with a couple, the head is 
taken to be either male in a mixed-sex couple or the older individual in a same-sex couple. Due to 
this organisation of the survey, no information can be inferred about the intra-household 
distribution of the analysed variables. 
One of the greatest advantages of the SCF differentiating it from similar household surveys 
is oversampling of high-income households. Nonresponse in survey data is problematic because it 
leads to errors in measurement, so that inequality may be underestimated (Korinek et al. 2006). 
Moreover, misrepresentation in household survey data can bias statistical inference as nonresponse 
by interviewees is likely to be non-random when such sensitive topics as wealth and income are 
investigated (Fessler/Shürtz 2013:48). Selective nonresponse among the richest is particularly 
problematic in the case of wealth as its distribution is highly skewed towards the top tail (see 








1989 69% 2,277 34% 866 3,143 
1992 70% 2,456 34% 1,450 3,906 
1995 70% 2,780 34% 1,519 4,299 
1998 70% 2,813 35% 1,496 4,309 
2001 70% 2,917 30% 1,532 4,449 
2004 70% 3,007 30% 1,515 4,522 
2007 70% 2,915 30% 1,507 4,422 
2010 70% 5,012 30% 1,480 6,492 
2013 70% 4,568 30% 1,458 6,026* 
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Fig.1.4 in Chapter 1). To overcome this problem the SCF is based on a dual-frame sample design 
to correct for the non-response bias (Codebook for 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances). The first 
frame consists of a multi-stage area-probability design, which is standard for the surveys of this 
type. It ensures an equal probability of selection of households in the sample. The second frame is 
based on a list sample derived from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax data to 
disproportionately account for the wealthy families. The area-probability sample and the list 
sample contribute approximately 75% and 25% respectively to the overall sample size. The 
response rates vary greatly between the two samples, with the list sample response rate being 
systematically lower than the area-probability sample (see Table 4.1 above). 
For confidentiality reasons, individuals with enough wealth to be listed among the Forbes 
400 are excluded from the list sample. Furthermore, to protect the identity of respondents, the 
public dataset has been systematically modified. Firstly, since 1998 no information on the 
geographical location of respondents is given. Moreover, continuous variables have been rounded, 
while small or unusual values of discrete variables have been collapsed. For certain cases, a set of 
variables has been transformed into missing to prevent identifiability of respondents. To 
approximate the distribution of the missing data and to minimise the overall distortion of this 
operation, the dataset statistically imputes the relevant variables five times by repeatedly drawing 
from an estimate of the conditional probability distribution of the data. Consequently, the total 
number of observations in each wave is five times the number of respondents.54 
Importantly, all these data transformations are kept confidential so that there is no possibility 
of establishing which variables have been imputed or blurred. However, the creators of the SCF 
assure that the impact of these manipulations on empirical analyses based on the transformed 
dataset should be minimal. Nevertheless, because of the resulting complexity of the survey design, 
the standard procedures of variance and standard error estimation are not applicable in the case of 
the SCF. To compute the correct standard errors accounting for sampling, the data has been 
divided into 999 replicates capturing some important features of the sample variation. Thus, the 
sampling variance can be estimated using replicate weights derived from the bootstrapping 
technique. 
Because the SCF is not of an equal-probability design, nonresponse adjusted probability 
weights account for nonresponse and the uneven probability of selection in the original design. A 
set of revised weights, computed from the original selection probabilities and estimates of the 
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 Note that for confidentiality reasons 11 observations were dropped from the 2013 wave, bringing the 
total number of respondents down to 6,015. 
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aggregate control totals from the Current Population Survey, is only available since the 1989 
wave. This treatment of the survey weights provides the reason for analysing the waves of the SCF 
from 1989 onwards. 
In general, estimates based on the SCF should be comparable to other surveys. However, 
because of the oversampling of rich households, the SCF may produce estimates of means and 
medians of financial variables that are slightly different from other datasets. This is because the 
distribution of many these variables tends to be highly skewed towards the top, which can provide 
inaccurate estimates when a smaller number of wealthy respondents is included. 
4.2. Methodology 
To test the hypothesis that wealth composition determines income and wealth inequality, the 
empirical analysis in this chapter is divided into two parts – linear regression estimation and 
inequality decomposition analysis. We combine parametric and non-parametric estimation 
approaches to evaluate the impact of household wealth composition on inequality. The advantage 
of applying the parametric techniques is their ability to account for correlation among the 
determinants of inequality, and can thus include the socio-demographic dimensions of inequality 
associated with gender, race, and generations. On the other hand, the non-parametric approaches 
avoid making assumptions about the error term required by the regression analysis, and are thus 
more robust to the presence of endogeneity and non-spherical errors in the data.  
Firstly, we employ the linear regression analysis to test the implication of the theoretical 
model from Chapter 3 that household balance sheet heterogeneity is associated with higher income 
and wealth inequality. We estimate a pooled OLS model, where relative inequality, defined as the 
ratio of household income to the median income in each wave, is regressed on variables measuring 
the composition of asset and portfolio holdings. To isolate the effect of wealth structures on 
inequality, we control for the socio-economic characteristics of the household head, including age, 
education, gender, race, self-employment, labour force participation, and family size. Despite the 
lack of a clear stochastic relationship between balance sheet composition and inequality, 
regression analysis is helpful in directly evaluating the statistical significance of the implication of 
the stock-flow consistent model in Chapter 3 regarding the impact of the interactions of wealth and 
income in generating inequality. By analysing the association between balance sheet composition 
and the position of a household in the distribution of income relative to the median in a regression 
model, we can assess the statistical significance of the model’s implication next to other 
explanations of inequality related to differences in household characteristics. Furthermore, we are 
able to extend the model implications to examine the gender, racial, and intergenerational 
dimension of the relationship between household wealth heterogeneity and inequality, which was 
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observed in Chapter 1 and explained theoretically in Chapter 2. To evaluate any systematic 
differences in the effect of wealth composition on the social dimension of inequality, we employ a 
chi-squared test55. 
The choice of the pooled OLS model is motivated by the complex design of the SCF 
outlined in the previous section, which limits the applicability of more advanced econometric 
techniques. The pooled OLS regression is preferred to the panel data estimation techniques 
commonly used in the survey data analysis because the SCF is not a panel but a repeated cross-
section. Consequently, the fixed and random effects estimators are not applicable in this case. An 
additional advantage of the pooled OLS estimation over these methods is that it accounts for time-
invariant variables such as dummies for gender and race, which are excluded from the fixed effects 
estimation (Wooldridge 2002:170). Moreover, the pooled OLS model is preferred to the 
alternative estimation of the cross-sectional averaging of least squares as the latter does not 
account for the time series dimension of the data. This leads to a biased estimator as the 
unobserved time effects are correlated with regressors. Consequently, by estimating a pooled OLS 
model we can account for the time effects present in the SCF. Since the size of the cross-section in 
the SCF is larger than the time series, separate intercepts are included for every period 
(Wooldridge 2002:170), corresponding to the dummy variables for each wave of the survey.  
Consistency56 of the pooled OLS estimator requires that residuals in the regression model 
are spherical, i.e. homoscedastic (so that the conditional variance of residuals is constant over 
time) and not serially correlated (so that the conditional covariance across residuals in different 
time periods is zero; Wooldridge 2002:171). Moreover, for the pooled OLS estimator to be 
unbiased57 we need to assume that the dependent variable is exogenous, i.e. it is independent of the 
error term. We argue that due to the complex data design of the SCF, these assumptions may be 
violated. To test the robustness of the pooled OLS results we compare them with the quantile 
regression estimates, as well as estimating the non-parametric Theil-Sen median slope. Both of 
these methods are shown to be more robust to extreme values, which may inflate the mean-based 
pooled OLS estimates. Moreover, the non-parametric approach allows to empirically evaluate the 
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 This is tested using the STATA command suest, which estimates the simultaneous variance of 
coefficients in two regressions with different sample size, and evaluates whether the two estimates are 
statistically different from each other based on a chi-squared test (See 
https://www.stata.com/manuals13/rsuest.pdf). 
56
 Consistency is an asymptotic property stating that as the sample size tends to infinity the estimator 
approaches its true population value (Greene 2011:103).  
57
 Unbiasedness is defined as a finite-sample property where the expected value of the estimator is 
equal to its population value (Greene 2011:95). 
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impact of wealth heterogeneity on inequality without making assumptions about the distribution of 
the error term, which are inherent in the regression approach and are likely to be violated in the 
SCF. Nevertheless, the pooled OLS estimates allow us to compare the statistical significance of 
differences in estimates across the socio-demographic categories using the chi-squared test, which 
is not applicable in the quantile regression and the Theil-Sen median slope estimation. 
In the second part of the empirical analysis, the inequality decomposition techniques are 
applied to measure the contribution of the different types of assets and debt to the overall measures 
of income and wealth inequality. The rationale for distinguishing between the relative median 
income ratio and the overall inequality indicators in this chapter is to provide a robust insight into 
inequality determination given the methodological limits of the empirical tools. Specifically, the 
low number of time series in the dataset prevents the regression of an overall inequality index on 
the proposed balance sheet variables due to insufficient degrees of freedom. This is because the 
overall measure is invariant across observations in each given wave. In contrast, the 
methodological features of the inequality decomposition analysis focused on variance allow for the 
examination of the determinants of the overall inequality indicator. 
The inequality decomposition analysis employs the non-parametric variance decomposition 
of Shorrock’s (1982) and the parametric decomposition of Fields (2003). The choice of these two 
methods is motivated by the ability to quantify the contribution of the income and wealth 
components to inequality in a manner robust to the endogeneity problems (Shorrocks 
decomposition), and correlation among the factor sources (Fields decomposition). Moreover, we 
use the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to examine the contribution of wealth structure to the gap 
in income and wealth across gender, race, generations, and in more detail across the income 
distribution. Consequently, we are able to explore the social dimension of the relationship between 
wealth heterogeneity and inequality, which could not be explicitly incorporated in the stock-flow 
consistent model developed in the previous chapter. In addition, the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition of the income and wealth gap between the bottom 90% and the top 10%, as well as 
the bottom 20% and the top 80% of the income distribution allows us to evaluate the three-class 
conceptualisation of the household sector based on the differences in wealth composition proposed 
in the stock-flow consistent model. 
Based on the model of inequality determination put forward in Chapter 3, we assume that 
the causality runs from household wealth composition to inequality. This is because disparities in 
wealth ownership translate into wealth and income inequality by generating differences in the rates 
of return and leverage associated with specific asset and debt holdings. However, it is empirically 
reasonable to assume the presence of mutual causality in the interplay between income and wealth 
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dynamics in generating inequality. This is because higher income flows can also influence which 
assets and debt can be accumulated by a household. Given the complex design of the SCF, the 
standard econometric solutions to endogeneity, such as the two-stage least squares or the 
generalised method of moments estimators, cannot be readily applied to the regression analysis 
undertaken here. Consequently, we argue that the decomposition analysis allows for a more robust 
assessment of the implication of the stock-flow consistent model in Chapter 3 by evaluating the 
contribution of wealth heterogeneity to overall inequality measures. 
4.3. Linear regression analysis 
The linear regression analysis aims to assess the statistical significance of the conclusion of the 
stock-flow consistent model developed in Chapter 3 that household balance sheet heterogeneity is 
associated with higher income and wealth inequality due to the differences in the returns to wealth 
and leverage dependent on the absolute size of wealth holdings. As described in the previous 
section, the pooled OLS estimation method is chosen due to the complexity of the SCF design, 
which prevents a straightforward implementation of the more sophisticated econometric methods. 
4.3.1. Pooled OLS specification 
Equation 4.1 presents the baseline regression model. The dependent variable zi,t is the ratio of 
income of household i relative to the median income of the whole sample in wave t. Xi,t is the 
matrix of regressors for each observation over time, and β is the matrix of estimated coefficients. 
Tt is a vector of year dummies. The error term êi,t is assumed to be normally distributed. 
õî,ú = ùî,ú= + iúγ + 	êî,ú  t = 1989, 1992, 1995, … , 2013  (4.1) 
To assess the statistical significance of the impact of wealth composition on relative 
inequality, we estimate a baseline regression model (equation 4.1) including detailed balance sheet 
composition variables and household socio-economic controls as explanatory variables in matrix 
Xi,t and a vector of year dummies Tt with 1989 being the reference year. However, as argued earlier 
there are strong reasons to suspect mutual causality between relative income inequality and wealth 
composition. This is because high-wealth individuals receive greater capital income through the 
returns to wealth. In turn, high income generates opportunities for the accumulation of more 
profitable assets through saving and investment. In our sample, the correlation between the median 
income ratio and net wealth is relatively high at 0.51. Given the structure of the survey, it is not 
possible to employ the standard procedures dealing with endogeneity, such as the instrumental 
variable estimation techniques. To address the potential endogeneity bias between the median 
income ratio and the absolute size of wealth components, the balance sheet composition variables 
are presented in terms of their contribution to the total holdings of assets or debt.  
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To assess the sensitivity of the estimates, we report coefficients of the quantile regression 
alongside the results of the pooled OLS estimation. Quantile regression analysis allows for 
estimation of the proposed economic relationship at different points of the conditional distribution 
of the dependent variable (Baum 2013). We consider the conditional median function of the 
median income ratio corresponding to the 50th percentile. Thus, in contrast to the OLS method 
which minimises the sum of squared errors, the quantile regression minimises the sum of the 
absolute values of the error term, and is thus also called the least-absolute-deviation (LAD) 
regression (ibid.).  Hence, the median quantile regression is more robust to outliers than the OLS. 
Moreover, it is semiparametric and avoids assumptions about the parametric distribution of the 
error term. Thus, the quantile regression is superior to the OLS if errors are highly non-normal, as 
is likely to be the case in the present dataset. 
The balance sheet composition variables include the relative shares of financial and non-
financial assets in total assets, the shares of secured and unsecured debt in total debt holdings, and 
leverage measures. Thus, this baseline specification only includes households with positive 
holdings of assets and debt. Table A3.1 in Appendix III presents the descriptive statistics for our 
variables of interest, while Table A3.2 shows the correlation matrix of regressors. 
All types of assets and liabilities considered in the empirical analysis in this chapter 
correspond to the definitions presented in Chapter 1, subsection 1.1.3. Among the detailed balance 
sheet composition variables, the contribution of financial assets is broken down into the total asset 
share of transaction accounts, financial investment assets, and retirement and insurance assets. The 
share of non-financial assets is decomposed into the contribution of primary residence, business 
equity, and vehicles and other non-financial assets to total asset holdings. As all balance sheet 
share variables sum to 1, we exclude the share of other real estate in total assets due to perfect 
collinearity issues58.  
As shown in the balance sheet analysis in Chapter 1, households towards the top of the 
distribution tend to hold more financial investment assets, business equity, and retirement and 
insurance assets relative to their overall portfolio. Thus, we expect that greater contribution of 
these assets to total asset holdings increases the median income ratio. In contrast, greater share of 
                                                   
58
 Further reason for excluding this variable from the regression analysis is low proportion of 
households owning this type of wealth (see Appendix I, section 1.3.1) together with the lack of a strong 
a priori theoretical rationale for its analysis (compared to e.g. business equity, which despite low 
ownership rate is theoretically important to analyse because of the definition of capitalists in the Post-
Keynesian literature described in Chapter 2). Nevertheless, to gauge the impact of other property 
holdings on relative inequality in the regression analysis, we include the share of mortgages secured by 
other real estate in total debt. 
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primary residence, transaction accounts, and vehicles and other non-financial assets in total 
holdings is expected to have a decreasing effect on the median ratio. This is because the balance 
sheet shares of these assets were observed to be the highest among households in the middle and 
the bottom of the income distribution.  
The relationship between debt and relative inequality is ambiguous. The association can be 
negative, as debt repayments reduce household disposable income. On the other hand, debt may 
have a positive impact on the median income ratio, as credit provides an additional source of 
financing which can be used for consumption and investment. This effect is defined by the 
composition of debt holdings. We expect the relationship to be positive for the greater share of 
debt secured by housing in total holdings, as it allows for home equity withdrawal. In contrast, 
greater reliance on unsecured debt in total liabilities is expected to decrease the median income 
ratio, as this type of debt is predominant among the low-income households. In the regression 
analysis, we distinguish between mortgages secured by primary residence and by other property, 
to gauge the impact of the ownership of other real estate on relative inequality (which was 
excluded from the asset composition variables). Moreover, the relative holdings of unsecured debt 
are broken down into instalment loans and credit card balances (other lines of credit and other debt 
are omitted due to multicollinearity issues). 
The consideration of the impact of household balance sheet composition on relative 
inequality calls for the inclusion of leverage measures. In the baseline balance sheet composition 
specification, we include the monthly debt-service-to-income ratio (DSY), the debt-to-asset ratio, 
and the debt-to-income ratio. In addition, a dummy variable is included indicating whether 
household monthly debt payments exceed 40% of her monthly income. The rationale for including 
the dummy variable is to control for the position in the income distribution among highly indebted 
households. Specifically, we examine the intercept difference among those with the monthly debt-
service-to-income ratio above 40% and less leveraged households. This approach differs from the 
inclusion of a squared term of the variable. This is because the squared term investigates the 
difference in the gradient of the relationship as debt-service-to-income ratio increases, affecting 
the slope of the regression line, while we are interested in analysing differences in the levels of the 
median income ratio across the degrees of indebtedness59. Higher debt-service-to-income ratio and 
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 In fact, inclusion of a squared term for the debt-service-to-income ratio instead of the dummy is 
insignificant in all specifications, which highlights different functions of the two methods. Thus, no 
non-linearity in the relationship between leverage and the median income ratio is found, and the focus 
is placed on the difference in the level of relative income (i.e. position in the income distribution) 
between extremely indebted households and the rest.  
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debt-to-asset ratio are expected to be negatively associated with relative inequality as households 
with high values of these ratios tend to be towards the bottom of the distribution (see Figure 1.16 
in Chapter 1). Conversely, we expect the debt-to-income ratio to be positively associated with 
relative inequality as households at the top of the distribution are observed to have higher values of 
this ratio than the rest. 
Among the socio-economic controls, we include variables associated with income inequality 
in the literature reviewed in Chapter 2. Firstly, we include age of the household head and the value 
of age squared in order to account for the presence of the life-cycle effects. According to this 
theory, we would expect an inverted U-shaped relationship between age and the median income 
ratio. As households engage in consumption smoothing over their life-cycle, they experience the 
highest levels of relative income during their productive years, declining after retirement. 
Secondly, we consider the impact of human capital accumulation through education on relative 
inequality, measured as the index of the highest educational achievement of the household head, 
ranging from 1 – no grades completed, to 17 – graduate school. Moreover, we include dummy 
variables for gender and race, equal to 1 for female-headed households and households headed by 
Blacks or Hispanics respectively. Based on the analysis of the trends in income and wealth in 
Chapter 1, we expect that households headed by females and Blacks or Hispanics have lower 
incomes relative to the median. Furthermore, we include a dummy variable for marital status, 
equal to 1 if the household head is single, and 0 otherwise. We expect single households to have a 
lower position in the income distribution relative to the median compared to households who are 
married or live in a partnership, who benefit from joint income streams (cf. Cohen/Haberfeld 
1991). Moreover, we account for labour force participation and type of employment of the 
household head. We include a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is out of labour 
force, expecting these households to be further down the distribution of income relative to the 
median compared to working households. In addition, we include a dummy variable for the type of 
employment equal to 1 if the household head is self-employed. The impact of self-employment on 
relative inequality is ambiguous. On the one hand, small entrepreneurs have been documented to 
experience lower income increases than wage-earning households (cf. Hamilton 2000). On the 
other hand, if self-employed households exercise control over corporations, seize large operational 
profits, and accumulate sizeable wealth through business equity, they are expected to be positioned 
at the top of the income distribution relative to the median (Wolff/Zacharias 2013:1383). Finally, 
to control for the household size, we include the number of children in the household. To capture 
the potentially non-linear relationship between household size and relative income, we include the 
squared value of the number of children. We expect a hump-shaped relationship between family 
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size and relative income as after a certain point a greater number of dependents places a higher 
burden on household finances. 
To evaluate the relevance of wealth composition as an independent determinant of 
inequality, we compare the baseline regression with a reduced specification including only 
household characteristics. Moreover, to verify the robustness of the detailed balance sheet 
estimates in terms of their sign and significance, we analyse a reduced general balance sheet 
specification including broader categories of wealth composition among regressors, namely the 
relative share of financial assets, secured and unsecured debt, and leverage60. 
4.3.2. Pooled OLS results 
Table 4.2 presents results of the pooled OLS estimation across the three specifications (reduced 
regression with socio-economic variables; regression with general balance sheet components; and 
the baseline model with detailed balance sheet variables). Moreover, it compares the results of the 
pooled OLS (POLS) and the median quantile regression estimation (QR) of the baseline detailed 
balance sheet specification61. As mentioned in the previous subsection, the rationale for comparing 
these three specifications is to provide an overview of the impact of broadly defined balance sheet 
composition, as well as a more detailed insight into the role of specific assets and liabilities in 
driving relative inequality. In addition, they provide a robustness check for the estimated signs and 
significance of the balance sheet components and socio-economic controls. This is also the task of 
the quantile regression estimation. 
In the baseline specification with detailed balance sheet composition variables, greater 
reliance on non-financial assets in total holdings is negatively associated with the median income 
ratio, except for the relative holdings of business equity. This negative effect is the strongest for 
households with large relative holdings of primary residence. A one-percentage point increase in 
the share of primary residence in total assets is associated with a 0.7 percentage point decline in 
the median income ratio, significant at 1% level. The impact of the relative holdings of vehicles 
and other non-financial assets is not statistically significant. In contrast, a one-percentage point 
rise in the share of business equity in total assets is associated with a 2.6 percentage point increase 
in the median income ratio, significant at 1% level. 
                                                   
60
 Note that due to collinearity issues we exclude the relative holdings of non-financial assets from this 
reduced general balance sheet composition specification. 
61
 While we report the measure of the goodness of fit for the quantile regression, it is not directly 
comparable with the adjusted R
2
 of the pooled OLS estimation due to methodological differences. This 
is because the indicators of the goodness of fit are not readily applicable in the quantile regression (cf. 
https://www.stata.com/manuals13/rqreg.pdf). 
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Greater contribution of financial assets to total holdings is estimated to have a positive 
impact on relative inequality. The effect is observed to be the highest for financial investment 
assets. A one-percentage point rise in the relative holdings of financial investment assets is 
associated with a 2.9 percentage point increase in the median income ratio. In contrast, a 
corresponding increase in the shares of transaction accounts and retirement and insurance assets in 
total holdings is associated with a lower increase in the median income ratio of 0.42 and 0.37 
percentage points respectively. All estimates are significant at 1% level. 
Moreover, the expected positive effect of secured debt holdings on relative inequality turns 
out to be driven by other real estate in the detailed balance sheet specification. A one-percentage 
point increase in the relative holdings of debt secured by other property is estimated to raise the 
median income ratio by 2.2 percentage points, significant at 1% level. A corresponding increase in 
the share of mortgages secured by primary residence in total debt is associated with a 0.3 
percentage point rise in the median income ratio, significant at 5% level. In contrast, greater 
relative share of unsecured debt holdings is negatively associated with the relative position in the 
income distribution. A one-percentage point increase in the relative holdings of credit card 
balances is associated with a 0.97 percentage point decrease in the median income ratio, while a 
parallel increase in the share of instalment debt in total debt is related to a 0.8 percentage point 
decline in the median ratio. 
As expected, the leverage measures are negatively associated with relative inequality.  A 
one-percentage point increase in the debt-payments-to-income ratio is associated with a 3.5 
percentage point decline in the median income ratio, significant at 5% level. Extremely indebted 
households with the debt-payments-to-income ratio greater than 40% are estimated to have a 96.5 
percentage point lower median income ratio compared to less indebted households, which is 
significant at 1% level. Both the debt-to-asset and the debt-to-income ratio are not statistically 
different from zero. 
Among the socio-economic controls, all variables have a statistically significant relationship 
with the median income ratio at 1% level. The highest positive impact is associated with 
educational attainment and self-employment status of the household head. An extra grade of 
educational achievement is estimated to increase the median income ratio by 17.7 percentage 
points, holding other variables constant. Self-employed households are estimated to have a 63.9 
percentage points higher median income ratio than other households. Conversely, the highest 
negative association with the median income ratio follows from marital status and labour force 
participation. The median income ratio is estimated to be 69.7 and 38.1 percentage points lower 
for households whose head is single and out of labour force respectively. Moreover, we find 
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support for the life-cycle effects, with an inverted-U shaped relationship between age and relative 
income. Based on the positive estimate of age and the negative coefficient of age squared, we find 
that the median income ratio reaches maximum at 65 years old62. Similarly, there is evidence of a 
statistically significant hump-shaped relationship between the number of children and the median 
income ratio. The maximum income ratio is recorded for families with four children (see previous 
footnote). Furthermore, race and gender have a statistically significant impact on relative 
inequality. Households whose head is female are estimated to have a 20.5 percentage point lower 
median income ratio than male-headed households, while households headed by Blacks or 
Hispanics are estimated to have a 5.8 percentage point lower income relative to the median 
compared to White households. 
Exclusion of the detailed balance sheet composition variables in the regression model alters 
some of the previously obtained estimates. In the reduced specification including only socio-
economic controls, all socio-economic variables are statistically different at 5% level than in the 
baseline specification. The magnitude of the life-cycle effects increases, with the optimum age 
rising to 69. The coefficient of educational attainment rises from 17.7 to 23.4. The estimates of 
marital status and labour force participation increase in absolute terms to -80.2 and -48.9 
respectively. The negative impact of gender increases to -29.9, while the coefficient of race rises to 
-27.3. Moreover, the estimate of the self-employed dummy increases to 136.0. 
In the general balance sheet specification, the estimates of the socio-economic variables 
remain close to the detailed balance sheet specification results, except for the coefficients of 
educational attainment, self-employed, females, and Blacks/Hispanics, which rise to 20.1, 138.2, -
30.2, and -14.2 respectively. Among the general balance sheet composition variables, a one-
percentage point increase in the share of financial assets in total assets is related to a 1.2 
percentage point increase in the median income ratio, holding other variables constant. The 
estimate is significant at 1% level. Secured debt holdings are positively associated with relative 
inequality, with a one-percentage point increase in the share of secured debt in total debt being 
related to a 0.3 percentage point rise in the median income ratio, significant at 5% level. In 
contrast, the impact of a one-percentage point increase in the relative holdings of unsecured debt is 
negative, reducing the median income ratio by 0.8 percentage points, significant at 1% level. As 
expected, the leverage measures have a negative association with relative inequality. A one-
                                                   
62
 This is based on own calculations of a formula obtained from the partial derivative of the median 
income ratio with respect to age from the regression equation. If x* is the optimal value of age, then 
q∗ = −=/2! where = is the estimate of age and !	is the estimate of age squared. The decimal points 
are rounded upwards if equal to or exceeding 0.5. 
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percentage point increase in the debt-payments-to-income ratio is associated with a 2.7 percentage 
point decline in the median income ratio, significant at 5% level. The ratio is estimated to be 96.1 
percentage points lower for households with debt payments exceeding 40% of income, significant 
at 1% level. The debt-to-asset and the debt-to-income ratio remain not statistically significant. 
Overall, these results are consistent in sign and significance with the estimates of the detailed 
balance sheet specification. 
Comparison of the baseline specification results with the quantile regression estimation 
shows that the OLS estimates are robust in terms of significance and sign, with the exception of 
transaction accounts and instalment debt. However, we observe differences in the magnitudes of 
the estimated coefficients. The impact of socio-economic variables on the median income ratio 
tends to be lower in the median regression compared to the pooled OLS estimation. The difference 
is particularly large for the self-employment dummy, which decreases from 63.9 in the OLS 
estimation to 0.8 in the quantile regression. 
Among the balance sheet composition variables, we find that the negative effect of the 
greater relative holdings of primary residence decreases in absolute terms in the median 
regression, with the estimate of -0.4 compared to -0.7 in the OLS estimation. Moreover, the impact 
of the greater relative holdings of vehicles and other non-financial assets on the median income 
ratio in the quantile regression is statistically significant at 1% level and larger in absolute terms 
compared to the OLS regression. A one-percentage point rise in the share of vehicles and other 
non-financial assets in total holdings is associated with a 0.4 percentage point decline in the 
median income ratio, while the estimate is not statistically different from zero in the pooled OLS 
estimation. Furthermore, a one-percentage point rise in the share of business equity and financial 
investment assets in total holdings is estimated to have a smaller increasing effect of 0.3 and 0.2 
percentage points respectively on the median income ratio in the quantile regression, compared to 
the estimates of 2.6 and 2.9 respectively in the OLS specification. This suggests that the original 
results for these variables are sensitive to the extreme values of business equity and financial 
investment assets holdings.  
Furthermore, we find substantial differences in the estimates of transaction accounts across 
the two regressions. While in the OLS estimation a one-percentage point rise in the share of this 
asset in total holdings is associated with an increase of 0.4 percentage points in the median income 
ratio, the coefficient turns negative at -0.3 in the median regression. Both estimates are significant 
at 1% level. Moreover, the magnitude of the positive effect of the greater relative holdings of 
retirement and insurance assets on the median income ratio is found to be lower in the median 
regression, with the estimate of 0.2 compared to the coefficient of 0.4 in the OLS estimation. 
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Among the debt composition variables, greater reliance on mortgages secured by primary 
residence is associated with higher increases in the median income ratio in the quantile regression. 
A one-percentage point rise in the share of this type of debt in total liabilities is estimated to 
increase the median income ratio by 0.6 percentage points (significant at 1% level), compared to a 
rise of 0.3 percentage points in the pooled OLS estimation, significant at 5% level. In contrast, the 
estimate of the greater relative holdings of mortgages secured by other property is lower in the 
median regression, with the coefficient of 1.1 compared to 2.2 in the OLS regression. Moreover, 
there are substantial disparities in the estimates of the relative instalment debt holdings across the 
two regressions. While a one-percentage point rise in the share of this debt in total liabilities is 
associated with a 0.8 percentage point decline in the median income ratio in the OLS estimation, a 
parallel increase is estimated to raise the median ratio by 0.01 percentage points in the quantile 
regression. Both estimates are significant at 1% level. Similarly, the effect of the greater relative 
holdings of credit card debt on the median income ratio is lower in absolute terms in the median 
regression, and is associated with a 0.04 percentage point decrease compared to a 0.9 percentage 
point decline in the OLS estimation. Both estimates are significant at 1% level. This indicates that 
at the median level debt composition is a greater and a more significant predictor of relative 
inequality than in the mean-based OLS regression. 
Moreover, we observe asymmetries in the estimates of leverage across the two regressions. 
A one-percentage point rise in the debt-payments-to-income ratio is associated with a decline of 
11.4 percentage points in the median income ratio in the quantile regression, significant at 1% 
level. Conversely, the decrease is lower at 3.5 percentage points in the OLS estimation, significant 
at 5% level. Additionally, households whose debt-service-to-income ratio exceeds 40% are found 
to have a 47.1 percentage point lower median income ratio compared to the less indebted 
households in the quantile regression. This gap is smaller than in the pooled OLS estimation, 
where the difference in the median income ratio between extremely indebted households and the 
rest is 96.5 percentage points. This suggests that the median household is more indebted in terms 
of the debt-service-to-income ratio than the mean. Moreover, the debt-to-asset and the debt-to-
income ratio are statistically significant at the 10% and 1% level respectively in the median 
regression, although the magnitudes are very close to zero.  
Figure 4.1 shows the differences in the estimates of the balance sheet composition variables 
in the detailed specification across quintiles. It is evident that the mean-based estimates of the OLS 
regression disguise much of the heterogeneity of the impact of household balance sheet 
composition on relative inequality. Comparing the estimates of the median and the OLS regression 
with the quantile regression coefficients estimated at the 20th and 90th percentile we observe that 
there are disparities in the impact of the balance sheet composition variables across the 
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distribution. The largest differences in the coefficient magnitudes are observed for business equity, 
financial investment assets, retirement and insurance assets, as well as debt secured by other 
property, and the debt-service-to-income ratio.  
Overall, results of the median regression indicate that estimates of the relative holdings of 
business equity, financial investment assets, transaction accounts, and instalment debt are 
particularly sensitive to extreme values. The results suggest that asset composition is a greater 
determinant of relative income for households towards the top of the distribution, which skews the 
mean-based estimates upwards. Simultaneously, debt composition emerges as a greater predictor 
of relative income for a typical median household, which is evident in the higher magnitudes of 
the estimates of unsecured debt and mortgages secured by primary residence in the quantile 
regression. The differences in the estimates of leverage measures indicate that the median 
household is more indebted and suffers greater declines in relative income due to increases in the 
debt-payments-to-income ratio than the average mean household.   
Table 4.2 Pooled OLS and quantile regression results 1989-2013 















     
Age 9.31*** 7.54*** 7.75*** 3.99*** 
 (0.273) (0.350) (0.407) (0.001) 
Age squared -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.04*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000) 
Educational attainment 23.37*** 20.12*** 17.70*** 8.74*** 
 (0.377) (0.447) (0.435) (0.001) 
Female -29.96*** -30.21*** -20.47*** -14.60*** 
 (3.356) (4.561) (4.689) (0.005) 
Black/Hispanic -27.28*** -14.23*** -5.79*** -5.77*** 
 (1.481) (1.749) (1.648) (0.003) 
Single -80.24*** -67.65*** -69.71*** -47.70*** 
 (3.927) (5.140) (5.174) (0.006) 
Number of children 16.33*** 14.64*** 18.23*** 7.64*** 
 (1.989) (2.028) (2.047) (0.003) 
Number of children squared -1.93*** -1.56*** -2.38*** -1.48*** 
 (0.446) (0.474) (0.473) (0.001) 
Self-employed 136.00*** 138.20*** 63.91*** 0.76*** 
 (6.777) (7.124) (7.178) (0.011) 
Out of labour force -48.96*** -31.68*** -38.09*** -27.80*** 
 (2.968) (3.560) (3.551) (0.005) 
Financial assets  1.23***   
  (0.051)   
Secured debt  0.29*   
  (0.150)   
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Unsecured debt  -0.75***   
  (0.150)   
Debt-service-to-income ratio (DSY)  -2.72** -3.50** -11.40*** 
  (1.259) (1.495) (0.015) 
DSY>40%  -96.01*** -96.49*** -47.10*** 
  (2.797) (3.030) (0.011) 
Debt-to-asset ratio  -0.003 -0.00 -0.00*** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Debt-to-income ratio  -0.01 -0.01 0.00* 
  (0.428) (0.444) (0.001) 




Vehicles and other non-financial   -0.08 -0.40*** 
   (0.109) (0.013) 
Business equity   2.64*** 0.31*** 
   (0.202) (0.054) 
Financial investment assets   2.87*** 0.23*** 
   (0.184) (0.017) 
Transaction accounts   0.42*** -0.26*** 
   (0.130) (0.012) 
Retirement and insurance assets   0.37*** 0.24*** 
   (0.113) (0.014) 
Debt secured by primary residence   0.33** 0.59*** 
   (0.158) (0.011) 
Debt secured by other real estate   2.16*** 1.11*** 
   (0.238) (0.014) 
Instalment debt   -0.83*** 0.01*** 
   (0.150) (0.010) 
Credit card balances   -0.97*** -0.04*** 
   (0.151) (0.012) 
1992 -18.43*** -19.34*** -18.44*** -2.74*** 
 (5.164) (6.507) (6.630) (0.006) 
1995 -24.70*** -28.87*** -22.91*** -10.70*** 
 (5.150) (6.408) (6.522) (0.005) 
1998 -17.82*** -24.95*** -20.75*** -11.50*** 
 (5.311) (6.822) (7.031) (0.010) 
2001 -8.022 -16.71** -10.38 -12.00*** 
 (6.573) (7.876) (8.039) (0.006) 
2004 -20.29*** -28.44*** -19.06*** -14.50*** 
 (5.303) (6.531) (6.578) (0.008) 
2007 -5.277 -13.50** -5.60 -14.00*** 
 (5.536) (6.628) (6.749) (0.007) 
2010 -17.01*** -21.13*** -10.56 -11.80*** 
 (5.390) (6.705) (6.671) (0.007) 
2013 -1.130 -9.18 2.31 -10.30*** 
 (5.453) (6.899) (6.868) (0.005) 
Constant -365.7*** -273.60*** -223.50*** -52.00*** 
 (9.583) (17.550) (22.160) (0.021) 
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Observations 41,528 30,219 30,219 30,219 
Adjusted R-squared* 0.036 0.053 0.065 0.219 
Root Mean Squared Error 621.8 545.1 541.6  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Base year 1989. Financial assets, primary residence, vehicles and other, business equity, liquid assets, 
retirement accounts, and financial investment assets are presented in terms of the percentage share of the value of 
these variables in total assets. Unsecured debt, secured debt, debt secured by primary residence and by other real 
estate, instalment debt, and credit card balances are expressed in terms of the percentage share of the value of 
these holdings in total debt. Balance sheet variable shares and the income median ratio are given in percentage 
terms.*Due to methodological assumptions of the quantile regression, we report the pseudo-R2 for the quantile 
regression and the adjusted R2 for the pooled OLS regression. 
 
Figure 4.1 Coefficients by quantile, USA 1989-2013 
 
Analysis of the goodness of fit of the estimated regression models suggests that out of the 
three pooled OLS specifications, the detailed balance sheet regression explains the most of the 
variation in the median income ratio. The highest adjusted R2 is obtained for the specification with 
detailed balance sheet variables. However, this statistic should be interpreted cautiously due to its 
low magnitudes of less than 10%. Low R2 is expected given the large sample size, but it may 
signal omitted variable problems. For this reason, we also compare the Root Mean Squared Error 
(RMSE), which takes a square root of the ratio of the residual sum of squares in the regression to 
its degrees of freedom. The lower value of RMSE of 541.6 in the detailed balance sheet 
specification confirms that its accuracy is higher compared to the reduced specifications. 
In addition to the potential omitted variable bias, a further limitation of our model may arise 
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accounting for the relative shares of the balance sheet variables. For this reason, this econometric 
exercise should be treated as an illustration of the statistical significance of the proposed 
relationship between household balance sheet composition and relative inequality, which has been 
observed in the descriptive analysis of the data in Chapter 1.  
Overall, the estimation results support our research hypothesis and the implication of the 
stock-flow consistent model developed in Chapter 3 that wealth heterogeneity increases inequality 
through differences in balance sheet composition. Households with higher levels of high-yielding 
financial investment assets, business equity, and debt secured by other real estate have relatively 
higher income levels compared to the median in the period studied. In contrast, incomes of 
households whose asset holdings rely on primary residence are estimated to be further away from 
the median towards the bottom of the distribution. Moreover, although the estimated relationship 
between the relative holdings of debt secured by primary residence and the median income ratio is 
positive, the effect is lower than for debt secured by other real estate. Moreover, incomes of 
households relying on unsecured debt holdings are estimated to be lower relative to the median. 
Furthermore, leverage matters. Highly indebted households with large monthly debt payments 
relative to monthly income, particularly those with debt-payment-to-income ratio exceeding 40%, 
are estimated to be further down the distribution of income relative to the median. While our study 
finds support for the significance of the socio-economic characteristics of households for relative 
inequality, their impact is reduced when wealth composition is considered.  
These findings suggest that household wealth heterogeneity significantly affects relative 
income distribution, and thus needs to be considered as an independent determinant of inequality. 
In the next section we analyse the social dimension of inequality, examining how the estimated 
effects of household wealth composition on relative income differ across gender, race, and 
generations. Moreover, we break down the analysis across periods to account for the impact of the 
subprime lending boom. Consequently, we consider the intersectional dimensions of inequality 
associated with financial sector transformation, which could not be included in the stock-flow 
consistent model due to its aggregate nature. 
4.3.3. Results by socio-demographic subgroup 
In order to account for the intersectional dimension of the impact of household wealth composition 
on inequality, the detailed balance sheet specification of the pooled OLS regression is re-estimated 
including interaction dummy variables for the balance sheet composition variables. The slope 
dummies equal 1 for female-headed households, households headed by Blacks/Hispanics, and 
households aged less than 35, with households headed by males, Whites/other ethnicities, and over 
35 taken as reference categories. The aim of analysing the slope dummy variables is to investigate 
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any systematic differences in the impact of wealth composition on relative inequality across 
gender, race, and generations, which could not be considered in the stock-flow consistent model 
developed in Chapter 3. We expect that due to the high opportunity cost of purchasing assets 
relative to financing everyday consumption, and because of discrimination issues in the credit 
markets associated with the predatory lending practices, these groups were exposed to more costly 
forms of borrowing and the impact of asset and debt composition on relative inequality is likely to 
be different for households headed by women, Blacks/Hispanics, and the young. For clarity to 
presentation, below we present tables with the estimated composite slopes and intercepts of the 
balance sheet composition variables and the median income ratio for female, Black/Hispanic, and 
young-headed households63. 
Gender 
Table 4.3 presents composite slope estimates of the balance sheet composition variables and the 
composite intercept for female-headed households. As our interest lies in assessing any potential 
differences in the impact of household wealth on relative income, we do not describe the 
differences in the socio-economic characteristics across the analysed subgroups in detail. 
The estimated directions of the relationship between the median income ratio and asset 
composition variables are consistent across gender and with the baseline specification results. 
However, asset variables have generally no significant impact on the position in the income 
distribution for female-headed households. The estimated composite coefficients of the total asset 
shares of primary residence, vehicles and other non-financial assets, transaction accounts, and 
retirement and insurance assets are not statistically different from zero. Only the estimate of the 
relative holdings of financial investment assets is statistically significant at 1%. However, it’s 
magnitude of 0.4 is substantially lower than the estimate of 3.9 for male-headed households. This 
suggests that the positive impact of higher relative holdings of financial investment assets and 
business equity is not shared equally across gender, with male households enjoying significantly 
higher increases in their incomes relative to the median compared to females. 
Furthermore, there are significant differences in the impact of debt composition on relative 
income across gender. While the interaction dummy of gender and relative holdings of debt 
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 Calculation of the composite slope and intercept is illustrated by the following example regression 
equation, where D is the dummy variable, Y is the dependent variable, X is a regressor, and ê is the 
error term: " = =d + =1ù + =e# + =V#ù + ê. For D=1: Ä = (=d + =e) + (=1 + =V)ù + ê, where 
(=d + =e) is the composite intercept and (=1 + =V) is the composite slope for subgroup for which the 
dummy is 1. For D=0 intercept and slope correspond to the original estimates =0	and =1.	
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secured by primary residence is not statistically significant, based on the calculation of the 
composite standard error the overall coefficient is positively and significantly associated with the 
median income ratio for female-headed households. Ceteris paribus, a one-percentage point 
increase in the share of mortgages secured by primary residence in total debt is associated with a 
0.2 percentage point rise in the median ratio for female households significant at 1% level, while 
the coefficient is not statistically different from zero for males. Moreover, male households 
holding debt secured by other property enjoy higher increases in their median income ratio of 2.2 
percentage points for each one-percentage point rise in these relative holdings. In contrast, the 
effect for female-headed households is significantly lower at 0.8 percentage points.  
Striking differences across gender emerge for the relative holdings of unsecured debt. While 
a one-percentage point increase in the share of instalment loans in total debt is associated with a 
1.1 percentage point decline in the median ratio among males significant at 1% level, the estimated 
effect is not statistically significant for female households. Moreover, a one-percentage point 
increase in the share of credit card balances in total debt is related to a 1.4 percentage point 
decrease in the median income ratio for male households, while the coefficient is not statistically 
different from zero for females. Moreover, the negative effect of leverage is magnified for female 
households, with a one-percentage point increase in the debt-payments-to-income ratio decreasing 
the relative income of women by 7.6 percentage points (although the interaction dummy is not 
statistically significant), compared to a 3.5 percentage point decline for men. In addition, incomes 
of females whose debt-payments-to-income ratio exceeds 40% are estimated to be significantly 
closer to the median than incomes of the extremely indebted males. This indicates that female-
headed households in the bottom half of the distribution tend to be more indebted compared to 
men. Furthermore, the insignificant estimates of the relative unsecured debt holdings suggest that 
this form of debt is not as detrimental for the relative income position among women compared to 
men. Lastly, we observe a significant difference in the intercept across gender, with female-headed 
households occupying a lower position in the income distribution in mean terms than male 
households. 
Comparison of the pooled OLS results with the quantile regression estimates shows 
robustness of the majority of these effects in terms of their sign, although the median regression 
estimation yields all regressors to be significant at 1% level. As in the full sample, the quantile 
regression coefficients tend to be lower in magnitude than the pooled OLS estimates. This is 
particularly notable in the case of the relative holdings of business equity, financial investment 
assets, and debt secured by other property, which signify that the median household sees smaller 
increases in their relative position in the income distribution from holding these types of wealth. 
As in the pooled OLS estimation, these coefficients are lower for the subsample of women 
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compared to men. Remarkably, the median female household is estimated to lower her position in 
the income distribution by 0.04 percentage points for each one-percentage point rise in the relative 
holdings of business equity. Moreover, the estimates of the relative holdings of unsecured debt are 
positively associated with the median income ratio for female-headed households and statistically 
significant at 1% level. This suggests that greater accumulation of unsecured debt has a larger 
effect for the relative position in the income distribution for the median female-headed household 
compared to males. Moreover, the quantile regression estimates of the debt-to-asset and debt-to-
income ratios are statistically significant and negative for both groups, but their magnitude remains 
close to zero.  
Overall, we find that female-headed households do not enjoy the same increases in their 
relative income following the rise in the relative holdings of business equity, financial investment 
assets, and other real estate (gauged by the contribution of debt secured by other property to total 
holdings). Moreover, we observe that female households suffer greater relative income declines 
from higher leverage compared to males, and that their relative position in the income distribution 
is related to a larger extent to unsecured debt accumulation. 
Table 4.3 Pooled OLS and quantile regression results with interaction dummies – gender and 
balance sheet composition variables, USA 1989-2013 
Median income ratio 
Composite slope  
 (POLS) 
 Composite slope  
(QR) 
Male Female  Male Female 
    
Primary residence -0.96*** -0.05  -0.57*** -0.13*** 
 (0.136) (0.091)  (0.015) (0.009) 
Vehicles -0.28** -0.03  -0.56*** -0.14*** 
 (0.131) (0.093)  (0.013) (0.010) 
Business equity 2.74*** 0.07  0.30*** -0.04*** 
 (0.220) (0.243)  (0.076) (0.036) 
Financial investment assets 3.94*** 0.42***  0.50*** 0.02*** 
 (0.252) (0.116)  (0.035) (0.013) 
Transaction accounts 0.53*** 0.06  -0.34*** -0.09*** 
 (0.184) (0.093)  (0.023) (0.023) 
Retirement and insurance assets 0.32** 0.11  0.34*** 0.11*** 
 (0.136) (0.096)  (0.016) (0.023) 
Debt secured by primary residence 0.26 0.24***  0.63*** 0.39*** 
 (0.209) (0.064)  (0.017) (0.014) 
Debt secured by other real estate 2.22*** 0.83***  1.24*** 0.67*** 
 (0.299) (0.167)  (0.029) (0.224) 
Instalment debt -1.14*** -0.02  -0.05*** 0.04*** 
 (0.200) (0.055)  (0.015) (0.010) 
Credit card balances -1.37*** -0.04  -0.16*** 0.07*** 
 (0.205) (0.059)  (0.014) (0.011) 
Debt-service-to-income ratio (DSY) -3.45** -7.59***  -0.13*** -0.04*** 
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 (1.519) (2.812)  (0.038) (0.031) 
DSY>40% -119.38*** -32.16***  -59.10*** -22.90*** 
 (3.685) (3.191)  (0.017) (0.012) 
Debt-to-asset ratio -0.01 0.00  -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.013) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Debt-to-income ratio -0.01 -0.50  0.00*** -0.01*** 
 (0.607) (1.193)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -171.65*** -269.45***  -27.70*** -73.30*** 
 (27.063) (17.911)  (0.000) (0.018) 
    
Observations 30,219  30,219 
Adjusted R-squared* 0.07  0.23 
Root Mean Squared Error 540.2   
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Full regression results (including socio-economic controls and time effects) are not reported because these 
estimates remain statistically the same in the regression including the interaction dummy variables. Full results 
available on request. Base year 1989. Estimates in bold indicate the Wald test yielding the interaction dummy 
statistically significant at 5% level. Standard errors calculated as K~- ù + K~- ù# + 28ÖK(ù, ù#) where 
XD is the interaction dummy. Italics indicate that the interaction dummy is not statistically significant. Asterisks 
reflect significance of the composite slope based on the calculated standard errors. *Due to methodological 
assumptions of the quantile regression, we report the pseudo-R2 for the quantile regression and the adjusted R2 




Table 4.4 presents estimation results of the detailed balance sheet specification with interaction 
dummies across racial groups, comparing the subsamples of households headed by Whites/other 
ethnic groups and Blacks/Hispanics. This categorisation is motivated by the similar patterns of 
wealth accumulation across these groups, as evidenced by the descriptive data analysis in Chapter 
1. The impact of asset composition on the median income ratio is significantly lower for 
Blacks/Hispanics, while debt accumulation is estimated to play a greater role than for Whites/other 
ethnic groups. 
Firstly, the positive effects of the greater shares of business equity and high-yielding 
financial investment assets in total holdings are not shared equally between these ethnic groups. 
While a one-percentage point increase in the contribution of business equity to total assets is 
estimated to increase the median income ratio by 2.9 percentage points among White/Other 
households significant at 1% level, this effect is not statistically different from zero for 
Blacks/Hispanics. Similarly, a one-percentage point rise in the relative holdings of financial 
investment assets is associated with a 3.1 percentage point increase in the median income ratio for 
Whites/other ethnic groups significant at 1% level. However, the corresponding estimate is not 
statistically different from zero for Blacks/Hispanics. 
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Similarly, estimates of the relative holdings of transaction accounts and retirement and 
insurance assets are not statistically different from zero for Black/Hispanic households, while they 
are positive and statistically significant at 1% for Whites and other ethnicities. Moreover, relative 
holdings of vehicles and other non-financial assets are estimated to be negatively related to the 
median income ratio for Black/Hispanic households. A one-percentage point rise in the share of 
vehicles in total assets is associated with a 0.4 percentage point decrease in the median income 
ratio for this group, significant at 1% level. In contrast, the estimate is not statistically significant 
for White/Other households.  
In contrast to assets, the estimates of debt composition variables tend to have a greater effect 
on the median income ratio for Blacks/Hispanics compared to Whites/other ethnic groups. A one-
percentage point increase in the share of debt secured by primary residence is associated with a 0.3 
percentage point rise in the median ratio among Blacks/Hispanics, significant at 1% level. 
Conversely, the estimate is not statistically significant for White/Other households. Gauging the 
impact of other property ownership, greater relative holdings of debt secured by other real estate 
are associated with higher increases in the median income ratio for Whites/other ethnic groups 
compared to Blacks/Hispanics. A one-percentage point increase in the share of this type of debt in 
total liabilities is estimated to raise the median income ratio of White/Other households by 2.2 
percentage points, compared to a 0.7 increase for Blacks/Hispanics. This suggests that ownership 
of property other than main residence has a greater effect on the relative incomes of Whites/other 
ethnic groups than for Blacks/Hispanics. 
Furthermore, there are significant differences in the impact of relative holdings of unsecured 
debt on the median income ratio across race. While the impact of greater relative holdings of 
instalment debt is estimated to be negative across race, the magnitude is significantly lower in 
absolute terms for Blacks/Hispanics. A one-percentage point increase in the share of instalment 
debt in total liabilities is associated with a 1.1 percentage point decline in the median income ratio 
for Whites/other ethnic groups, significant at 1% level. In contrast, a corresponding rise is related 
to a decrease of 0.1 percentage points significant at 10% level for Blacks/Hispanics. Moreover, a 
one-percentage point rise in the share of credit card balances in total debt is estimated to decrease 
the median income ratio of White/Other households by 1.3 percentage points (significant at 1% 
level), while the coefficient is not significantly different from zero among Blacks/Hispanics. 
A similar pattern is detected for the impact of the debt-service-to-income ratio on relative 
income across race. A one-percentage point rise in the ratio is estimated to decrease the median 
income ratio of Whites/other ethnic groups by 4.4 percentage points, significant at 1% level. In 
contrast, the coefficient is not statistically different from zero for Blacks/Hispanics. However, 
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Black and Hispanic households whose debt-payments-to-income-ratio exceeds 40% are estimated 
to have a 49.4 percentage point lower median income ratio relative to the less indebted 
households. The median income ratio is estimated to be 108.3 percentage point lower for 
Whites/other ethnic groups. This indicates that Blacks and Hispanics in the bottom half of the 
distribution are more indebted compared to White and Other households. Lastly, on average 
Black/Hispanic households are lower in the income distribution relative to the median than Whites 
and other ethnicities, which is evidenced by statistically significant intercept dummy. 
Comparing the above results with the quantile regression, we observe that most of the 
estimates are consistent in terms of significance and sign. As in the regression across gender, the 
quantile regression coefficients tend to be of lower magnitude than in the pooled OLS estimation. 
Among exceptions, the estimate of the relative holdings of business equity is not statistically 
significant for the subsample of Whites. Moreover, the coefficients of the relative holdings of 
financial investment and retirement and insurance assets are negative and statistically significant in 
the quantile regression for the subsample of Blacks/Hispanics, while the pooled OLS estimates are 
not statistically different from zero. This signifies that greater ownership of these assets does not 
improve the relative position in the income distribution for Blacks/Hispanics. Furthermore, the 
quantile regression estimates of the relative holdings of instalment debt and credit card balances 
are positive and statistically significant for Blacks/Hispanics. This indicates that the position in the 
income distribution of the median Black or Hispanic household relied to a greater extent on 
unsecured debt accumulation. In contrast, unlike in the pooled OLS regression, the quantile 
regression estimates of the debt-service-to-income, debt-to-asset, and the debt-to-income ratio are 
statistically significant and negative for Blacks/Hispanics (and the latter two also for Whites/Other 
ethnicities), although their magnitude is close to zero.  
Overall, these results suggest that while asset composition plays a greater role in influencing 
the relative incomes of Whites/other ethnic groups, debt and leverage are larger determinants of 
the relative position of Blacks/Hispanics along the income distribution. This indicates that 
minority households have become more dependent on debt in the process of financial sector 
transformation as their access to asset ownership was limited between 1989-2013. The resulting 
higher levels of leverage among minority households have significantly contributed to the 
deepening of racial inequality measured in the mean terms, as observed in the balance sheet 
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Table 4.4 Pooled OLS and quantile regression results with interaction dummies – race and balance 
sheet composition variables, USA 1989-2013 
Median income ratio 
Composite slope  
 (POLS) 
 Composite slope  
(QR) 
White/Other Black/Hispanic  White/Other Black/Hispanic 
    
Primary residence -0.82*** -0.38**  -0.44*** -0.33*** 
 (0.131) (0.160)  (0.011) (0.008) 
Vehicles -0.16 -0.37**  -0.43*** -0.39*** 
 (0.127) (0.146)  (0.009) (0.007) 
Business equity 2.87*** 0.08  0.34 -0.02 
 (0.255) (0.255)  (0) (0) 
Financial investment assets 3.13*** 0.30  0.28*** -0.12*** 
 (0.214) (0.194)  (0.028) (0.023) 
Transaction accounts 0.51*** -0.15  -0.24 -0.34 
 (0.164) (0.171)  (0) (0) 
Retirement and insurance assets 0.40*** -0.16  0.36*** -0.08*** 
 (0.133) (0.155)  (0.015) (0.011) 
Debt secured by primary residence 0.23 0.30***  0.58*** 0.42*** 
 (0.203) (0.090)  (0.011) (0.016) 
Debt secured by other real estate 2.23*** 0.72***  1.20*** 0.63*** 
 (0.287) (0.227)  (0.039) (0.011) 
Instalment debt -1.08*** -0.11*  -0.04*** 0.05*** 
 (0.194) (0.064)  (0.007) (0.007) 
Credit card balances -1.27*** -0.10  -0.10*** 0.07*** 
 (0.198) (0.070)  (0.009) (0.008) 
Debt-service-to-income ratio (DSY) -4.43** -0.72  -0.10*** -0.04*** 
 (1.823) (3.513)  (0.001) (0.023) 
DSY>40% -108.30*** -49.38***  -49.20*** -33.80*** 
 (3.434) (8.291)  (0.003) (0.027) 
Debt-to-asset ratio -0.01 0.00  0.01*** -0.00*** 
 (0.007) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Debt-to-income ratio -0.55 0.00  -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.477) (2.956)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -201.78*** -255.91***  -49.40*** -58.64*** 
 (25.664) (20.522)  (0.000) (0.009) 
    
Observations 30,219  30,219 
Adjusted R-squared* 0.07  0.22 
Root Mean Squared Error 540.9   
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Full regression results (including socio-economic controls and time effects) are not reported because these 
estimates remain statistically the same in the regression including the interaction dummy variables. Full results 
available on request. Base year 1989. Estimates in bold indicate the Wald test yielding the interaction dummy 
statistically significant at 5% level. Standard errors calculated as K~- ù + K~- ù# + 28ÖK(ù, ù#) where 
XD is the interaction dummy. Italics indicate that the interaction dummy is not statistically significant. Asterisks 
reflect significance of the composite slope based on the calculated standard errors. *Due to methodological 
assumptions of the quantile regression, we report the pseudo-R2 for the quantile regression and the adjusted R2 
for the pooled OLS regression. WLS iteration in quantile regression selected at 40 for convergence. 
 




Table 4.5 presents results of the detailed balance sheet specification with interaction dummies 
across age groups, comparing households aged below 35 and those 35 years old and above. This 
categorisation is motivated by the results of the descriptive analysis in Chapter 1, which revealed 
that the youngest group of households fared consistently worse over time compared to the older 
households in terms of changes in their income and wealth.  
As in the case of gender and race, the positive effects of the greater relative holdings of 
business equity and financial investment assets on relative income are not shared equally across 
generations. A one-percentage point increase in the share of business equity in total assets is 
estimated to increase the median income ratio by 3.3 percentage points for households aged 35 and 
above, significant at 1% level. In contrast, the estimate for the youngest group is not statistically 
different from zero. Similarly, a one-percentage point increase in the share of financial investment 
assets in total holdings is estimated to raise the median income ratio of households aged 35 and 
above by 3.6 percentage points. Conversely, the estimate is significantly lower at 0.5 for 
households aged below 35. Both estimates are significant at 1% level.  
Furthermore, we find an asymmetric impact of the relative holdings of transaction accounts 
on the median income ratio across generations. A one-percentage point rise in the share of 
transaction accounts in total assets is estimated to increase the relative income of households aged 
35 and above by 0.4 percentage points, significant at 5% level. In contrast, the estimate is not 
statistically different from zero among households below 35 years old. In addition, we estimate 
that there is no statistically significant difference between the coefficients of the relative holdings 
of primary residence, retirement and insurance assets, and vehicles and other non-financial assets 
between age groups, although the latter estimate is not statistically significant among households 
aged below 35. 
Moreover, there are significant differences in the impact of debt composition on relative 
income across generations. Debt holdings are estimated to have a greater positive effect on the 
median income ratio for households younger than 35 compared to asset composition. A one-
percentage point increase in the share of debt secured by primary residence is estimated to raise 
the median income ratio of the youngest group by 0.8 percentage points, while the estimated effect 
of 0.1 is significantly lower for households older than 35. Both estimates are significant at 1% 
level. We find no significant differences in the impact of mortgages secured by other property on 
the median income ratio between generations, although the magnitude of the estimate for young 
households is lower than for households aged 35 and above. Importantly, while the estimated 
effect of greater relative holdings of unsecured debt on the median income is negative for 
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households aged 35 and above, the impact is found to be not statistically significant for the 
youngest group.  
Furthermore, higher leverage levels have a more detrimental impact on the relative income 
among households below 35 years old compared to those aged 35 and above. A one-percentage 
point increase in the debt-service-to-income ratio is associated with a 16.8 percentage point 
decline in the median income ratio for the youngest group, significant at 1% level. In contrast, a 
parallel rise in the leverage ratio is estimated to decrease the median ratio of households aged 35 
and above by 3.6 percentage points, significant at 5% level. Moreover, households below 35 years 
old whose monthly debt-payments-to-income ratio exceeds 40% percent are estimated to have 
47.3 percentage points lower median ratio compared to less indebted households, while relative 
income is found to be 107.8 percentage points lower among extremely indebted households aged 
35 and above. Both estimates are significant at 1% level. Additionally, we find that a one-
percentage point rise in the debt-to-asset ratio is associated with a decline of 0.01 in the median 
income ratio significant at 1% level among households aged 35 and over. The estimates of the 
debt-to-asset and the debt-to-income ratios are not statistically different from zero for households 
below 35. Lastly, comparison of the intercept dummy indicates that young households have a 
lower position in the income distribution relative to the median than households aged 35 and over. 
Comparison of the pooled OLS and the quantile regression results shows that the majority of 
the estimates are robust in terms of their sign and significance, although the quantile regression 
coefficients tend to have lower magnitudes compared to the pooled OLS estimates. The median 
regression estimate of the relative holdings of vehicles and other non-financial assets is not 
significantly different from zero for Whites/other ethnicities. Moreover, unlike in the pooled OLS 
regression the estimate of the relative holdings of business equity is found to be positive and 
statistically significant for young households in the quantile regression, although its magnitude of 
0.1 is substantially below the coefficient of 0.4 for households aged 35 and over. In contrast, the 
estimate of the relative holdings of financial investment assets is negative and significant for this 
group, compared to a positive pooled OLS coefficient. This indicates that relative incomes of 
young households do not benefit to the same extent from ownership of these assets compared to 
households aged 35 and above. Furthermore, quantile regression estimates of the relative holdings 
of transaction accounts are negative for both age groups, while the pooled OLS coefficients are 
positive. In addition, the quantile regression coefficient of the relative holdings of instalment debt 
for households below 35 is statistically significant and positive compared to the negative pooled 
OLS result. Furthermore, the quantile regression estimates of the debt-to-asset and the debt-to-
income ratio are statistically significant for both age groups, but the magnitudes are close to zero.  
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Overall, the above results indicate that debt accumulation is related to higher increases in 
relative income among households aged below 35 than asset composition, especially in terms of 
debt secured by main residence. In contrast, greater reliance on unsecured debt holdings is 
associated with lower relative income among households aged 35 and above. However, these older 
households enjoy significantly greater increases in the median income ratio than the youngest 
group, which is associated with their greater holdings of financial investment assets and business 
equity. Moreover, households below 35 years old are found to suffer greater relative income losses 
from higher debt-payments-to-income ratio relative to those aged 35 and above. Similarly to 
gender and race, the lower estimate for extremely indebted households among the youngest group 
indicates that they tend to be more indebted on average. 
 
Table 4.5 Pooled OLS and quantile regression results with interaction dummies – age group and 
balance sheet composition variables, USA 1989-2013 
Median income ratio 
Composite slope  
 (POLS) 
 Composite slope  
(QR) 
Aged 35+ Aged <35  Aged 35+ Aged <35 
    
Primary residence -0.77*** -0.41**  -0.43*** -0.27*** 
 (0.129) (0.178)  (0.006) (0.018) 
Vehicles -0.47*** -0.04  -0.53 -0.17 
 (0.129) (0.135)  (0) (0) 
Business equity 3.33*** -0.06  0.42*** 0.08*** 
 (0.244) (0.197)  (0.103) (0.103) 
Financial investment assets 3.63*** 0.52***  0.39*** -0.01*** 
 (0.242) (0.150)  (0.013) (0.014) 
Transaction accounts 0.35** 0.12  -0.31*** -0.10*** 
 (0.179) (0.129)  (0.011) (0.008) 
Retirement and insurance assets 0.28** 0.23*  0.21*** 0.27*** 
 (0.131) (0.139)  (0.006) (0.006) 
Debt secured by primary residence 0.10*** 0.81***  0.53*** 0.73*** 
 (0.203) (0.092)  (0.004) (0.020) 
Debt secured by other real estate 2.00*** 1.40***  1.10*** 0.69*** 
 (0.285) (0.280)  (0.074) (0.012) 
Instalment debt -1.01*** -0.04  -0.00*** 0.07*** 
 (0.197) (0.042)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Credit card balances -1.21*** 0.00  -0.10 0.12 
 (0.196) (0.046)  (0) (0) 
Debt-service-to-income ratio (DSY) -3.60** -16.82***  -0.12*** -0.09*** 
 (1.526) (4.617)  (0.003) (0.003) 
DSY>40% -107.81*** -47.27***  -47.70 -35.68 
 (8.292) (3.117)  (0) (0) 
Debt-to-asset ratio -0.01*** -0.00  -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.002) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Debt-to-income ratio -0.01 -0.14  0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (2.276) (0.294)  (0.000) (0.000) 
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Constant -200.2*** -278.20***  -34.50*** -73.63*** 
 (30.364) (20.206)  (0.000) (0.004) 
    
Observations 30,219  30,219 
Adjusted R-squared* 0.07  0.22 
Root Mean Squared Error 540.7   
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Full regression results (including socio-economic controls and time effects) are not reported because these 
estimates remain statistically the same in the regression including the interaction dummy variables. Full results 
available on request. Base year 1989. Estimates in bold indicate the Wald test yielding the interaction dummy 
statistically significant at 5% level. Standard errors calculated as K~- ù + K~- ù# + 28ÖK(ù, ù#) where 
XD is the interaction dummy. Italics indicate that the interaction dummy is not statistically significant. Asterisks 
reflect significance of the composite slope based on the calculated standard errors. *Due to methodological 
assumptions of the quantile regression, we report the pseudo-R2 for the quantile regression and the adjusted R2 
for POLS. WLS iteration in quantile regression selected at 30 for convergence. 
 
Summary 
In sum, we find that the relative incomes of women, Blacks, Hispanics, and households aged 
below 35 are determined to a larger extent by debt composition rather than assets. The magnitude 
of the positive effects of the greater share of business equity and financial investment assets in 
total holdings is significantly smaller for these groups. Moreover, unsecured debt is found to have 
a less detrimental association with their median income ratios than for the other groups, although 
at varying levels of significance. We also find evidence for an asymmetric impact of leverage on 
relative income, with greater declines in the median income ratio for female and young 
households. Moreover, lower estimates of extremely indebted households in the subsamples of 
women, Blacks, Hispanics, and the young suggest that these groups tend to be more indebted on 
average than their counterparts. Our results indicate that female, Black, Hispanic, and young 
households have become more dependent on debt and did not share the same improvements in 
their relative position in the income distribution arising from the ownership of assets as households 
headed by Whites, males, and those over 35. This gauges the impact of the absolute size of wealth 
holdings among these groups on generating higher returns to wealth compared to their 
counterparts. Consequently, households headed by females, Blacks, Hispanics, and aged below 35 
faced higher leverage levels on average, which pushed them further down the income distribution. 
The statistical significance of the estimated effects suggests that disparities in asset ownership and 
the resulting levels of indebtedness and leverage have significantly contributed to the deepening of 
the gender, racial, and intergenerational inequality, as argued in Chapter 1. 
4.3.4. Results by period 
In addition to examining the relationship between wealth components and relative income 
inequality across socio-demographic characteristics, we break down the pooled OLS analysis by 
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period. Table 4.6 presents results of the detailed balance sheet specification of the pooled OLS 
regression estimated separately between 1989-1998, 2001-2007, and 2010-2013. The first period 
corresponds to the pre-subprime lending years, when growth in the private household debt was 
rising steadily (see Figure 1.10 in Chapter 1). The second period is associated with the acceleration 
of the subprime lending in the USA and the corresponding housing bubble (see Figure 1.12 in 
Chapter 1). The third period captures the post-crisis conditions, namely the fall in the aggregate 
household debt relative to the GDP. We expect that the impact of the relative holdings of the 
different types of assets and liabilities has changed over time, investigating statistically significant 
differences across estimates at 5% level between 1989-1998 and 2001-2007, as well as between 
2001-2007 and 2010-2013. As in the case of the socio-demographic characteristics, we only 
describe results for the wealth composition variables and leverage, although the remaining 
estimates are displayed in Table 4.6. Estimates in bold indicate statistical difference across 
coefficients at 5% level according to the °2 test. 
Among the asset composition variables, there is no statistically significant difference across 
subperiods in the estimates of the relative holdings of primary residence, vehicles and other non-
financial assets, transaction accounts, and retirement and insurance assets. In contrast, the positive 
impact of a greater share of business equity and financial investment assets in total holdings has 
increased significantly in the subprime period. A one-percentage point rise in the relative holdings 
of business equity was associated with a 3.2 percentage point increase in the median income ratio 
in 2001-2007, which is significantly higher at 5% level that the estimate of 1.8 between 1989-
1998. Similarly, the impact of a one-percentage point increase in the share of financial investment 
assets in total holdings on the median income ratio increased from 1.9 to 3.7 percentage points 
between the pre-subprime period and the subprime lending boom era. This reflects how the 
expansion and securitisation of subprime lending translated into higher returns and capital income 
increases for the holders of business equity and high-yielding financial assets. 
Furthermore, the positive effect of a greater share of debt secured by other real estate in total 
liabilities rose significantly from 1.4 percentage points in the pre-subprime period to 2.9 in the 
subprime boom era. While we observe a parallel rise in the estimate of the relative holdings of 
mortgages secured by primary residence between these two periods from 0.08 (not statistically 
different from zero) to 0.5 (significant at 1% level), the difference is estimated not to be 
statistically significant at 5% level. This reflects the looser lending conditions in the subprime 
period, particularly in terms of mortgage lending. Moreover, we find that the effect of unsecured 
debt holdings on the median ratio did not change significantly over time.  
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In contrast, the post-crisis period marks a statistically significant decline in the negative 
impact of leverage on relative income. A one-percentage point increase in the debt-payments-to-
income ratio was associated with a 2-percentage point decrease in the median income ratio in 
2010-2013. This is lower in absolute terms than the estimate of -17 in the subprime era and 
signifies an increased role of leverage in determining the relative income ratio. This is paralleled 
by a rise in the relative income gap between extremely indebted households and those with the 
debt-service-to-income ratio below 40%, from 84.8 percentage points in the subprime boom era to 
110.5 in the post-crisis period.  
In addition to examining changes in the estimates of the balance sheet composition, we find 
that the estimated lower level of the median income ratio for Black and Hispanic households is 
explained by a large negative effect after the Great Recession. In the regression for 2010 and 2013, 
Blacks and Hispanics are estimated to have a 17.5 percentage point lower median income ratio 
compared to Whites and other ethnic groups, which is significant at 1% level. This is significantly 
different at 5% from the estimate of -1 and -1.7 between 1989-1989 and 2001-2007 respectively. 
Moreover, we observe that the goodness of fit of the proposed regression model according to the 
adjusted R2 and RMSE is the most accurate for the subprime lending years compared to the other 
subperiods. 
Comparing the above results with the quantile regression estimates, we observe that most of 
the coefficients are robust in terms of sign and significance. The pooled OLS estimates tend to be 
higher in magnitude than the quantile regression results. Unlike in the pooled OLS, the quantile 
regression coefficient of the relative holdings of primary residence is not statistically different 
from zero between 2001-2007, while the estimate of vehicles is statistically significant over 2010-
2013. Moreover, the quantile regression coefficients of the relative holdings of financial 
investment and retirement and insurance assets are not statistically significant between 1989-1998. 
In addition, the coefficient of the relative holdings of transaction accounts is negative in all periods 
in the quantile regression, compared to the positive pooled OLS estimates. Furthermore, the 
coefficients of the relative holdings of instalment and credit card debt, and the debt-service-to-
income ratio are not statistically different from zero between 1989-1998 and 2001-2007. In 
contrast, unlike in the pooled OLS, the estimates of the debt-to-income ratio and the debt-to-asset 
ratio are statistically significant at 1% level in the quantile regression in all periods. While the 
value of the coefficient of the debt-to-income ratio is close to zero, the estimate of the debt-to-
asset ratio increases overtime from 0 in 1989-1998 to -1.9 in 2010-2013. Lastly, among household 
characteristics we observe differences in the pooled OLS and the quantile regression estimates for 
age, educational attainment, marital status, and the number of children. 
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Overall, analysis of the results of the pooled OLS regression across subperiods shows that 
while most of the estimates remain consistent in terms of their sign and significance across 
subperiods, the impact of balance sheet composition on relative inequality has changed over time. 
This is particularly vivid in terms of the increased effect of the relative holdings of business 
equity, financial investment assets, and debt secured by other real estate on the median income 
ratio in the subprime era. This is consistent with the finding of the stock-flow consistent model 



















      
 
Table 4.6 Pooled OLS and quantile regression results by period 


















Age 7.75*** 6.79*** 8.18*** 8.57***  3.99*** 4.35*** 3.64 3.89*** 
 (0.407) (0.763) (0.771) (0.686)  (0.001) (0.000) (0) (0.001) 
Age squared -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.07***  -0.04*** -0.038*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Educational attainment 17.70*** 15.51*** 19.05*** 20.75***  8.74*** 8.16 9.01 9.48*** 
 (0.435) (0.715) (0.762) (0.806)  (0.001) (0) (0) (0.003) 
Female -20.47*** -21.81*** -20.68** -18.98***  -14.60*** -17.10*** -13.50*** -10.70*** 
 (4.689) (7.557) (10.080) (4.581)  (0.005) (0.003) (0.080) (0.014) 
Black/Hispanic -5.79*** -1.02 -1.76 -17.79***  -5.77*** -7.24*** -3.61*** -7.83*** 
 (1.648) (2.669) (2.989) (3.429)  (0.003) (0.005) (0.117) (0.009) 
Single -69.71*** -61.24*** -72.83*** -74.32***  -47.70*** -45.00 -48.80 -51.00*** 
 (5.174) (8.262) (10.770) (5.869)  (0.006) (0) (0) (0.014) 
Number of children 18.23*** 8.72*** 23.97*** 27.02***  7.64*** 5.23*** 11.10 6.85*** 
 (2.047) (3.008) (3.671) (4.649)  (0.003) (0.006) (0) (0.011) 
Number of children squared -2.38*** -0.87 -3.72*** -3.23***  -1.48*** -1.06*** -02.23 -1.04*** 
 (0.473) (0.673) (0.860) (0.966)  (0.001) (0.001) (0) (0.003) 
Self-employed 63.91*** 68.90*** 52.51*** 68.64***  0.76*** 3.20*** 4.46*** -4.05*** 
 (7.178) (11.210) (10.740) (15.750)  (0.011) (0.020) (0.432) (0.032) 
Out of labour force -38.09*** -36.71*** -33.65*** -43.10***  -27.80*** -25.80 -28.00*** -28.50*** 
 (3.551) (5.264) (7.444) (5.741)  (0.005) (0) (0.112) (0.008) 
Primary residence -0.67*** -0.66*** -0.64*** -0.61**  -0.42*** -0.40*** -0.39 -0.45*** 
 (0.113) (0.150) (0.230) (0.263)  (0.012) (0.009) (0) (0.023) 
Vehicles -0.08 -0.23 0.06 0.14  -0.40*** -0.36 -0.36 -0.45*** 
 (0.109) (0.144) (0.228) (0.270)  (0.013) (0) (0) (0.028) 
Business equity 2.64*** 1.80*** 3.23*** 3.63***  0.31*** 0.15*** 0.42*** 0.54*** 
 (0.202) (0.297) (0.350) (0.471)  (0.054) (0.050) (1.01) (0.146) 
Financial investment assets 2.87*** 1.85*** 3.64*** 3.77***  0.23*** 0.16 0.35*** 0.39*** 
 (0.184) (0.248) (0.409) (0.393)  (0.017) (0) (0.345) (0.039) 
Transaction accounts 0.42*** 0.02 0.60** 0.95***  -0.26*** -0.25*** -0.17*** -0.31*** 
 (0.130) (0.144) (0.269) (0.329)  (0.012) (0.010) (0.358) (0.028) 
Retirement and insurance assets 0.37*** 0.26* 0.33 0.61**  0.24*** 0.16 0.30*** 0.35*** 
 (0.113) (0.154) (0.241) (0.254)  (0.014) (0) (0.288) (0.033) 
Debt secured by primary residence 0.33** 0.08 0.49** 0.63***  0.59*** 0.64*** 0.57 0.67*** 
 (0.158) (0.270) (0.192) (0.234)  (0.011) (0.008) (0) (0.040) 
Debt secured by other real estate 2.16*** 1.36*** 2.91*** 2.59***  1.11*** 1.12*** 1.29*** 1.04*** 




















          
Instalment debt -0.83*** -0.93*** -0.74*** -0.77***  0.01*** 0.05 -0.03 0.05*** 
 (0.150) (0.264) (0.161) (0.202)  (0.010) (0) (0) (0.039) 
Credit card balances -0.97*** -1.07*** -0.92*** -0.90***  -0.04*** -0.01 -0.08 0.04*** 
 (0.151) (0.268) (0.161) (0.208)  (0.012) (0) (0) (0.040) 
Debt-service-to-income ratio (DSY) -3.50** -10.91** -16.07*** -1.93**  -11.40*** -15.70 -13.50 -4.07*** 
 (1.495) (4.798) (3.254) (0.985)  (0.015) (0) (0) (0.012) 
DSY>40% -96.49*** -85.63*** -82.47*** -105.90***  -47.10*** -45.50 -43.30*** -43.20*** 
 (3.030) (5.133) (7.949) (6.937)  (0.011) (0) (0.141) (0.015) 
Debt-to-asset ratio -0.00 -0.04 -0.00 -0.00  -0.00*** 0.00*** -1.01*** -1.86*** 
 (0.001) (0.033) (0.003) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.037) (0.004) 
Debt-to-income ratio -0.01 -0.00 -0.69 -1.05  0.00* -0.0172*** 0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.444) (0.928) (2.395) (1.381)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1989 (base year) (base) (base)    (base) (base)   
          
1992 -18.44*** -18.02***    -2.74*** -1.75***   
 (6.630) (6.617)    (0.006) (0.006)   
1995 -22.91*** -23.90***    -10.70*** -9.71   
 (6.522) (6.521)    (0.005) (0)   
1998 -20.75*** -18.87***    -11.50*** -9.75***   
 (7.031) (7.135)    (0.010) (0.005)   
2001 -10.38  (base)   -12.00***  (base)  
 (8.039)     (0.006)    
2004 -19.06***  -7.56   -14.50***  -2.01***  
 (6.578)  (5.654)   (0.008)  (0.113)  
2007 -5.60  5.64   -14.00***  -1.30***  
 (6.749)  (6.272)   (0.007)  (0.125)  
2010 -10.56   (base)  -11.80***   (base) 
 (6.671)     (0.007)    
2013 2.31   13.42***  -10.30***   1.03*** 
 (6.868)   (4.883)  (0.005)   (0.007) 
Constant -223.50*** -134.20*** -285.00*** -338.30***  -52.00*** -56.6 -59.4 -73.5*** 
 (22.160) (32.680) (35.920) (39.310)  (0.021) (0) (0) (0.071) 
          
Observations 30,219 11,322 9,856 9,041  30,219 11,322 9,856 9,041 
Adjusted R-squared* 0.065 0.045 0.091 0.075  0.219 0.226 0.221 0.214 
Root Mean Squared Error 541.6 570.4 484.0 569.7      
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.190 
Note: Pairs of estimates in bold indicate that the difference between coefficients of 1989-98 and 2001-07 as well as 2001-07 and 2010-13 regressions is statistically significant at 5% level. 
*Due to methodological assumptions of the quantile regression, we report the pseudo-R
2
 for the quantile regression and the adjusted R
2
 for the pooled OLS regression. 
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4.3.5. Non-parametric sensitivity analysis 
The pooled OLS estimation finds that greater relative holdings of business equity, financial 
investment assets, and secured debt are associated with higher position of a household in the 
distribution of income relative to the median. In contrast, greater reliance on primary residence, 
transaction accounts, and unsecured debt pushes household income away from the median towards 
the bottom of the distribution. The statistical significance of these estimates indicates that the 
implication of the stock-flow model developed in Chapter 3, namely that household wealth 
heterogeneity increases inequality, is empirically validated. Moreover, we find that the magnitude 
of the positive effects of the relative ownership of business equity and financial investment assets 
was boosted in the subprime lending era between 2001-2007, and has not been shared equally 
across gender, race, and generations. Instead, debt composition and leverage are found to be 
associated with higher increases in the relative position along the income distribution of these 
groups. This is consistent with the discussion of the Post-Keynesian analyses of consumption in 
Chapter 2, which linked the increasing indebtedness of women, ethnic minorities, and the young to 
wealth disparities arising due to the processes of securitisation and subprime lending. Similar 
finding is observed for the typical median household in the quantile regression, whose estimates 
tend to be of lower magnitudes compared to the pooled OLS regression, particularly for the 
relative holdings of primary residence and transaction accounts. 
In this section we evaluate the sensitivity of these findings to the assumptions of the 
regression method. We argue that while the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances carries the benefit 
of a detailed analysis of household wealth, the complexity of the data structure results in a likely 
violation of many of the standard regression assumptions regarding endogeneity and non-spherical 
errors. Software limitations restrict the possibility of using traditional methods addressing these 
issues. Moreover, the OLS methodology relying on mean averages in calculating the estimates 
may inflate some coefficients due to its sensitivity to the extreme values of wealth. Thus, to 
provide a robustness check to the pooled OLS and the quantile regression results, we compare 
these estimates with results of the non-parametric Theil-Slope median ratio.  
The Theil-Sen median slope is defined as the median of all slopes calculated between each 
pairs of datapoints of any two variables64 (Theil 1950; Sen 1968). Its interpretation is similar to the 
regression coefficient as the unit change in the outcome variable given a unit increment in the 
predictor variable. The difference between the non-parametric and the regression-based slope is 
                                                   
64
 The analysis is conducted using STATA package censlope developed by Newson (2006). 
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that the non-parametric gradient is based on the calculation of a rank parameter rather than the 
conditional distribution estimation. It thus avoids problems associated with the violation of the 
assumptions regarding the error term, which are likely to be encountered in a complex dataset such 
as the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances (Granato 2006). Moreover, the Theil-Sen median slope 
is by definition more robust to outliers than the OLS estimates. 
To gauge the preciseness of the median slope estimates, we report confidence intervals65 
which are robust to differences in the conditional population distribution of the median income 
ratio (e.g. its unequal variance), given the different values of our explanatory variables (Newson 
2012). 
Given the outcome variable Y, the predictor variable X, and a proportion q (0,1) The 
Theil-Sen median slope is defined as ! in equation 4.2: 
 " # − !%, % = 1 − 2*       (4.2) 
Where " is a rank correlation coefficient Somers’ D (Somers 1962) and q=0.566,67. Given the 
definition of Somers’ D D(Y|X), the Theil-Sen median slope satisfies the following property 
(equation 4.3): 
1 − 2(0.5) 	= 1 # − !% %          
0 = Pr #4 − !%4 < #6 − !%6 − Pr #4 − !%4 > #6 − !%6  
 Pr	[(#6 − #4)/(%6 − %4) < !)] = Pr	[(#6 − #4)/(%6 − %4) > !)]  (4.3) 
This means that a pairwise slope (Y2–Y1)/(X2–X1), where Y1<Y2 and X1<X2, is equally 
likely to be above or below !. We assume that the Theil-Sen median slope follows the t-
distribution. 
                                                   
65
 Due to the construction of the censlope module, confidence intervals for the Theil-Sen median slope 
are calculated using the jackknife standard errors. The main difference between the two methods is that 
the jackknife procedure is less computationally intensive compared to the bootstrapping technique as it 
uses less replicates (cf. Schiel 2011). 
66
 The alternative parameter which is more commonly used in the rank defining literature is the 
Spearman correlation coefficient (Spearman 1904). However, it is not suitable to be analysed in the 
survey data setting, and its confidence intervals are less reliable and interpretable (Kendall/Gibbons 
1990). The main difference between the Spearman coefficient and Somers D is that the former is 
calculated as the product-moment correlation between the cumulative distribution functions of two 
variables rather than the probabilities of concordance/discordance (see next footnote; Newson 2001). 
67
 Given two random variables U and V, Somers’ D D(U|V) is a conditional probability of concordance 
or discordance between two ordered pairs of U and V (U1, U2) and (V1,V2), where U1<U2 and V1<V2 
(Newson 2001:2). U and V are concordant if the larger of the two values of U is associated with a 
greater value of V, and they are discordant if the larger U-value is related to a smaller of the two values 
of V. Similarly to other correlation coefficients D(U|V) (-1,1). 
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The additional advantage of this non-parametric approach is the ability to evaluate the 
relationship between relative inequality and the relative holdings of assets and liabilities which had 
to be excluded from the regression model due to the multicollinearity issues associated with the 
construction of the balance sheet composition variables. This include the share of other property in 
total assets, as well as the shares of other unsecured lines of credit and other debt in total liabilities. 
Table 4.7 presents estimates of the Theil-Sen median slope for the balance sheet 
composition variables and the socio-economic controls in the whole sample. We describe the 
results for balance sheet composition variables, comparing the non-parametric slope with the OLS 
and the quantile regression estimates. The robustness analysis reveals consistency in the direction 
of the relationship estimated in the pooled OLS regression across majority of the balance sheet 
composition variables. Exceptions include estimates for the relative holdings of primary residence, 
debt-service-to-income ratio, debt-to-asset ratio, and debt-to-income ratio, which are positive. 
Similarly, the median slope of the relative transaction asset holdings is positive (unlike in the 
quantile regression). Among socio-economic controls, all of the median slope estimates apart from 
age and the number of children squared are consistent in sign with the earlier estimation methods. 
We find a negative non-parametric association between age and the median income ratio, while 
the median slope of the number of children squared is positive.  
In terms of variables which are excluded from the regression analysis, the median slope 
estimate of the relative holdings of other property shows that a one-percentage point rise in the 
share of this asset in total holdings is associated with a 2.9 percentage point increase in the median 
income ratio. The magnitude of this effect is higher compared to the greater relative holdings of 
primary residence and vehicles, and is closer to the impact of business equity and financial 
investment assets. In addition, debt variables excluded from the regression analysis are found to be 
positively related to the median income ratio in terms of the median slope. A one-percentage point 
rise in the share of other unsecured lines of credit it total debt is associated with a 1.2 percentage 
point increase in the median income ratio, while a parallel increase in the relative holdings of other 
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Table 4.7 Theil-Sen median slope 
Median income ratio 
Theil-Sen 
median slope 







   
Socio-economic controls     
Age -0.11 -0.12 -0.01  7.75 3.99 
Age squared -0.00 -0.00 -0.00  -0.06 -0.04 
Educational attainment 14.15 14.06 14.23  17.70 8.74 
Female -65.05 -65.56 -64.47  -20.47 -14.60 
Black/Hispanic -40.71 -40.98 -40.51  -5.79 -5.77 
Single -76.38 -76.95 -75.87  -69.71 -47.70 
Number of children 13.19 13.13 13.27  18.23 7.64 
Number of children squared 5.15 5.11 5.17  -2.38 -1.48 
Self-employed 50.04 49.81 50.47  63.91 0.76 
Out of labour force -54.40 -54.53 -54.30  -38.09 -27.80 
       
Share of total assets       
Primary residence 0.23 0.23 0.24  -0.67 -0.42 
Other property 2.95 2.93 2.97  (omitted) 
Vehicles and other non-financial assets -0.48 -0.49 -0.47  -0.08 -0.40 
Business equity 3.05 3.02 3.08  2.64 0.31 
Financial investment assets 2.66 2.61 2.71  2.87 0.23 
Transaction accounts 0.20 0.19 0.21  0.42 -0.26 
Retirement and insurance assets 2.88 2.84 2.91  0.37 0.24 
       
Share of total debt       
Debt secured by primary residence 0.74 0.73 0.74  0.33 0.59 
Debt secured by other property 2.38 2.35 2.40  2.16 1.11 
Instalment debt -0.43 -0.44 -0.43  -0.83 0.01 
Credit card balances -0.39 -0.40 -0.39  -0.97 -0.04 
Other unsecured lines of credit 1.23 1.19 1.27  (omitted) 
Other debt 0.24 0.21 0.27  (omitted) 
       
Leverage measures       
Debt-service-to-income ratio (DSY) 109.99 109.50 110.49  -3.50 -11.40 
DSY > 40% -31.38 -31.83 -31.01  -96.49 -47.10 
Debt-to-asset ratio 27.59 27.19 27.99  -0.00 0.00 
Debt-to-income ratio 22.91 22.80 23.01  -0.01 -0.00 
Note: Confidence intervals are constructed using the jackknife standard errors. 
 
In addition to the whole sample, we analyse robustness of the linear regression analysis by 
subgroup. Table A3.3 in Appendix III compares the Theil-Sen median slopes across gender, race, 
generations, and subperiods. We find that most of the estimates are robust in terms of their sign 
and significance, and the relative size between subgroups. Similarly to the whole sample median 
slopes, we find that the coefficients of the debt-service-to-income ratio, the debt-to-asset ratio, the 
debt-to-income ratio, and the relative holdings of primary residence are positive in the non-
parametric estimation, compared to the negative regression coefficients. Moreover, the Theil-Sen 
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median slope of the relative holdings of retirement and insurance assets is positive for the 
subsample of Blacks/Hispanics and in each subperiod (compared to the generally negative 
regression coefficients). Similarly, the median slope of the relative holdings of transaction 
accounts is positive across gender and generations compared to the negative regression estimates. 
We also find that the median slope of the relative holdings of vehicles is positive for the 
subsample of women, while the regression estimates are negative. Furthermore, unlike the 
regression coefficients, the estimated median slopes of the relative holdings of financial 
investment assets and transaction accounts are found to be greater among Blacks/Hispanics than 
for Whites/Other ethnicities. We also observe the non-parametric estimates of the relative holdings 
of instalment debt, as well as credit card balances for gender and subperiods to be negative 
compared to the positive regression coefficients. Moreover, among the socio-economic controls, 
we find the median slope of age to be negative across race, for households younger than 35, and 
over 1989-1998 and 2001-2007, compared to the positive regression coefficients. 
Among variables not included in the regression analysis, we find that a one-percentage point 
increase in the relative holdings of other property has a larger impact on the relative position in the 
income distribution of 3 percentage points for males, Whites/Other ethnicities, and households 
aged 35 and above. This effect is estimated to be lower at 1.1 percentage points for female 
households, 2 percentage points for Blacks/Hispanics, and 1.5 percentage points for households 
younger than 35. Moreover, we observe overall positive effects of the greater relative holdings of 
the other types of debt on the median income ratio. These are estimated to be higher at 
approximately 1-2 percentage points for the other unsecured lines of credit, and 0.3-0.5 for other 
debt in the subsamples of males, Whites/Other ethnicities, households aged 35 and above, and 
over 1989-1998, while the median slopes for the remaining subgroups are estimated to be below 1. 
In sum, the sensitivity analysis using the non-parametric estimation of the Theil-Sen median 
slope supports our main finding regarding the asymmetric impact of the balance sheet composition 
on relative income inequality. We observe larger differences in the estimated values between the 
OLS and the quantile regression results, while the median slope coefficients of the non-parametric 
approach are more consistent with the OLS estimates. The greatest disparities between these two 
methods are found for the share of primary residence in total assets and the debt-service-to-income 
ratio, both of which have opposite signs to the regression estimates. In addition, the non-
parametric median slope estimation allows us to account for the impact of the relative holdings of 
other property, other unsecured lines of credit, and other debt, which are excluded from the 
regression analysis due to multicollinearity issues. We find that these balance sheet items are 
positively associated with the median income ratio. 




The linear regression analysis established a statistically significant relationship between household 
wealth heterogeneity and relative income inequality using the nine waves of the U.S. Survey of 
Consumer Finances between 1989 and 2013. We confirmed the finding of the stock-flow 
consistent model which stated that balance sheet heterogeneity influenced inequality by generating 
unequal flows of capital income related to the returns to wealth dependent on the absolute size of 
wealth holdings. Moreover, we tested this conclusion across the social dimensions of inequality, 
finding that debt composition and leverage contribute more than asset holdings to the relative 
position of households headed by women, Blacks/Hispanics, and the young in the income 
distribution. The originality of our analysis was to apply the existing estimation methods in a new 
way to establish a significant empirical link between balance sheet composition and relative 
income inequality, highlighting its intersectional dimension. Nevertheless, the issues of 
endogeneity, omitted variable bias, and non-spherical residuals may pose problems to the 
consistency and unbiasedness of our estimates. 
We showed that greater reliance on primary residence, unsecured debt, and higher leverage 
in household balance sheets was significantly associated with lower position in the income 
distribution relative to the median. In contrast, greater contribution of financial investment assets, 
business equity, and secured debt to total asset and debt holdings respectively was significantly 
associated with higher relative position in the income distribution. However, these effects were 
significantly smaller for households headed by women, Blacks/Hispanics, and the young. We 
found that the magnitude of the positive effects of the relative holdings of business equity and 
financial investment assets increased in the subprime lending boom era between 2001-2007 
compared to the period 1989-1998. Thus, we supported the proposition of the stock-flow 
consistent model from Chapter 3 that the impact of household wealth composition on inequality 
was magnified by the processes of securitisation and subprime lending in that period.  
Most of these results were found to be robust in terms of significance and sign when 
compared to the estimates of the non-parametric Theil-Sen median slope and the quantile 
regression. Results of the Theil-Sen median slope estimation showed that the magnitudes of the 
majority of the pooled OLS estimates were not substantially influenced by extreme values or 
problems with the regression assumptions about the error term. Some notable exceptions included 
the relative holdings of primary residence, mortgages secured by primary residence, and the debt-
service-to-income ratio, whose effects on relative inequality were higher when estimated by the 
median slopes. 
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Moreover, the lower values of the asset composition variables estimated in the quantile 
regression suggested that the magnitudes of the positive effects of greater relative asset holdings 
were stronger for households towards the top of the income distribution. Conversely, relative 
income in the quantile regression was found to be significantly increased by the greater relative 
holdings of instalment loans, which lowered the household position in the income distribution in 
the pooled OLS estimation. Moreover, the negative effect of higher leverage on relative income 
was magnified in the quantile regression, being particularly detrimental for the bottom quintile. 
Overall, the estimated asymmetric magnitudes of the balance sheet composition variables 
indicated that the increases in relative income due to the greater relative holdings of assets 
(particularly business equity and financial investment assets) were higher among households 
headed by men, Whites, and those over 35 years old. Based on the analysis in Chapter 1, we 
observed that these groups owned higher levels of wealth between 1989-2013. Consequently, we 
confirm that the size of the payoffs from owning particular types of wealth are related to the 
absolute value of wealth holdings. This is also evident in the higher magnitudes of the mean-based 
OLS estimates compared to the median quantile regression, and the higher quantile regression 
coefficients of asset composition for the 90th percentile.  
In sum, having established the statistical significance of our research hypothesis formalised 
in the stock-flow consistent model in Chapter 3, in the next section we decompose income and 
wealth inequality by their components. The inequality decomposition analysis allows us to assess 
the relative contribution of the different balance sheet items to inequality. Moreover, it facilitates 
the examination of the role of wealth composition in influencing inequality across gender, race, 
and generations, which was highlighted by the Post-Keynesian analysis of consumption discussed 
in Chapter 2 but could not be incorporated into the stock-flow consistent model due to its 
aggregation. Simultaneously, we can test the validity of the proposed conceptualisation of the 
household sector in the Chapter 3 model by decomposing the wealth and income gap between 
different parts of the income distribution by wealth components and the associated income 
sources. 
4.4. Inequality decomposition analysis 
In the previous section we established the statistical significance of the impact of balance sheet 
composition on relative inequality, finding substantial asymmetric effects across the distribution, 
gender, race, and generations, particularly in terms of the relative holdings of business equity, 
financial investment assets, unsecured debt, and leverage. This part of the chapter aims to formally 
assess the contribution of different assets and liabilities and their associated income flows to the 
overall measures of income and wealth inequality. We thus evaluate the implication of the earlier 
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stock-flow consistent model regarding the role of the specific patterns of wealth accumulation in 
driving the overall measures of inequality analysed in the model, arising due to disparities in the 
returns to wealth and leverage across households determined by the absolute size of wealth 
holdings. Moreover, we address the limitation of the stock-flow consistent model regarding its 
inability to incorporate the intersectional dimension of inequality by explicitly focusing on the 
determinants of income and wealth distribution across gender, race, and generations. In addition, 
by decomposing the wealth and income gap between the different parts of the income distribution, 
we gauge the validity of the proposed balance sheet composition underpinning the three-class 
conceptualisation of households in the model in Chapter 3. 
The inequality decomposition analysis is conducted in three parts to account for the impact 
of the components of income and wealth as well as the socio-economic characteristics of 
households. Firstly, we apply the Shorrocks (1982) factor decomposition, which typically 
compares variance of the income factor sources to the variance of total income68. The main 
innovation of our analysis is to extend the decomposition approach to examine the contribution of 
factor sources to wealth inequality. Secondly, Fields’s (2003) regression-based decomposition is 
utilised to analyse the variance of income and wealth relative to their factor sources controlling for 
socio-economic characteristics of households69. Thirdly, we undertake a comprehensive analysis 
of the determinants of income and wealth disparities across gender, race, generations, as well as 
between specific parts of the income distribution using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition70. The 
chapter concludes with a comparative evaluation of the regression techniques and the non-
parametric methods as tools to analyse inequality through the lens of household wealth 
composition, arguing that endogeneity problems pose a persistent problem in the regression-based 
analyses.  
The main advantage of the decomposition analysis is the possibility to directly evaluate the 
contribution of each type of asset and debt and their related income flows to wealth and income 
inequality. For this reason, the inequality decomposition analysis is conducted separately for 
income and wealth, each broken down by its factor source. Income is decomposed into wages and 
capital income earned on different types of wealth (business income, capital gains or losses, 
taxable and non-taxable interest and dividend income, social security and pension income), as well 
                                                   
68
 Shorrocks decomposition is implemented in STATA using package ineqfac developed by Jenkins 
(2009). 
69
 Fields regression-based decomposition is implemented using STATA module ineqrbd developed by 
Fiorio/Jenkins (2008). 
70
 Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is analysed using STATA module oaxaca developed by Jann (2008). 
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as income from transfers and other sources. Moreover, net wealth is broken down into non-
financial assets (primary residence, other real estate, business equity, vehicles and other non-
financial assets), financial assets (transaction accounts, financial investment assets, retirement and 
insurance assets), as well as secured debt (mortgages secured by primary residence and by other 
property), unsecured debt (instalment loans, credit card balances, and other unsecured lines of 
credit), and other debt from miscellaneous sources.  
Unlike in the linear regression analysis in the previous section, the balance sheet variables in 
the decomposition analysis are presented in terms of their absolute magnitudes rather than shares 
in total holdings. This is because the statistical techniques underpinning inequality decomposition 
do not encounter the problem of the trivial association between the absolute values of income and 
balance sheet items encountered in the regression analysis. Moreover, the contribution of 
disparities in the absolute values to the overall inequality measures is more easily interpretable in 
the decomposition method than the balance sheet composition variables constructed in the linear 
regression analysis. 
The reason for applying more than one decomposition approach in our analysis is that each 
technique sheds light on the different drivers of inequality. The use of multiple decomposition 
techniques is common in the inequality decomposition literature (Thompson/Suarez 2015; 
Brewer/Wren-Lewis 2016). Non-parametric methods such as the Shorrocks decomposition 
examine which components contribute the most to inequality of an additive concept of income and 
wealth. Thus, they provide an exhaustive and consistent insight into factor decomposition, 
avoiding assumptions about the error term of the data generating process. On the other hand, if any 
of the components are correlated, the non-parametric methods cannot evaluate which factor is 
more important (Brewer/Wren-Lewis 2016:292). This is addressed using the multivariate 
regression-based decomposition of Fields (2003), where all factors are considered simultaneously 
and income/wealth are derived conditionally rather than additively. Moreover, the Fields 
regression-based approach can assess the impact of other factors on inequality, such as the socio-
economic characteristics of households, which is not possible in the additive non-parametric 
method. However, while accounting for the overall contribution of the socio-economic variables to 
inequality, the Fields regression-based decomposition cannot evaluate which factors contribute 
more to inequality across subgroups. To answer this question, subgroup decomposition methods 
such as the Oaxaca-Blinder approach are applied. 
4.4.1. Shorrocks decomposition 
To quantify the contribution of wealth composition and its associated income flows to income and 
wealth inequality, we use Shorrocks (1982) decomposition. It allows us to test the implication of 
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the stock-flow consistent model from Chapter 3 by evaluating the extent to which the proposed 
heterogeneity of wealth contributes to inequality. 
The decomposition method developed by Shorrocks (1982) has been traditionally applied to 
analyse income (Schmid 1994; Heshmati 2004; Frassdorf et al. 2011; Brewer/Wren-Lewis 2016). 
This approach breaks down the level of inequality in a given period according to a natural 
decomposition rule where total income is a sum of its factor components (Cowell/Fiorio 
2011:514). It is non-parametric as it does not consider the distribution of income conditional on its 
factors.  
An important property of the Shorrocks decomposition is that it is invariant to the measure 
of inequality used (ibid.). Assuming that total income Y is the sum of a k number of components Yk 
(equation 4.4), inequality measure I(Y) can be divided into k components Sk corresponding to the 
absolute contribution of each income factor to inequality (equation 4.5; Fields 2003). 
# = 	 #;
;
;<4          (4.4)  
 =(#) = 	 >;( #;; @)
;
;<4        (4.5) 
The relative factor inequality weight sk (equation 4.6) is the proportionate contribution of 
inequality in each factor Sk to the overall inequality measure I(Y). Assuming that the inequality 
measure I(Y) is symmetric, continuous, and would be equal to zero if all members of the 
population received the same amount of income (Fields 2003), the relative factor inequality weight 
sk can be expressed as the ratio of the covariance of the total income and the k-th income 
component to the variance of total income (equation 4.7; Brewer/Wren-Lewis 2016). Inequality 








         (4.7) 
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;<4 = 1         (4.8) 
For this property to hold it is additionally assumed that the amount of inequality attributable 
to any one factor is not dependent on how the remaining factors are grouped, and that any two 
factors whose distributions are proportionate to each other should yield the same value of the 
relative contribution to inequality (ibid.). 
The above assumptions are fulfilled by most of the inequality measures conventionally used 
in the literature, such as the Gini index, the Atkinson index, the generalised entropy indices, the 
coefficient of variation, and centile measures (Fields 2003).  
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In the analysis below, we first decompose net worth inequality by its source. Then, the 
Shorrocks decomposition is applied to the inequality of income net of debt payments. The default 
inequality measure chosen for this analysis is the coefficient of variation, which was also used in 
the stock-flow consistent model in Chapter 3. The reason behind the choice of this indicator is its 
decomposability (see section 1.1. in Chapter 1) and ability to encompass both income and wealth, 
resulting in a more consistent comparison of inequality decomposition across these two concepts. 
Moreover, we report the mean share of each factor to the overall income or wealth and compare 
this to the inequality contribution of each component. 
Figure 4.2 below and Table A3.4 in Appendix III present results of the Shorrocks 
decomposition for net wealth. Because of the definition of net wealth, the contribution of debt to 
wealth inequality is negative, with higher absolute values signifying higher contribution to 
inequality. We find that secured debt contributed -0.9% to net wealth inequality in 1989, rising to -
1.5% in 2010 in absolute terms before settling back at -0.9% in 2013. The contribution of 
unsecured debt was -0.6% in 1989, peaking at -1.1% in 1992 and turning positive at 0.3% in 2013. 
The contribution of other debt fell in absolute terms from -0.2% in 1989 to -0.1% in 2013. 
Among non-financial assets, the contribution of business equity to the inequality of net 
worth increased from 48.5% in 1989 to 51.5% in 2013, while the contribution of other real estate 
fell from 21.9% to 6.5% in the same period. Primary residence contributed 4.7% to net worth 
inequality in 1989, peaking at 6% in 2004 before settling at 4.3% in 2013. The contribution of 
vehicles and other non-financial assets to net worth inequality fluctuated between 1%-3% in the 
period. 
Among financial assets, the contribution of financial investments assets to net wealth 
inequality rose from 18.8% in 1989 to 33.9% in 2001, falling to 28.7% in 2013. Transaction 
accounts were the second largest factor among the financial assets, contributing an average of 
3.2% to net worth inequality between 1989-2013, peaking at 5.5% in 1995. Finally, retirement and 
insurance assets increased their contribution to net wealth inequality from 2.3% in 1989 to 4.2% in 
2013. 
The contribution to inequality differs from the overall mean share of net wealth of the 
various assets and debt. Primary residence is estimated to be the largest component of net worth, 
with the share rising from 36.4% in 1989 to 38.4% in 2004 before decreasing to 32.2% in 2013. 
The share of business equity increased from 21.4% of net worth in 1989 to 23.2% in 2007, falling 
to 20.9% in 2013. The share of other real estate in net worth declined from approximately 15% in 
1989 and 1992 to 11.5% in 2013. Similarly, the share of vehicles and other non-financial assets in 
net worth decreased from 6.3% in 1989 to 4.5% in 2013. Among financial assets, the share of net 
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worth attributed to financial investments assets rose from 19.1% in 1989 to 26.5% in 2001, 
decreasing to 21.6% in 2013. In contrast, the share of retirement and insurance assets increased 
steadily from 9.3% in 1989 to 19.9% in 2013. The share of transaction accounts in net worth 
fluctuated between 4.4% and 6.6% in the period. Moreover, the share of secured debt in net worth 
increased in absolute terms from -10.6% in 1989 to -16.7% in 2010, falling to -14.2% in 2013. In 
contrast, the share of unsecured debt remained more stable, fluctuating between -2.2% to -3% in 
the period. Finally, the mean share of other debt in net worth more than doubled in absolute terms 
from -0.3% in 1989 to -0.7% in 1998, falling to -0.2% in 2013.  
Figure 4.2 Shorrocks decomposition for net wealth, USA 1989-2013 
 
The contribution of balance sheet variables to net wealth translated into income inequality 
through disparities in capital income. Figure 4.3 presents results of the Shorrocks inequality 
decomposition for income between 1989 and 2013. Overall, results show that business income, 
capital gains, and wages contributed the most to income inequality in the period. The contribution 
of business income fell from 58.7% in 1989 to 27% in 1998, after which it increased to 41.4% in 
2004 and declined again to an average of 30.9% between 2007-2013. Furthermore, the 
contribution of capital gains to income inequality was almost a third at 28.4% in 1989, falling to 
6.9% in 1995. While the data doesn’t allow us to decompose the contribution of capital gains 
further, we suspect that its observed fluctuations represent volatility of stock and house prices. 
Moreover, the contribution of disparities in wages to overall income inequality increased from 6% 
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Among the remaining income sources, the contribution of interest and dividend income to 
the overall income inequality increased from 6.1% in 1989 to 7.6% in 2013, peaking at 37.8% in 
1995. The contribution of social security and retirement income to income inequality rose from 
0.2% in 1989 to 0.6% in 2013, peaking at 1.3% in 2004. Furthermore, the contribution of transfer 
income decreased from 0.9% in 1989 to 0.4% in 2013, although it reached 16.4% and 26.7% in 
1992 and 1998 respectively. Finally, the contribution of debt payments increased from -0.3% in 
1989 to -0.8% in 2013 in absolute terms, peaking at -3.6% in 199271. Table A3.5 in Appendix III 
presents a more detailed breakdown of the contribution of debt to inequality, showing that among 
the various types of debt it is mortgage payments which contribute the most to inequality, followed 
by consumer debt and revolving debt payments (with the exception of the 1989 wave). 
As in the case of net worth, Panel B in Figure 4.3 shows that the contribution of the different 
income sources to inequality did not correspond to the mean share of each component to net 
income in our sample. The estimated mean shares were more stable over time than the relative 
factor inequality weights presented in Panel A in Figure 4.3. The share of wages in total net 
income increased from 73.9% in 1989 to 81.4% in 2004, declining to 71.2% in 2013. The share of 
business income in total net income rose from 12% in 1989 to 16.3% in 2007, falling to 14.8% in 
2013, while the share of interest and dividend income declined from 7.4% in 1989 to 3.9% in 
2013. The share of capital gains relative to income fluctuated more visibly in the period, peaking 
at 7.8% in 2007. In turn, the share of social security and retirement income in total net income 
grew from 9.3% in 1989 to 14.7% in 2013. The share of transfer and other income in total net 
income averaged 3.7% between 1989-2013, peaking at 9.9% in 1992. Finally, the share of 
mortgage payments rose in absolute terms from -8.3% in 1989 to -12% in 2007, falling to -9.4% in 
2013, while the share of consumer debt payments remained approximately constant at 4% over the 
period. The share of revolving debt payments increased in absolute terms from -0.8% in 1989 to -
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 Recall that decomposition here is conducted for income net of debt payments, hence debt contributes 
negatively to income inequality by definition. Hence, the greater the absolute value of the estimated 
contribution of debt, the higher its contribution to inequality. 
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Figure 4.3 Shorrocks decomposition for income, USA 1989-2013 
 
Overall, results of the Shorrocks decomposition reveal that assets, specifically business 
equity and financial investment assets, contribute more to wealth inequality than debt. This is 
connected with income inequality, which is estimated to be determined primarily by capital 
income flowing from business ownership and capital gains, and increasingly by wage income. 
In the next subsection, we apply the regression-based inequality decomposition of Fields 
(2003) to analyse how the above results hold when income and wealth are estimated conditionally 
rather than additively. In this way, we consider the correlated determinants of inequality associated 
with its social dimension, controlling for the impact of household socio-economic characteristics 
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4.4.2. Regression-based inequality decomposition 
The regression-based inequality decomposition (RBD) treats the factor components of income or 
wealth as explanatory variables in a regression model. It is based on Fields (2003), who draws 
from Shorrocks (1982) non-parametric decomposition. The advantage of a parametric 
decomposition such as RBD is its ability to consider the role of correlated factors such as 
household socio-economic characteristics in determining inequality, which cannot be included in 
the non-parametric additive method of Shorrocks (Heshmati 2004). 
The RBD technique follows the estimation of a linear regression model (equation 4.9) using 
OLS. At any point in time: 
 KL = !;M;,L + OL
P
;<Q         (4.9) 
Where zi is the natural logarithm of the dependent variable Zi for each observation (equation 
4.10), which in our analysis is either income or net wealth at the household level, xk,i is a set of 
explanatory variables which influence Zi, and ϵi is the residual term. 
 KL = ln	(TL)         (4.10) 
To maintain consistency with the earlier decomposition analysis, regressors correspond to 
the aforementioned sources of income and wealth. While the intercept is included in the linear 
regression, it is not used for the decomposition analysis as it is constant for each observation. 
Importantly, the residual contribution to inequality unexplained by the proposed regression model 
is included72. 
RBD assesses the contribution of the variance of each regressor times its corresponding 
coefficient squared, and the covariance between explanatory variables to the overall variance in 
the dependent variable. Similarly to the Shorrocks decomposition, RBD assesses the contribution 
of the regressors to inequality of the dependent variable by estimating the relative inequality 
weight sk for each explanatory variable. In fact, RBD is analogous to the Shorrocks decomposition 
when the product of each explanatory variable and its coefficient βkxk,i is considered as one factor 
(Brewer/Wren-Lewis 2016:294). Thus, the relative inequality weight sk of the estimated composite 
component !;M;,L can be expressed as the ratio of the covariance of that component with the mean 
dependent variable z to the estimated variance of z (4.11). 
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 An alternative approach to RBD not adopted in this chapter is to perform decomposition on the 
predicted regression, which evaluates the contribution of each right-hand side component of the 
regression equation to inequality in the predicted values of the dependent variable, omitting the error 
term.  






         (4.11) 
Thus, as in the Shorrocks decomposition, the underlying measure of inequality does not 
influence the result in the RBD method (Fields 2003). 
The majority of studies apply RBD to explain income inequality (cf. Heshmati 2004; 
Cowell/Fiorio 2011). The original feature of the analysis in this chapter is to extent RBD to 
analyse the determinants of wealth inequality, accounting for balance sheet variables and 
household characteristics. 
Table 4.8 presents results of the Fields decomposition for net wealth73. The residual 
component contributes more than one third to inequality in net wealth in each wave. Such 
significant contribution of the residual term to inequality of the dependent variable is common in 
the literature (cf. Brewer/Wren-Lewis 2016). The contribution of balance sheet variables was 
14.4% in 1989, rising to 15.5% in 2004, and decreasing to 12.9% in 2013. Household 
characteristic contributed 48.2% to wealth inequality in 1989, increasing to 50.3% in 2004, and 
falling to 47.7% in 2013. 
Among the balance sheet variables, results of the Fields decomposition uphold the finding 
that assets contribute more to inequality than debt established in the Shorrocks decomposition. The 
contribution of assets was 12.9% in 1989, and increased to 14.3% in 1995 before falling to 12.6% 
in 2013, while liabilities contributed 1.4% to wealth inequality in 1989, rising to around 2.7% in 
2004 and 2007. In 2013, the contribution of debt to wealth inequality fell to 0.3%74. 
Among assets, non-financial assets are found to contribute a greater portion to wealth 
inequality than financial assets, although the impact of non-financial assets fell from 11.9% in 
1989 to 9.8% in 2013. Primary residence contributed the most among non-financial assets over 
time, with the relative inequality weight of 10.7% in 1989, rising to 10.8% in 2010 after the crisis, 
and falling to 9.5% in 2013. Other real estate contributed an average of 0.3% to net wealth 
inequality between 1989-2013, peaking at 0.6% in 2007. Similarly, the contribution of vehicles 
and other non-financial assets to wealth inequality averaged 0.3% in the period. Moreover, the 
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 Note that in contrast to the non-parametric Shorrocks decomposition, where income and net wealth 
were constructed based on their additive definition as the sum of components, in the parametric 
decomposition we use the values of net wealth and total income provided in the dataset. 
74
 Because this method is based on the estimation of a conditional distribution of income and wealth, 
the contribution of debt is not negative by definition as in the case of the additive non-parametric 
decomposition. 
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contribution of business equity to wealth inequality decreased from 0.4% in 1989 to 0.1% in 2013, 
reaching 0.3% in 2007. 
In contrast to the declining influence of non-financial assets, financial assets became a 
greater driver of wealth inequality over time as their contribution rose from 1% in 1989 to 2.9% in 
2013, peaking at 3.5% in 2001. Retirement and insurance assets contributed the largest portion to 
net wealth inequality out of all the types of financial assets, with the relative inequality weight 
increasing from 1.3% in 1989 to 2.5% in 2013. Transaction accounts contributed an average of 
0.3% to wealth inequality in this period. Curiously, the relative inequality weight of financial 
investment assets was negative between 1989-1992 and in the crisis years 2007-2010, suggesting 
their alleviating effect on net wealth inequality. Over the whole period, however, the contribution 
of financial investment assets in determining wealth inequality increased from -0.6% in 1989 to 
0.3% in 2001, reaching 0.04% in 2013.  
Among the debt variables75, secured debt was a more important driver of wealth inequality 
in the period studied than unsecured debt. The relative inequality weight of secured debt rose from 
1.2% in 1989 to 3.1% in the crisis in 2007, declining to 0.4% in 2013. Debt secured by primary 
residence contributed 1% to wealth inequality in 1989, peaking at an average of 2.6% between 
2004-2007 before falling to -0.01% in 2013. In contrast, the contribution of debt secured by other 
property increased over time from 0.2% in 1989 to 0.4% in 2013, peaking at 0.7% in 2007. 
Unsecured debt contributed 0.5% to inequality in 1989, which declined -0.1% in 2013. The 
contribution of instalment debt and credit card balances averaged 0.1% and -0.05% respectively in 
this period. Finally, other debt contributed to reducing inequality between 1989-2013 at an average 
of -0.1%. 
Among the socio-economic characteristics of households, age and educational attainment 
have the largest impact on the overall net wealth inequality. The relative inequality weight of age 
decreased over time from 25% in 1989 to 19.8% in 2013, while the contribution of educational 
attainment rose from 17.2% to 22.8% in the same period. Differences in gender of the household 
head contributed 4.4% to income inequality in 1989, increasing to 5.3% in 2004 before falling to 
2.7% in 2013. Furthermore, the relative inequality weight of self-employment decreased from 
2.1% in 1989 to 1.8% in 2013. In contrast, the contribution of wealth disparities across race and 
marital status of the household head fluctuated at around 0% in the period. In contrast, differences 
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 Other lines of credit are excluded to avoid perfect collinearity problem among regressors in the 
regression equation. 
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in the number of children and labour force participation had an alleviating impact on wealth 
inequality between 1989-2013, averaging -0.9% and -0.3% respectively. 
Overall, the Fields decomposition shows that disparities in the balance sheet structures are a 
sizeable determinant of wealth inequality when household characteristics are accounted for and 
wealth is defined in conditional terms through a linear regression model. In contrast to the non-
parametric Shorrocks decomposition, primary residence is estimated to be a more important driver 
of inequality among the balance sheet variables than business equity and financial investment 
assets. 
We argue that the differences in balance sheet composition contributed to income inequality 
through generating unequal capital income and debt repayment flows.  Table 4.9 presents results 
of the multivariate regression-based decomposition for income. The residual term contributed an 
average of 13.7% to income inequality between 1989-2013, peaking at 24.1% in 1995. Income 
sources explained 20.1% of income inequality in 1989, which fell to 8.1% in 2013. Household 
characteristics determined more than two-thirds of income inequality in the period studied, with 
the contribution of 65.9% in 1989 rising to 74% in 2013. 
Unlike in the Shorrocks decomposition, in RBD it is wages rather than capital income that 
contributed more to inequality between 1989-2013. In fact, capital income is estimated to reduce 
inequality over time. In contrast, transfer income exacerbated inequality in the period, with the 
estimated negative relative inequality weight of -0.04% in 1989 rising to 0.8% in 2013. This 
indicates that income redistribution through transfers did not sufficiently alleviate income 
inequality in the period studied. 
The relative inequality weight of wage income was 21.4% in 1989, decreasing to 8.4% in 
2013, while capital income reduced income inequality by 1.3% in 1989, although this effect 
declined in absolute terms to -0.1% in 2001, reaching -1% in 2013. Each of the individual 
components of capital income contributed less than 1% in absolute terms to either exacerbating or 
alleviating inequality. The relative inequality weight of income from business ownership was 
negative in 1989 at -0.04%, but this increased from 1992 onwards, with a positive contribution to 
inequality of 0.9% in 2010-2013. Similarly, interest and dividend income reduced inequality by 
1% in 1989, and this effect declined to -0.06% in 2013. Furthermore, capital gains contributed 
0.5% to income inequality in 1989, which fell to 0.3% in 2013. However, between 1992-1995 and 
in 2010, the relative inequality weight of capital gains was marginally positive, indicating an 
exacerbating effect on income inequality. In contrast, the impact of social security and retirement 
income on reducing inequality increased over time, with the relative inequality weight rising in 
absolute terms from -0.7% in 1989 to over -2% in 2010 and 2013. 
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While the overall contribution of the individual income sources in the regression-based 
decomposition of income inequality fell in the period studied, the contribution of debt payments 
was increasing. It rose from 4.9% in 1989 to 5.6% in 2013, peaking at 5.9% in the crisis in 2007. 
Until 2001, it was payments of consumer debt that drove this increase. In 1989, consumer debt 
payments explained 3.5% of income inequality, decreasing to 0.5% in 2004 before reaching 2.1% 
in 2013. In contrast, the contribution of mortgage repayments to inequality rose from 1.5% in 1989 
to 3.3% in 2013, peaking at 3.9% in 2010. The contribution of revolving debt payments was 
around 0% in the period. 
Among household characteristics, educational attainment and gender of the household head 
had the highest positive contribution to inequality over time. The relative inequality weight of 
educational attainment declined from 67.4% in 1989 to 57.2% in 2013, while differences in 
income across gender of the household head explained 14.6% of income inequality in 1989, falling 
to 9.1% in 2013. Furthermore, the number of children and employment status had an exacerbating 
effect on income inequality in the period. The relative inequality weight of the number of children 
decreased from 9.5% in 1989 to 7.1% in 2013. The differences in income between employed 
households and those not working accounted for 7.6% of income inequality in 1989, peaking at 
12.3% in 2007 before falling to 8.8% in 2013. In contrast, the contribution of self-employment to 
income inequality over time was oscillating around 0%. Other socio-economic factors estimated to 
reduce inequality are age, marital status, and race of the household head. The relative inequality 
weight of age was -11.9% in 1989, rising in absolute terms to -12.3% in 1995. However, it turned 
positive in 2010 after the crisis, contributing 1.5% to income inequality in 2013, which signifies 
rising intergeneration income inequality over time. Similarly, the alleviating impact of marital 
status on inequality diminished over time. In 1989, the differences in income between single and 
married households reduced income inequality by 12.4%, but this effect fell to -2.7% in 2013. 
Similarly, income disparities between Blacks/Hispanics vs. Whites/other ethnicities reduced 
income inequality by 8.9% in 1989, decreasing to -7.7% in 2013. 
Overall, results of the Fields decomposition for income show that educational attainment, 
gender, and wage inequality were the main determinants of the overall income inequality between 
1989-2013 defined in conditional terms in a linear regression model, while age, race, marital 
status, and social security and retirement income were the main factors reducing inequality. 
Moreover, payments on mortgages and consumer debt are estimated to have contributed 
increasingly to income inequality in the period. Household characteristics are estimated to 
contribute more to income than wealth inequality. It is surprising that capital income, which is 
estimated to be the main determinant of income inequality in the Shorrocks decomposition, is 
found here to have an alleviating impact on inequality.  
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The differences in results between the Fields and the Shorrocks decomposition can be 
explained by their methodological differences. Recall that while the Shorrocks decomposition 
defines income as an exhaustive sum of all components and inequality contribution is determined 
by the mean value of each factor source, the Fields multivariate regression-based decomposition 
considers a composite factor component !;M;,L (compare equations 4.7 and 4.11). Consequently, 
the Fields relative inequality weights are sensitive to the OLS estimates of the coefficients for each 
type of income. As indicated previously, the OLS estimation may suffer from serious endogeneity 
issues in our case due to reverse causality – while ownership of the different types of wealth 
influences its absolute size due to disparate returns and leverage, the absolute size of wealth may 
also determine which types of assets and debt can be afforded. For this reason, one needs to 
consider the results of both the non-parametric and the parametric decompositions in light of their 
relative merits outlined above in order to understand the impact of balance sheet structure and 
household characteristics on inequality. 
In sum, the above decomposition analysis supports the implications of the stock-flow 
consistent model in Chapter 3 that balance sheet composition influences income and wealth 
inequality. This is highlighted by the high contribution of capital income to income inequality, and 
of business equity and financial investment assets to wealth inequality in the Shorrocks 
decomposition, as well as the large contribution of primary residence and wages to wealth and 
income inequality in the Fields decomposition. In the next section, we seek to analyse how balance 
sheet composition and household characteristics explain the intersectional dimension of wealth 
and income inequality discussed by the Post-Keynesian analyses of consumption in Chapter 2. 
Moreover, by analysing the income and wealth disparities in more detail across the income 
distribution, we assess the validity of the three-class conceptualisation of households based on 


















      
 
Table 4.8 Fields decomposition for net wealth 
Log Net Worth 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
Residual 37.43 37.24 38.79 37.82 36.10 34.22 36.95 37.72 39.43 
          
Household characteristics 48.21 47.98 46.83 47.88 49.69 50.33 48.75 47.95 47.68 
Age 25.09 26.91 26.40 24.73 22.97 23.26 23.34 23.33 19.81 
Educational attainment 17.20 18.63 18.09 21.02 22.39 23.06 22.02 21.37 22.82 
Female 4.36 2.94 2.38 3.23 3.72 5.25 3.44 2.90 2.71 
Black/Hispanic 0.07 -0.91 0.00 -1.26 0.10 -1.52 -0.50 -0.32 0.37 
Single -0.12 -0.31 -0.09 0.01 -0.20 -0.77 0.09 0.53 1.20 
Number of children -0.23 -1.18 -0.97 -0.97 -0.67 -0.79 -1.44 -1.05 -0.96 
Self-employed 2.04 2.21 1.34 1.85 1.71 2.14 1.98 1.79 1.79 
Out of labour force -0.21 -0.30 -0.31 -0.73 -0.34 -0.29 -0.19 -0.59 -0.07 
          
Balance sheet variables 14.36 14.77 14.38 14.30 14.21 15.45 14.30 14.33 12.89 
Assets 12.95 12.48 14.33 13.73 12.65 12.73 11.60 14.11 12.64 
Non-financial 11.95 10.36 11.89 10.27 9.18 9.67 9.87 11.35 9.75 
Primary residence 10.74 9.31 11.46 9.29 8.35 9.24 8.79 10.82 9.45 
Other real estate 0.04 0.14 0.23 0.53 0.25 0.27 0.64 0.29 0.13 
Vehicles and other 0.73 0.66 0.00 0.38 0.35 0.06 0.14 0.18 0.06 
Business equity 0.44 0.24 0.19 0.07 0.22 0.10 0.31 0.06 0.12 
Financial 1.00 2.12 2.44 3.46 3.47 3.06 1.73 2.76 2.88 
Transaction accounts 0.27 0.52 0.15 0.43 0.15 0.66 0.05 0.13 0.36 
Financial investment assets -0.58 -0.01 0.11 0.18 0.27 0.07        -0.22 -0.19 0.04 
Retirement and insurance 
assets 
1.31 1.61 2.18 2.86 3.05 2.33 1.90 2.82 2.48 
          
Debt 1.41 2.30 0.05 0.57 1.57 2.72 2.70 0.22 0.25 
Secured 1.20 2.41 -0.06 0.49 1.60 2.82 3.06 0.30 0.40 
By primary residence 1.00      2.44 -0.14 0.58 1.35 2.74 2.36 0.28       -0.01 
By other real estate 0.20      -0.03 0.08        -0.09 0.25 0.08 0.71 0.03 0.41 
Unsecured 0.55 -0.01 0.15 0.23 0.04 0.13 -0.34 -0.07 -0.14 
Instalment debt 0.51 0.08 0.17 0.27 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00        -0.04 
Credit card balances 0.04        -0.09 -0.02        -0.04 0.00 0.13        -0.35 -0.07        -0.10 
Other debt -0.34 -0.11 -0.03 -0.15 -0.08 -0.23 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
          
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 





















Table 4.9 Fields decomposition for income 
Log Income 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
Residual 9.02 16.78 24.14 16.61 12.54 11.31 8.40 11.72 12.30 
          
Household characteristics 65.99 67.31 63.62 70.35 70.65 76.00 76.41 76.66 74.02 
Age -11.93 -12.21 -12.29 -5.48 -7.14 -3.69 -5.75 2.27 1.55 
Educational attainment 67.42 67.08 56.23 60.68 66.07 64.98 64.26 61.12 57.17 
Female 14.63 11.31 14.78 12.64 8.82 10.75 9.66 8.57 9.08 
Black/Hispanic -8.87 -8.20 -5.70 -7.01 -7.47 -9.71 -6.83 -7.76 -7.69 
Single -12.41 -8.61 -6.56 -7.05 -6.04 -4.40 -3.66 -2.62 -2.69 
Number of children 9.53 7.32 5.73 7.05 5.87 7.57 5.99 6.70 7.05 
Self-employed 0.01 0.23 -0.87 -0.32 -0.11 0.26 0.45 0.09 0.69 
Out of labour force 7.60 10.40 12.29 9.84 10.65 10.25 12.31 8.28 8.85 
          
Income components 20.05 11.12 6.97 10.02 12.86 10.01 9.30 7.35 8.13 
Wages 21.39 11.79 8.60 10.50 12.61 10.14 9.36 8.76 8.40 
Capital income -1.31 -0.71 -1.67 -0.49 -0.05 -0.23 -0.10 -1.46 -1.04 
Business income -0.04 0.53 0.14 0.43 0.53 0.66 0.81 0.94 0.87 
Interest and dividends -1.02 -0.22 -0.63 -0.34 -0.34 0.00 -0.19 -0.06 -0.06 
Capital gains 0.47 -0.46 -0.12 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.23 0.00 0.25 
Social security and retirement -0.72 -0.55 -1.06 -0.89 -0.56 -1.19 -0.94 -2.34 -2.08 
Transfer income -0.04 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.31 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.76 
          
Debt payments 4.94 4.79 5.27 3.02 3.95 2.68 5.88 4.28 5.55 
Mortgages 1.49 1.74 1.87 0.22 1.12 2.18 3.20 3.92 3.32 
Consumer debt 3.45 2.92 2.87 2.08 2.52 0.48 2.65 0.41 2.12 
Revolving debt 0.00 0.14 0.53 0.72 0.31 0.02 0.03 -0.06 0.12 
          
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: All values in percentages. 
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4.4.3. Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
The aim of the Oaxaca-Blinder (OB) decomposition analysis is to evaluate the impact of 
differences in household wealth composition and the associated flows of capital income and debt 
payments on the social dimension of inequality. This could not be explicitly examined in the 
stock-flow consistent model in Chapter 3 due to its high level of aggregation. The Post-Keynesian 
analyses of consumption discussed in Chapter 2 highlighted that the impact of financial sector 
transformation on inequality influenced the disparities in income and wealth across gender, race, 
and generations through leveraged homeownership and increasing indebtedness of women, ethnic 
minorities, and the young. The OB decomposition allows to test this proposition by quantitatively 
evaluating the contribution of different assets and debt and the associated income flows to income 
and wealth inequality across these social characteristics. Moreover, by decomposing the disparities 
in income and wealth in more detail across the income distribution we gauge the validity of the 
three-class conceptualisation of households based on their wealth composition proposed in the 
stock-flow consistent model in Chapter 3. 
The OB decomposition typically examines the contribution of income sources to explaining 
the estimated difference in mean income (expressed in the natural logarithm) between two 
mutually exclusive subpopulation groups. It was originally applied to analyse wage discrimination 
across gender (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973), and was recently extended to poverty 
(Biewen/Jenkins 2005), health inequality (O’Donnell et al. 2007), as well as wealth disparities 
across race in the USA (Thompson/Suarez 2015), gender in Germany (Sierminska et al. 2010), 
and in the Eurozone (Mathä et al. 2014). In this section, we use the OB decomposition to 
investigate the contribution of wealth composition and the related capital income flows to the gap 
in income and wealth across gender, race, generations, and in more detail across the income 
distribution, comparing the bottom 90% to the top 10% as well as the bottom 20% to the top 80%. 
The decomposition of the intergenerational wealth gap and the disparities in wealth and income 
across the distributional groups constitute the most original features of our analysis. 
The OB technique decomposes the difference in the outcome variable across the two 
subgroups into explained and unexplained variation. The explained variation in the mean value of 
the dependent variable across subgroups is the contribution of the proposed model variables, while 
the unexplained variation is related to unobserved structural factors, such as discrimination.  
Underlying the OB decomposition in each wave of the data is the following system of linear 
equations 4.12 and 4.13: 
 !"
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Where zi
A and zi
B correspond to the natural logarithm of income and wealth across subgroups 
A and B respectively, regressed on k explanatory variables. The log of net wealth is explained by 
the values of primary residence, other real estate, vehicles and other non-financial assets, business 
equity, transaction accounts, financial investment assets, retirement and insurance assets, as well 
as debt secured by main residence and other property, unsecured forms of debt including 
instalment loans, credit card balances, and other lines of credit, and other debt. The log of income 
is explained by its sources, including wages, business income, pension income, capital gains, 
interest and dividend income, transfer income, and debt payments. As in the RBD method, we use 
the reported values of net worth and total income form the dataset. 
Based on these two models, a counterfactual equation (4.14) is constructed, where the 
coefficients of the subgroup B regression are replaced with the corresponding coefficients of the 
subgroup A regression. 
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The decomposition exercise concerns the following equation, expressing the difference 
between the average log of income and wealth for both subgroups (equation 4.15): 
 !# − !/ = !# − !/′ + !/′ − !/       (4.15) 
The first expression in brackets on the right-hand side corresponds to the difference 
explained by model variables (income sources and balance sheet composition). If there was no 
significant difference between the coefficients of subgroup A and subgroup B, this term would be 
zero. The second expression in brackets shows the unexplained variation in the mean value of the 
dependent variable !, corresponding to differences in the coefficients of the subgroup B regression 
and the counterfactual subgroup A regression. 
Substituting for the respective expressions of the average of zi  of both subgroups and the 
counterfactual regression of subgroup B, we obtain the following: 
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Expression in (4.16) explains the variation in !	between subgroups A and B as the 
differences in the values of the explanatory variables of each group, i.e. the explained gap in 
endowments. Conversely, expression (4.17) attributes the difference in !	to the variation between 
coefficients of the regression of subgroup A and subgroup B, i.e. the unexplained gap in 
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coefficients. In a more general case in equation 4.18, a third component of the difference in 
income encountered in equation 4.15 can be derived, corresponding to the gap arising from the 
interaction of the variation in the explanatory variables and the differences in the model 
coefficients, i.e. the interaction term between the differences in endowments and coefficients 
(Daymont/Andrisani 1984).  
 !# − !/ = %(
#Δ)( + ∆%()(
/ + ∆%(Δ)(     (4.18) 
In the analysis below, we report the contribution of all three components of equation 4.18. 
However, because of the clarity of interpretation, we only examine the explained part of inequality 
in detail, analysing the contribution of household characteristics, income sources, debt payments, 
and balance sheet variables. This is because the income and net wealth gap across subgroups 
explained by the differences in endowments constitutes the portion of inequality accounted for by 
the proposed set of explanatory variables.  
Gender 
Wealth inequality 
Table 4.10 presents results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the net wealth gap among 
male and female-headed households. The first part of the table shows the estimated log of net 
worth and its difference for male and female-headed households over time, and the estimated 
percentage contributions of differences in endowments, coefficients, and the interaction term. 
The wealth gap between male and female-headed households is estimated to have fallen 
slightly in our sample, from 1.12 in 1989 to 1.08 in 2013. Nevertheless, the log of net wealth of 
female households is estimated to constitute around 90% of the value of net wealth of male-headed 
households. Differences in endowments are estimated to explain the largest portion of the wealth 
gap – between 40.2% and 134.3% – apart from the 2007 and 2013 waves, when differences in 
endowments reduced the wealth gap by one third, and increased it by 21.9% respectively. The 
above 100% contributions are expected given the variation in explanatory variables, and have been 
encountered in the previous literature (cf. Thompson/Suarez 2015). 
Differences in balance sheet variables explain the larger positive portion of the gap in 
endowments across male and female households, while disparities across household socio-
economic characteristics contributed negatively to inequality. The crisis year 2007 is an anomaly, 
when the differences in the balance sheet variables contributed to reducing the endowments gap 
across gender, while the contribution of household characteristics was positive. 
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Similarly to the findings of the Shorrocks and the Fields decomposition for the overall 
wealth inequality, assets contributed more to the gender wealth gap than debt between 1989-2013. 
Differences in assets explained 98.5% of the differences in endowments in 1989, rising to 312% in 
2013, and a negative contribution in 2007 of -186.43%. Differences in debt holdings accounted for 
19.1% of the endowments gap in 1989, peaking at 24.5% in 2004 before falling to 13.3% in 2013. 
Similarly to assets, in 2007 debt reduced the endowments gap across gender by -13.1%, and the 
contribution was also negative in 1995 and 2001. 
Among assets, non-financial assets contributed more to the endowments gap than financial 
assets, although the contribution of the latter increased more over time. Differences in non-
financial asset holdings explained 60.8% of the differences in endowments across gender in 1989, 
rising to 161.7% in 2013, and a negative contribution in 2007 of -135.6%. Financial assets 
accounted for 37.6% of the endowments gap in 1989, falling to -50.9% in 2007, and rising to 
150.5% in 2013.  
Among non-financial assets, differences in primary residence holdings explained the largest 
portion of the endowments gap. Moreover, the contribution of differences in the ownership of 
other property increased overtime and continued to be positive throughout the 2007 crisis. 
Furthermore, the impact of the differences in vehicles and other non-financial asset holdings on 
the endowments gap across gender is estimated to have fallen over time. In contrast, differences in 
the ownership of business equity accounted for an increasing portion of the endowments gap over 
time, although the contribution was smaller compared to the other assets. 
Among financial assets, inequality of retirement and insurance assets had the largest 
contribution to the endowments gap across gender. This was followed by the contribution of 
differences in the ownership of transaction accounts, but it fluctuated between negative and 
positive values between 1989-2013. We find that the contribution of differences in financial 
investment assets to the endowments gap across gender declined over time, rebounding somewhat 
in the latest wave of the data.  
Among debt holdings, the contribution of the differences in secured debt holdings to 
explained inequality, particularly backed by primary residence, was higher than that of unsecured 
debt until 2004. However, the latter became greater during and after the 2007 crisis, driven 
primarily by changes in the contribution of differences in instalment debt holdings. Moreover, 
differences in holdings of other debt accounted for a decreasing and lower portion of explained 
inequality across gender.   
Among household characteristics, differences in age are estimated to reduce the explained 
gender wealth gap, with the effect increasing in absolute terms between 1989-2013. Differences 
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among single and married households are estimated to reduce the differences in endowments 
across gender, with the effect rising in absolute terms over time. Moreover, differences in the 
number of children had an alleviating effect on the differences in endowments across gender 
between 1989-2001 and in 2010, turning positive in 2004. In contrast, labour force participation, 
educational attainment, race, and self-employment are estimated to contribute positively to the 
differences in endowments.  
Overall, results of the OB decomposition for gender show that balance sheet composition 
contributed more to the explained gender wealth gap than socio-economic characteristics over 
1989-2013. Asset inequality explained more of the endowments gap across gender than 
differences in debt holdings. This is consistent with the balance sheet analysis in Chapter 1, as debt 
was more equally distributed across gender between 1989-2013. It also reflects the Post-Keynesian 
analyses of consumption in Chapter 2, which highlighted the role of the subprime lending 
expansion in increasing the indebtedness of women. Differences in holdings of primary residence 
and retirement and insurance assets were found to contribute the most to the explained gender 
inequality between 1989-2013, although the contribution of business equity and financial 
investment assets increased over time, particularly after 2007. This is consistent with the earlier 
results of the linear regression analysis. Moreover, unsecured debt holdings accounted for an 
increasing part of the gender wealth gap after the Great Recession. In addition, labour force 
participation, race, and educational attainment explained the largest portion of the explained 
gender wealth gap. Our results regarding the large contribution of inequality in retirement and 
insurance assets and business equity to the gender wealth gap is consistent with Sierminska et al. 
(2010), although we estimate a greater contribution of housing to gender wealth inequality. This is 
due to the institutional differences as the median household in Germany is not a homeowner 




















Table 4.10 Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the gender net wealth gap 
Log Net Worth 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
Male 11.55 11.43 11.51 11.70 11.92 11.89 11.95 11.72 11.68 
Female 10.43 10.55 10.73 10.74 10.68 10.66 10.91 10.65 10.60 
Difference 1.12 0.89 0.78 0.95 1.25 1.24 1.04 1.07 1.08 
Endowments 67.76% 134.31% 55.25% 40.20% 75.48% 57.12% -31.32% 52.41% 21.85% 
Coefficients 30.78% 32.73% 23.69% 33.59% 37.60% 55.20% 45.32% 37.99% 24.55% 
Interaction 1.46% -67.04% 21.06% 26.21% -13.08% -12.31% 86.00% 9.60% 53.60% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Endowments 
         
Household characteristics -17.57% 33.12% -54.09% -95.33% 15.59% -31.53% 299.54% -48.73% -225.48% 
Age -44.30% -29.71% -52.38% -56.83% -16.15% -40.69% 109.66% -35.47% -118.11% 
Educational attainment 5.13% 7.47% 6.59% 12.69% 10.37% 8.99% -25.51% 13.64% 36.06% 
Black/Hispanic 4.56% 1.70% 16.13% 6.13% 8.31% 7.41% -11.02% 7.24% 18.09% 
Single 0.00% 52.06% -49.30% -39.25% 0.73% -27.88% 272.18% -41.46% -214.85% 
Number of children -0.75% -5.10% -10.31% -22.98% -2.09% 2.55% 12.35% -1.45% 4.99% 
Self-employed 8.65% 1.35% 1.10% -9.11% 4.37% 3.31% -8.31% -6.32% 9.68% 
Out of labour force 9.14% 5.35% 34.09% 14.03% 10.05% 14.79% -49.81% 15.10% 38.67% 
Balance sheet variables 117.57% 66.88% 154.09% 195.33% 84.41% 131.53% -199.54% 148.73% 325.48% 
Assets 98.47% 62.00% 163.72% 180.30% 101.01% 107.04% -186.43% 145.10% 312.20% 
Non-financial 60.84% 21.84% 103.79% 131.85% 72.78% 53.13% -135.58% 79.89% 161.69% 
Primary residence 49.08% 14.10% 90.59% 122.31% 78.00% 52.28% -139.06% 65.99% 166.94% 
Other real estate 3.09% 0.40% 1.91% -3.17% 3.20% 1.45% 7.10% 6.54% 9.90% 
Vehicles and other 9.74% 7.80% 12.62% 17.68% -3.32% 0.83% -4.83% -3.54% -19.50% 
Business equity -1.07% -0.47% -1.33% -4.97% -5.10% -1.43% 1.21% 10.91% 4.36% 
Financial 37.63% 40.17% 59.93% 48.45% 28.23% 53.91% -50.85% 65.20% 150.51% 
Transaction accounts 11.19% 0.59% 0.28% 4.15% 1.87% -0.95% -22.33% 22.99% -26.54% 
Financial investment 
assets 
13.01% 0.45% 4.08% 0.96% -0.42% 0.54% -1.55% 0.15% 18.67% 
Retirement and 
insurance assets 
13.44% 39.13% 55.57% 43.35% 26.78% 54.32% -26.97% 42.06% 158.38% 
Debt 19.10% 4.87% -9.63% 15.02% -16.60% 24.49% -13.10% 3.63% 13.29% 
Secured 12.85% 9.65% -14.12% 24.47% -16.57% 18.54% -9.03% -4.90% -0.79% 
By primary residence 11.88% 8.30% -26.79% 19.34% -16.25% 15.85% -3.75% -9.02% -1.21% 
By other real estate 0.97% 1.36% 12.67% 5.14% -0.31% 2.69% -5.28% 4.13% 0.43% 
Unsecured 18.02% 3.13% -1.79% -5.73% 1.10% 1.10% 5.77% 7.37% 7.19% 
Instalment debt 16.44% 1.56% -3.75% -4.39% 0.32% -2.31% 9.63% 6.53% 12.22% 
Credit card balances 1.59% 1.57% 1.96% -1.34% 0.78% 3.41% -3.86% 0.83% -5.02% 
Other debt -11.78% -7.91% 6.28% -3.72% -1.13% 4.85% -9.84% 1.16% 6.88% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Income inequality 
To evaluate the contribution of income flows associated with wealth composition to the gender 
income inequality, Table 4.11 presents the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the income gap 
across gender As expected, the income gap among male and female households is smaller than the 
net wealth gap. While the log income gap decreased over time in the sample, falling from 0.9 in 
1989 to 0.8 in 2013, incomes of female-headed households constituted only around 90% of the 
incomes of male-headed households in the period. The majority of this income gap – between 86% 
to 120% – is explained by the differences in endowments across male and female households, i.e. 
is explained by the proposed set of explanatory variables (recall equation 4.15). 
Among the explanatory variables, income sources contributed the most to the differences in 
endowments, followed by differences in household characteristics, and debt payments. Among 
income sources, wages explained the majority of the differences in endowments, rising from 
63.7% in 1989 to 79.2% in 2013. Interestingly, in 2004 before the crisis the contribution of wages 
to the endowments gap decreased temporarily to 7.7%, as the contribution of capital income rose 
to 9.5% and the contribution of debt payments peaked at 27.1%. Capital income explained a 
smaller part of the gap in endowments than wages, rising from 8.9% to 1989 to 13.2% in 2010 
before decreasing to 7.8% in 2013. Among the various types of capital income, social security and 
retirement income and business income contributed an increasing portion to the endowments gap. 
The contribution of differences in interest and dividend income and capital gains was 
comparatively lower, and experienced a decrease between 1989-2013, peaking at the time of the 
Great Recession. Finally, differences in the receipts of transfer income reduced the differences in 
endowments among male and female-headed households (except for the 1992 and 1995 waves). 
Among debt payments, differences in mortgage payments accounted for the largest part of 
the endowments gap between male and female households, rising from 9.5% in 1989 to 23.6% in 
2004 before falling to 2.7% in 2013. Differences in consumer debt payments accounted for 1.5% 
of the endowments gap in 1989, rising to 4.3% in 2007, and declining to 1.9% in 2013. 
Differences in revolving debt payments explained 1.6% of the differences in endowments in 1989, 
peaking at 7.8% in 1992, and falling to 0.03% in 2013. 
Among household characteristics, differences in labour force participation, marital status, 
and educational attainment explained the largest part of the differences in endowments among 
male and female households between 1989-2013, while differences in age contributed to reducing 
the endowments gap. The large contribution of differences between single and married household 
to income inequality reflects the observation in Table A1.15 in Appendix I that female-headed 
households are predominantly single. Furthermore, income differences among Black/Hispanic 
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households and White/other contributed positively to the endowments gap across gender, although 
this contribution declined between 1989-2013. This highlights the intersectional dimension of race 
and gender in income inequality. Similarly, the positive contribution of differences in the number 
of children to the gender gap in endowments declined over time. In addition, the contribution of 
the income disparities between self-employed households and the rest was lower compared to the 
other socio-economic characteristics.  
In sum, we find that income sources contributed a greater portion to the net income gap 
across gender than household characteristics, and this contribution increased over time. Debt 
payments have raised their contribution to the net income inequality across gender before the 
Great Recession, and this was driven by the differences in mortgage payments, although payments 
on consumer debt contributed an increasing portion to inequality after the 2007 crisis. Differences 
in wages accounted for the largest portion of the gender income gap, which increased between 
1989-2013. Transfer income is found to have contributed little to reducing the gender income gap. 
Across household characteristics, marital status, labour force participation, and educational 




















Table 4.11 Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the gender income gap 
Log Income 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
Male 10.91 10.85 10.90 10.97 11.08 11.08 11.08 11.00 11.00 
Female 10.02 9.99 9.94 10.09 10.15 10.19 10.24 10.25 10.20 
Difference 0.90 0.86 0.96 0.88 0.93 0.89 0.84 0.75 0.79 
Endowments 111.87% 50.75% 79.91% 101.49% 117.08% 86.36% 100.22% 115.35% 122.91% 
Coefficients 17.68% 18.35% 32.47% 31.49% 24.72% 25.96% 18.52% 15.94% 10.76% 
Interaction -29.55% 30.90% -12.38% -32.98% -41.80% -12.32% -18.74% -31.29% -33.67% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
          
Endowments          
Household characteristics 15.23% -18.10% -6.87% 36.75% 22.87% 56.38% 11.55% -0.89% 8.91% 
Age -4.17% -7.40% -3.19% -4.82% -1.44% -2.93% -5.81% -2.40% -2.50% 
Educational attainment 4.36% 14.73% 3.45% 3.13% 4.47% 4.53% 3.67% 1.23% 1.41% 
Black/Hispanic 4.23% 4.38% 3.86% 2.51% 1.75% 1.11% 0.99% 0.43% 0.97% 
Single 0.00% -49.27% -25.43% 24.40% 11.42% 42.29% 1.67% -7.47% 2.31% 
Number of children 4.31% 1.16% 1.27% 0.59% 0.09% 0.80% 0.75% 1.46% 1.16% 
Self-employed 2.69% -3.06% 2.18% -1.80% -0.11% -1.61% 3.46% 0.70% 2.02% 
Out of labour force 3.80% 21.36% 11.00% 12.73% 6.69% 12.18% 6.81% 5.17% 3.53% 
          
Income components 72.16% 88.00% 95.67% 57.85% 69.41% 16.52% 73.58% 95.56% 86.49% 
Wages 63.71% 83.91% 89.27% 59.24% 62.80% 7.67% 73.34% 85.45% 79.22% 
Capital income 8.87% 3.71% 6.24% -0.68% 8.25% 9.48% 0.98% 13.19% 7.75% 
Business income 0.16% 1.70%     -0.02% 1.69% 2.23% 1.70% 1.58% 9.21% 1.56% 
Interest and dividends 0.34% 1.02% 0.88% 1.01% 1.65% 0.99% 2.43%     -0.56% 0.87% 
Capital gains 6.32% 0.32% 0.59%    -0.67%    -0.77% 2.99%     -3.31% 0.32% 0.47% 
Social security and 
retirement 
2.05% 0.68% 4.80%    -2.71% 5.13% 3.79% 0.29% 4.22% 4.85% 
Transfer income -0.42% 0.38% 0.16% -0.71% -1.64% -0.62% -0.75% -3.08% -0.49% 
          
Debt payments 12.61% 30.11% 11.19% 5.40% 7.72% 27.10% 14.87% 5.32% 4.61% 
Mortgages 9.54% 19.23% 7.39% 6.01% 5.85% 23.58% 9.81% 4.36% 2.69% 
Consumer debt 1.53% 3.11% 2.75% -1.03% 0.95% 1.25% 4.32% 0.85% 1.88% 
Revolving debt 1.55% 7.76% 1.06% 0.43% 0.92% 2.27% 0.74% 0.11% 0.03% 
          
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 





Table 4.12 shows results of the OB decomposition for the net wealth gap across Black/Hispanic 
households and White/other. The wealth gap increased over time from 1.5 in 1989 to 1.7 in 2013. 
Differences in endowments explained by the estimated regression model accounted for the largest 
part of the wealth gap, increasing from 73.3% in 1989 to 91.6% in 2013.  
Balance sheet variables are estimated to explain the majority of differences in endowments 
across race, although the contribution decreased from 80.6% in 1989 to 58.5% in the crisis in 
2007, before rising to 70.8% in 2013. Household characteristics accounted for an increasing 
portion of the gap in endowments, rising from 19.5% in 1989 to 41.5% in 2007 before declining to 
29.2% in 2013.  
Among balance sheet variables, disparities in asset holdings contributed more to the gap in 
endowments across race than differences in debt ownership. Assets explained 80.6% of the 
differences in endowments in 1989, falling to 59.1% in 2001, before increasing to 76% in 2013. In 
contrast, differences in debt holdings across race are estimated to reduce the endowments gap, and 
this negative effect rose in absolute terms from -0.1% in 1989 to -5.2% in 2013, with a peak of -
15.7% in 1995. 
Among assets, non-financial assets explained more of the endowments gap across race than 
financial assets in the period studied. However their contribution fell over time from 70.5% in 
1989 to 50.9% in 2013, peaking at 86.9% in 1995. In contrast, the portion of the differences in 
endowments explained by disparities in financial assets holdings increased from 10.1% in 1989 to 
25.1% in 2013, with a high of 26.1% in 2004 before the crisis.  
Among non-financial assets, primary residence accounted for the largest albeit decreasing 
part of the endowments gap across race. The contribution of differences in vehicles and other non-
financial assets and other property fluctuated between positive and negative values over time. In 
contrast, differences in the ownership of business equity are estimated to reduce the endowments 
gap, with the effect rising in absolute terms between 1989-2013. 
Among financial assets, differences in transaction accounts explained the most of the 
differences in endowments across race, increasing between 1989-2013. Moreover, the contribution 
of retirement and insurance assets to the explained inequality across race rose in this period. 
Surprisingly, differences in the ownership of financial investment assets across race are estimated 
to reduce the endowments gap and this effect increased in absolute terms. 
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Among debt, differences in unsecured debt contributed more to the endowments gap across 
race in the period, while secured debt is estimated to have reduced this gap. Differences in 
unsecured debt holdings accounted for 3% of the differences in endowments across race in 1989, 
rising to 3.5% in 2001, and decreasing to 1.7% in 2013. This was driven by differences in 
instalment debt holdings before the 2007 crisis, and the fall in the contribution of disparities in 
credit card debt after the Great Recession. On the contrary, differences in secured debt holdings 
reduced the gap in endowments across race by 2.7% in 1989, rising to -17.9% in 1995, and 
decreasing in absolute terms to -5.5% in 2013. This alleviating effect on the endowments gap 
across race was driven by the differences in the ownership of debt secured by primary residence. 
In contrast, the contribution of differences in debt secured by other property across race was 
generally positive and increased between 1989-2013. Finally, disparities in other debt holdings 
tended to reduce the differences in endowments across race, with the effect rising in absolute terms 
from -0.4% in 1989 to -1.4% in 2013, although the contribution was positive in 1992-1995 and 
2004-2007, averaging 0.8%. 
Among household characteristics, differences in age, educational attainment, and marital 
status contributed the most to explained wealth inequality across race between 1989-2013, while 
labour force participation is estimated to have reduced these disparities. The contribution of wealth 
disparities across male- and female-headed households to the endowments gap across race 
fluctuated between positive and negative values. Similar pattern is observed for the contribution of 
differences in the number of children and self-employment. 
In sum, we find that the explained wealth inequality between Blacks/Hispanics and 
Whites/other ethnicities was determined primarily by the increasing contribution of financial 
assets, specifically transaction accounts and retirement and insurance assets, as well as disparities 
in age, educational attainment, and differences across marital status and gender. This reflects that 
limited access to banking services and pension schemes among minority households contributed to 
the racial wealth inequality. Moreover, debt is found to have contributed to reducing wealth 
inequality over time, although this was driven by secured debt holdings, as disparities in unsecured 
debt contributed positively to wealth inequality, particularly before the Great Recession. This 
indicates that disparities in homeownership restricted access to secure credit for minority 




















Table 4.12 Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the racial net wealth gap 
Log Net Worth 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
White/Other 11.52 11.44 11.53 11.68 11.92 11.90 11.97 11.80 11.77 
Black/Hispanic 10.01 10.05 10.11 10.31 10.30 10.34 10.53 10.22 10.10 
Difference 1.51 1.39 1.42 1.36 1.62 1.56 1.44 1.59 1.66 
Endowments 73.27% 123.74% 100.84% 93.16% 107.82% 116.05% 76.93% 98.28% 91.61% 
Coefficients 45.11% 39.86% 50.64% 37.48% 45.15% 35.17% 41.32% 37.89% 38.12% 
Interaction -18.38% -63.60% -51.48% -30.64% -52.97% -51.22% -18.25% -36.16% -29.73% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Endowments          
Household characteristics 19.45% 23.72% 18.00% 31.67% 21.12% 21.60% 41.54% 27.88% 29.17% 
Age 6.59% 6.70% 5.57% 19.58% 9.22% 9.99% 33.08% 16.75% 11.46% 
Educational attainment 1.65% 7.22% 5.76% 11.44% 6.09% 8.21% 8.03% 12.01% 13.52% 
Female -0.62% -0.16% -0.09% 3.26% 5.13% 4.25% 6.05% 2.37% 0.10% 
Single 9.60% 2.34% 4.50% 0.35% 0.55% 0.03% -0.57% 2.00% 4.78% 
Number of children 1.37% 5.41% 2.21% -0.89% -0.41% 0.08% 0.70% -1.26% 1.05% 
Self-employed 0.43% 3.30% 1.72% 0.33% 2.46% 0.16% 0.69% -0.07% 0.68% 
Out of labour force 0.43% -1.09% -1.67% -2.40% -1.92% -1.13% -6.45% -3.91% -2.43% 
Balance sheet variables 80.55% 76.28% 82.00% 68.33% 78.88% 78.40% 58.46% 72.12% 70.83% 
Assets 80.61% 83.56% 97.71% 72.83% 78.12% 83.29% 59.07% 79.30% 75.99% 
Non-financial 70.53% 65.07% 86.89% 61.46% 31.15% 57.21% 47.55% 59.73% 50.91% 
Primary residence 70.28% 60.26% 75.15% 52.31% 32.99% 60.46% 43.18% 55.00% 53.66% 
Other real estate -1.39% 2.12% -0.04% 0.32% 2.73% 1.85% 1.88% -0.85% 0.41% 
Vehicles and other 3.87% 2.25% 9.94% 10.95% -2.14% -0.59% 4.82% 8.16% -1.39% 
Business equity -2.22% 0.44% 1.84% -2.11% -2.42% -4.51% -2.34% -2.58% -1.77% 
Financial 10.08% 18.49% 10.82% 11.36% 46.96% 26.08% 11.53% 19.57% 25.08% 
Transaction accounts -1.62% 18.96% 17.31% 2.61% 28.86% 17.08% 10.08% 12.23% 22.27% 
Financial investment 
assets 
-0.26% -6.26% -16.73% -7.48% 0.58% -2.81% -29.86% -7.50% -5.21% 
Retirement and 
insurance assets 
11.96% 5.80% 10.24% 16.23% 17.53% 11.81% 31.31% 14.84% 8.02% 
Debt -0.06% -7.29% -15.71% -4.49% 0.77% -4.88% -0.61% -7.19% -5.16% 
Secured -2.67% -10.08% -17.90% -6.48% -2.63% -8.03% -1.24% -8.25% -5.51% 
By primary residence -3.05% -8.25% -16.81% -8.52% -2.83% -7.94% -1.25% -9.54% -8.02% 
By other real estate 0.38% -1.84% -1.09% 2.04% 0.20% -0.09% 0.01% 1.30% 2.52% 
Unsecured 3.04% 1.98% 0.48% 2.57% 3.50% 2.74% 0.49% 1.31% 1.74% 
Instalment debt 2.98% 1.64% -0.10% 1.64% 3.23% 0.60% 0.19% -0.27% 0.22% 
Credit card balances 0.06% 0.34% 0.58% 0.92% 0.27% 2.14% 0.30% 1.58% 1.52% 
Other debt -0.43% 0.82% 1.72% -0.58% -0.10% 0.40% 0.15% -0.25% -1.40% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Income inequality 
To illustrate the contribution of household wealth composition to income inequality, Table 4.13 
shows results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition for the income gap across race, estimating 
income inequality between Black/Hispanic households and White/other. Similarly to gender, and 
unlike for wealth, the racial income gap is estimated to have decreased in the sample over time, 
from 0.8 in 1989 to 0.5 in 2010, with a recent increase to 0.7 in 2013. The majority of the racial 
income gap is explained by the differences in endowments of the explanatory variables covering 
household characteristics, income sources, and debt payments. 
Income sources contributed the most to the explained differences in endowments across 
race, followed by household characteristics, and debt payments. Among income sources, 
differences in wages explained 48.1% of the gap in endowments across race, rising to 59.9% in 
2013, and declining to 15.9% in 2010. Capital income accounted for 24.4% of the differences in 
endowments across race in 1989, increasing to 29.7% in 2010 and falling to 21.4% in 2013. 
Among the various types of capital income, differences in social security and retirement income 
explained the largest portion of the differences in endowments, and the contribution increased 
between 1989-2013. This was followed by the contribution of differences in business income to 
the endowments gap across race, which declined over time, peaking in 2010. Moreover, interest 
and dividend income contributed to widening of the differences in endowments in the 1990s, but 
this effect changed to reduce the gap in endowments since 1998. Similarly, the contribution of 
differences in capital gains was not consistent over time, fluctuating between positive and negative 
values. Lastly, the contribution of transfer income to the endowments gap across race was positive 
but comparatively low. This suggests that the social transfer policy did not alleviate income 
inequality across race to a great extent. 
Among debt payments, differences in mortgage payments accounted for an increasing part 
of the gap in endowments across race, rising from 4.7% in 1989 to 21.5% in 2010 before declining 
to 3.5% in 2013. Differences in revolving debt payments accounted for 1.1% of the differences in 
endowments in 1989, increasing to 3.7% in 2010, and reaching 1.6% in 2013. The contribution of 
differences in consumer debt payments in explaining the endowments gap across race followed an 
inverted-U shaped trajectory, rising from 0.3% in 1989 to 3% in 2004 before the crisis, and 
declining to 0.9% in 2013. 
Among household characteristics, educational attainment, age, marital status, and gender 
contributed the most to the differences in endowments explaining the racial income gap, while 
labour force participation, the number of children, and self-employment contributed to reduce the 
endowments gap.  
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Overall, we find that the explained income inequality across Black/Hispanic households and 
Whites/other ethnicities was driven by the differences in wage receipts, social security and 
retirement income, business income, mortgage payments, as well as educational attainment, 
marital status, and age. Importantly, the contribution of debt payments was particularly large 
immediately after the 2007 crisis, driven by the rising contribution of payments on unsecured debt 
holdings. These findings reflect the differences in employment security across households, which 
results in their limited access to pension income for minorities. The rising contribution of debt 
payments on mortgages and unsecured debt to the explained racial inequality suggests differences 




Table 4.14 presents results of the OB decomposition of the net wealth gap between households 
aged less than 35 and those aged 35 and above between 1989-2013. It is estimated to have 
increased from 1.71 in the log terms in 1989 to 1.84 in 2007, falling to 1.68 in 2013. In the period, 
net wealth of households aged below 35 constituted around 85% of the size of net wealth of 
households aged 35 and over. The majority of the intergenerational net wealth gap is explained by 
the proposed regression model, which contributed 166.8% to the gap in 1989, rising to 255.3% in 
2013.  
Balance sheet variables are estimated to explain the largest part of the difference in 
endowments across generations, and this contribution increased between 1989-2013. In contrast, 
the contribution of household characteristics to the endowments declined over time.  
Among balance sheet variables, assets are estimated to contribute more to the endowments 
gap than debt. The impact of differences in asset holdings across age groups experienced a U-
shaped path in the period studied, falling from 49% in 1989 to 34.2% in 2004, and increasing 
during and after the crisis, reaching 71.4% in 2013. In contrast, the impact of debt is found to be 
ambiguous, increasing the endowments gap by an average of 1.2% over 1989-1995, declining to -




















Table 4.13 Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the racial income gap 
Log Income 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
White/Other 10.82 10.73 10.74 10.83 10.95 10.96 10.96 10.92 10.91 
Black/Hispanic 10.05 10.13 10.10 10.24 10.38 10.40 10.48 10.44 10.35 
Difference 0.76 0.60 0.64 0.59 0.57 0.55 0.48 0.47 0.56 
Endowments 82.66% 91.92% 109.92% 80.67% 87.08% 87.21% 89.17% 79.14% 113.56% 
Coefficients 36.36% 28.79% 44.29% 35.84% 31.81% 22.79% 37.29% 24.38% 28.93% 
Interaction -19.01% -20.71% -54.21% -16.51% -18.89% -10.00% -26.46% -3.52% -42.49% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
          
Endowments          
Household characteristics 20.92% 14.41% 26.05% 22.55% 29.09% 35.81% 22.17% 28.24% 10.82% 
Age 0.93% 1.50% 6.19% 9.42% 8.59% 3.58% 11.21% 11.90% 1.98% 
Educational attainment 8.37% 11.49% 8.99% 11.19% 16.74% 21.47% 15.74% 22.81% 6.73% 
Female 3.08% 4.46% 1.80% 7.28% 9.03% 4.95% 2.09% 6.33% 1.13% 
Single 8.24% 2.99% 9.20% 3.78% 3.90% 7.93% 5.04% 6.58% 4.64% 
Number of children -2.73% -4.22% 2.10% -2.67% -0.90% -0.33% -0.81% -6.05% -1.86% 
Self-employed 0.72% -1.13% -1.03% 0.03% -1.67% 0.96% 0.47% -2.91% 0.88% 
Out of labour force 2.30% -0.69% -1.21% -6.48% -6.59% -2.75% -11.57% -10.40% -2.68% 
          
Income components 72.99% 81.72% 66.18% 64.48% 58.82% 49.10% 74.09% 45.54% 83.14% 
Wages 48.05% 58.18% 35.04% 40.33% 50.37% 37.98% 50.81% 15.87% 59.90% 
Capital income 24.37% 23.67% 32.84% 24.18% 8.54% 11.61% 24.74% 29.67% 21.42% 
Business income 8.84% 10.96%     7.25% 3.70% 5.30% -4.88% 8.55% 12.33% 0.53% 
Interest and dividends 0.93% 4.32% 21.45%    -3.51% 0.73%  -14.91% -4.62%     -0.06% -3.05% 
Capital gains 1.33% -4.52% -6.60%   2.74%   -10.83% 4.65%     -1.68% 0.92% -0.61% 
Social security and 
retirement 
13.27% 12.92% 10.74%   21.25% 13.34% 26.74% 22.48% 16.48% 24.55% 
Transfer income 0.57% -0.13% -1.70% -0.03% -0.09% -0.49% -1.45% 0.00% 1.82% 
          
Debt payments 6.10% 3.87% 7.77% 12.97% 12.09% 15.09% 3.74% 26.21% 6.04% 
Mortgages 4.70% 2.01% 1.20% 6.64% 9.64% 9.73% 1.38% 21.51% 3.54% 
Consumer debt 0.27% 1.03% 2.97% 2.33% 2.63% 3.00% 0.87% 1.01% 0.88% 
Revolving debt 1.13% 0.84% 3.60% 4.00% -0.18% 2.37% 1.49% 3.70% 1.62% 
          
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Among assets, non-financial assets are estimated to explain more of the differences in 
endowments across generations than financial assets, although the importance of the latter 
increased after the 2007 crisis. Differences in non-financial assets holdings across age groups 
explained 33.6% of the differences in endowments in 1989, falling to 20.5% in 2010 before 
increasing to 45.3% in 2013. In contrast, differences in the holdings of financial assets accounted 
for 15.4% of the endowments gap across generations in 1989, declining to 4.5% in 2004, after 
which the contribution rose to 29.8% in 2010, reaching 26% in 2013. 
Among non-financial assets, differences in holdings of primary residence across age groups 
accounted for the largest part of the endowments gap, declining between 1989-2004 and increasing 
since. This reflects the increases in homeownership among the youngest group before the Great 
Recession, and the sharp decline since, which was observed in the balance sheet analysis in 
Chapter 1. Similarly, the contribution of differences in other property holdings to the endowments 
gap across generations increased over time, as did the contribution of disparities in vehicles and 
other non-financial assets. In contrast, differences in business equity holdings across generations 
accounted for a positive but decreasing part of the endowments gap over time. 
Among financial assets, disparities in the holdings of retirement and insurance assets across 
age groups explained the greatest part of the differences in endowments, followed by financial 
investment assets, whose contribution to the endowments gap across generations increased rapidly 
around the time of the Great Recession. In contrast, the impact of differences in the holdings of 
transaction accounts on the intergenerational endowments gap decreased over time, peaking in 
2004.  
Among debt components, secured debt contributed more to the endowments gap across age 
groups than unsecured debt, although the impact of both types of debt was not unambiguous in the 
period studied. The contribution of other debt holdings to the endowments gap was comparatively 
low and fluctuated between positive and negative values between 1989-2013. Differences in 
unsecured debt holdings across generations reduced the differences in endowments by 0.1% in 
1989, but this turned positive at 1.7% in 1992, reaching 0.3% in 2013. This was driven primarily 
by the increasingly positive contribution of differences in the holdings of instalment debt 
compared to the negative contribution of credit card debt. Among the types of secured debt, 
disparities in mortgages secured by primary residence had a greater negative contribution to the 
differences in endowments across age groups than debt secured by other real estate.  
Among household characteristics, age differentials accounted for the greatest portion of the 
differences in endowments. Differences in net wealth between self-employed households and the 
rest, as well as between Blacks/Hispanics and Whites/other ethnicities contributed positively to 
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deepening wealth inequality across generations between 1989-2013. Similarly, disparities in the 
number of children increased the explained intergenerational wealth inequality over time, albeit at 
lower magnitudes. The impact of net wealth disparities between single and married households is 
estimated to be mixed, while labour force participation, gender, and educational attainment 
contributed to reduce the difference in endowments across age groups over time. 
Overall, results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the intergenerational net wealth gap 
show that apart from age differences, disparities in the holdings of primary residence, other real 
estate, vehicles and other non-financial assets, and retirement and insurance assets determined the 
explained intergenerational wealth inequality between 1989-2013. The contribution of financial 
assets, particularly retirement and insurance assets as well as financial investment assets, increased 
after the Great Recession. This indicates that young households have had less access to pensions 
compared to the older households and their peers in the previous waves of the data. Similarly, it 
reflects the observation that homeownership became less affordable for the young after the Great 
Recession. In contrast to the racial wealth gap, but in line with the findings for gender, disparities 
in unsecured debt, particularly instalment debt, explained more of the intergenerational wealth 




















Table 4.14 Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the intergenerational net wealth gap 
Log Net Worth 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
Aged 35+ 11.70 11.53 11.62 11.78 11.93 11.91 12.03 11.77 11.69 
Aged <35 9.99 10.08 10.19 10.13 10.34 10.17 10.19 9.94 10.02 
Difference 1.71 1.46 1.43 1.65 1.59 1.74 1.84 1.83 1.68 
Endowments 166.82% 167.25% 201.29% 148.52% 205.30% 163.55% 228.51% 164.47% 255.28% 
Coefficients 53.08% 24.13% 33.67% 35.46% 25.06% 26.41% 32.88% 23.33% 7.08% 
Interaction -119.90% -91.37% -134.96% -83.98% -130.36% -89.97% -161.39% -87.80% -162.36% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Endowments          
Household characteristics 49.90% 49.71% 51.94% 66.12% 56.52% 65.33% 57.90% 48.31% 33.61% 
Age 55.16% 58.79% 61.83% 70.52% 59.59% 67.22% 61.44% 51.85% 35.41% 
Educational attainment -1.11% -2.73% -2.11% -1.35% -0.34% 0.16% 0.28% -0.74% -0.56% 
Female -1.90% -1.44% 0.06% -0.09% -0.43% -1.57% -1.58% -0.83% -0.29% 
Black/Hispanic 0.36% 0.50% 0.98% 1.55% 0.44% 1.14% 1.39% 1.24% 0.31% 
Single 0.00% -0.20% 0.04% 0.25% 0.17% 0.02% -0.11% 0.05% 0.01% 
Number of children 0.53% 1.12% 0.52% 0.89% 0.49% 0.12% 0.58% -0.17% 0.15% 
Self-employed 0.81% 0.70% 0.63% 1.43% 0.39% 1.06% 1.11% 0.89% 0.40% 
Out of labour force -3.96% -7.03% -10.01% -7.08% -3.80% -2.81% -5.20% -3.98% -1.81% 
Balance sheet variables 50.10% 50.29% 48.06% 33.88% 43.48% 34.67% 42.10% 51.69% 66.39% 
Assets 49.00% 49.29% 46.55% 33.91% 44.29% 34.24% 42.07% 50.37% 71.35% 
Non-financial 33.55% 36.19% 29.70% 25.00% 27.46% 29.71% 25.21% 20.53% 45.30% 
Primary residence 27.71% 29.25% 25.33% 11.13% 13.49% 6.53% 15.11% 4.29% 30.16% 
Other real estate 2.56% 0.08% 3.59% 6.23% 5.04% 8.95% 6.20% 11.85% 3.02% 
Vehicles and other 2.13% 6.65% 1.14% 8.27% 6.77% 14.21% 3.58% 3.98% 12.23% 
Business equity 1.15% 0.20% -0.36% -0.61% 2.16% 0.01% 0.32% 0.41% -0.11% 
Financial 15.44% 13.10% 16.85% 8.91% 16.84% 4.53% 16.86% 29.84% 26.04% 
Transaction accounts 0.67% 0.34% 5.09% 0.97% -0.03% 3.70% 1.45% 1.04% -2.99% 
Financial investment 
assets 
1.98% -0.36% 3.05% 2.99% -0.22% -12.18% -1.72% 5.39% 3.38% 
Retirement and 
insurance assets 
12.80% 13.12% 8.71% 4.95% 17.09% 13.01% 17.12% 23.41% 25.65% 
Debt 1.10% 1.00% 1.50% -0.03% -0.81% 0.43% 0.03% 1.32% -4.96% 
Secured 0.30% 0.01% -0.91% -0.45% -0.48% 0.34% -1.21% 0.83% -5.39% 
By primary residence 1.31% -0.29% -1.13% -0.16% -0.16% 0.99% -0.44% 1.29% -5.35% 
By other real estate -1.01% 0.30% 0.22% -0.28% -0.32% -0.65% -0.77% -0.46% -0.04% 
Unsecured -0.07% 1.72% 0.02% 0.03% 0.50% 0.49% 0.40% -0.93% 0.33% 
Instalment debt -0.10% 1.65% 0.05% -0.02% 0.50% 0.22% 0.61% 0.00% 0.96% 
Credit card balances 0.03% 0.07% -0.02% 0.04% 0.00% 0.27% -0.21% -0.93% -0.63% 
Other debt 0.87% -0.73% 2.39% 0.39% -0.84% -0.41% 0.84% 1.42% 0.11% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Income inequality 
To analyse the contribution of disparities in capital income and debt payment flows associated 
with the heterogeneity of wealth composition, Table 4.15 shows results of the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition of income inequality across age groups. The intergenerational income gap is 
estimated to have increased over time from 0.3 in the log terms in 1989 to 0.4 in 2013. The 
majority of the gap is explained by the proposed regression model (i.e. by differences in 
endowments), accounting for 279.5% in 1989 rising to 394.7% in 2013.  
Household characteristics explained the majority of the gap in endowments across 
generations, followed by disparities in income components. The contribution of  debt payments 
was estimated to have a mixed impact on the differences in endowments over time, reducing the 
endowments gap in 1989, 1995, and 2007, and widening the gap in 1992, 1998-2004, and in 2010-
2013. 
Among household characteristics, differences in age accounted for the majority of the 
intergenerational differences in endowments. The magnitude of the contribution of the other socio-
economic variables was comparatively low. Differences in income across race and marital status 
contributed positively to the endowments gap, while the contribution of differences in the number 
of children and self-employment was mixed between 1989-2013. In contrast, the contribution of 
labour force participation, educational attainment, and income differences across gender to the 
explained intergenerational income gap was negative. 
Among income components, capital income contributed more to the differences in 
endowments than wage income. Differences in capital income receipts across age groups 
explained 26.1% of the endowments gap in 1989, although this contribution declined to 13.3% in 
2013, with an anomalous negative effect of -26.3% in 2004. This was driven by a comparatively 
high contribution of social security and retirement income, and of business income. Differences in 
the receipts of capital gains and interest and dividend income across age groups had a mixed 
contribution to the explained income gap. Moreover, wages accounted for 3.6% of the differences 
in endowments across generations in 1989, increasing to 9.6% in 2013, with a peak of 12.5% in 
2004. Disparities in the receipts of transfer income across generations contributed an average of 
0.1% to the endowments gap between 1989-2013, signalling insufficient impact of the social 
transfer policy in alleviating the intergenerational income inequality.  
Among debt payments, the contribution of differences in mortgage debt payments across 
generations was positive and increased from 0.3% of the differences in endowments in 1989, 
peaking at 3.8% in 2004, before falling to 0.1% in 2013. Disparities in payments on revolving debt 
initially reduced the differences in endowments across generations by an average of 0.1% between 
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1989-1995, but the effect became positive since 1998, with a peak of 1.4% in 2004. In contrast, 
differences in payments on consumer debt are estimated to reduce the endowments gap across age 
groups, with the contribution of -0.4% in 1989 increasing in absolute terms to -0.5% in 2013. 
Overall, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the intergenerational income gap shows that 
income disparities across households younger than 35 years and those aged 35 and above were 
driven primarily by differences in capital income receipts, in addition to the dominant impact of 
the age differential. This finding stands in contrast to the decomposition of income inequality 
across gender and race, where inequality was found to be determined by wage income disparities. 
Nevertheless, the impact of wage inequality on the intergenerational income gap has increased 
over time. Moreover, as in the case of gender and race, income transfers have contributed little to 
reducing the income gap across generations. These results suggest that access to wealth ownership 
determined the intergenerational income gap between 1989-2013. Moreover, the intergenerational 
income inequality has become increasingly driven by worse employment opportunities among the 




















Table 4.15 Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the intergenerational income gap 
Log Income 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
Aged 35+ 10.73 10.66 10.68 10.81 10.90 10.91 10.92 10.88 10.86 
Aged <35 10.47 10.45 10.45 10.44 10.58 10.54 10.60 10.49 10.44 
Difference 0.27 0.21 0.23 0.37 0.32 0.37 0.32 0.39 0.42 
Endowments 279.46% 621.91% 492.11% 240.34% 336.77% 244.04% 382.22% 332.20% 394.71% 
Coefficients 103.72% 106.95% 134.46% 106.16% 85.01% 90.62% 82.34% 84.99% 68.64% 
Interaction -283.18% -628.86% -526.57%   -246.50% -321.78% -234.65% -364.56% -317.18% -363.35% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
          
Endowments          
Household characteristics 68.84% 92.13% 70.51% 78.94% 88.18% 109.99% 89.42% 85.58% 77.13% 
Age 91.68% 102.15% 80.59% 91.50% 99.96% 120.33% 98.24% 90.67% 80.42% 
Educational attainment -5.05% -1.96% -0.98% -0.98% -0.47% -0.37% -0.34% -0.98% -0.45% 
Female -1.43% -0.54% -0.95% -0.27% 0.12% -0.88% -0.63% -0.17% -0.03% 
Black/Hispanic 1.58% 0.30% 1.36% 1.03% 0.78% -0.09% 0.98% 0.29% 0.33% 
Single 0.39% 0.22% 0.35% 0.61% 2.36% 0.84% -0.58% 1.07% 1.10% 
Number of children -2.09% 0.42% 0.46% 0.64% 0.34% 0.78% 0.84% 0.05% 0.34% 
Self-employed 0.12% -0.42% -0.18% 0.72% -0.58% 0.98% 0.58% 0.15% 0.14% 
Out of labour force -16.37% -8.04% -10.16% -14.29% -14.33% -11.60% -9.65% -5.52% -4.71% 
          
Income components 31.60% 7.06% 29.72% 20.36% 11.66% -14.67% 11.14% 10.66% 22.84% 
Wages 3.58% 0.77% 6.49% 10.83% 4.35% 12.49% 7.50% 6.54% 9.61% 
Capital income 26.10% 6.29% 23.18% 9.50% 7.21% -26.32% 3.80% 4.38% 13.29% 
Business income 4.39% 1.01%     6.89% 0.05% 2.30% -3.30% 3.97% 1.84% 3.15% 
Interest and dividends -1.43% 2.70% 1.38%      0.85% 1.35%  -39.19% 2.48%   -15.08% -1.37% 
Capital gains 5.82% -0.97% 1.24%    -4.55%      3.81% 2.75%    -13.88% 0.17% -1.60% 
Social security and 
retirement 
17.32% 3.56% 13.67%    13.14% -0.25% 13.42% 11.23% 17.44% 13.11% 
Transfer income 1.92% 0.00% 0.05% 0.03% 0.11% -0.84% -0.17% -0.26% -0.07% 
          
Debt payments -0.44% 0.81% -0.23% 0.70% 0.15% 4.67% -0.56% 3.76% 0.04% 
Mortgages 0.29% 1.25% 1.51% 0.95% 2.06% 3.82% 0.95% 3.30% 0.05% 
Consumer debt -0.40% -0.56% -1.61% -0.57% -1.92% -0.49% -1.57% -0.33% -0.51% 
Revolving debt -0.33% 0.12% -0.13% 0.33% 0.02% 1.35% 0.06% 0.79% 0.49% 
          
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Top 10% vs. bottom 90% of income distribution 
The purpose of decomposing the wealth and income gap between the bottom 90% and the top 10% 
of the income distribution is to assess which asset and debt holdings contributed to the 
concentration of wealth and income at the top of the distribution. Thus, we evaluate the validity of 
the proposed balance sheet composition underlining the three-class conceptualisation of the 
household sector in the stock-flow consistent model developed in Chapter 3, gauging the 
differences between the top group of households and the rest of the distribution. 
Wealth inequality 
Table 4.16 shows results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the net wealth gap between 
households in the bottom 90% of the income distribution vs. households in the top 10%. The net 
wealth gap in the logarithmic terms is estimated to have risen steadily over time, from 2.58 in 
1989 to 2.98 in 2013. Differences in endowments explained by the proposed regression model 
accounted for the largest portion of the net wealth gap, falling over time from 156.2% in 1989 to 
144.7% in 2013.  
Balance sheet variables explained the largest albeit declining portion of the endowments gap 
between the bottom 90% and the top 10% of the income distribution, while the contribution of 
household characteristics is estimated to be lower and have increased over time. 
Among balance sheet variables, assets are found to contribute more to the endowments gap 
as debt is estimated to have a reducing effect. Differences in asset holdings across the bottom 90% 
and the top 10% explained 86.7% of the endowments gap in 1989, increasing to 87.1% in 2013, 
with an average peak of 91.4% over 1995-2001. In contrast, the impact of debt was negative at -
2.3% in 1989, rising in absolute terms to -14.2% in 2010 and reaching -6.3% in 2013. However, 
the contribution of disparities in debt ownership to the explained wealth concentration was 
temporarily positive averaging 2.8% immediately before and during the crisis in 2004-2007.  
Among assets, non-financial assets explained more of the differences in endowments 
between the bottom 90% and the top 10% of the income distribution than financial assets. 
Differences in non-financial asset holdings between the two groups accounted for 61.3% of the 
endowments gap in 1989, declining to 44.9% in 2007, before reaching 60.7% in 2013. In turn, 
differences in the holdings of financial assets explained 25.5% of the differences in endowments 
across the two groups, rising to 26.5% in 2013. 
Among non-financial assets, differences in the holdings of primary residence as well as 
vehicles and other non-financial assets accounted for the greatest and increasing portion of the 
endowments gap. In contrast, the contribution of differences in the holdings of other real estate 
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and business equity to the endowments gap between the bottom 90% and the top 10% decreased 
over time. 
Among financial assets, differences in holdings of retirement and insurance assets 
contributed the most to the endowments gap between the bottom 90% and the top 10% of the 
income distribution, followed by financial investment assets. The contribution of differences in the 
holdings transaction accounts to the gap in endowments between the bottom 90% and the top 10% 
was mixed between 1989-2013, fluctuating around positive and negative values.  
Among debt components, secured debt is estimated to have a larger reducing effect on the 
differences in endowments across the bottom 90% and the top 10% than unsecured debt, although 
its impact turned briefly positive before the Great Recession. Differences in secured debt holdings 
across the two groups reduced the endowments gap by an average of 2.8% between 1989-2001, 
turning positive at an average of 3.7% over 2004-2007 before returning to a negative contribution 
since 2010. This was driven by the impact of differences in debt secured by primary residence. In 
contrast, the contribution of differences in the holdings of mortgages secured by other real estate 
was positive albeit lower throughout the period. 
Conversely, differences in the unsecured debt holdings contributed positively to widen the 
differences in endowments between the bottom 90% and the top 10% of the income distribution 
over 1989-1992, averaging 0.3%. However, since 1992 this effect turned negative, rising in 
absolute terms from -0.02% in 1995 to -1.1% in 2013. This was driven by changes in the 
contribution of differences in the instalment debt holdings as disparities in credit card debt 
holdings contributed positively to the endowments gap over the period, although the magnitude of 
this effect was low.  
Among household characteristics, disparities in net wealth due to educational attainment, 
marital status, and labour force participation are estimated to have the largest contribution to the 
differences in endowments between the bottom 90% and the top 10% of the income distribution, 
followed by race, gender, and self-employment. The impact of differences in age across the two 
groups was mixed in the period. 
In sum, results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the net wealth gap between 
households in the bottom 90% and the top 10% of the income distribution show that wealth 
inequality between these two groups was driven primarily by differences in the ownership of 
primary residence, vehicles and other non-financial assets, and retirement and insurance assets, as 
well as disparities across the levels of educational attainment, marital status, labour force 
participation, and, to a lesser extent, race, gender, and self-employment. Importantly, the 
ownership of financial investment assets became a greater determinant of wealth concentration at 
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the top decile before the Great Recession and in the most recent wave of the data. This supports 
our inclusion of securitised financial assets in the balance sheet of rentiers in the stock-flow 
consistent model in Chapter 3. Moreover, we find that the overall contribution of debt to the 
explained wealth concentration was negative in the period, which supports the inclusion of rentier 
debt in the Chapter 3 model by highlighting the incorporated differences in debt accumulation 
motives between the middle class and the rentiers. 
Income inequality 
To assess the impact of income flows associated with wealth composition on income 
concentration, Table 4.17 presents results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the net income 
gap between households in the bottom 90% of the income distribution vs. households in the top 
10%. The income gap is estimated to have increased over time, from 1.85 in the logarithmic terms 
in 1989 to 1.99 in 2013. The majority of the income gap is explained by differences in 
endowments across households in the bottom 90% and the top 10% of income distribution.  
Differences in receipts of the various income components between the bottom 90% and the 
top 10% of the distribution accounted for the greatest portion of the differences in endowments 
explaining the net wealth gap. In contrast, the impact of household characteristics on the 
differences in endowments across the bottom 90% and the top 10% decreased over time. 
Differences in debt payments across the two groups accounted for a lower and a decreasing 
portion of the gap in endowments in the period studied. 
Among income components, differences in wages across the bottom 90% and the top 10% 
explained the largest part of the gap in endowments, falling from 59.3% in 1989 to 54% in 2013, 
with a peak of 70.1% in 1995. Differences in capital income accounted for 21.9% of the gap in 
endowments across the two groups, increasing to 41.2% in 2013, with the highest contribution of 
48% in the crisis in 2007. This was driven by the high and increasing contribution of differences in 
business income and capital gains to the endowments gap between the bottom 90% and the top 
10%, followed by the differences in interest and dividend income and, to a smaller extent, 
disparities in social security and retirement income. Furthermore, the contribution of transfer 
income to the endowments gap between the bottom 90% and the top 10% of the income 
distribution was positive, declining from 1.3% in 1989 to an average of 0.5% between 1992-2010 
before rising to 2.5% in 2013. 
Among household characteristics, educational attainment, labour force participation, and 
marital status contributed the most to widening of the differences in endowments between the 
bottom 90% and the top 10% of the income distribution, followed by disparities across gender, 
race, age, and the number of children. The impact of these household variables declined between 
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1989-2013, with a minor pickup in the last wave of the data. Moreover, the contribution of self-
employment to the explained income gap between the top 10% and the bottom 90% was mixed 
and fluctuated between positive and negative values over time.  
Among debt payments, differences in mortgage payments between the bottom 90% and the 
top 10% of the income distribution explained the largest part of the differences in endowments in 
1989 at 2.9%, but this effect declined over time to an average of 0.2% over 2004-2010, turning 
negative at -0.5% in 2013. Similarly, the contribution of differences in consumer debt payments to 
the endowments gap across the two groups was greater in the first half of the period, rising from 
0.4% in 1989 to 0.9% in 1998, falling thereafter to reach 0.2% in 2013. Lastly, differences in the 
revolving debt payments declined steadily over time, from 1.7% in 1989 to an average of 0.03% 
over 2001-2013. 
Overall, results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the income gap between households 
in the bottom 90% and the top 10% of the income distribution reveal that disparities in wage 
receipts were the main driver of income inequality across the two groups between 1989-2013. This 
validates the inclusion of the rentier wage in the rentier income equation in the stock-flow 
consistent model in Chapter 3. Moreover, the finding that the contribution of disparities in capital 
income, particularly business income and capital gains, increased overtime also supports our 





















Table 4.16 Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the Top 10%–Bottom 90% net wealth gap 
Log Net Worth 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
Top 10% 13.57 13.29 13.29 13.54 13.92 13.98 14.14 13.97 14.03 
Bottom 90% 10.99 10.94 11.05 11.18 11.33 11.27 11.37 11.13 11.06 
Difference 2.58 2.35 2.24 2.36 2.59 2.71 2.77 2.84 2.98 
Endowments 156.21% 155.38% 146.43% 170.89% 170.29% 154.70% 157.25% 115.23% 144.71% 
Coefficients 74.32% 69.54% 77.19% 75.29% 69.48% 71.79% 70.70% 66.99% 72.08% 
Interaction -130.52% -124.92% -123.63% -146.17% -139.77% -126.48% -127.95% -82.22% -116.79% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Endowments          
Household characteristics 15.55% 14.54% 15.56% 12.18% 11.35% 17.84% 16.53% 25.67% 19.18% 
Age 0.33% -1.04% 0.36% -0.35% -0.15% 0.61% 0.77% 0.65% 0.24% 
Educational attainment 5.04% 5.29% 5.21% 5.22% 5.02% 7.01% 6.50% 10.73% 8.61% 
Female 1.76% 1.19% 0.75% 1.23% 1.52% 3.47% 2.41% 2.83% 1.25% 
Black/Hispanic 1.95% 1.16% 2.21% 1.11% 1.70% 1.93% 1.86% 2.83% 2.25% 
Single 3.31% 3.45% 3.00% 2.62% 1.28% 1.36% 1.54% 3.77% 3.13% 
Number of children 0.02% -0.67% -0.30% -0.23% 0.00% 0.04% 0.03% -0.02% 0.04% 
Self-employed 1.86% 2.46% 1.51% 1.31% 0.52% 2.03% 1.83% 1.79% 1.39% 
Out of labour force 1.27% 2.71% 2.81% 1.27% 1.46% 1.39% 1.59% 3.08% 2.27% 
Balance sheet variables 84.45% 85.46% 84.44% 87.82% 88.65% 82.16% 83.47% 74.33% 80.82% 
Assets 86.73% 87.11% 94.89% 88.61% 90.80% 79.44% 80.56% 88.57% 87.14% 
Non-financial 61.25% 49.83% 58.55% 48.02% 65.48% 48.31% 44.90% 78.32% 60.67% 
Primary residence 40.62% 41.03% 49.85% 31.31% 37.71% 34.90% 33.03% 70.15% 45.23% 
Other real estate 6.60% 0.78% 2.17% 1.29% 2.87% 6.34% 3.24% 0.01% 0.27% 
Vehicles and other 7.78% 6.81% 4.81% 11.44% 20.08% 8.02% 6.28% 9.15% 16.21% 
Business equity 6.25% 1.21% 1.72% 3.98% 4.82% -0.95% 2.35% -0.98% -1.04% 
Financial 25.48% 37.27% 36.34% 40.59% 25.32% 31.13% 35.65% 10.25% 26.47% 
Transaction 
accounts 
-0.44% 9.48% 3.77% 9.77% 3.87% -3.20% 11.87% 0.46% -1.64% 
Financial 
investment assets 
8.84% 6.03% 4.20% 12.84% 2.81% 13.81% -2.16% -0.89% 9.43% 
Retirement and 
insurance assets 
17.08% 21.77% 28.37% 17.98% 18.64% 20.51% 25.94% 10.68% 18.68% 
Debt -2.29% -1.65% -10.45% -0.79% -2.15% 2.72% 2.91% -14.24% -6.32% 
Secured -1.84% -1.03% -9.92% 0.44% -1.43% 3.42% 4.03% -12.81% -5.48% 
By primary 
residence 
-3.33% -0.92% -11.76% -0.21% -2.53% 2.94% 2.44% -13.92% -6.67% 
By other real estate 1.49% -0.12% 1.85% 0.66% 1.10% 0.48% 1.60% 1.11% 1.19% 
Unsecured 0.44% 0.23% -0.02% -0.45% -0.15% -0.46% -0.73% -1.20% -1.07% 
Instalment debt 0.42% 0.05% -0.14% -0.24% -0.18% -0.73% -0.32% -1.29% -1.10% 
Credit card balances 0.02% 0.17% 0.13% -0.21% 0.03% 0.27% -0.41% 0.08% 0.03% 
Other debt -0.89% -0.85% -0.51% -0.78% -0.57% -0.24% -0.39% -0.22% 0.23% 
          


















     
 
Table 4.17 Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the Top 10%–Bottom 90% income gap 
Log Income 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
Top 10% 12.33 12.21 12.24 12.34 12.55 12.52 12.61 12.53 12.56 
Bottom 90% 10.48 10.43 10.44 10.54 10.64 10.64 10.65 10.61 10.57 
Difference 1.85 1.79 1.80 1.80 1.91 1.88 1.95 1.92 1.99 
Endowments 139.43% 120.23% 166.11% 178.34% 207.62% 275.17% 332.98% 301.89% 307.39% 
Coefficients 82.41% 82.34% 86.01% 82.17% 81.82% 83.33% 75.42% 78.04% 77.62% 
Interaction -121.85% -102.57% -152.12% -160.50% -189.44% -258.50% -308.40% -279.93% -285.01% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
          
Endowments          
Household characteristics 12.51% 15.23% 9.37% 7.81% 6.44% 2.56% 2.09% 1.80% 2.46% 
Age 0.33% 0.00% 0.17% 0.15% 0.09% 0.09% 0.07% 0.09% 0.10% 
Educational attainment 3.97% 5.21% 2.61% 2.57% 2.69% 0.61% 0.57% 0.48% 0.48% 
Female 1.03% 1.02% 1.58% 1.11% 0.67% 0.50% 0.17% 0.16% 0.02% 
Black/Hispanic 1.78% 0.79% 0.91% 0.61% 0.47% 0.14% 0.15% 0.05% 0.10% 
Single 2.48% 3.72% 1.44% 1.32% 1.40% 0.61% 0.52% 0.44% 0.90% 
Number of children 0.16% 0.34% 0.04% 0.11% 0.03% 0.10% 0.01% 0.06% 0.07% 
Self-employed 0.71% -0.11% 0.39% 0.25% -0.23% -0.27% -0.09% -0.04% 0.16% 
Out of labour force 2.06% 4.25% 2.22% 1.68% 1.31% 0.78% 0.69% 0.56% 0.63% 
          
Income components 82.56% 78.78% 86.45% 87.54% 91.26% 97.01% 97.50% 97.74% 97.72% 
Wages 59.29% 62.02% 70.12% 59.15% 61.56% 58.40% 49.28% 62.26% 53.98% 
Capital income 21.97% 16.70% 15.66% 27.51% 28.78% 38.18% 48.02% 34.84% 41.20% 
Business income 1.51% 3.47%     1.49% 5.63% 8.54% 20.38% 24.21% 22.93% 20.00% 
Interest and dividends 4.46% 13.49% 11.55%      6.09% 2.38%    6.42% 7.30%     6.36% 6.02% 
Capital gains 14.30% -0.18% 1.02%    15.01%   17.37% 8.81%     14.48% 3.40% 10.97% 
Social security and 
retirement 
1.70% -0.08% 1.59%    0.78% 0.49% 2.57% 2.03% 2.15% 4.21% 
Transfer income 1.30% 0.06% 0.67% 0.87% 0.91% 0.43% 0.20% 0.64% 2.54% 
          
Debt payments 4.93% 5.99% 4.18% 4.65% 2.30% 0.43% 0.41% 0.47% -0.18% 
Mortgages 2.89% 4.52% 3.40% 3.64% 1.75% 0.05% 0.13% 0.31% -0.45% 
Consumer debt 0.36% 0.75% 0.50% 0.85% 0.52% 0.31% 0.27% 0.16% 0.22% 
Revolving debt 1.68% 0.72% 0.27% 0.16% 0.03% 0.07% 0.02% 0.00% 0.05% 
          
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Bottom 20% vs. top 80% of income distribution 
The decomposition of the income and wealth gap between the bottom 20% and the top 80% of the 
income distribution enables us to assess the validity of the constructed balance sheet composition 
of the bottom group in the three-class household sector proposed in the stock-flow consistent 
model. We analyse the contribution of the differences in balance sheet composition to inequality 
between the lowest income group and the rest of the distribution, which indirectly evaluates the 
distinction between the middle and the working class based on homeownership undertaken in the 
model in Chapter 3. 
Wealth inequality 
Table 4.18 presents results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the net wealth gap between 
households in the bottom 20% of income distribution vs. households in the top 80%. The wealth 
gap is estimated to have increased over time from 2.14 in the logarithmic terms in 1989 to 2.24 in 
2013. The majority of the wealth gap is explained by the regression model, as differences in 
endowments contributed 253.2% in 1989, falling to 119.8% in 2013.  
Balance sheet variables explained the majority of the differences in endowments between 
the bottom 20% and the top 80%, falling over time due to the decline in the contribution of debt, 
which fluctuated between positive and negative values over time. In contrast, differences in asset 
holdings between the two groups explained a larger and increasing part of the endowments gap 
between 1989-2013. Similarly, the impact of household characteristics on the differences in 
endowments increased in this period, but its magnitude was comparatively low. 
Among asset holdings, non-financial assets are estimated to have contributed more to the 
differences in endowments between the bottom 20% and the top 80% than financial assets. 
Disparities in non-financial asset ownership across the two groups explained 63.5% of the 
endowments gap in 1989, increasing to an average of 70.2% over 2007-2013. This was driven by 
the contribution of differences in the holdings of primary residence, which rose between 1989-
2013. Similarly, the impact of differences in the ownership of vehicles and other non-financial 
assets on the endowments gap between the two groups increased in the period. In contrast, the 
contribution of differences in business equity and other real estate holdings was mixed over time 
and fluctuated between positive and negative values. 
Moreover, financial assets explained 21.7% of the differences in endowments between the 
bottom 20% and the top 80% in 1989, increasing to 32.4% in 2013, with a negative impact of -
7.3% in 2010 immediately after the financial crisis. Among financial assets, differences in the 
ownership of retirement and insurance assets explained the largest part of the endowments gap 
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between the bottom 20% and the top 80%, while the contribution of disparities in transaction 
accounts and financial investment assets fluctuated between positive and negative values between 
1989-2013. 
Among debt components, secured debt is estimated to have a greater negative effect on the 
differences in endowments between the bottom 20% and the top 80% than unsecured debt. 
Differences in the holdings of secured debt between the two groups reduced the endowments gap 
by 7.3% in 1989, increasing in absolute terms to an average of -29.5% over 2010-2013. This was 
driven by changes in the contribution of differences in holdings of debt secured by primary 
residence, while the contribution of differences in the holdings of debt secured by other real estate 
fluctuated in the period. Furthermore, differences in unsecured debt holdings explained 24.8% of 
the endowments gap between the bottom 20% and the top 80% of the income distribution in 1989, 
declining to -4.2% in 2013. This was driven by changes in the contribution of differences in 
instalment debt holdings, as the impact of differences in the credit card debt holdings was 
comparatively higher and increased between 1989-2013. In contrast, the contribution of 
differences in other debt holdings to the endowments gap rose from -2.9% in 1989 to 6% in 2007 
during the crisis, declining to an average of 0.1% over 2010-2013. 
Among household characteristics, differences in the level of educational attainment, labour 
force participation, marital status, as well as gender and race accounted for the largest part of the 
endowments gap between the bottom 20% and the top 80% of the income distribution. 
Furthermore, the contribution of differences in net wealth between self-employed households and 
others was positive but low between 1989-2013, while the impact of disparities in the number of 
children was mixed. In contrast, differences in age had a negative effect on the endowments gap 
between the bottom 20% and the top 80%, and the effect increased in absolute terms over time. 
Overall, results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the net wealth gap between 
households in the bottom 20% and in the top 80% of the income distribution show that wealth 
inequality among these groups between 1989-2013 was driven by primarily the differences in the 
ownership of main residence, vehicles and other non-financial assets, as well as disparities in 
educational attainment and labour force participation. This supports the differentiation of the 
middle class from the working class in the stock-flow consistent model in Chapter 3 by their 
homeownership. Moreover, the increasing contribution of differences in the ownership of 
retirement and insurance assets to the explained wealth inequality between these groups signals 
that households in the bottom quintile had a more limited access to private pension wealth than 
households in the top 80%. Furthermore, the declining contribution of differences in secured debt 
coupled with the rising impact of the disparities in credit card balances on the explained wealth 
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inequality across these two groups supports the distinction between secured and unsecured debt in 
the stock-flow consistent model, and its allocation to the middle and the working class 
respectively.  
Income inequality 
To understand the impact of wealth composition on income inequality, Table 4.19 shows results of 
the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the net income gap between households in the bottom 20% 
of income distribution vs. households in the top 80%. In contrast to net wealth inequality, the 
income gap in the logarithmic terms is estimated to have fallen over time, after an initial increase 
from 1.8 in 1989 to 1.84 in 1998, to 1.64 in 2010, rising to 1.67 in 2013. Differences in 
endowments explained by the regression model accounted for the largest part of the net income 
gap over time, increasing from 34.2% in 1989 to 484.5% in 2013. 
Differences in income components are estimated to have the highest contribution to the 
differences in endowments between households in the bottom 20% vs. the top 80% of the income 
distribution. The contribution of household characteristics and debt payments was mixed between 
1989-2013, fluctuating between positive and negative values. 
Among income components, differences in wage receipts contributed the most to the 
endowments gap between the bottom 20% and the top 80%, increasing from an average of 69.3% 
over 1989-1992 to 110.7% in 1995 before declining to 69.6% in 2013. Disparities in the receipts 
of capital income initially reduced the endowments gap by an average of 10.7% in 1989 and 1995, 
turning positive in 1998 and increasing to 30.7% in 2013. This was driven by the high contribution 
of differences in the receipts of business income, capital gains, and social security and retirement 
income to the endowments gap between the two groups. In contrast, differences in the receipts of 
interest and dividend income accounted for a lower portion of the endowments gap, and the 
contribution was initially negative. Moreover, differences in the receipts of transfer income 
contributed to widening of the differences in endowments across the bottom 20% and the top 80% 
by 12.6% in 1992, decreasing to 0.1% in 2013, with a negative effect averaging -0.9% in the 
remaining waves. This indicates that the social transfer policy in the USA in that period failed to 
target the poorest households in the bottom quintile of the distribution.  
Among household characteristics, disparities across race, level of educational attainment, 
and the number of children have had the highest contribution to the differences in endowments 
between the bottom 20% and the top 80% of the income distribution. The contribution of income 
disparities due to differences in gender, labour force participation, marital status, and self-
employment was mixed in the period, while differences in age contributed to reducing the 
endowments gap. 
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Among debt payments, differences in payments on revolving debt had the highest 
contribution to the endowments gap between households in the bottom 20% vs. in the top 80% of 
the income distribution, falling from 16.3% in 1989 to 0.04% in 2013, with a marginally negative 
effect in 1998 and 2004. Similarly, differences in mortgage payments across the two groups 
accounted for 4.5% of the endowments gap in 1989, turning negative in 1992 and reaching -0.1% 
in 2013. In contrast, the impact of differences in payments on consumer debt on the endowments 
gap between the bottom 20% and the top 80% increased over time, from -2.3% in 1989 to a 
positive average of 0.3% over 1998-2001, declining to 0.02% in 2013. 
Overall, results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the income gap between the bottom 
20% and the top 80% of the income distribution show that differences in wages across the two 
groups contributed the most to income inequality explained by the proposed regression model. 
Nevertheless, differences in capital income receipts, particularly business income, capital gains, 
and social security and retirement income, have become greater determinants of inequality, 
particularly since the mid-2000s. The importance of capital gains supports the validity of 
introducing the middle class into the household sector in the stock-flow consistent model in 
Chapter 3 based on homeownership and recognising the growing heterogeneity of wealth towards 
the bottom of the distribution. This is also motivated by the increasing wealth gap between the 




















Table 4.18 Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the Bottom 20%–Top 80% net wealth gap 
Log Net Worth 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
Top 80% 11.60 11.49 11.59 11.79 11.97 11.96 12.03 11.81 11.79 
Bottom 20% 9.43 9.71 9.88 9.79 9.85 9.73 9.99 9.67 9.55 
Difference 2.17 1.79 1.71 2.00 2.12 2.23 2.04 2.14 2.24 
Endowments 253.16% 133.48% 83.75% 163.63% 145.83% 107.39% 152.98% 60.45% 119.76% 
Coefficients 60.02% 61.60% 62.48% 61.85% 65.08% 61.30% 60.72% 60.88% 57.01% 
Interaction -213.18% -95.08% -46.22% -125.48% -110.91% -68.69% -113.69% -21.34% -76.77% 
Total 11.60 11.49 11.59 11.79 11.97 11.96 12.03 11.81 11.79 
Endowments          
Household characteristics 0.20% 9.79% 19.49% 2.25% 4.48% 14.23% 14.37% 37.11% 26.04% 
Age -1.83% -10.04% -11.07% -3.40% -5.05% -5.41% -7.38% -7.28% -4.02% 
Educational attainment -1.18% 3.63% 3.56% 2.75% 5.23% 4.86% 9.37% 16.57% 9.09% 
Female 3.30% -1.11% -1.70% -1.66% -0.86% 11.73% 2.52% 12.45% 0.26% 
Black/Hispanic 0.84% 1.94% 5.84% 0.12% 2.68% 2.92% 0.91% 3.68% 2.59% 
Single 0.42% 6.72% 10.20% 4.32% 1.17% -5.64% 2.49% 1.54% 7.02% 
Number of children 0.28% -1.46% -5.62% -1.19% -0.52% 1.27% -0.32% 5.22% 1.27% 
Self-employed 0.38% 2.57% 2.60% 0.30% -0.61% 1.22% 1.81% 0.60% 0.56% 
Out of labour force -2.00% 7.54% 15.68% 1.01% 2.46% 3.29% 4.97% 4.32% 9.27% 
Balance sheet variables 99.80% 90.21% 80.51% 97.75% 95.52% 85.77% 85.63% 62.89% 73.96% 
Assets 85.18% 122.24% 115.55% 89.26% 119.24% 95.53% 81.82% 76.68% 105.01% 
Non-financial 63.50% 82.39% 112.53% 53.07% 116.75% 92.48% 53.98% 83.93% 72.62% 
Primary residence 47.88% 56.95% 89.58% 40.96% 63.15% 88.81% 49.94% 83.62% 56.20% 
Other real estate 3.06% 8.44% 4.26% -4.83% 7.38% 5.17% -3.04% 0.32% -3.19% 
Vehicles and other 0.94% 17.99% 20.33% 15.17% 38.43% 4.59% 8.80% 1.21% 21.53% 
Business equity 11.62% -0.99% -1.64% 1.77% 7.79% -6.10% -1.72% -1.23% -1.91% 
Financial 21.68% 39.85% 3.01% 36.18% 2.49% 3.05% 27.84% -7.25% 32.39% 
Transaction 
accounts 
4.25% 12.99% 2.50% 1.80% 0.47% -9.36% -2.85% 8.58% -5.08% 
Financial 
investment assets 
8.24% 7.47% -1.56% 2.68% -5.18% -4.67% 0.27% -1.24% 6.37% 
Retirement and 
insurance assets 
9.20% 19.38% 2.06% 31.70% 7.20% 17.07% 30.41% -14.59% 31.10% 
Debt 14.62% -32.03% -35.03% 8.49% -23.72% -9.75% 3.81% -13.78% -31.05% 
Secured -7.29% -30.51% -51.13% 2.64% -22.89% -29.58% -0.75% -31.93% -27.04% 
By primary 
residence 
-5.96% -13.03% -53.72% -0.52% -14.33% -27.35% -1.55% -30.13% -26.90% 
By other real estate -1.33% -17.47% 2.59% 3.16% -8.56% -2.23% 0.80% -1.80% -0.13% 
Unsecured 24.75% -1.34% 13.24% 6.84% 0.37% 19.78% -1.42% 18.21% -4.19% 
Instalment debt 6.72% -0.50% 8.65% 6.17% -1.23% 8.63% -1.87% -0.11% -7.94% 
Credit card balances 18.04% -0.84% 4.58% 0.66% 1.60% 11.14% 0.45% 18.32% 3.76% 
Other debt -2.85% -0.18% 2.86% -0.99% -1.20% 0.05% 5.98% -0.06% 0.17% 


















      
 
Table 4.19 Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the Bottom 20%–Top 80% income gap 
Log Income 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
Top 80% 11.01 10.96 10.99 11.07 11.19 11.18 11.19 11.12 11.10 
Bottom 20% 9.21 9.16 9.09 9.24 9.37 9.39 9.46 9.48 9.43 
Difference 1.80 1.80 1.90 1.84 1.81 1.79 1.73 1.64 1.67 
Endowments 34.16% 143.05% 94.26% 151.21% 233.30% 286.05% 365.84% 372.40% 484.54% 
Coefficients 60.78% 62.80% 66.38% 64.87% 63.25% 63.48% 60.45% 61.50% 58.14% 
Interaction 5.06% -105.85% -60.64% -116.09% -196.54% -249.52% -326.29% -333.90% -442.68% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
          
Endowments          
Household characteristics 13.44% 2.54% 4.25% 2.02% 0.62% -0.26% 0.39% -0.33% -0.33% 
Age -0.16% -0.45% -0.94% -0.34% 0.02% -0.02% -0.10% -0.01% -0.01% 
Educational attainment 6.03% -0.03% -0.29% 0.86% 0.74% -0.27% -0.06% 0.05% -0.06% 
Female -0.86% 1.02% 2.24% 0.18% -0.26% 0.43% -0.19% -0.02% -0.10% 
Black/Hispanic 6.87% 1.00% 1.67% 0.53% -0.22% -0.02% 0.01% -0.06% 0.00% 
Single 0.45% -1.14% -1.57% -0.58% 0.83% -0.61% 0.41% -0.07% 0.07% 
Number of children 6.06% 0.18% 0.36% -0.08% -0.01% 0.11% -0.01% 0.06% -0.04% 
Self-employed -0.17% 0.38% 0.51% 0.31% -0.64% -0.08% 0.09% 0.04% 0.01% 
Out of labour force -4.78% 1.58% 2.29% 1.14% 0.16% 0.18% 0.24% -0.31% -0.19% 
          
Income components 68.04% 103.15% 92.04% 98.98% 98.78% 101.00% 100.64% 101.29% 100.41% 
Wages 72.66% 65.89% 110.68% 80.16% 86.82% 77.47% 71.60% 76.64% 69.60% 
Capital income -4.38% 24.61% -17.03% 19.32% 11.80% 24.28% 29.96% 25.87% 30.71% 
Business income 1.45% 11.13%     2.60% 6.54% 6.98% 13.08% 15.88% 15.80% 15.33% 
Interest and dividends -4.84% 6.84% 0.90%      4.27% 0.96%    2.07% 4.53%     1.07% 3.14% 
Capital gains -9.47% 3.46% -27.38%      4.70%     1.82% 2.47%     5.93% 2.35% 4.48% 
Social security and 
retirement 
8.49% 3.18% 6.85% 3.81% 2.04% 6.66% 3.62% 6.64% 7.76% 
Transfer income -0.25% 12.64% -1.61% -0.50% 0.15% -0.75% -0.92% -1.22% 0.10% 
          
Debt payments 18.53% -5.69% 3.70% -0.99% 0.60% -0.74% -1.02% -0.97% -0.08% 
Mortgages 4.51% -6.32% 1.28% -1.28% -0.43% -0.89% -1.51% -1.06% -0.13% 
Consumer debt -2.30% 0.22% 0.22% 0.33% 0.26% 0.20% 0.19% -0.01% 0.02% 
Revolving debt 16.32% 0.41% 2.21% -0.04% 0.77% -0.05% 0.30% 0.10% 0.04% 
          
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 




In this subsection, we analysed the determinants of wealth and income inequality between 1989 
and 2013 using the OB decomposition across gender, race, generations, and in more detail across 
the distribution of income between the top 10% and the bottom 90% as well as between the bottom 
20% and the top 80%. We established that disparities in the ownership of primary residence and, 
to a lesser extent, private pension wealth were the main drivers of wealth inequality across the 
analysed subgroups. Similarly, we found that the disparities in wages, business income, capital 
gains, and retirement income contributed the most to income inequality across subgroups, and the 
higher contribution of wages was the most consistent. 
The main original feature of this analysis was to comprehensively examine the intersectional 
nature of income and wealth inequality determined by the heterogeneity of household wealth 
composition. We thus addressed the limitation of the stock-flow consistent model in Chapter 3, 
which did not explicitly account for the social dimension of wealth inequality. Moreover, by 
decomposing the gap in income and wealth gap between the bottom 90% and the top 10%, as well 
as between the bottom 20% and the top 80% of the income distribution, we provided empirical 
support for the proposed construction of the balance sheet structures of the three classes of 
households in the stock-flow consistent model. Specifically, the high contribution of wage 
inequality to the income gap between the top 10% and the bottom 90%, together with the negative 
contribution of debt disparities motivated the inclusion of the rentier wage and the rentier debt in 
the model. Moreover, rising wealth inequality between the bottom 20% and the top 80% driven by 
disparities in homeownership justified the distinction of the middle class from the working class. 
4.4.4. Decomposition analysis summary 
The inequality decomposition analysis in this chapter combined non-parametric and parametric 
approaches to empirically evaluate the finding of the stock-flow consistent model developed in 
Chapter 3 and asses which types of wealth were the key drivers of inequality in the USA between 
1989-2013. The analysis was conducted for both wealth and income, considering the different 
types of assets and liabilities, and the associated income flows from wealth ownership, as well as 
income from employment and transfers. We used three approaches to decompose the level of 
income and wealth inequality over time – the Shorrocks decomposition, the regression-based 
Fields decomposition, and the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition.  
A common conclusion from all three decomposition approaches was that differences in asset 
ownership contributed more to wealth inequality than disparities in debt between 1989-2013. Non-
financial assets were estimated to explain a greater portion of wealth inequality than financial 
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assets. In the parametric approaches, wage income contributed more to income inequality than 
capital income, while in the non-parametric approach the contribution of wages to income 
inequality increased over time. In addition, the parametric approaches estimated a higher 
contribution of debt payments to income inequality than the Shorrocks decomposition. Moreover, 
transfer income was found not to reduce inequality to a great extent, suggesting that the current 
policy of social transfers did not sufficiently alleviate income polarisation in the US society. 
Furthermore, among household characteristics considered in the parametric approaches, 
educational attainment, race, and gender consistently emerged as sizeable determinants of both 
income and wealth inequality. 
Comparison of the results of the Fields decomposition and the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition showed that the precise contribution of income sources, debt payments, and 
balance sheet variables differed substantially across the population, confirming the relevance of 
the intersectional analysis of the research hypothesis. The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition was 
found to give greater weight to capital income and debt holdings than the Fields decomposition, 
emphasising disparities in social security and retirement income, and business income. Moreover, 
the contribution of unsecured debt and financial investment asset ownership to wealth inequality 
increased at various moments of time across the analysed subgroups. 
Results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition supported our argument that wealth 
composition was a substantial driver of wealth and income inequality across gender, race, and 
generations due to the political economy of securitisation and subprime lending discussed by the 
Post-Keynesian analyses of consumption on Chapter 2. We thus addressed the limitation of the 
stock-flow consistent model from Chapter 3, which could not take this social dimension of wealth 
distribution into account. Moreover, the rising wealth inequality between the bottom 20% and the 
top 80% of the income distribution driven by disparities in homeownership, together with the 
increasing contribution of capital gains to income inequality indicated that the introduction of the 
middle class in the household sector in the model based on the differences in homeownership was 
valid. Simultaneously, the increasing contribution of wages alongside capital income and the 
negative impact of debt holdings to the explained inequality between the top 10% and the bottom 
90% motivated our definition of the capitalist class as working rentiers accumulating debt. This 
analysis enabled us to examine how the extreme ends of the distribution differ from the rest, 
providing justification for the division of households in the stock-flow consistent model in Chapter 
3. 
In sum, the decomposition analysis in this chapter showed that in order to understand the 
determinants of income and wealth inequality since the 1980s is it necessary to consider the 
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intersectional dimension of wealth heterogeneity, which generates inequality through disparate 
income flows across households dependent on the absolute size of wealth. We conclude that the 
variation of the decomposition results is not a weakness of the analysis but it rather highlights the 
importance of a comprehensive consideration of wealth composition across the various 
heterogeneous groups in the US society in analysing inequality. Consequently, we refrain from 
choosing the preferred decomposition method. Both the non-parametric and the parametric 
approaches have their merits, keeping in mind their methodological differences. Instead we argue 
that the regression-based techniques of Fields and Oaxaca-Blinder, which allow for correlation 
among the determinants of inequality, need to be complemented by the non-parametric Shorrocks 
decomposition given the potential problems of regression estimation highlighted earlier in this 
chapter, such as endogeneity problems associated with reverse causality. 
4.5. Summary 
The empirical results of the analysis in this chapter confirmed the finding of the stock-flow 
consistent model developed in Chapter 3, namely that differences in wealth composition 
influenced inequality by generating disparities in leverage and the returns to wealth dependent on 
its absolute size. The linear regression analysis, together with the non-parametric median slope 
estimation, established the statistical significance of the relationship between household balance 
sheet composition and relative inequality, measured in terms of the position of household income 
relative to the median. We found that greater relative ownership of primary residence, low-
yielding transaction accounts, and unsecured debt pushed households away from the median 
towards the bottom of the income distribution. In contrast, higher accumulation of business equity, 
high-yielding financial investment assets, secured debt, as well as retirement and insurance assets 
and other property pulled households further away from the median towards the top of the income 
distribution. The latter effects were found to be driven primarily by the processes of securitisation 
and subprime lending between 2001-2007 and were not shared equally across gender, race, and 
generations. 
Moreover, the inequality decomposition analysis assessed the quantitative contribution of 
wealth components and their associated income flows to the absolute measures of wealth and 
income inequality. In addition to business equity, financial investment assets, retirement and 
insurance assets, and their associated income flows, the analysis highlighted the contribution of 
disparities in homeownership and wages in determining wealth and income inequality. These were 
particularly sizeable in generating income and wealth disparities across gender, race, and 
generations. Moreover, the detailed analysis of the gap in income and wealth across the 
distribution, comparing the top 10% to the bottom 90% as well as the bottom 20% to the top 80%, 
243     ––– Chapter 4 ––– 
 
validated the proposed classification of balance sheet structures in the three-class household sector 
developed in the stock-flow consistent model. It confirmed the relevance of including the rentier 
wage, accounting for differences in debt accumulation motives, and distinguishing between the 
working and the middle class based on homeownership in analysing the dynamics of inequality in 
the context of financial sector transformation.  
Overall, our analysis showed that there is a visible intersectional dimension of the impact of 
wealth composition on inequality. While we were not able to resolve the causal debates 
highlighted in Chapter 1, we exposed the role of financial sector transformation in exacerbating 
the racial, gender, and intergenerational disparities in wealth and income through differences in 
household balance sheet composition across these social categories. The high contribution of 
housing to the gender, racial, and intergenerational inequality supported the insights of the Post-
Keynesian analyses of consumption discussed in Chapter 2. These highlighted that the processes 
of securitisation and subprime lending induced an unsustainable accumulation of wealth among 
women, ethnic minorities, and the young, based on leveraged homeownership. This was also 
reflected in the rising contribution of capital gains income to income inequality alongside wages. 
This insight is particularly relevant in light of the restructuring of the US housing market after the 
Great Recession making homeownership more exclusive due to rising house prices. Consequently, 
our analysis shows that disparities in homeownership, together with access to secured debt, 
pension wealth, and high-yielding assets such as business equity and financial investment assets 
continue to define the inequality and the intersectional dimension of income and wealth 
distribution. 
The most original features of our analysis include the application of a combination of 
parametric and non-parametric estimation methods which are commonly used in the income 
inequality literature to analyse the distribution of wealth, particularly in terms of the variance-
based decompositions of Shorrocks and Fields, the quantile regression, and the Theil-Sen median 
slope estimation. Moreover, the linear regression analysis introduces a new specification into the 
inequality determination literature, constructing measures of relative inequality and balance sheet 
composition variables. The main limitation of our approach concerns the potential implications of 
endogeneity, omitted variable bias, heteroscedasticity, and serial correlation for the reliability of 
our parametric results, and the inability to account for correlation among factor components in the 
non-parametric approaches. 
In sum, we establish empirical support for the research hypothesis formalised in the stock-
flow consistent model, answering the final research question regarding the precise channels 
through which wealth ownership influences inequality in the US society. We conclude that 
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analyses which do not explicitly consider wealth distribution cannot fully explain the observed 
increases in income and wealth inequality in the USA since the 1980s. Consequently, the 
consideration of household wealth composition as an independent determinant of inequality with a 
visible intersectional dimension across gender, race, and generations has important policy 
implications. In the next chapter, we analyse how our research findings inform the current policy 
debates on reducing inequality in the literature. 
 




In the previous chapters, we showed that differences in the household balance sheet structures had 
become a significant determinant of the income and wealth distribution in the USA since the 
1980s. Households with more diverse asset portfolios consisting of profitable financial assets, 
business equity, and various types of property were able to accumulate larger returns on their 
wealth and thus enjoy greater income increases than households relying on primary residence and 
low-yielding financial assets as their main source of wealth. The ability to accumulate wealth 
among the low- and middle-income households was undermined by the volatility of house prices 
and became tied to the financial market performance. Given the low valuation of their assets and 
stagnating income growth associated with the broader liberalisation measures in the USA, 
households in the middle and the bottom of the income distribution suffered from higher leverage 
than households at the top, even though the latter group was indebted the most both in terms of the 
value of debt and ownership rates.  
In this chapter, we analyse the policy implications of our research findings that household 
wealth heterogeneity generates inequality because of differences in leverage and the associated 
returns to wealth dependent on its absolute size. We attempt to answer the following questions: 
what policy strategies to alleviate income and wealth inequality have been put forward in the 
literature? Are these policy proposals suitable to tackle inequality in the USA in the context of the 
disparities in household wealth composition across the distribution? What are the implication of 
these policies for the racial, gender, and intergenerational inequality? Finally, what are the 
potential obstacles to implementing these policies in the present US context?  
We first recall policy implications of the existing literature on inequality discussed in 
Chapter 2. From the standpoint of the permanent income hypothesis, inequality is seen as a natural 
outcome of market processes arising due to differences in skills and marginal productivities across 
households. Consequently, the standard recommendation to reduce inequality is investment in 
human capital through education (Murphy/Topel 2016). However, empirical evidence suggests 
that the recently observed decreases in human capital inequality have not been accompanied by 
falling income and wealth inequality (Castelló-Climent/Doménech 2014). In this context, several 
policy proposals explicitly focused on taxation and the distribution of market income and wealth 
have been put forward in the recent literature. We discuss these policy proposals in detail, and 
evaluate their effectiveness in reducing wealth inequality in light of our research findings 
regarding the importance of wealth distribution for overall inequality. We first review the global 
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wealth tax developed by Piketty (2014), followed by Atkinson’s (2015) proposals of reducing 
wealth inequality. Moreover, we discuss Galbraith’s (2016) three-tier approach to inequality 
alleviating policies, extending his recommendations regarding the distribution of income to wealth, 
as well as Stiglitz’s (2012) policy recommendations of improving market transparency. 
These policy proposals are assessed against the questions stated above, highlighting several 
issues for consideration. Firstly, we argue that distinct policy measures targeting wealth inequality 
have greater potential to reduce economic inequality than policies aimed at improving the 
distribution of income alone. Secondly, we argue that taxation would be more effective if 
complemented by policies affecting the distribution of market outcomes. The latter could be 
focused not only on promoting sustainable asset ownership among low-wealth households but also 
on alleviating their debt burden. Such mix of policies is likely to be more successful in promoting 
a more egalitarian distribution of wealth and income in the long run, simultaneously addressing the 
racial, gender, and intergenerational inequalities. 
5.1. Summary of the key policy recommendation in the literature 
In light of Piketty’s (2014) emphasis on the importance of wealth distribution for overall 
inequality, he emphasises the need for policy to explicitly target wealth inequality. Piketty 
advocates the introduction of a progressive global wealth tax, drawing from earlier proposals for 
wealth taxation (Thurston 1963; Thurow 1972; Shakow 1986; Wolff 1995,1996). He puts forward 
several other measures addressing income inequality, such as progressive income taxes, but argues 
that these are not sufficient to reduce the inequality of wealth. This is because income taxes only 
affect returns earned from wealth but not the stock of wealth, which continues to earn large 
returns. In contrast, taxation of wealth directly reduces the amount of wealth which decreases its 
growth (r) relative to income (g). Importantly, such wealth tax must be implemented globally in 
order to escape revenue losses due to tax evasion76 associated with the mobility of wealth. Piketty 
proposes the global wealth tax to be imposed on an annual basis on the value of all assets owned 
by an individual which exceed $1.35 million, less the value of debt. The associated tax rate would 
increase from 1% on net assets valued between $1.35 to $6.75 million to 2% for net asset holdings 
over $6.75 million.  
                                                   
76 It is important to distinguish between tax evasion and tax avoidance. While both practices pose 
problems to effective redistribution, only tax evasion is illegal (cf. Pressman 2016). In contrast, tax 
avoidance is a practice of using the legal system to switch to non-taxable forms of income/wealth to 
reduce tax burden.  
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Wealth taxation is also a part of Atkinson’s (2015) outstanding policy program to combat 
rising inequality in high-income countries. He puts forward 15 comprehensive policy proposals 
and 5 further ideas to pursue to reduce income and wealth inequality. The first four proposals are 
aimed at the distribution of income and concern policies promoting employability-enhancing 
innovation, improving the bargaining power of workers, guaranteed public employment at the 
minimum wage, and a national pay program involving the creation of a new institution called the 
Social and Economic Council. Proposals 12 to 15 concentrate on improving social security 
systems and international cooperation on development issues. 
Proposals 5 to 7 explicitly focus on policies affecting the distribution of wealth. Highlighting 
that there are differences in the rates of return on wealth across households (Piketty’s r), Atkinson 
postulates the establishment of a national savings bonds program with maximum holdings per 
person, which would guarantee a positive rate of return on savings for small savers, thus equalising 
to a certain extent the return on wealth across households (Atkinson 2015:167-8). Furthermore, to 
improve the ability to accumulate wealth among households at the bottom of the distribution, 
Atkinson proposes payment of a capital endowment on reaching adulthood (similar propositions 
were put forward earlier in Sandford 1969; Atkinson 1972; Ackerman/Alstott 1999; 
LeGrand/Nissan 2000). This would be equivalent to a minimum inheritance, and would thus 
alleviate the unequal distribution of bequests, although Atkinson does not specify how much 
should be paid out or whether the use of such capital endowment should be subjected to any 
restrictions (e.g. financing of education). Moreover, in order to improve the intergenerational 
wealth distribution, Atkinson emphasises the importance of building up of net worth by the state 
through accumulating state assets. He thus urges to see beyond national debt towards public assets 
as a part of the economic legacy passed down to the future generations. 
In order to fund the national savings bonds programme, the payments of capital endowment, 
and the acquisition of state assets, Atkinson suggests various progressive income and wealth tax 
reforms in proposals 8 to 11. He postulates to increase the marginal tax rates on personal income 
up to 65% for the top earners. Moreover, he proposes to extend the Earned Income Tax Credit-type 
measures, which exclude wage income from taxes until a certain threshold, to a larger base of low-
income families. In terms of taxing wealth, Atkinson is in favour of replacing the inheritance tax 
with a progressive lifetime capital receipts tax (Atkinson 2015:194). He argues that this would 
increase revenue coming from this form of taxation, which has stood at only around 0.2% of 
national income in the USA since the 1990s (Boadway et al. 2010). Importantly, he advocates 
switching from the present taxation of inheritance upon giving to taxing wealth receipts, which 
would provide greater incentives for spreading wealth more equally. The final form of wealth 
taxation put forward by Atkinson is a progressive property tax linked to the ability to pay.  
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While not explicitly proposed, Atkinson ponders the possibility of introducing an annual 
wealth tax à la Piketty. He is optimistic about its success for two reasons. Firstly, the increasing 
levels of wealth inequality make the need for a general wealth tax more pressing (Weale 
2010:834). Secondly, the accumulation of household wealth has not been a result of rising savings 
but rather of increasing asset prices (Atkinson 2015:200). In fact, the personal savings rate in the 
USA has declined from 13.3% in 1971 to just 2.6% in 2005, stabilising at around 5% since 2014 
(source: BEA 2017). For this reason, the introduction of a wealth tax would not directly impede 
savings as these have not contributed to the observed wealth increases. 
A different distinction between the various areas of policy action to reduce inequality is 
undertaken by Galbraith (2016). He distinguishes between three levels of policy responses to 
inequality, albeit focusing on income – changing the structure of market incomes, redistribution 
through taxes and transfers, and affecting the costs of living through public goods provision or 
taxing sales and consumption. Unionisation, minimum wage policies, national wage bargaining, 
and the Earned Income Tax Credit are some of the more effective measures improving the 
distribution of market incomes. Galbraith argues that promoting education may not be as relevant 
for reducing inequality in the context of today’s corporate structure in the USA as traditionally 
envisaged in the income inequality and poverty literature. This is because income inequality arises 
primarily due to high salaries paid in the highly innovative winner-take-all markets, which are 
restricted to a small number of employees (Galbraith 2016:142). Consequently, unless provided 
publicly at all levels, higher education is bound to exacerbate inequality rather than alleviate it. 
Galbraith argues that progressive income taxation is a more powerful tool of alleviating 
inequality than sales taxes or social insurance policies because it takes into account final household 
welfare. The latter are deemed problematic as they are highly regressive. For instance, non-wage 
income and incomes above a certain threshold are excluded from contributions to Social Security 
and Medicaid. In addition, they may inflate inequality measures while simultaneously creating 
low-income high-wealth households. Furthermore, the disproportionate impact of sales taxes on 
the lower income households is hidden from the conventional income inequality measures, which 
exclude final consumption. 
Moreover, Galbraith considers a financial transaction tax as a means of reducing inequality, 
but he argues that it would have little impact on the structure of market incomes (2016:139). 
However, we argue that financial transaction tax could contribute to reigning in wealth 
concentration at the global level. This is because it could reduce the amount of wealth accumulated 
in the financial sector, thus lowering the value of the associated returns to high-yielding financial 
assets.  
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Galbraith is sceptical about Piketty’s annual wealth tax proposition for two reasons. Firstly, 
problems of valuation make it difficult to adequately assess the value of wealth on an annual basis, 
creating incentives for tax avoidance (for instance by shifting towards tax exempt forms of wealth 
before the valuation date) and generating high costs of detailed record keeping required to 
adequately redistribute wealth (ibid.:156). Secondly, partial liquidation of non-money financial 
assets needed to pay the tax would lower the price of these assets, thus reducing the tax revenue. 
An alternative form of wealth taxation proposed by Galbraith is taxation of land. He argues that 
given the unproductive nature of land, its taxation would have a less damaging effect on incentives 
and could thus face comparatively less opposition than the annual wealth tax (ibid.:159). 
Moreover, the fixed locality of land would make this tax more effective in capturing rents. Similar 
benefits accrue to the estate and gift taxes, which provide a check on today’s outcomes and future 
opportunities, improving the intergenerational distribution of income. 
Taxation and financial sector regulation have also been put forward as the means to reduce 
inequality by Stiglitz (2012). His policy proposals are mainly concerned with reducing income 
inequality through improving market competition and reducing market imperfections which allow 
for rent seeking. Nevertheless, some of his proposals on financial sector reform, bankruptcy laws, 
public investment, taxation, and corporate policy carry positive implications for alleviating wealth 
inequality. Firstly, increasing banking transparency, restricting leverage and excessive risk taking, 
reducing interconnectedness across financial institutions, and regulating predatory lending 
practices are important in curbing the excessive wealth concentration at the top and reducing the 
balance sheet volatility of households towards the middle and the bottom of the distribution. 
Secondly, reforming bankruptcy laws to make them more debtor-friendly has capacity not only to 
discourage lax lending practices by banks, but also to alleviate the high debt burden of highly 
leveraged households. Similar benefit accrues to increasing public investment in education, 
healthcare, social protection programs, and subsidised savings to the poor, which would reduce the 
need for debt accumulation among the low-income households. Moreover, Stiglitz advocates 
increasing the taxation of inheritance to alleviate the intergenerational wealth inequality, as well as 
enforcing more progressive income and corporate taxes to discourage rent seeking. Similarly, 
reducing government subsidies to corporations has capacity to lower the return on business equity 
and reduce the market power of individual firms. 
Like Galbraith, Stiglitz (2014) is also sceptical of Piketty’s global wealth tax proposal. He 
argues that it is politically unfeasible and discourages incentives for productive activities. Instead, 
he proposes to improve the existing income and corporate taxation to promote competition and 
economic efficiency, which would reduce the size and the availability of rents in the economy. For 
this reason, he advocates to gradually phase out tax subsidies such as mortgage deductions, as 
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these narrow the tax base, favour rich homeowners, and encourage excessive borrowing and 
housing consumption, which drives up the prices of housing and allows for rent seeking. This can 
have another positive impact for alleviating wealth inequality by reducing the possibility of tax 
avoidance through accumulating mortgage debt against property wealth by the rich. 
Overall, the above works represent some of the most comprehensive views on the role of 
economic policy in reducing wealth and income inequality. Piketty’s global wealth tax proposal 
seems to be received rather sceptically by other scholars in the field. In the remainder of this 
chapter, we assess these criticisms as well as the rest of the proposed policies to redistribute wealth 
and influence its market distribution. This evaluation is conducted along two lines of argument. 
Firstly, we support Piketty’s call for the necessity to explicitly address the distribution of wealth to 
combat rising economic inequality. Secondly, in line with Galbraith and Stiglitz, we argue that 
taxation is not enough to achieve this goal and needs to be complemented by policies affecting the 
distribution of market wealth as well as measures reducing the debt burden of households towards 
the bottom of the distribution. We support these arguments by analysing the potential implications 
of the discussed policies on the income and wealth disparities across race, gender, and generations, 
which are particularly relevant in the US context. 
5.2. Addressing income vs. wealth inequality 
The research undertaken in this thesis has shown that the dynamics of wealth distribution are 
crucial for understanding inequality in the context of financial sector transformation in the USA 
since the 1980s. This is because of the differences in wealth composition across households, which 
generate disparate flows of capital income as the returns to wealth depend on its absolute size. This 
relationship between wealth heterogeneity and inequality has an intersectional dimension, shaping 
the distribution of income and wealth across class, gender, race, and generations. Consequently, 
policy measures aiming to alleviate inequality without paying explicit attention to the distribution 
and composition of wealth cannot achieve sustained reductions in income and wealth inequality. 
However, paralleling the focus of economic theory, most the existing policy measures to 
reduce inequality have been concentrated on income rather than wealth, regarding income as a 
sufficient tool to alleviate wealth inequality. One argument in favour of this approach states that 
since saving enables the accumulation of wealth, redistribution of income would contribute to 
reducing wealth inequality (Schneider et al. 2016). However, as evidenced by the review of the 
Post-Keynesian literature in Chapter 2, saving rates are heterogeneous among households, and they 
are observed to have fallen since the 1980s. Consequently, redistribution of income by itself 
cannot promote a more equal wealth accumulation through saving. Moreover, since our research 
findings have shown that inequality emerges because the returns to wealth are dependent on its 
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absolute size, taxation of income would not reduce the stocks of wealth holdings, and differences 
in the returns and accumulation of wealth would persist (which parallels Piketty’s argument). For 
this reason, policy aiming to reduce inequality should be explicitly focused on targeting the 
distribution of wealth.   
Among measures addressing income inequality, policies such as cash transfers have been 
implemented to provide income subsidies for those at the bottom of the distribution. In addition, 
redistributive measures taxing saving or consumption have been considered as ways of indirectly 
decreasing wealth inequality (Schneider et al. 2016: 141). However, these forms of taxation are not 
even likely to effectively reduce income inequality as they risk putting a greater tax burden on 
small savers and households towards the middle and the bottom of the distribution, particularly in 
the context of the rising costs of privatised public services (cf. ITEP 2004) and the insufficient 
support of the government income transfers, as evidenced by the decomposition analysis in 
Chapter 4.  
While it is important to target low-income households through income subsidies and 
transfers, it is crucial to address high incomes at the top of the distribution. This would involve 
reigning in high wages earned by executives who earn salaries above their marginal contributions 
to economic productivity, particularly in the financial sector (cf. Arestis et al. 2013, 
Philippon/Reshef 2012). Progressive taxation of earnings with marginal tax rates increasing with 
income has great potential to redistribute wage income more equally. However, since a large part 
of income of households at the top is composed of investment and capital income from wealth 
ownership, income taxation alone is not enough to effectively reduce income inequality. For this 
purpose, it is necessary to explicitly address wealth. 
An alternative way to reduce wealth inequality through income taxation is by increasing the 
corporate income tax as it is the households at the top of the distribution which have the largest 
holdings of the corporate stock. A problem with corporate taxation is that it is enforced at the 
national level, while modern corporations operate as multi-national entities (Pressman 2016:133). 
The ability to shift revenues overseas provides strong incentives for race-to-the-bottom in terms of 
lowering the corporate tax rates across countries. Piketty’s solution to this problem is to base the 
tax on wage payments and sales in a given country rather than corporate revenues (2014:561). 
Pressman (2016:135) argues that such corporate tax reform has potential to influence not only the 
distribution of income but also wealth. This is because it would decrease the future after-tax profits 
of firms, thus reducing the stock valuation and directly affecting wealth holdings of the rich, 
which, as shown by the analyses in Chapter 1 and 4, are composed in large part of business equity.  
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Pressman’s emphasis on the interplay between the corporate income tax and stock valuation 
exposes why income taxation and transfers constitute more of a short run solution to wealth 
inequality in the context of privatised capitalism characteristic of the USA. On the one hand, since 
the concentration of wealth creates a cumulative process of increasing political influence which 
furthers the accumulation of wealth (Piketty 2014; Atkinson 2015), income taxation alone is not 
able to curb the economic power of the rich associated with their large wealth holdings (McCain 
2017:83). On the other hand, while increasing the income flows of those worse off would enable 
them to fund immediate expenses, it would not allow for a sustained accumulation of savings to 
finance education, healthcare, and other investments. It is thus necessary to explicitly target the 
distribution of wealth in order to provide a check on the fortunes amassed at the top of the 
distribution and foster a more sustainable accumulation of wealth and income at the bottom. 
Apart from reducing the economic power and returns to wealth of the richest, taxation of 
wealth holdings would allow to reign in the concentration of wealth by providing incentives to sell 
assets. Greater mobility of wealth across the distribution induced by asset sales is argued to 
increase economic efficiency (Pressman 2016:147) and could also reduce the returns on assets, 
provided that there is enough supply to avoid an asset bubble. 
There are other possible policy strategies focused on income inequality which are not 
explored in this chapter. These include policies improving the stability of employment conditions 
by regulating casual contracts, supporting wages, and enhancing workers’ bargaining power, all of 
which could be a part of the conscious effort by the state to invest in technological progress 
(Mazzucato 2013; Proposals 1, 2, and 3 in Atkinson 2015). This is reminiscent of Minsky’s 
proposal of federal government acting as the employer of last resort, which was argued to raise the 
wage floor and provide public goods and services in high-unemployment areas (Minsky 1965, 
1968, 1973; Wray 2007). 
In sum, the above discussion supports Piketty’s assertion that it is necessary to explicitly 
target the distribution of wealth to address the limitations of the income taxation in reducing 
wealth inequality. This is supported by our research findings that inequality emerges because 
wealth heterogeneity generates unequal capital income flows from returns to wealth, which are 
determined by the absolute size of wealth holdings. In the next section, we investigate the limits of 
wealth taxation proposed in the literature and discuss the alternative strategies to affect the 
distribution of market wealth. 
253     ––– Chapter 5 ––– 
 
5.3. Redistribution vs. affecting market outcomes 
The empirical literature on policy evaluation for income distribution tends to find a stronger 
redistributive effect of cash transfers relative to taxation (Immervoll et al. 2006; Avram et al. 
2014). However, this positive effect is inflated by the state pension provision. When excluded from 
social transfers, taxes are estimated to have a comparatively greater impact on reducing income 
inequality (Guillaud et al. 2017). Such empirical research on the relative merits of wealth taxation 
and direct distribution is yet to be undertaken. The discussion below shows that while most of the 
implemented policies and current policy recommendations focus on taxation, redistributive 
measures would be more effective if accompanied by policies influencing the distribution of 
market wealth. This is because in the present context taxation creates incentives for tax evasion. 
Moreover, our research findings show that there was an increase in the levels of asset 
accumulation among the low- and middle-income households in the USA since the 1980s, which 
was underpinned by the rising leverage levels. Consequently, due to the increased heterogeneity of 
household wealth composition related to the growing holdings of leveraged wealth towards the 
middle and the bottom of the distribution, certain forms of wealth taxation risk targeting 
inappropriate groups of the population. 
5.3.1. Taxation 
The summary of the policy literature above reveals that Piketty’s proposition for the global wealth 
tax has been severely criticised and labelled as utopian on the grounds that it is politically and 
logistically impossible to implement (Pressman 2016). However, in light of our research findings 
we support Piketty’s call for the implementation of an annual wealth tax due to its ability to curb 
the political power associated with the large holdings of wealth. This is because we found that 
returns to wealth became dependent on its absolute size, which was driven by differences in the 
balance sheet composition across the distribution. Households with high wealth earn higher returns 
than households with lower wealth holdings due to their ability to participate in financial securities 
markets, purchase corporate shares, and accumulate secured forms of debt. Moreover, their high 
fortunes allow them to access wealth management funds, whose high fees further boost the returns 
earned on the diversified portfolio of assets.  
Nevertheless, we notice the challenges to the implementation of Piketty’s global wealth tax. 
In addition to the political and the logistic obstacles highlighted by Stiglitz (2014) and Galbraith 
(2016), we support Piketty’s concern that taxation of wealth holdings generates incentives for tax 
avoidance and evasion associated with the mobility of wealth. These are particularly likely in the 
case of financial wealth owned by the richest households, which is highly liquid. The ability to 
shift wealth overseas or to other types of holdings highlights the need for a comprehensive design 
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of the wealth taxation policy, which would capture the diversity of forms which are taken by 
wealth ownership and its associated capital income flows. Consequently, in light of our research 
findings regarding the heterogeneity of household wealth composition and its impact on the 
distribution of income and wealth, we argue that taxation of wealth holdings as envisioned by 
Piketty would be more effective in reducing wealth inequality if complemented by other types of 
taxes. An additional advantage of such a comprehensive taxation reform is that many of these 
alternative forms of taxation are already in place, and their reform would be more feasible to 
implement in the short run than Piketty’s proposition. 
The first alternative form of wealth taxation to be considered is the inclusion of capital gains 
in taxable income. This would prevent large growth of wealth at the top and would provide greater 
financial stability to households in the middle the distribution, who leverage up in the process of 
home equity withdrawal (IMF 2017). At present in the USA, much of the capital income earned on 
high-yielding wealth holdings of the rich is earned from stocks, bonds, and real estate, which are 
all tax-exempt (Pressman 2016:146). Since these are only taxed once sold, gains from these assets 
accumulate tax free (Weale 2010:833-834). For this reason, a progressive capital gains tax has 
potential to immediately redistribute wealth more equally. 
Secondly, progressive taxation of wealth transfers – specifically gifts and bequests – could 
be implemented to avoid the perpetuation of wealth inequality from one generation to the other. In 
US, taxes on estates (i.e. inheritance) are levied on the donor. We support Atkinson’s (2015) call 
for this type of taxation to be collected on receipt, because it would provide incentives for asset 
sales, which under conditions mentioned earlier could result in a more equal distribution. 
However, it has to be emphasised that the estate tax is not enough to reduce wealth inequality 
without a general tax on wealth holdings. This is because there are incentives for the richest to take 
advantage of the existing tax reliefs and pass their wealth throughout their lifetime tax free 
(Boadway et al. 2010). Moreover, current law in the USA only taxes the net value of inheritable 
wealth (IRS 2017). Rich households can thus accumulate mortgage debt to reduce the taxable 
value of their real estate, which does not affect their financial stability as their leverage is kept low 
due to high-yielding asset holdings and high incomes. Consequently, in its current form, the 
inheritance tax may fall disproportionately on households in the middle of the distribution whose 
wealth is tied up in housing. For this reason, taxation of wealth transfers could be extended to 
incorporate transfers among corporations. The financial transactions tax proposed by Galbraith 
(2016) could be particularly powerful in harnessing the large wealth holdings accumulated in the 
financial sector and in reducing the rate of return earned on securities and other financial 
investment assets. Moreover, Atkinson’s (2015) idea of the lifetime capital receipts tax could be 
seriously considered by policymakers. Not only would it diminish the possibilities of spreading 
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wealth transfers throughout lifetime to avoid the inheritance tax, but it could also boost the 
currently small revenues from this type of wealth transfer taxation. 
Thus, in light of our research findings regarding the influence of household wealth 
heterogeneity on inequality, we argue that a comprehensive wealth tax reform including taxes on 
holdings and transfers of wealth has potential to effectively reduce inequality in the USA. Such 
reform could be based on progressive taxes collected as a proportion of wealth holdings above a 
certain tax-free threshold with increasing marginal rates, as well as on increases in wealth through 
a progressive capital gains tax and transaction taxes. Such approach would have an additional 
advantage of being able to dampen the revenue losses from tax evasion and avoidance. This is 
because transactions have locality attached to them. Consequently, taxing wealth transfers between 
individuals as well as financial and non-financial businesses would ensure that redistribution takes 
place in a given tax jurisdiction, so that tax avoidance becomes costly, and high returns on 
financial assets held by households at the top of the distribution are limited. 
McCain (2017) puts forward a similar proposition of complementing the taxation of wealth 
holdings with an additional tax on flows. He proposes that the annual wealth tax be accompanied 
by a tax on net revenue of large businesses, corporations, multinationals, and multi-state 
organisations. The net revenue tax would be imposed on corporate profits net of input costs as well 
as wages and salaries paid within the taxing jurisdiction, but including bonuses paid above a 
certain threshold, transfer payments, and payments for intellectual property rights. It would thus 
replace the corporate income tax and the sales taxes. The major advantage of introducing such net 
revenue tax alongside the tax on wealth holdings is that documented wealth tax payments by a 
company would be deducted from its net revenue, thus reducing the overall tax liability on the 
transaction tax. As such, the combination of the wealth tax on holdings and the net revenue tax 
would discourage tax evasion and avoidance by including capital income earned on business 
equity held by the rich, and providing incentives for tax payments by businesses and high net 
worth individuals, who will “want to report the transaction to save [themselves] taxes” (Higgins 
1968:531; Kaldor 1956b; McCain 2017:78). We argue that McCain’s proposal deserves 
consideration by policymakers for two reasons. Firstly, it provides a more adequate coverage of 
corporate income and wealth than the current corporate income tax, providing a check on the 
income and wealth of the rich derived from business ownership. Secondly, it would dispose of the 
problematic sales taxes, which, as argued before, put a disproportionate tax burden on households 
towards the bottom of the distribution who consume a larger share of their income. 
While the comprehensive wealth tax reform has great potential in alleviating wealth 
inequality, we appreciate that taxation of wealth is problematic. There is a historical record of 
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failed attempts at the wealth tax implementation, such as the fireplace and window taxes in the 17th 
century England, and a more recent rollback of wealth taxes across Europe (Pressman 2016:140-
141). As mentioned before, one of the main reasons for the failure of the domestic wealth tax on 
holdings is the possibility of tax evasion and avoidance. In the absence of global cooperation, there 
are strong incentives for wealth holders to relocate their assets to whichever country offers the 
lowest tax rates, resulting in the estimated $200bn losses in tax revenue around the world (Zucman 
2016). This problem may persist even after introducing a more comprehensive wealth transaction 
tax if costs of moving funds abroad remain low. Thus, a coordinated global effort focused on a 
worldwide system of redistribution may be necessary to reign in the perverse incentives to evade 
taxes, and to alleviate losses in national wealth associated with the shift of the individual and 
corporate wealth to tax havens (Zucman 2016). However, even this may not solve the problem of 
tax avoidance. This is because of the presence of wealth arbitrage. Under the arbitrage, asset 
ownership can be separated from return e.g. through establishing a trust, where a part of wealth is 
sold in exchange for regular interest payments (Pressman 2016:144). This prevents the 
identification of the actual owners of wealth, so that taxes cannot be effectively levied.  
Furthermore, there are other major challenges to the sustainable redistribution of wealth 
apart from tax evasion and tax avoidance, which are partly highlighted by Galbraith (2016) and 
need to be considered in light of our research findings regarding the impact of wealth 
heterogeneity on inequality. Firstly, adequate taxation of wealth faces substantial valuation issues. 
While more frequently traded financial assets and property are evaluated more regularly and thus 
rigorously, consumer durables as well as pension funds and family trusts are more difficult to 
evaluate because they are either sold infrequently or it is complex to identify the actual asset owner 
(Pressman 2016:142). Moreover, most contemporary wealth taxes around the world rely on self-
declared wealth values, which are likely to be underreported (ibid.:145). Furthermore, wealth tax 
in the form proposed by Piketty faces liquidity problems for wealth owners with little income 
flows, such as pensioners, or owners of illiquid assets for whom property is the major source of 
collateral, thus disproportionately affecting the middle-income households (Pressman 2016:143). 
In this situation, in order to pay the tax on wealth, an individual may be forced to borrow even 
more against her wealth, which further perpetuates inequality by increasing household leverage.  
Similar weakness can be attributed to the taxation of wealth components. In the USA, the 
property tax is imposed on the gross value of property wealth, thus ignoring the issue of leverage 
(Pressman 2016:141). Consequently, the greatest tax burden is placed on households in the middle 
of the distribution, whose balance sheets rely on property wealth. For similar reasons, taxation of 
the increases in wealth may be problematic as it can easily miss the target, taxing those down in 
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the distribution whose wealth rises due to the price bubbles occurring in the housing and the 
financial market. 
Overall, the above discussion of the limits to wealth taxation, underpinned by the analysis of 
household balance sheet structures undertaken in this thesis, shows that one of the greatest 
challenges to the design and implementation of an effective wealth tax is ensuring that it accurately 
targets the owners of the highest fortunes. This is evident in the case of income – while top income 
tax rates in the USA have decreased dramatically since the 1940s stabilising at approximately 
35%-40% since the late 1980s, the government tax revenue continues to grow (Pressman 
2016:137). Moreover, recent research indicates that the present structure of the tax relief programs 
is highly regressive – in 2013 the bottom 60% of families received only 12% of funds accruing to 
these programs, while the top 1% obtained over a quarter of the support (Levin et al. 2014:6). This 
highlights the scope for reforming the current mortgage deductions program to increase its 
progressivity. Consequently, in contrast to Stiglitz (2012) who argues for its abandonment, we see 
the potential of the mortgage deduction scheme to effectively reduce wealth inequality by 
alleviating the debt burden of the lower income borrowers. 
In sum, our research findings regarding the increasing heterogeneity of household wealth 
structures can explain why the middle- and low-income households bear an increasing tax burden 
compared to the rich (cf. CBO 2014). This is because wealth taxation which does not consider the 
rise in homeownership and the expansion of private pension schemes among households towards 
the bottom of the distribution may end up targeting those families who already struggle with 
stagnant wage growth, high leverage, and the rising costs of housing, healthcare and education. For 
this reason, the reduction of wealth inequality can be more effective if taxation is accompanied by 
other measures which explicitly target the distribution of market wealth. 
5.3.2. Affecting the distribution of market wealth 
The above discussion of the limitations to wealth taxation highlights that taxation alone may not 
achieve a sustainable reduction in wealth inequality. Thus, in light of our research findings, we 
support Galbraith’s (2012) and Atkinson’s (2015) proposals to develop policy strategies directly 
affecting the distribution of market wealth. We argue that these measures necessitate the 
dedication of public spending and a coherent government-led strategy which would become the 
pinnacle of improving the ex ante distribution of wealth. Such policies could be focused in a 
number of areas – affecting the rates of return earned on various assets, direct wealth transfers to 
low-income households, and asset-building programs, e.g. subsidised saving.  
Measures influencing the rates of return earned of the different types of wealth have a 
potential to reduce wealth inequality by boosting returns for small savers and reigning in high 
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returns earned on business equity and high-yielding financial assets at the top. Atkinson’s (2015) 
proposal 5 is focused on ensuring a guaranteed positive return on savings for small savers and 
lower-income households through the national savings bonds program. This is desirable given our 
finding that returns earned by small savers towards the bottom of the distribution are lower than 
the average rates of return on wealth. Since the wedge between these two rates constitutes an 
income for the financial sector, the national savings bonds program could counteract the incentive 
among financial intermediaries to keep the rate of return for small savers low (Atkinson 2015:167). 
Moreover, policy could affect the rates of return by limiting the charges imposed by the wealth 
management funds (ibid:164). In addition to these measures, as argued above increased financial 
regulation and supervision of the financial sector operations could reign in the high returns earned 
by households at the top of the distribution, who have been the main beneficiaries of financial 
deregulation and innovation since the 1980s. Furthermore, it would act to disassociate the fate of 
highly leveraged wealth owners towards the middle and the bottom of the distribution from the 
whimsies of the financial markets, as was the case in the 2007 crash. 
Furthermore, the government can provide direct wealth payments to individuals subject to 
certain conditions, as put forward by Atkinson (2015) in his proposal 6 of the capital endowment 
payments and proposal 7 of a public Investment Authority running a sovereign fund raising the net 
worth of the state. Moreover, creation of an inclusive social security program is vital to providing a 
sustainable safety net for households at the bottom of the distribution (Atkinson 2015), with 
potential to improve gender and intergenerational inequalities. These policies are important in 
promoting the equality of opportunity in the accumulation of wealth. This is because inclusive 
social security, accumulation of public net worth, and the establishment of the capital endowment 
payments to the young have the capacity to improve wealth accumulation possibilities for 
everyone in the society. Consequently, such policies constitute more long terms solutions to wealth 
inequality. This means that the initial reduction in inequality may be rather small compared to 
other policy measures which explicitly address the excessive concentration of wealth at the top or 
target low wealth households. 
In line with this argument, the ex ante policies can also promote asset holdings and subside 
savings among the poor. This has been the objective of measures proposed and partially 
implemented in the USA such as the Individual Development Accounts (IDAs), the Children’s 
Savings Accounts (CSAs), and the Universal Savings Accounts (USAs). IDAs were implemented 
at the federal and the state level in 1996 as savings accounts drawn from the household earned 
income, which match savings of low-income households with public and privately raised funds. In 
turn, CSAs are federal and state matched savings accounts encouraging investment in education by 
low-income families (Cramer/Newville 2009). After the completion of a college degree, any 
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remaining funds on the CSA can be spent on the accumulation of other assets, e.g. housing. 
Finally, USAs are proposed tax-free savings accounts aimed at small savers, which would be 
available to any adult citizens and permanent residents (US Congress 2017a). Contributions to the 
USAs would resemble the Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) with the difference that funds 
could be withdrawn at any time (versus after retirement under IRAs) and may not exceed $5,500 a 
year. USAs were first introduced to the Senate Committee on Finance in November 2015, but the 
proposal has not been developed since (US Congress 2017a and 2017b). The advantage of such 
measures is that in addition to providing resources to satisfy household financial needs and 
generate opportunities for investment in human and tangible capital, they offer a more sustained 
way out of poverty, allowing households to achieve a degree of long term economic security 
(Sherraden 1991).  
However, while promoting asset ownership among low-income households is important in 
providing a more level playing field for wealth accumulation in the society, our research findings 
regarding the systemic role of finance in influencing the returns earned on wealth highlight the 
challenges of asset-based welfare policies arising from the valuation dynamics. Such policies may 
lead to an unsustainable accumulation of debt among low-income households as the increased 
demand following the promotion of a particular type of asset ownership may drive up its prices. 
This is supported by the example of the UK, where the push for homeownership under the Help to 
Buy and the Buy to Let policy has contributed to rising house prices, and made homeownership 
unaffordable for first-time buyers (Montgomerie/Buedenbender 2015). This example is 
particularly important to consider in the US context given the changing structure of the housing 
market after the Great Recession, which increased the number of households renting their 
residence (JCHS 2015). 
Moreover, similar pitfalls can be attributed to asset-based welfare policies focused on 
promoting financial literacy and inclusion. This is because they shift the responsibility for the 
adverse consequences of the unsustainable wealth accumulation towards the individual rather than 
acknowledging the systemic role of finance in increasing wealth inequality. With the rates of 
return determined in the financial markets (as evidenced by the case of housing in the recent 
bubble), these measures threaten to increase inequality even more. Moreover, given the rising costs 
of private education, expansion of CSAs may not be enough to boost the educational attainment of 
the youth from low-income families. To even out the educational opportunities more effectively, 
we echo Galbraith’s call for the provision of public education at all levels. 
Consequently, our finding that financial sector transformation influences the returns earned 
on the different types of wealth suggests that the asset-based welfare policies should be closely 
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supervised by the government. This is to avoid the build-up of leverage among low-income 
households who may become priced out of the asset markets. If the promotion of asset ownership 
among low-income households is not managed by the government, it risks to perpetuate inequality 
through the valuation dynamics. This reveals that to effectively reduce wealth inequality it is 
necessary to consider the other side of net wealth and leverage – debt.  
As suggested by Stiglitz (2012), measures reducing the debt burden of households can be 
focused on debt forgiveness and restructuring for low-income borrowers, as well as on the 
regulation of lending practices to discourage predatory lending. Moreover, in the long run the 
increased provision of public goods and raising wages would act to reduce the necessity to take on 
debt.  
Current debt reduction initiatives in the USA are rather limited and more often applied to 
businesses and banks. One reason for such insufficient consideration of personal debt relief is the 
fall in the overall levels of household debt relative to GDP after the Great Recession (see Figure 
1.10 in Chapter 1; cf. Bricker et al. 2011, 2014). However, our analysis of the data in Chapter 1 
shows that households have not deleveraged sufficiently after the Great Recession, which can be 
explained by stagnant incomes, stringent personal bankruptcy laws, and lower household saving 
rates (Scott/Pressman 2015). Furthermore, while the problem of subprime mortgages may have 
been reduced after the 2007 crisis (albeit at the cost of millions of households facing foreclosures, 
cf. Newman/Schafran 2013), house prices are on the rise again and are close to their pre-
recessionary levels (see panel B, Figure 1.12 in Chapter 1). This has a twofold implication for 
wealth inequality. On the one hand, it provides incentives for refinancing through home equity 
withdrawal for the existing homeowners and can increase household leverage. On the other hand, 
rising house prices increase the wealth gap between homeowners and the growing group of renters, 
making access to housing a decisive factor in perpetuating wealth inequality in the future. 
Moreover, there has been a rise in the unsustainable patterns of borrowing reminiscing the pre-
crisis subprime mortgage lending after the 2007 crisis, however this time they are focused on other 
forms of borrowing, such as auto loans (see panel B, Figure 1.11 in Chapter 1). Unsecured debt, 
particularly student loans, vehicle loans, and credit card debt, remains problematic and is on the 
rise particularly among the low-income households. Consequently, addressing the problem of 
overindebtedness remains important after the Great Recession and is necessary to combat growing 
wealth inequality. 
As a part of the debt relief initiatives after the 2007 crisis, the 2010 Dodd Frank Act 
established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) in order to supervise bank and non-
bank institutions, as well as credit reporting and debt collection agencies in order to make lending 
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conditions more transparent (USA.gov 2017). In light of the growing holdings of unsecured debt 
among the low-and middle-income households, the authority of CFPB could be strengthened to 
focus on regulating lending conditions in consumer credit markets.   
Overall, the evaluation of the policy proposals put forward in the literature in light of our 
research findings suggests that the reduction in wealth inequality can be effectively achieved 
through a mix of policies rather than redistribution alone. We argue in favour of the combination 
of taxes on capital gains, wealth holdings and transfers, together with policies regulating the 
returns to wealth, reducing the debt burden, and promoting sustainable asset accumulation for low-
income households. We emphasise that all measures need to be comprehensively designed to 
discourage tax avoidance and target the appropriate parts of the population. For this reason, the 
government’s dedication to public spending and regulation is a pre-requisite for a sustainable 
alleviation of wealth inequality. 
5.4. Social implications of inequality-reducing policies: gender, race, generations 
In addition to examining the impact of policies reducing wealth and income inequality across the 
distribution, it is important to analyse what implications these policies would have for the racial, 
gender, and intergenerational disparities. This is highlighted by the empirical analysis in Chapter 4, 
which revealed intersectionalities in the relationship between wealth composition and distribution. 
While we found that the ownership of houses and pensions constituted one of the key causes of 
wealth inequality across gender, race, and generations, the presence of asymmetric effects of 
balance sheet composition on the position in the income distribution calls for a careful 
consideration of the social impact of the above policies. This is because inequality-reducing policy 
may have unintended consequences for the social dimension of inequality due to the heterogeneity 
of wealth composition and leverage across these groups. 
5.4.1. Gender 
As shown in the inequality decomposition analysis in Chapter 3, labour market characteristics are 
important determinants of the gender wealth gap in addition to earnings. Differences in the type of 
employment across men and women in terms of tenure and unionisation have been shown to 
translate into lesser access and lower value of women’s pension wealth (Chang 2006:123). 
Moreover, since female-headed households recorded in the data are predominantly single and face 
a disproportionate burden of childcare compared to single male-headed households, their wealth 
building capabilities are further impeded (ibid.; see Table A1.15 in Appendix I). Consequently, in 
addition to directing resources raised from the wealth tax revenue towards policies improving the 
wealth accumulation prospects of women, there is an important role of increasing the government 
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child support programs in alleviating wealth inequality across gender. This is important for both 
single and married women. For the former, adequate child support would contribute to immediate 
improvement in their living standards. In the case of married women, increased government 
support in childcare (through e.g. longer paid maternity leaves and the introduction of paid 
paternity leaves77) could counteract the documented negative effect of marriage on women’s 
human capital accumulation and the disproportionately detrimental effect that divorce has on 
women’s wealth and income (ibid.:124).  
Furthermore, policy could consider the joint dimensions of race and gender in designing the 
inequality-reducing policies. As signalled in the analysis in Chapters 1 and 4, these categories are 
not mutually exclusive and it is Black women that are one of the most marginalised groups in the 
American society (Crenshaw 1989). Antidiscrimination policies failing to recognise that the 
cumulative joint impact of race and gender on inequality can be greater than that of these 
categories individually will not be sufficient to reduce economic inequality among minority 
women and the rest of the society (ibid.). Among the existing policies, IDAs have been shown to 
be particularly beneficial, with the majority of home purchases through this program undertaken 
by females and minority individuals, who additionally faced lower foreclosure rates than 
homebuyers outside the program after the 2007 crisis (Rademacher et al. 2010). 
5.4.2. Race 
As documented in Chapters 1 and 4, there is a substantial wealth gap between white households 
and Blacks/Hispanics in the USA. This gap has widened after the Great Recession primarily due to 
the sluggish housing market recovery (Weller/Ahmad 2013). Because of the systematically lower 
incomes and worse job market opportunities, Black and Hispanic households have faced lower 
wealth accumulation possibilities than White households. The expansion of subprime lending 
targeted at ethnic minorities meant that the rise in homeownership among these groups in the 
2000s was associated with unsustainable indebtedness characterised by high fees and penalties. 
Consequently, due to the low levels of home equity Black and Hispanic households were 
disproportionately affected by foreclosures when the crisis hit and faced significantly greater 
wealth losses compared to White households (Gruenstein Bocian et al. 2011). Importantly, the 
foreclosure crisis has not been resolved and homeownership rates among Blacks and Hispanics 
continue to decline (See Table A1.16 in Appendix I, Weller/Ahmad 2013:21). Coupled with low 
                                                   
77 Paid paternity leaves are only offered in California, and paid family leave legislation has been passed 
in New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island (see http://money.cnn.com/2016/06/16/pf/parental-leave-
fathers/index.html). 
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participation of minority households in private pension plans, without government action the racial 
wealth gap is bound in increase in the future. 
In addition to improving wages, employment opportunities, and job security for minority 
households, policy could be focused on expanding their wealth building capacity and home 
security. Wolff (1995) argues that wealth taxation would contribute positively to alleviating 
inequalities among race. Its main benefit would be to provide funding to asset-building programs 
and capital-endowment-type policies targeting the communities of colour. The subsidised savings 
programs such as IDAs, USAs, and CSAs could be expanded at favourable terms to minority 
households, together with the Earned Income Tax Credit, which could be tailored to minority 
earners by taking into account their lower wages and the precarious nature of their employment.  
Furthermore, policies addressing the debt burden of minority households are particularly 
important. Lending conditions could be more closely supervised by the state, eliminating 
discrimination in the credit markets, and reducing high fees and penalties charged on loans to 
minority borrowers. For this purpose, alternative credit scoring models could be considered to 
combat the unfair lending conditions (Chopra et al. 2017). Furthermore, current bankruptcy laws 
in the USA under Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 favour wealth owners and are thus biased against 
minority borrowers who are less likely to hold wealth (Dickerson 2004). Consequently, the 
Bankruptcy Code could be reformed to remove this racial bias. Moreover, policy could aim to 
prevent further foreclosures by helping in debt renegotiations and partial debt forgiveness. In the 
medium to long run, housing and other public services could be made more accessible, affordable, 
and sustainable for minority households. This is particularly important given the low 
homeownership rates in Black and Latino communities and rising rental costs in the cities. 
5.4.3. Generations 
Finally, the inequality-reducing policies should consider their potential impact on the 
intergenerational wealth disparities. As shown in the analysis in Chapter 1, young households are 
now at a great disadvantage in terms of their wealth accumulation capacities and the sustainability 
of wealth holdings compared to their peers several decades ago. This is primarily due to the high 
costs of housing and the increasingly unaffordable rents related to the rising house prices, as well 
as the inability to find stable and secure employment and to participate in the more ubiquitous 
private pension plans. Recalling Piketty’s concerns, wealth status of parents passed on through 
inheritance risks becoming the decisive factor shaping the economic wellbeing of the future 
generations. Thus, the estate tax reform discussed above, as well as the other forms of wealth 
taxation, play an extremely important role in ensuring a more egalitarian distribution of wealth 
across generations today and in the future. It is important, however, that these redistribution 
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policies are complemented by the capital endowment measures and the provision of debt relief to 
promote sustainable wealth accumulation for the young. 
In sum, policies focused on debt relief and increasing government support through social 
security, subsidised savings, and the provision of affordable homeownership and public services 
have potential to explicitly reduce wealth inequality across gender, race, and generations. The 
finding of the inequality decomposition analysis in Chapter 4 that transfer income did not 
sufficiently alleviate income inequality indicates that there is scope for a more adequate design and 
implementation of the social transfer policies in the USA. Moreover, the finding that educational 
attainment is one of the main causes of income and wealth inequality across subgroups suggests 
that a more inclusive provision of education may alleviate the income and wealth disparities across 
these social groups. Importantly, as argued earlier, such policy should be focused on public 
provision across all levels to effectively reduce inequality. 
5.5. Obstacles to policy implementation 
As highlighted in the discussion so far, the design and implementation of measures that 
successfully reduce wealth inequality face substantial challenges. There is a number of political 
obstacles to the effective implementation of policies reducing wealth inequality. On the one hand, 
redistribution measures tend to be unpopular among voters. On the other hand, concerns over 
public debt discourage large scale public spending initiatives which we argue are necessary for a 
sustainable alleviation of wealth inequality. 
The political difficulties in implementing higher tax rates for the top incomes can be 
explained twofold. Firstly, this is because large wealth is linked to greater political power, as the 
rich are able to lobby political parties against progressive redistribution policies (Piketty 2014:513; 
Page et al. 2013). Secondly, in the presence of aspirational voting, voters may be reluctant to 
support progressive taxation with increasing marginal rates in hope that they or their descendants 
could themselves become rich in the future (Schneider et al. 2016:149). Such perceptions may be 
particularly strong if one believes in the “American Dream”, seeing prosperity as an outcome of 
individual effort rather than of a particular socio-institutional structure (cf. Piketty 1995).  
Furthermore, the society tends to perceive inequality to be lower than it actually is, and can 
thus underestimate the degree of taxation necessary to redistribute wealth (Norton/Ariely 2011). 
Qualitative research on the urban elites in London found that the reference group for a part of 
individuals in the top 1% is not the median household but rather those at the very top of the 
distribution belonging to the top 0.1%, 0.01% etc. (Hecht 2017). On the other hand, the poor may 
have an analogous relative experience of their circumstances, underestimating their own poverty 
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and disassociating themselves from the poor (Shildrick/MacDonald 2013). Such perceptions 
further impede the implementation of higher taxes, as those in the top tend to see themselves as 
worse off while those at the bottom perceive themselves to be better off than observed in monetary 
terms, and both groups may feel already burdened with taxes compared to their peers (Chin 2014). 
Such inaccurate views on inequality are related to the limited interactions between the rich and the 
poor in the urban space, which arises in part from the segregation of impoverished communities in 
the cities. For this reason, urban planning and social policy focused on counteracting the 
geographical segregation of poor neighbourhoods may act as a device improving the relational 
perceptions, which could encourage the society to participate in the redistribution of wealth to 
alleviate inequality.  
Furthermore, the opposition to progressive taxation and higher top tax rates may be 
alleviated if accompanied by effective public spending programs. However, recent evidence on 
income suggests that the mix of a high degree of tax progressivity and high average tax rates may 
not politically feasible in OECD countries (Guillaud et al. 2017). In fact, increases in the coverage 
of social transfers and in tax progressivity tend to be accompanied by lower rates of transfers and 
taxation respectively. Thus, there may be political trade-offs between the various dimensions of the 
inequality-reducing policies. Given lower rates, high progressivity of taxes may reduce the 
government tax revenue and its ability to fund public spending programs. Guillaud et al. (2017) 
argue that it is the rate of transfers rather than coverage that has the largest redistributive effect, 
while both the rate and the progressivity of taxation can achieve similar degrees of income 
inequality reduction (ibid.). Such research is yet to be conducted for wealth distribution. 
Nevertheless, we argue that the adequate tax reform focused on targeting the currently tax exempt 
forms of top incomes (dividends and capital gains) has a potential to secure large absolute amounts 
of tax revenue even at lower rates (Galbraith 2016:143).  
Overall, the role of government in reducing inequality is a common thread in the policy 
proposals found in the literature. Focusing on the taxation of income, Piketty argues that state 
capacity has reached its limits in high-income countries, and thus increased state spending does not 
constitute an adequate way to redistribute income in the future. However, he does not explain why 
there are persistent differences in the personal tax rates across the developed economies and why 
they have not been equalised (Pressman 2016:131). Consequently, we argue that there is a scope 
for a conscious and comprehensive policy strategy by the government to effectively implement 
higher taxation.  
One of the major obstacles to such large scale public spending programs is the opposition to 
government debt accumulation by economists and the politicians (Reinhart/Rogoff 2010; Pescatori 
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et al. 2014). However, these reservations tend to be ideologically motivated as empirical evidence 
on the negative relationship between government debt and economic performance is highly mixed 
and does not sufficiently address the reverse causality issues (Bonser-Neal 2015). Keynesian 
theory suggests that public deficit can be associated with positive fiscal multipliers, particularly in 
times of an economic downturn (Keynes 1936; Lerner 1951; Botta/Tori 2015; Leão 2015; 
Qazizada/Stockhammer 2015)78. In the Post-Keynesian view, fiscal policy is justified due to the 
persistence of involuntary unemployment in the long run (Fontana 2009:3)79. Recent evidence 
shows that coordinated public investment and wage-led recovery policies can lead to positive 
increases in economic growth in G20 countries (Onaran 2014). 
A more important issue with public debt concerns its distributive implications, which is 
raised by Piketty (2014). Since the majority of government bonds created through the issuance of 
public debt are owned by the rich, Piketty argues that increasing public deficit can perpetuate 
wealth inequality. His preferred solution is to raise taxation and use the proceeds to pay off 
government debt. Alternative measures of raising inflation and austerity are discouraged. While 
austerity itself contributes to rising inequality (Ball et al. 2013; Rawdanowicz et al. 2013), 
inflation is difficult to control and is highly imprecise. On the one hand, it may reduce the debt 
burden of borrowers by decreasing the real value of debt (Piketty 2014:544). However, it may 
simultaneously harm savers and can drive up asset prices, generating asset bubbles and 
contributing to financial instability (ibid.:547). 
The consideration of inflation sheds light on the distributive implications of the broader 
economic policy. Specifically, the alleviation of wealth inequality can be improved by a 
coordinated fiscal and monetary policy. The role of monetary policy in affecting inequality has 
been particularly relevant after the Great Recession. The unconventional low-interest rates and 
quantitative easing (QE) policies adopted after the 2007 crisis by the Federal Reserve have 
alleviated some of the negative consequences of the recession by restoring confidence in the 
economy and boosting demand (Ennis/Wolman 2015). However, these measures have had 
unintended consequences for wealth inequality (Claeys et al. 2015; Montecino/Epstein 2015; 
Domanski et al. 2016). On the one hand, through the sales of government bonds QE drove up asset 
prices. This benefited the asset owners, who are highly concentrated at the top of the distribution 
                                                   
78 Positive fiscal multiplier means that government spending increases aggregate demand and economic 
growth (cf. Keynes 1936). 
79 This is in contrast to the New Keynesian view, which questions the usefulness of fiscal policy in the 
long run. This is because of their assumption that in the long run the economy adjusts to full 
employment due to rationally optimising decisions of economic agents (see footnote 34 in section 2.1, 
Chapter 2). 
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as shown in the analysis in Chapter 1. Furthermore, low interest rates encouraged highly-indebted 
households to borrow even more. Not only did it weigh negatively on their net wealth, but it also 
inflated house prices by keeping borrowing costs low and boosting the availability of credit. While 
the rising house prices have increased the wealth of homeowners, homeownership has become 
unaffordable for those not on the housing ladder, forcing these groups to rent at increasing costs.  
Consequently, the central bank’s response to growing inequality could be focused in three 
areas. Firstly, it could be through a closer supervision of financial activity. In this way, the Fed 
could monitor how the extra liquidity is invested by banks, prioritising investment in productivity-
enhancing activities and discouraging speculative investment in real estate and financial products. 
Secondly, through financial supervision the Fed could also liaise with CFPB to regulate lending 
conditions – particularly unsecured lending and lending to low-income borrowers. This could 
contain the rising leverage and financial instability faced by a large part of the US population. 
Moreover, the Fed could cooperate with the government to move towards a broader fiscal 
approach to economic policy. This is to ensure that the positive implications of monetary policy 
for household wealth through asset price increases are shared more equally. In addition, such 
coordinated monetary-fiscal policy could serve to reduce macroeconomic volatility (Romer/Romer 
2017). 
Another important dimension of policy implementation in the US context is whether the 
analysed inequality-reducing policies should be enacted at the state or the federal level. We argue 
that the federal coordination is more effective for the implementation of the proposed measures. 
Firstly, this is because most of the asset-building policies and the existing debt relief legislation are 
already implemented at the federal level and the proposed reforms aim to extend the existing 
policies. Secondly, without federal legislation differences in the levels of wealth taxation across 
states would create incentives for tax avoidance and evasion associated with shifting wealth to 
states with the lowest tax rates. Furthermore, recent evidence suggests that state taxes tend to be 
more regressive than federal taxes. In ten states the bottom 20% of taxpayers have been found to 
pay as much as six times more in terms of their income than the wealthy80 (Davis et al. 2013; ITEP 
2017). The curious example of Kansas shows just how damaging the regressive state tax system 
can be by exacerbating inequality and draining public finances (Ehrenfreund 2017). The 2012 tax 
reform in Kansas, which raised taxes on the poor and lowered the tax rates for the rich, generated 
substantial shortfalls in the state budget. In June 2017, the state legislature overturned the reform 
                                                   
80 These states are Washington, Florida, South Dakota, Illinois, Texas, Tennessee, Arizona, 
Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Alabama (Davis et al. 2013:4). 
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and increased tax rates. However, since taxes were raised for all earners, the regressive structure 
was deepened and the tax burden of individuals in the poorest quintile remained nearly three times 
as much as the tax rate of the richest 1%. This shows that the federal intervention and policy 
coordination can be more effective in ensuring that the tax system is fair to all households and that 
everyone can benefit from the subsidised savings programs and debt relief policies. 
Finally, what is perhaps the most important prerequisite to a successful distributive policy is 
fostering of shared values of justice and equality in the society. Without this, any increases in 
taxation and public spending may face opposition, providing a check on the political willingness to 
implement the more progressive tax policies (similar point regarding increasing wages is 
emphasised by Kalecki 1943). In terms of redistribution, the society could be united along the 
principles of vertical and horizontal equity. According to the principle of vertical equity, 
individuals with larger wealth should be taxed at relatively higher rates as they have a greater 
ability to pay taxes (Pressman 2016:146). The principle of horizontal equity states that individuals 
with an equal capacity to pay taxes should pay the same amount. Importantly, one should consider 
this capacity not only in terms of the size of assets, but also in terms of leverage, wages, and socio-
economic conditions (for example the number of dependents, marital status, and annual expenses 
on necessities – which would include inter alia healthcare and education). 
It may be argued that the achievement of the common sense of social justice is an extremely 
long process and perhaps a utopian task. While it must be acknowledged that establishing shared 
empathy to social injustice would take time, this should be neither a discouragement for achieving 
such a prospect nor an excuse for inaction. As in the case of implementing successful inequality 
reducing policies, the most effective way to move towards the goal of the shared sense of social 
justice and equality is through the government initiative. Proactive government spending programs 
focused on reducing inequality through improving public services and investing in research 
informing about the causes and consequences of inequality can benefit everyone in the society. 
With such tangible benefits and knowledge, taxpayers may be more willing to pay their taxes and 
participate in a more egalitarian economic development.  
It is crucial, however, that commitment to equality and justice is shared at the global level. 
Atkinson proposes to establish an international progressive wealth and income tax authority, which 
would offer personal tax payers the opportunity to opt out of the national tax regimes by entering 
the global system (Atkinson 2015:201). He ponders the possibility of introducing a minimum net 
worth required to be a part of the global tax regime. He argues that this could create prestige 
equivalent to the Forbes 400 list, thus providing incentives for the rich to pay their taxes under a 
unified global scheme. Such initiative seems to be a feasible goal for international efforts against 
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tax evasion. However, it needs to be recognised that the issue of tax avoidance may not be solved 
even with global coordination due to the presence of wealth arbitrage (see section 5.3.1). It is for 
this reason that the sustainable reduction in wealth, income, and social inequalities necessitates 
shared aspirations towards social justice in the society as a whole. 
In sum, the main obstacles to the implementation of the inequality reducing policies 
discussed in this chapter are related to the political unwillingness to support progressive taxation 
reforms, concerns over public debt accumulation, and unintended consequences of the asset-based 
welfare policies and monetary policy for reinforcing inequality through asset price dynamics. For 
this reason, we argue that global coordination and dedicated public spending programs focused on 
affordable housing, public provision of education, and improving public services have potential to 
inspire the common goal of social justice, which could lead to more sustainable reductions in 
wealth inequality. 
5.6. Summary 
Based on our findings, this chapter evaluated policies to reduce wealth inequality proposed in the 
literature. We argued that to achieve a sustained reduction in wealth inequality, a mix of wealth 
taxation and policies explicitly addressing the distribution of market wealth was particularly 
effective. The redistributive policies could include an annual wealth tax on holdings, 
complemented by taxes on wealth transfers, such as capital gains and inheritance. In the future, 
policymakers could consider developing a lifetime capital receipts tax (Atkinson 2015) and the net 
revenue tax (McCain 2017). Proceeds from the raised tax revenue could be used to finance 
government spending programs focused on debt relief, subsidising savings, and providing 
affordable and sustainable housing and capital endowments to the low-income households. 
Importantly, such measures, together with establishing a more generous child support system, 
could explicitly reduce the wealth gap across race, gender, and generations. Moreover, reduction of 
high returns earned by the rich could be achieved by a closer supervision of the financial sector 
activity and lending practices (particularly unsecured subprime credit), adequate taxation of 
wealth, corporate income, and financial transactions, as well as by limiting charges imposed by the 
wealth management funds. To overcome the political obstacles to increased wealth taxation and 
public spending, the commitment to achieving greater equality should be shared within the society 
and globally. Proactive government strategy focused on improving the quality and access to public 
services and infrastructure through harmonious fiscal and monetary policy and promoting research 
was argued to be capable of achieving such goal. 
 




This thesis analysed the relationship between financial sector transformation and inequality in the 
USA since the 1980s, proposing an innovative approach to inequality determination focused on 
disparities in household wealth structures. The main hypothesis put forward in this work was that 
changes in financial intermediation, financial deregulation, and securitisation influenced wealth 
accumulation possibilities across the distribution by generating a hierarchy of monetary claims which 
favoured the rich and forced the low- and middle-income households into unsustainable indebtedness. 
This wealth heterogeneity shaped inequality by generating disparities in leverage and rates of return to 
wealth dependent on its absolute size. 
In order to investigate this hypothesis, the thesis posed the following research questions: 
(1) How has financial sector transformation influenced income and wealth distribution in the USA 
since the 1980s? 
(2) How do differences in ownership of wealth shape inequality? 
(3) Which types of assets and liabilities are held by the US households at different points of the 
income distribution and how has this balance sheet composition changed over time, 
particularly in light of the 2007 financial crisis? 
Given our research findings, we analysed the implications of the increased heterogeneity of 
household wealth composition for economic policy aiming to reduce wealth and income inequality in 
the USA. 
i. Theoretical contributions 
This thesis contributes to the literature on inequality by developing a novel approach to understanding 
the determinants of economic inequality in the USA since the 1980s in the context of financial sector 
transformation. This contribution is both theoretical and empirical. At the theoretical level, we develop 
a new theory of inequality determination, which argues that inequality arises because the 
heterogeneity of wealth composition across households generates unequal leverage and returns to 
wealth which depend on the absolute size of wealth holdings.  
Furthermore, the proposed approach highlights the need for an explicit theoretical distinction 
between income wealth focused on analysing their relative dynamics. Moreover, this theoretical 
argument regarding inequality determination as an outcome of the interplay between income and 
wealth draws together dispersed strands of the economic literature from a variety of ideological 
traditions, evaluating insights of the macroeconomic theories of distribution identified with the 
Keynesian, New Keynesian, and the Post-Keynesian school of thought, and the neoclassical 
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microeconomic literature on household portfolio decisions. In addition, it engages with the less known 
Post-Keynesian analyses of consumption, highlighting the social determination of household wealth 
accumulation. 
Moreover, the three-class stock-flow consistent model developed in this thesis contributes to the 
Post-Keynesian macro-modelling literature by introducing a new conceptualisation of the household 
sector in the Post-Keynesian macro-modelling framework based on balance sheet composition rather 
than sources of income. The increased heterogeneity of workers and capitalists arising due to financial 
sector transformation is addressed by the introduction of a third class of households identified with the 
middle class of leveraged homeowners emergent in the processes of securitisation and the subprime 
lending boom. This contribution is shown to result in higher levels of inequality and macroeconomic 
instability than the traditional two-class taxonomy of households in the Post-Keynesian macro-models. 
In addition, based on incorporating money endogeneity and financial sector complexity into a 
three-class conceptualisation of households, the formal model of inequality determination contributes 
to the Post-Keynesian financialisation literature by proposing household wealth composition as the 
new mechanism in addition to the channel of the shareholder value maximisation and endogenous 
money creation through which financial sector transformation generates wealth and income inequality. 
Lastly, the contribution of the policy analysis undertaken in Chapter 5 is to highlight the 
importance of the appropriate design of wealth redistribution policies in light of the increased 
complexity of household balance sheet composition. It presents an original evaluation of the existing 
policy proposals for reducing inequality, drawing from the analysis of the latest literature and the 
current policy infrastructure in the USA. It contributes to the current policy debate in the inequality 
literature by highlighting the potential to effectively reduce wealth inequality through combining a 
comprehensive wealth tax reform, financial regulation, and measures improving the distribution of 
market wealth by controlled asset-building programs and personal debt relief. Moreover, it enriches 
the literature by explicitly analysing the impact of the proposed policies on the racial, gender, and 
intergenerational wealth inequality. 
ii. Empirical contributions 
Among the empirical contributions of this thesis, the detailed analysis of income and wealth 
composition in Chapter 1 is one of the first ones to examine wealth inequality with an explicit focus 
on class, gender, race, and generations. Moreover, decomposition of inequality measures by the 
components of income and wealth in Chapter 1 provides a more detailed examination of the 
differences in the distribution of the individual drivers of inequality than the current literature using 
the data from the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances.  
––– Conclusion ––– 
 
272 
The empirical contribution of the macroeconomic model of inequality determination developed 
in Chapter 3 is its calibration using the US data and the simulation of trends in inequality and leverage, 
which closely correspond to the observed values in the data. The original feature of the model is its 
ability to show how the three-class taxonomy of household based on their balance sheet heterogeneity 
induces higher inequality and greater macroeconomic instability compared to the conventional two-
class classification. 
The empirical contribution of the analysis in Chapter 4 is to establish a quantitative support for 
the relationship between household wealth structures and inequality using household level data from 
the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances. The thesis contributes to the empirical literature on the 
determinants of inequality by adopting an original methodological approach combining the 
econometric and the non-parametric methods and estimation of the relative and overall inequality 
measures. With help of this approach, we show that analyses of inequality which do not consider 
wealth distribution cannot fully explain the increasingly unequal distribution of income and wealth 
observed in the USA since the 1980s. The analysis developed in this thesis is thus one of the first ones 
to provide a robust examination of wealth composition as the cause of inequality, taking advantages of 
the relative merits of both econometric and non-parametric approaches. Moreover, the thesis 
contributes to the inequality decomposition literature by extending its traditional focus on income into 
examining the determinants of wealth inequality across the distribution, race, gender, and generations. 
This analysis quantifies the intersectional dimension of the impact of wealth composition on 
inequality, highlighting the need to account for wealth disparities in analysing the causes of the 
gender, racial, and intergenerational inequality.  
Lastly, the innovative feature of the analysis in this thesis is the empirical validation of the 
theoretical conceptualisation of the three-class household sector in the stock-flow consistent model, 
which is undertaken using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method. 
iii. Main findings 
Chapter 1 
To answer the first two research questions, Chapter 1 developed the theoretical link between financial 
sector transformation and inequality. We demonstrated that in the context of financial sector 
transformation in the USA since the 1980s, wealth became increasingly important as an independent 
determinant of economic inequality alongside income. We highlighted that the processes of 
securitisation generated an explicit interplay between income and wealth. On the one hand, higher 
income allowed access to high-yielding financial instruments and business equity. On the other hand, 
greater wealth became associated with higher capital income receipts, and served as collateral to 
access larger amounts of secured debt, which further facilitated financial investment. Sustained 
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increases in income and wealth among the rich kept leverage in check as their indebtedness rose. 
Simultaneously, low wealth levels among households at the bottom of the income distribution limited 
their wealth accumulation possibilities, which in turn reduced the amount earned in capital gains and 
placed a greater burden of debt holdings and repayments on household finances. We observed that this 
relationship between wealth composition and inequality had a distinctive social dimension, 
influencing income and wealth disparities across gender, race, and generations. Consequently, we 
argued that analyses of inequality in times of financial sector transformation should explicitly consider 
the distribution of wealth. 
Chapter 2 
In light of the call for an explicit consideration of wealth as the determinant of inequality in times of 
financial sector transformation, Chapter 2 undertook a review of the economic literature on the causes 
of inequality. It thus aimed to understand what determinants of inequality had been put forward by the 
existing economic theory and to what extent wealth and finance had been considered. The review of 
the literature on inequality determination revealed a gap in the existing theories. On the one hand, the 
heterogeneity of household wealth structures had not been considered by the macroeconomic theories 
of distribution. This is because with the exception of Piketty (2014) this literature had been focused on 
income disparities, arising due to the differences in marginal contribution to production, human capital 
accumulation, skill-biased technological change, and trade openness (mainstream approach), policy 
choices generating market imperfections and rent seeking behaviour (Stiglitz 2012), financial 
liberalisation (Galbraith 2012, 2016), declining bargaining power of workers (political economy 
approach), and differences in the sources of income (the Post-Keynesian approach). On the other hand, 
the life-cycle theory and the permanent income hypothesis had not considered the impact of financial 
sector transformation on the portfolio choices of households. They thus downplayed the role of 
securitisation and subprime lending on wealth accumulation decisions of households, neglecting the 
consequences of the differences in leverage and rates of return to wealth for inequality. Hence, the 
thesis aimed to fill the gap in the literature by developing a formal model of inequality determination 
in a Post-Keynesian macro-modelling framework, drawing from Piketty’s insights regarding the 
interplay between wealth and income and the Post-Keynesian assumption of the social dependence of 
consumption. 
Chapter 3 
Based on the analysis of the literature in Chapter 2, we developed a new theory of inequality 
determination combining Piketty’s theory of unequal returns with the Post-Keynesian assumption of 
the social dependence of consumption in a unified Post-Keynesian macro-modelling framework. We 
adopted the stock-flow consistent modelling approach because its integrated balance sheet analysis 
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across the real and financial sectors yielded itself to the examination of the impact of financial sector 
complexity on household wealth heterogeneity. To account for the increasingly capitalist features of 
workers, and high wage earnings among the top income group employed as financial executives, we 
provided a new conceptualisation of the household sector in the Post-Keynesian macro-models.  
The main innovation of our model was to define households according to their balance sheet 
composition rather than the type of income received. Heterogeneity of wealth composition was 
incorporated into the model by introducing a third class of households identified with the middle class 
of leveraged homeowners, who emerged during the subprime lending bubble in the 2000s. To explain 
the distribution of wealth endogenously, we distinguished between different motives for debt 
accumulation based on the Post-Keynesian analyses of consumption discussed in Chapter 2. This was 
achieved by introducing relative consumption concerns into the middle class portfolio decisions, and 
by distinguishing between necessitous borrowing of the working class based on unsecured debt, 
accumulation of mortgages to satisfy consumption emulation among the middle class, and secured 
debt as an investment strategy for the rentier class. 
Furthermore, we introduced the process of securitisation by analysing a complex financial sector 
consisting of commercial banks, SPVs/underwriters, and institutional investors. We developed the link 
between financial sector complexity and inequality by assuming that in addition to receiving profits of 
all financial institutions, rentiers accumulated securitised assets derived from mortgages to the middle 
class. Consequently, the main distributional channels in our model emerged through securitisation, 
payments of housing rentals by the working class to the rentiers, endogenous money creation by 
commercial banks, as well as consumption emulation and leverage levels determining the amount of 
debt repayments by the middle and the working class. 
The model was calibrated using empirical data to represent the features of the US economy. It 
was simulated to analyse changes in the overall inequality indices for income and wealth, and in 
various leverage measures of the household groups. Additionally, we reported the leverage ratio for 
the whole economy to gauge the impact of household wealth heterogeneity of macroeconomic 
stability. We compared simulation results of the full model to four reduced scenarios excluding the 
innovative features of our model – a “pure capitalist” specification with no rentier wage, and 
specifications without consumption emulation, securitisation, or the middle class. Finally, we tested 
the robustness of the full specification results to the choice of parameter values by performing a 
univariate and a multivariate sensitivity analysis, which additionally aimed to reproduce the conditions 
of an economic downturn corresponding to the Great Recession. 
We showed that by accounting for household wealth heterogeneity, rentier wage, relative 
consumption concerns, and the securitisation of mortgages to the middle class, the model reproduced 
the stylised facts presented in Chapter 1, namely that wealth inequality exceeded income inequality in 
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the period. The simulated magnitudes of the Gini coefficient for income and wealth were close to their 
observed values, while the remaining variables were consistent in terms of trends and ordering across 
households with the empirical values estimated from the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances in 
Chapter 1. Importantly, the model showed that greater heterogeneity of household balance sheet 
structures, proxied by the introduction of the middle class, resulted in higher inequality levels than 
scenarios based on the two-class taxonomy of households, or excluding the rentier wage, consumption 
emulation, or securitisation. The simulation results were shown to be robust to changes in most of the 
key parameters, particularly in the long run. The model outcome was the most sensitive to changes in 
the wage share of output, the firm profit retention ratio, as well as household lending norms and the 
marginal consumption propensities, suggesting the relevance of both income and wealth channels for 
inequality determination. Moreover, the multivariate sensitivity analysis reproduced the empirical 
finding of increasing wealth inequality and decreasing income inequality immediately after the 2007 
recession. 
Overall, the macroeconomic model of inequality determination developed in this chapter 
demonstrated that household balance sheet heterogeneity contributed to higher income and wealth 
inequality through uneven returns on assets held by different household groups and differences in the 
degrees of leverage related to securitisation of housing and the relative consumption concerns among 
the middle class. Thus, the model provided a formal support to the research hypothesis, showing that 
theories of inequality which did not account for wealth distribution could not fully explain the 
observed levels of income and wealth inequality in the USA and the high levels of macroeconomic 
fragility. We noted that the caveat of the stock-flow consistent model developed in this chapter was its 
inability to explicitly consider the social dimension of inequality across gender, race, and generations 
due to the high level of analytical aggregation. 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 undertook a formal empirical test of the implications of the stock-flow consistent model, 
namely that household balance sheet heterogeneity increased inequality. Specifically, the empirical 
analysis in this chapter intended to answer the third research question and quantitatively evaluate 
which types of wealth contributed the most to inequality in the USA since the 1980s.  
Using data from the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances between 1989 and 2013, the empirical 
analysis was conducted in two parts. Firstly, the linear regression analysis using the pooled OLS 
estimation was undertaken to test the statistical significance of the finding of the stock-flow consistent 
model regarding the impact of household wealth heterogeneity on inequality, measured in relative 
terms as the median income ratio. The robustness of this estimation was evaluated by comparing the 
pooled OLS results with the quantile regression estimates and the non-parametric correlation methods. 
To address the caveat of the stock-flow consistent model, the statistical significance of the relationship 
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between wealth composition and relative inequality was explicitly analysed across the social 
dimensions of gender, race, and generations. In addition, the relationship was estimated across 
subperiods to test the role of the processes of securitisation and subprime lending in generating the 
distributional effects of wealth composition.  
Secondly, we applied the inequality decomposition analysis to evaluate the precise contribution 
of the individual asset and debt holdings to absolute inequality measures. A mix of the non-parametric 
method of Shorrocks (1982) and the parametric decomposition of Fields (2003) was chosen to provide 
a comprehensive and robust insight into the determination of income and wealth inequality in the 
period. In addition, we used the parametric Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to decompose the gap in 
income and wealth across gender, race, generations, as well as between the top 10% and the bottom 
90%, and the bottom 20% vs. the top 80% of the income distribution. This enabled us to explore the 
impact of balance sheet composition on the social dimension of inequality, and to test the validity of 
the proposed construction of balance sheets of the three classes of households in the stock-flow 
consistent model in Chapter 3. 
We found that a greater contribution of high-yielding financial investment assets and business 
equity to total assets was significantly associated with the largest increases in the household position 
in the income distribution relative to the median, raising the median income ratio by approximately 3 
percentage points for every one-percentage point rise in the relative holdings of these assets. 
Moreover, while all types of financial assets were significant and positively associated with the 
median income ratio, greater reliance on primary residence was significantly associated with lower 
position in the income distribution relative to the median. Among liabilities, higher relative holdings 
of secured debt, particularly mortgages backed by other real estate, were significantly associated with 
increases in the median income ratio, while reliance on unsecured debt was related to declines of 
approximately 1 percentage points for every one-percentage point increase in the share of instalment 
loans and credit card balances in total debt. Moreover, higher debt-service-to-income ratio was 
significantly associated with around 4 percentage point decline in the position of household income in 
the distribution relative to the median following a one-percentage point increase in this measure of 
leverage, and the median income ratio was particularly low for extremely indebted households for 
whom monthly debt payments exceeded 40% of monthly income. Among household characteristics, 
higher educational attainment and self-employment had the largest positive effect on the median 
income ratio, while female, Black/Hispanic, and single households were found to occupy a lower 
relative position in the income distribution compared to the estimated mean value. These results were 
compared to the estimates of a pooled OLS specification including only the socio-economic variables, 
finding that upon the inclusion of the balance sheet composition variables the magnitude of the socio-
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economic estimates was lower. This suggested that analyses which did not explicitly account for 
wealth composition inflated the role of the socio-economic determinants of inequality. 
To establish any statistically significant differences in the impact of balance sheet composition 
on relative inequality, the pooled OLS regression was estimated across gender, race, and age groups. 
We found that the positive effects of greater shares of business equity and financial investment assets 
in total holdings were significantly lower among women, Blacks, Hispanics, and households aged 
below 35. The relative position of these groups in the income distribution was found to rely more on 
debt composition rather than assets. Greater reliance on unsecured debt was observed to be positively 
associated with their median income ratios, although at varying levels of significance. Moreover, the 
lower estimates of extreme indebtedness showed that households headed by women, Blacks, 
Hispanics, and the young tended to be more indebted on average than their counterparts in the period 
studied. Moreover, the negative impact of higher debt-service-to-income ratio on relative income was 
higher for households headed by women and the young.  
In addition, to evaluate the role of the process of securitisation and subprime lending on 
generating the impact of wealth distribution on inequality, the pooled OLS regression was estimated 
for three subperiods corresponding to the pre-subprime era between 1989 and 1998, the subprime 
lending boom between 2001 and 2007, and the post-crisis period between 2010 and 2013. While most 
of the estimates were consistent over time, the positive impact of the relative holdings of business 
equity, financial investment assets, and debt secured by other real estate on the median income ratio 
was found to be significantly higher in the sub-prime lending boom. 
The robustness of the OLS results was tested using the quantile regression analysis and the non-
parametric Theil-Sen median slope estimation. This type of sensitivity analysis was motivated by the 
greater resilience of both alternative methods to outliers. Moreover, the non-parametric estimation 
avoided making assumptions about the error term in a regression model, which we concluded were 
likely to be violated in the dataset due to non-spherical errors and endogeneity problems arising from 
potential mutual causality between wealth composition and income inequality. Overall, despite minor 
differences in sign and magnitude among certain estimates both the quantile regression and the non-
parametric method supported the main findings of the pooled OLS analysis, namely that there were 
significant asymmetric effects of balance sheet composition on relative inequality across class, gender, 
race, and generations in the USA between 1989-2013. 
The second part of the empirical analysis in Chapter 4 provided a comprehensive evaluation of 
the contribution of the individual assets and liabilities to overall inequality measures. We combined 
the non-parametric and the parametric inequality decomposition methods of Shorrocks (1982) and 
Fields (2003) for both wealth and income, considering the different types of assets and debt, as well as 
income flows from wealth ownership and household characteristics. Moreover, using the Oaxaca-
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Blinder method we decomposed the wealth and income gap across gender, race, and generations, 
evaluating the social dimension of the finding of the stock-flow consistent model in Chapter 3. In 
addition, by decomposing the income and wealth gap between the top 10% and the bottom 90%, and 
between the bottom 20% and the top 80% of the income distribution, we gauged the validity of the 
proposed balance sheet classification of the three groups of households in the stock-flow consistent 
model. 
The contribution of the differences in assets to wealth inequality was found to be greater than of 
disparities in debt, driven by large estimated differences in the ownership of business equity, financial 
investment assets, as well as primary residence and retirement assets. Debt holdings and repayments 
were found to play a comparatively small role in contributing to wealth and income inequality. This 
was paralleled by the finding that capital income, particularly business income and capital gains, 
contributed a large part to income inequality between 1989-2013, although the role of wage disparities 
increased over time. Among household characteristics, disparities in educational attainment emerged 
as the highest determinant of income and wealth inequality in the sample as well as across subgroups.  
Furthermore, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition across the distributional groups validated the 
proposed balance sheet classification of households in the stock-flow consistent model in Chapter 3. 
The introduction of the middle class was supported by the high contribution of primary residence and 
capital gains to the wealth and income gap respectively between the bottom 20% and the top 80% of 
the income distribution, and by the growing disparities in wealth between these two groups compared 
to a decreasing income gap. Moreover, the inclusion of the rentier wage and debt was supported by the 
finding that wage inequality explained a large part of the income gap across the top 10% and the 
bottom 90% of the distribution, together with a negative contribution of debt to wealth inequality. 
Overall, the empirical analysis showed the significance of the research hypothesis regarding the 
impact of wealth composition on income and wealth inequality formalised in the stock-flow consistent 
model. We also provided evidence for the intersectional dimension of wealth distribution in driving 
gender, racial, and intergenerational inequalities in the USA since the 1980s. Moreover, it supported 
the introduction of the middle class and the redefinition of the bottom and the top group of households 
in the Post-Keynesian macro-model in Chapter 3 based on their balance sheet composition. We 
concluded that analyses which do not consider wealth composition as an independent determinant of 
inequality could not fully explain the rise in income and wealth inequality across the analysed 
categories in the USA since the 1980s. 
iv. Policy implications 
Policy implications of our finding that greater heterogeneity of household wealth composition 
contributed to income and wealth inequality by influencing disparities in the returns to wealth and 
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leverage were analysed in Chapter 5. We evaluated policy measures proposed in the existing literature, 
analysing Piketty’s (2014) proposition of the global wealth tax, Atkinson’s (2015) proposals for 
reducing wealth inequality, Galbraith’s (2016) three-step approach to inequality reduction extended to 
wealth, and Stiglitz’s (2012) proposition of improving financial market transparency. We explicitly 
focused on the implications of these policies for alleviating the gender, racial, and intergenerational 
wealth inequality.  
Given our research finding that wealth inequality emerged as the rates of returns to wealth were 
related to its absolute size, we argued in favour of Piketty’s proposal to explicitly tax wealth holdings. 
However, given our findings regarding the heterogeneity of household wealth composition, we noted 
that taxation of wealth holdings alone created incentives for tax avoidance and evasion arising from 
the mobility of wealth, particularly liquid assets owned by the rich. Moreover, it risked targeting 
households towards the middle and the bottom of the income distribution who relied on illiquid 
property wealth. Consequently, we advocated that a comprehensive wealth taxation reform could be 
more effective in alleviating wealth inequality. In addition to the tax on holdings, such reform could 
include progressive taxes on capital gains and wealth transfers. Nevertheless, we appreciated that the 
other forms of wealth taxation suffered from their own problems. For this reason, we argued that 
policies directly affecting the distribution of market wealth proposed by Atkinson (2015) could 
complement the redistribution measures to effectively reduce wealth inequality. Policies such as the 
national savings bonds program or the payments of capital endowments had potential to boost the size 
and the returns to wealth of lower-income households. Furthermore, the accumulation of assets by the 
state could be effective in building up its net worth and improving the economic legacy passed down 
to the future generations. Moreover, we supported Atkinson’s proposition of complementing the 
progressive income taxes with tax credits for wage income, arguing that they could promote a more 
appropriate targeting of taxation towards high earners at the top while simultaneously alleviating the 
racial and gender wealth inequality. We also highlighted Atkinson’s idea of a progressive property tax 
and a progressive lifetime capital receipts tax, which could replace the inheritance tax and boost the 
currently low tax revenues. 
Furthermore, we supported Galbraith’s (2016) criticism of the consumption and sales taxes, 
arguing that they placed the burden of taxation onto households with higher propensities to consume, 
which tended to be towards the bottom of the distribution. Furthermore, we argued that his proposition 
of a financial transactions tax could significantly reduce the high returns earned in the financial sector, 
which are passed on to the richest through profitable financial asset ownership. A similar insight 
regarding the role financial sector regulation in reducing inequality was put forward by Stiglitz (2012). 
We argued that his proposals of financial regulation through increasing transparency of the banking 
sector, reducing interconnectedness between financial institutions, discouraging risky speculative 
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behaviour through regulating predatory lending practices, and reforming the personal bankruptcy laws 
had an important role in reducing wealth inequality. This is because these policies would be able to 
limit the high returns generated by speculative financial activity, and to improve financial security of 
low-income households by restricting their leverage. 
Moreover, we supported Stiglitz’s emphasis on looking beyond personal taxes towards 
increasing corporate taxation and reducing corporate subsidies, arguing that this would reduce the 
rates of return earned on business equity holdings which were found to be concentrated at the top of 
the distribution. We also agreed with Stiglitz’s and Galbraith’s call for increasing investment in public 
services, affordable housing, and subsidising savings to the poor, arguing that these measures could 
have a positive role in improving wealth accumulation prospects of ethnic minorities, women, and the 
young, while simultaneously reducing their dependence on debt. For the same reasons, we argued that 
promoting more debtor-friendly bankruptcy laws, regulating unsecured lending standards, and 
designing regulated asset-based welfare programs could effectively reduce inequality among these 
groups by reigning in their leverage. However, we noted Piketty’s (2014) argument regarding the 
distributional consequences of public debt accumulation, arguing that these policies should be 
complemented by progressive taxation to avoid wealth increases among the rich asset owners 
associated with the sales of government bonds.  
Moreover, we noted that because the existing policy infrastructure in the USA was highly 
regressive, inequality-reducing policies would be the most effective if coordinated at the federal level. 
We highlighted the importance of the fiscal policy to be complemented by monetary policy focused on 
financial sector regulation and monitoring of lending standards. Moreover, we argued for the 
extension of the existing subsidised savings programs such as the Universal Savings Accounts, the 
Child Savings Accounts, and the Individual Development Accounts to a wider base of low income 
households, ethnic minorities, women, and the young. 
In sum, the main policy implications of our research concern the need for distinct policy 
measures targeting wealth inequality. This is because in the context of our research findings income 
taxes only affect returns earned on wealth but not its absolute size. We highlight that due to the 
increased heterogeneity of household wealth composition, a mix of different wealth taxes, together 
with subsidised savings programs, personal debt relief, financial regulation, and coordinated fiscal-
monetary policy could be particularly effective in achieving reducing wealth inequality in the USA 
across various social groups.  
v. Limitations and further research 
The scope of this thesis is to analyse the impact of financial sector transformation on household wealth 
composition and inequality in the USA since the 1980s. Its main argument can be extended to 
understand rising inequality in countries with similar institutional features, e.g. the UK. However, the 
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mechanisms behind the relationship between wealth heterogeneity and inequality need to be analysed 
separately for each country, considering their laws and institutional conditions for wealth 
accumulation. Securitisation based on subprime lending was largely a US phenomenon and cannot be 
readily applied in the European or the developing country context. For instance, while the US 
households at the bottom of the distribution have had incentives to accumulate housing wealth due to 
privatisation of public services, the average family in Germany or Austria rents their property due to 
the established social housing infrastructure (ECB 2013). Similarly, in the emerging economies 
channels of informal finance, remittances, and the colonial past are likely to be relevant in determining 
the wealth accumulation possibilities and inequality. Consequently, policy solutions proposed in this 
thesis are applicable mainly in the US context and need to be analysed carefully when considered in 
other countries. 
The main limitations of the analysis in this thesis are related to the aggregate and complex 
nature of the stock-flow consistent model, and estimation problems arising due to the design of our 
dataset. Firstly, while the high aggregation of the analytical categories allows for an integrated balance 
sheet analysis of the interrelated economic sectors and the implications of wealth heterogeneity on 
macroeconomic stability, it limits the possibility to analyse the intersectional dimension of inequality. 
Moreover, its complex nature restricts its ability to examine the heterogeneity of household portfolio 
behaviour in more detail to incorporate the remaining tenets of the Post-Keynesian analyses of 
consumption, such as the satiation and hierarchy of consumption choices.  
Secondly, the main caveat of the empirical analysis is that the results may be subject to a bias 
given that the problem of endogeneity cannot be properly addressed in the dataset of choice. 
Moreover, low goodness-of-fit in the pooled OLS regression signals potential omitted variables, which 
may introduce bias to our estimates. Moreover, the complex design of the U.S. Survey of Consumer 
Finances results in a likely violation of the assumption of non-spherical errors, and may lead to 
inefficiency of our parametric results. 
Given its scope and limitations, this thesis offers a variety of directions to be developed in future 
research. Firstly, the theoretical model of inequality determination undertaken here could be extended 
to include securitisation of consumer debt, heterogeneity of marginal consumption propensities out of 
wealth, endogenous movements across household groups related to changes in wealth accumulation 
and leverage, and government redistribution policy. Moreover, the model could be extended into 
different modelling methodologies to provide a more refined depiction of the mechanism between 
wealth composition and distribution. This could be achieved through an analytical Post-Keynesian 
functional distribution model relating returns to wealth to its absolute size in a three-class setting. An 
advantage of such demand-led model would be the possibility to incorporate the gendered, racial, and 
intergenerational dimensions of economic behaviour, as highlighted by Onaran (2015). Moreover, the 
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theoretical framework developed in this thesis could be applied to analyse the consequences of wealth 
inequality on economic performance. Such research could be developed by integrating the 
heterogeneity of households and their wealth structures into a macroeconomic agent-based model (cf. 
Russo 2016). 
Secondly, the empirical analysis presented here could be extended to other countries. This 
would allow to understand which institutional mechanisms in advanced and emerging economies 
generate inequality in the different legal and historical contexts. This strand of research would be 
particularly relevant given the increasing availability of good quality data on wealth distribution, such 
as the European Household and Consumption Survey and the Distributional National Accounts. 
Moreover, to understand the changing landscape of finance and its impact on household wealth, the 
results obtained in this work could be revised with the new data from the upcoming 2016 wave of the 
U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances. 
Furthermore, focus on the social dimension of wealth inequality adopted in this thesis could be 
pursued in more detail. Not enough academic research has investigated the determinants of the racial, 
gender, and intergenerational wealth inequality in the context of financialised economies. 
Understanding the determinants of wealth inequality across these categories can be applied using the 
findings presented here. In addition, our insights can inform future work on the impact of the racial 
and gender inequalities on macroeconomic performance. Furthermore, the analysis could be extended 
using individual-level data to examine the role of intra-household wealth distribution in generating 
personal inequality. 
Lastly, policy proposals put forward in this thesis could be formally assessed in the US context. 
Such comparative policy evaluation could analyse the potential quantitative impact of wealth taxation, 
asset-building programs, and debt relief measures on wealth inequality. Moreover, this analysis could 
guide the design of policy strategy to reduce inequality, indicating the most urgent areas for policy 
action and maximising the effectiveness of the long-term measures. 
vi. Concluding remarks 
This thesis presented a comprehensive research program for understanding the causes and 
consequences of rising wealth inequality in the USA since the 1980, which could be extended into 
other contexts using the latest data and methods. We conclude with an emphasis on the need to invest 
in improved public services, research into the determinants and consequences of inequality, and 
promoting global coordination to tackle inequality in order to promote shared values of social justice 
in the society, and achieve sustainable reductions in income and wealth inequality in the long run. 
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Appendix I  
Data analysis in Chapter 1 
Appendix to Section 1.1. Trends in inequality (source for all tables: own calculations based on U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances 1989-2013) 
 
Table A1.1 Decile boundaries for income percentiles  
Wave 
0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-100 
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
1989 0 18,855.5 18,855.5 37,711.1 37,711.1 58,452.1 58,452.1 94,277.6 94,277.6 133,874.2 133,874.2 188,000,000.0 
1992 0 18,325.5 18,325.5 33,319.1 33,319.1 54,976.6 54,976.6 88,295.7 88,295.7 126,612.7 126,612.7 109,000,000.0 
1995 0 18,653.2 18,653.2 34,197.5 34,197.5 55,959.5 55,959.5 91,711.5 91,711.5 124,354.5 124,354.5 155,000,000.0 
1998 0 20,292.7 20,292.7 37,686.4 37,686.4 60,878.0 60,878.0 97,115.0 97,115.0 134,801.4 134,801.4 256,000,000.0 
2001 0 21,601.3 21,601.3 40,502.5 40,502.5 67,504.2 67,504.2 108,006.7 108,006.7 156,609.7 156,609.7 166,000,000.0 
2004 0 22,796.5 22,796.5 41,793.5 41,793.5 65,856.5 65,856.5 110,182.9 110,182.9 159,575.2 159,575.2 130,000,000.0 
2007 0 23,093.0 23,093.0 41,567.3 41,567.3 66,969.6 66,969.6 109,691.6 109,691.6 158,186.8 158,186.8 210,000,000.0 
2010 0 21,787.7 21,787.7 38,128.6 38,128.6 62,095.1 62,095.1 101,313.0 101,313.0 152,514.2 152,514.2 387,000,000.0 
2013 0 20,290.6 20,290.6 36,523.1 36,523.1 59,857.4 59,857.4 101,453.1 101,453.1 154,208.8 154,208.8 180,000,000.0 
Note: All values in 2013 USD. 
Table A1.2 Decile boundaries for net worth percentiles 
Wave 
0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-100 
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
1989 -38,400,000.0 3,976.7 3,976.7 46,400.4 46,472.7 140,086.8 140,249.4 341,630.9 341,811.7 663,649.7 665,186.1 282,000,000.0 
1992 -528,535.6 5,719.2 5,735.4 46,468.2 46,517.0 127,836.4 127,868.9 300,418.8 300,418.8 581,372.9 581,502.9 2,840,000,000.0 
1995 -21,900,000.0 7,893.0 7,893.0 51,228.5 51,425.8 131,979.7 132,177.1 299,265.4 299,326.1 579,071.5 579,359.9 1,330,000,000.0 
1998 -21,700,000.0 7,033.2 7,033.2 57,037.9 57,037.9 157,690.6 157,819.2 391,403.1 391,403.1 705,469.0 705,469.0 740,000,000.0 
2001 -4,236,829.0 8,929.9 8,929.9 65,266.8 65,266.8 183,088.6 183,128.0 498,785.8 498,798.9 978,897.6 978,950.1 776,000,000.0 
2004 -561,560.6 7,953.8 7,978.4 64,741.2 64,741.2 190,828.7 190,890.4 537,871.9 538,019.9 1,028,810.0 1,029,427.0 883,000,000.0 
2007 -531,868.3 8,196.4 8,230.1 72,886.3 72,886.3 222,201.2 222,201.2 557,917.1 557,917.1 1,021,969.0 1,022,081.0 1,590,000,000.0 
2010 -7,429,424.0 4,608.3 4,608.3 42,546.3 42,546.3 148,333.4 148,429.9 445,503.9 445,503.9 1,020,254.0 1,020,469.0 1,170,000,000.0 
2013 -227,000,000.0 4,300.0 4,300.0 38,150.0 38,180.0 147,600.0 147,600.0 428,200.0 428,300.0 942,050.0 942,200.0 1,320,000,000.0 
















Appendix to Section 1.3. Balance sheet analysis (source for all tables: own calculations based on U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances 1989-2013) 




Holders Conditional median Conditional mean 
 
Holders Conditional median Conditional mean 
1989 94.7% 147,859.3 411,492.0 
 
72.3% 27,113.6 65,321.5 
1992 95.8% 137,536.2 370,759.1 
 
73.2% 28,270.9 70,136.6 
1995 96.4% 155,127.4 392,925.6 
 
74.5% 33,089.8 74,031.3 
1998 96.8% 177,117.8 488,003.5 
 
74.1% 46,888.3 90,695.4 
2001 96.7% 195,078.3 613,634.5 
 
75.1% 51,215.4 95,284.8 
2004 97.9% 214,628.4 665,152.9 
 
76.4% 68,316.1 127,591.9 
2007 97.7% 249,575.0 751,170.0 
 
77% 75,732.6 141,503.0 
2010 97.4% 201,157.3 651,688.6 
 
74.9% 76,090.4 139,622.5 
2013 97.9% 178,200.0 632,560.0 
 
74.5% 60,700.0 122,268.0 
Growth rate (percent) 
1989-2013 3.4 20.5 53.7 
 
3.0 123.9 87.2 
1989-2007 3.2 68.8 82.5 
 
6.5 179.3 116.6 
2007-2013 0.2 -28.6 -15.8 
 
-3.2 -19.8 -13.6 
 
 
 Non-financial assets  Financial assets 
 Primary residence  Other property  Business equity  











 Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean 
1989 63.9% 129,548.5  20.3% 55,040.2  13.3% 76,833.3  84.5% 21,958.5  85.6% 23,699.7  52.8% 69,824.5  53.5% 34,587.2 
1992 63.9% 119,031.7  19.4% 49,134.2  14.4% 66,814.2  86.4% 18,174.0  86.9% 20,365.1  50.5% 59,867.7  55.7% 37,372.1 
1995 64.7% 117,289.4  18.0% 39,075.9  12.8% 68,570.1  84.9% 23,061.7  87.4% 20,109.0  50.5% 73,612.2  58.6% 51,207.3 
1998 66.3% 135,598.0  18.6% 47,030.3  12.7% 82,554.2  83.5% 23,200.1  90.6% 22,496.2  51.9% 109,483.4  59.7% 67,641.3 
2001 67.7% 166,489.2  16.8% 57,899.3  13.6% 101,399.2  85.5% 26,507.6  91.4% 30,218.7  51.7% 142,242.2  61.6% 88,878.3 
2004 69.1% 214,661.2  18.1% 73,819.9  13.3% 110,033.5  87.0% 28,196.4  91.3% 31,268.0  49.9% 122,852.6  58.4% 84,321.3 
2007 68.6% 238,572.0  19.0% 81,964.9  13.6% 146,287.8  87.7% 27,038.9  92.1% 28,051.6  47.5% 131,388.2  60.8% 97,866.7 
2010 67.3% 193,185.9  18.6% 72,726.9  13.2% 113,705.2  87.2% 25,647.8  92.5% 32,809.1  39.8% 112,817.8  57.6% 100,795.9 


















 Secured debt  Unsecured debt  Other 
 By primary residence  By other property  Instalment debt  Credit card balances  
Other unsecured lines of 
credit 
 Other debt 
 Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean 
1989 39.5% 44,827.6  5.2% 5,016.6  49.4% 10,878.6  39.7% 1,873.0  3.2% 1,209.7  6.7% 1,516.0 
1992 39.1% 50,468.0  5.7% 7,181.3  46.0% 7,954.7  43.7% 2,242.5  2.4% 584.0  8.4% 1,706.1 
1995 41.0% 53,949.1  4.8% 5,830.5  46.0% 8,838.7  47.3% 2,878.5  1.9% 422.7  8.5% 2,111.8 
1998 43.1% 64,633.1  5.0% 6,840.6  43.8% 12,025.3  44.1% 3,508.3  2.3% 302.2  8.8% 3,385.9 
2001 44.6% 71,679.9  4.6% 5,904.9  45.2% 11,781.0  44.4% 3,211.2  1.5% 483.3  7.2% 2,224.5 
2004 47.9% 95,774.1  4.0% 11,086.3  46.0% 13,930.6  46.2% 3,826.5  1.6% 915.6  7.6% 2,058.8 
2007 48.7% 105,610.6  5.5% 14,359.6  46.9% 14,478.1  46.1% 4,922.0  1.7% 606.6  6.8% 1,526.1 
2010 47.0% 103,540.5  5.4% 13,651.4  46.4% 15,566.9  39.4% 3,991.7  2.1% 1,409.4  6.4% 1,462.6 
2013 42.9% 90,180.1  5.3% 10,987.6  47.2% 15,999.4  38.1% 2,931.6  1.9% 880.9  6.6% 1,288.4 
Note: All median and mean values in 2013 USD. Holders represents the proportion of all households holding asset or debt. All values are conditional on holding assets or debt. 
Appendix to Section 1.3.1. Detailed balance sheet analysis by income group (source for all tables: own calculations based on U.S. Survey of Consumer 
Finances 1989-2013) 
Table A1.4 Before-tax family income and net worth by income percentile, USA 1989-2013  
 Before-tax income 
Wave 
0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-100 
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean 
1989 11,313.3 10,802.9 26,397.7 26,597.9 47,138.8 46,921.1 73,536.6 74,024.0 109,362.0 110,786.2 188,555.2 313,842.6 
1992 10,995.3 10,658.9 26,655.3 25,818.1 43,314.9 44,171.7 68,304.2 70,315.6 103,289.3 104,428.6 174,925.5 244,407.6 
1995 10,414.7 10,093.2 26,425.3 26,709.5 46,632.9 45,727.0 68,395.0 70,251.2 104,146.9 105,650.7 170,987.4 266,723.4 
1998 11,740.8 11,247.3 28,989.5 28,803.7 47,832.7 48,529.6 76,822.3 77,600.0 113,059.2 113,680.0 186,982.5 312,472.4 
2001 13,500.8 13,146.7 32,402.0 31,676.2 52,653.3 52,920.5 85,055.3 85,610.5 129,608.1 128,823.4 222,763.8 411,988.8 
2004 13,931.2 13,330.2 31,661.8 32,162.2 53,191.8 53,549.7 84,093.6 85,307.1 129,180.0 131,410.1 227,964.6 371,243.7 
2007 13,855.8 13,811.3 32,330.1 31,777.4 53,113.8 53,088.5 84,289.3 85,970.2 128,165.9 130,275.9 232,084.2 445,044.1 
2010 14,162.0 13,820.1 30,502.8 29,921.7 49,022.4 49,538.4 76,257.1 78,759.3 120,922.0 122,671.4 220,056.2 372,686.7 
2013 14,203.4 13,318.6 28,406.9 28,566.7 46,668.5 47,243.1 76,191.3 78,544.1 121,743.8 124,292.7 229,284.1 406,234.0 
Growth rate (percent) 
           
1989-2013 25.5 23.3 7.6 7.4 -1.0 0.7 3.6 6.1 11.3 12.2 21.6 29.4 
1989-2007 22.5 27.8 22.5 19.5 12.7 13.1 14.6 16.1 17.2 17.6 23.1 41.8 



























Note: All figures in 2013 USD. 
 
 
Table A1.5 Asset holdings by income group, USA 1989-2013 
       
 
 
     
 
Net worth  
0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-100  
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean 
1989 3,470.5 44,642.5 44,827.8 123,026.6 76,134.9 185,522.8 122,011.0 246,891.9 243,262.9 404,257.6 715,382.4 1,818,168.0 
1992 6,499.1 54,144.6 45,330.9 105,324.3 64,308.2 164,787.5 123,027.1 227,019.1 195,134.1 370,360.7 595,150.9 1,565,693.0 
1995 9,107.3 67,756.4 52,974.0 121,867.0 70,080.6 154,088.5 115,510.7 242,495.6 194,744.1 392,560.4 542,338.8 1,669,558.0 
1998 8,291.2 70,852.6 50,033.3 139,656.9 76,336.5 179,745.9 160,320.9 291,764.9 271,180.3 471,217.6 646,858.6 2,218,943.0 
2001 10,571.4 69,995.5 50,690.2 155,162.5 84,177.2 214,458.2 186,476.7 387,539.3 345,244.5 594,930.5 1,097,192.0 2,968,968.0 
2004 9,334.9 88,244.3 42,666.7 151,954.6 89,649.4 241,354.3 197,672.7 418,269.2 389,302.9 607,967.7 1,145,096.0 3,130,447.0 
2007 9,998.5 118,863.1 42,441.7 151,002.1 99,300.0 236,525.1 230,622.2 417,509.4 402,219.1 689,524.9 1,257,643.0 3,712,543.0 
2010 6,537.3 125,244.2 29,846.7 139,272.3 69,874.6 211,242.1 136,748.4 313,353.5 309,880.8 610,394.3 1,279,101.0 3,114,946.0 
2013 6,200.0 87,530.3 21,700.0 111,350.1 62,000.0 170,066.2 159,000.0 333,843.7 300,000.0 629,917.6 1,137,300.0 3,248,013.0 
Growth rate (percent) 
           
1989-2013 78.6 96.1 -51.6 -9.5 -18.6 -8.3 30.3 35.2 23.3 55.8 59.0 78.6 
1989-2007 188.1 166.3 -5.3 22.7 30.4 27.5 89.0 69.1 65.3 70.6 75.8 104.2 
2007-2013 -38.0 -26.4 -48.9 -26.3 -37.6 -28.1 -31.1 -20.0 -25.4 -8.6 -9.6 -12.5 
Total assets 
Wave 
0-20 20-40 40-60 
Holders Median Mean Holders Median Mean Holders Median Mean 
1989 78.8% 14,099.1 62,283.8 95.1% 75,918.0 143,727.7 99.9% 122,318.3 216,825.8 
1992 82.6% 24,533.9 75,195.5 97.1% 68,678.8 125,894.1 99.7% 100,897.8 199,948.7 
1995 84.4% 23,071.8 91,203.1 97.9% 86,671.0 145,200.3 99.9% 126,712.7 192,139.0 
1998 87.1% 21,014.0 92,817.1 98.1% 90,345.8 166,077.6 99.2% 151,986.8 227,615.9 
2001 85.6% 33,487.0 94,328.1 98.3% 89,167.4 183,301.0 99.8% 152,464.4 266,345.3 
2004 92.2% 20,963.4 113,358.1 97.8% 96,561.2 192,640.1 99.8% 190,964.4 314,373.4 
2007 89.8% 26,610.3 152,382.7 98.9% 94,314.8 187,664.2 100% 207,211.9 313,075.4 
2010 89.9% 16,075.4 170,463.9 98% 81,877.6 179,771.5 99.5% 170,935.5 289,067.4 
2013 92.2% 15,010.0 116,383.7 97.9% 62,300.0 146,292.7 99.7% 141,860.0 228,745.9 
 
Growth rate (percent) 
1989-2013 17.0 6.5 86.9 2.9 -17.9 1.8 -0.2 16.0 5.5 
1989-2007 14.0 88.7 144.7 4.0 24.2 30.6 0.1 69.4 44.4 






























 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-100 
Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 33.0% 28,971.7  55.3% 65,946.9  64.9% 92,260.0  76.1% 131,364.8  86.6% 198,841.1  93.6% 410,700.1  
1992 39.2% 41,008.5  56.4% 64,026.2  61.4% 80,341.7  75.4% 124,191.2  84.3% 176,905.2  90.1% 364,558.5  
1995 39.6% 40,009.6  55.9% 67,882.3  62.0% 83,613.1  77.4% 127,447.9  85.9% 180,718.5  91.3% 328,088.6  
1998 38.2% 43,657.2  56.3% 71,684.5  66.9% 96,697.1  79.2% 147,837.3  88.2% 204,206.2  93.1% 405,142.8  
2001 40.5% 46,864.1  57.5% 84,224.3  65.9% 106,478.1  82.3% 175,058.4  90.1% 247,234.7  94.4% 554,694.1  
2004 40.4% 55,323.2  56.9% 95,599.8  71.6% 155,672.7  83.0% 228,590.2  91.7% 326,988.0  94.7% 718,907.6  
2007 41.6% 72,285.5  55.1% 96,774.6  69.1% 151,161.7  83.9% 254,654.7  92.5% 395,969.1  94.3% 802,642.7  
2010 37.3% 60,853.1  56.1% 90,368.4  70.8% 130,074.7  80.6% 184,953.0  91.1% 298,248.0  92.0% 669,364.8  
2013 37.5% 50,710.6  52.9% 75,018.6  63.7% 99,541.0  80.6% 175,725.9  88.6% 279,731.6  93.7% 640,610.3  
 
Other real estate 
 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-100 
Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 6.1% 4,597.6  13.3% 8,860.8  18.0% 20,832.8  24.6% 30,127.0  28.2% 71,149.3  50.6% 324,234.1  
1992 5.4% 6,725.0  12.8% 10,132.9  17.4% 26,929.2  21.6% 28,991.4  29.9% 56,736.6  49.4% 272,678.5  
1995 7.4% 9,146.5  12.2% 9,429.8  14.3% 15,702.8  19.9% 29,990.9  26.4% 45,108.7  45.6% 206,408.2  
1998 4.0% 8,764.3  12.1% 17,617.1  16.5% 19,124.4  23.1% 35,200.0  28.1% 47,660.1  46.4% 249,687.1  
2001 5.0% 4,344.8  10.8% 15,218.5  13.1% 18,222.0  18.8% 35,368.9  26.7% 56,079.6  46.0% 359,308.2  
2004 5.3% 10,129.5  9.7% 16,059.0  16.1% 28,458.0  22.2% 50,930.6  27.7% 67,112.9  46.7% 447,124.1  
2007 7.5% 14,502.1  9.6% 17,416.8  15.6% 25,157.4  21.9% 55,617.7  29.9% 90,399.5  51.3% 488,423.6  
2010 7.0% 31,108.0  11.0% 17,950.5  15.8% 29,342.1  20.7% 38,070.1  28.5% 79,594.2  48.8% 403,529.0  
2013 4.4% 6,857.3  8.6% 10,450.9  14.0% 21,131.1  22.1% 41,343.3  30.3% 90,982.9  46.1% 362,340.6  
 
(Table A1.5 continued) 
Wave 
60-80 80-90 90-100 
Holders Median Mean Holders Median Mean Holders Median Mean 
1989 99.5% 195,219.5 309,461.2 100% 349,584.2 491,641.3 100% 854,981.1 1,983,370.0 
1992 100% 200,008.4 287,337.7 100% 297,981.7 458,955.5 99.6% 793,859.5 1,758,677.0 
1995 99.7% 212,047.9 313,438.7 100% 314,626.3 494,925.6 100% 712,796.8 1,844,774.0 
1998 99.8% 265,676.6 382,096.5 100% 390,116.5 586,753.1 100% 867,576.8 2,436,697.0 
2001 100% 302,368.0 472,800.1 100% 495,279.5 727,750.0 100% 1,336,723.0 3,207,301.0 
2004 100% 357,117.9 533,888.6 99.8% 572,461.5 786,508.8 100% 1,428,102.0 3,447,362.0 
2007 100% 385,287.3 560,013.5 100% 636,232.1 896,497.6 100% 1,524,869.0 4,052,343.0 
2010 99.9% 286,035.6 434,508.2 100% 481,191.4 792,404.8 100% 1,593,108.0 3,455,615.0 
2013 100% 272,500.0 440,117.5 100% 493,600.0 806,878.6 100% 1,402,200.0 3,550,871.0 
Growth rate (percent)          
1989-2013 0.5 39.6 42.2 0.0 41.2 64.1 0.0 64.0 79.0 
1989-2007 0.5 97.4 81.0 0.0 82.0 82.3 0.0 78.4 104.3 


















 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-100 
Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 3.1% 6,160.9  9.0% 18,955.2  10.6% 33,688.9  14.6% 30,591.9  21.3% 58,676.0  37.5% 494,788.2  
1992 4.4% 8,100.2  8.5% 9,349.0  11.2% 24,150.4  16.4% 31,629.3  22.1% 52,421.7  40.5% 446,585.2  
1995 4.9% 15,184.6  7.5% 9,218.4  10.6% 14,239.4  15.4% 26,532.0  19.5% 51,141.4  31.4% 484,616.1  
1998 4.3% 8,185.2  6.0% 7,547.1  10.8% 20,182.0  14.8% 37,065.1  20.6% 57,116.4  34.4% 599,164.0  
2001 2.6% 7,317.3  8.6% 11,859.9  10.1% 16,889.4  14.4% 38,257.4  22.5% 78,245.5  41.7% 755,990.1  
2004 4.0% 15,463.5  8.1% 18,705.4  10.8% 18,481.3  15.1% 43,361.6  18.8% 53,284.4  38.5% 835,522.7  
2007 3.5% 28,776.3  5.1% 7,772.7  10.6% 29,157.5  18.1% 37,628.7  20.1% 101,846.0  40.8% 1,126,669.0  
2010 5.1% 33,261.5  6.5% 13,810.2  10.8% 20,937.4  15.4% 34,581.8  19.2% 63,503.5  37.7% 846,805.2  
2013 4.1% 23,204.8  5.4% 7,605.3  8.7% 11,656.4  13.6% 34,555.2  17.9% 74,866.3  35.5% 875,357.6  
 
 
Vehicles and other non-financial assets 
 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-100 
Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 53.3% 5,524.4  82.1% 10,437.1  95.1% 14,537.1  95.0% 22,489.8  97.4% 30,107.1  96.3% 75,409.7  
1992 56.7% 5,031.9  86.6% 9,211.0  94.2% 14,159.3  96.7% 19,735.1  98.0% 27,571.1  97.7% 52,897.8  
1995 59.1% 6,645.7  86.0% 11,228.1  91.6% 16,958.9  93.6% 26,210.6  94.7% 34,256.0  93.9% 68,672.3  
1998 58.5% 6,439.0  83.3% 11,738.7  89.7% 18,519.0  94.0% 25,449.6  93.0% 31,361.6  91.2% 71,492.7  
2001 57.6% 7,421.2  87.6% 14,509.4  91.7% 18,743.1  95.5% 27,914.8  96.8% 36,871.0  93.9% 85,061.6  
2004 65.8% 7,579.6  86.1% 13,058.0  92.2% 21,990.5  96.0% 32,386.2  96.5% 38,408.2  93.9% 89,613.9  
2007 65.0% 7,969.0  87.3% 13,523.5  94.5% 21,181.6  95.5% 30,349.5  96.5% 37,166.3  95.8% 82,965.5  
2010 65.0% 9,075.9  86.4% 13,000.2  92.0% 21,533.1  96.0% 27,500.4  96.3% 37,772.5  96.3% 72,567.6  




 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-100 
Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 55.3% 4,405.2  83.0% 12,569.6  92.9% 13,231.3  97.8% 18,592.8  98.2% 25,107.5  99.4% 104,977.4  
1992 62.1% 3,956.8  84.7% 7,473.3  91.3% 13,780.9  97.7% 14,688.1  98.8% 26,340.6  98.7% 91,261.9  
1995 63.1% 4,634.0  85.3% 7,250.1  92.0% 11,514.4  97.3% 14,861.1  98.7% 21,784.1  99.8% 97,365.3  
1998 68.6% 4,387.6  90.4% 11,804.1  95.6% 11,735.1  98.9% 17,304.3  99.6% 27,556.1  100.0% 101,638.3  
2001 71.8% 5,586.9  90.4% 11,013.6  96.5% 14,869.1  99.0% 22,932.6  99.7% 32,997.6  99.2% 152,476.4  
2004 75.6% 5,362.5  87.4% 10,060.6  95.6% 15,753.8  98.5% 33,892.1  99.1% 34,190.4  100.0% 143,274.8  
2007 75.1% 5,108.5  90.2% 8,519.2  96.1% 11,258.2  99.3% 20,842.0  100.0% 33,846.8  100.0% 150,033.7  
2010 76.1% 6,878.7  91.2% 9,727.8  96.3% 14,155.6  99.0% 19,933.3  99.8% 47,092.2  99.9% 173,176.4  


















Financial investment assets 
 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-100 
Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 19.9% 9,493.3  45.5% 17,641.1  52.9% 28,683.4  61.8% 50,992.3  79.3% 52,046.1  88.4% 401,712.9  
1992 25.2% 7,564.2  40.1% 17,671.0  46.4% 25,512.8  62.5% 36,034.9  73.3% 58,892.0  82.9% 346,376.8  
1995 22.6% 9,629.5  40.2% 24,698.4  52.1% 27,496.8  61.1% 45,537.2  71.9% 86,719.9  81.4% 412,331.6  
1998 26.8% 16,052.4  40.8% 29,980.4  51.7% 30,889.9  62.0% 59,128.1  70.8% 95,048.1  85.5% 698,965.5  
2001 22.0% 16,023.6  41.0% 27,701.1  52.7% 48,365.9  62.2% 86,903.3  73.7% 131,760.3  87.1% 891,369.5  
2004 22.4% 13,594.3  37.1% 27,361.6  48.1% 41,046.5  62.5% 74,657.3  75.8% 107,263.8  83.3% 786,091.4  
2007 24.8% 19,624.8  33.3% 24,952.6  45.6% 35,202.0  59.4% 70,470.3  67.6% 84,596.9  80.7% 903,162.9  
2010 19.3% 18,638.0  28.7% 19,410.5  38.3% 31,317.6  47.0% 52,364.4  57.6% 99,666.0  74.4% 761,116.7  
2013 18.3% 17,989.9  23.8% 17,543.7  32.9% 26,492.6  40.9% 46,865.1  55.1% 91,434.6  71.7% 831,496.4  
Retirement and insurance assets 
 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-100 
Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 15.3% 3,130.7  36.6% 9,317.0  56.7% 13,592.4  73.3% 25,302.6  81.6% 55,714.2  89.4% 171,547.6  
1992 19.7% 2,808.8  41.8% 8,030.8  56.5% 15,074.3  72.6% 32,067.8  85.9% 60,088.5  90.3% 184,318.3  
1995 22.1% 5,953.1  46.2% 15,493.4  61.6% 22,613.6  76.1% 42,859.1  84.2% 75,196.9  89.5% 247,292.0  
1998 24.1% 5,331.3  43.5% 15,705.9  64.2% 30,468.4  78.9% 60,112.1  83.6% 123,804.6  91.9% 310,606.9  
2001 24.3% 6,770.1  46.5% 18,774.3  64.2% 42,777.8  82.1% 86,364.7  90.0% 144,561.2  92.0% 408,401.2  
2004 21.4% 5,905.6  41.7% 11,795.8  63.6% 32,970.6  77.4% 70,070.7  85.2% 159,261.0  90.6% 426,827.8  
2007 20.9% 4,116.5  45.7% 18,704.9  63.8% 39,957.1  82.2% 90,450.6  90.8% 152,673.1  92.5% 498,445.1  
2010 19.5% 10,648.7  43.0% 15,504.0  59.3% 41,706.9  76.1% 77,105.3  87.8% 166,528.4  92.5% 529,055.0  
2013 18.1% 5,026.2  38.7% 13,605.6  59.5% 39,771.5  75.8% 91,023.8  86.3% 191,238.1  94.4% 569,292.7  
Note: All median and mean figures in 2013 USD. Holders represents the proportion of all households holding assets. All values are conditional on holding assets. 
 
Total debt 
Wave 0-20 20-40 40-60 
Holders Median Mean Holders Median Mean Holders Median Mean 
1989 47.1% 3,072.9 9,522.7 59.5% 9,037.9 22,739.8 78.1% 21,690.9 39,998.6 
1992 48.9% 3,574.5 16,288.6 65.8% 9,261.2 25,547.2 79.1% 18,538.6 43,880.8 
1995 49.2% 4,735.8 18,721.8 68.6% 13,327.0 30,010.1 79.4% 22,813.8 47,291.7 
1998 47.3% 6,161.2 20,728.1 66.8% 14,724.1 35,304.5 79.9% 36,881.7 57,713.3 
2001 49.3% 6,960.0 22,108.8 70.2% 14,445.4 35,405.5 82.1% 39,107.6 62,598.1 
2004 52.6% 8,632.0 30,837.9 69.8% 20,346.8 52,433.5 84% 54,628.2 85,846.9 
2007 51.7% 9,768.3 35,302.2 70.2% 20,210.3 48,761.0 83.8% 62,820.4 91,406.8 
2010 52.5% 10,717.0 53,009.6 66.8% 21,734.0 55,399.5 81.8% 65,373.4 93,335.4 
2013 52.1% 11,000.0 37,739.3 66.5% 21,000.0 47,820.8 81% 40,000.0 71,724.8 
Growth rate (percent) 
1989-2013 10.6 258.0 296.3 132.4 110.3 132.4 84.4 79.3 84.4 
1989-2007 9.8 217.9 270.7 123.6 114.4 123.6 189.6 128.5 189.6 
2007-2013 0.8 12.6 6.9 3.9 -1.9 3.9 -36.3 -21.5 -36.3 




















(Table A1.6 continued) 
Mortgages secured by primary residence 
 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-100 
Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 7.5%  3,716.8  23.3%  14,042.3  37.9%  24,930.0  56.3%  50,706.3  70.4%  67,780.4  74.1%  130,426.7  
1992 10.3%  9,380.0  22.0%  16,311.3  35.3%  27,925.0  56.5%  54,267.6  68.2%  79,934.2  74.8%  151,833.9  
1995 10.6%  9,941.2  26.0%  19,918.1  37.6%  32,383.7  59.3%  61,815.6  69.8%  88,737.2  72.9%  145,626.3  
1998 11.0%  10,989.9  24.1%  22,760.5  43.7%  39,658.1  63.4%  73,807.5  73.5%  100,423.6  73.0%  176,563.2  
2001 13.8%  13,714.9  26.7%  22,542.5  44.4%  45,185.2  62.1%  77,270.7  76.9%  114,425.5  75.4%  213,098.2  
2004 15.7%  18,462.3  29.9%  36,161.9  51.6%  66,036.8  65.7%  105,521.4  76.9%  156,552.5  76.2%  259,919.6  
2007 14.6%  21,388.3  29.9%  32,463.5  50.4%  69,909.8  69.8%  118,950.0  80.8%  185,126.0  76.4%  281,318.4  
2010 14.7%  27,331.5  29.8%  38,503.5  51.5%  71,336.7  65.4%  109,331.9  74.9%  159,848.1  72.6%  292,072.9  
2013 13.6%  18,402.3  25.8%  32,374.4  40.1%  50,624.9  62.9%  93,517.6  71.9%  158,804.5  72.6%  267,612.0  
 
Mortgages secured by other real estate 
 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-100 
Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 1.0%  366.5  0.9%  897.7  3.3%  1,772.7  5.6%  2,418.4  10.7%  7,498.4  19.4%  23,869.1  
1992 0.5%  379.2  2.0%  505.7  4.0%  3,589.0  5.6%  4,118.5  10.0%  8,431.1  22.3%  36,040.7  
1995 1.3%  1,022.6  1.6%  1,105.9  3.2%  2,405.6  5.2%  4,041.6  7.7%  6,696.4  17.3%  27,849.8  
1998 0.7%  1,155.4  1.8%  1,811.4  4.1%  2,612.6  6.7%  6,863.5  7.7%  7,844.4  15.4%  27,182.4  
2001 0.4%  171.9  1.7%  964.6  3.3%  2,563.8  5.7%  4,288.4  9.9%  8,121.7  14.2%  27,924.2  
2004 0.3%  1,800.7  1.3%  1,949.6  2.7%  3,304.7  4.4%  5,624.4  7.6%  9,353.1  15.1%  65,090.8  
2007 1.1%  2,496.1  2.0%  2,096.7  2.6%  3,088.0  6.9%  12,436.6  8.4%  18,045.0  21.9%  69,731.1  
2010 1.2%  4,582.9  1.9%  3,547.7  3.4%  3,623.1  6.1%  7,675.6  9.2%  14,565.0  19.2%  71,636.5  






        
(Table A1.6 continued)         
Wave 60-80 80-90 90-100 
Holders Median Mean Holders Median Mean Holders Median Mean 
1989 86.2% 51,100.0 70,838.4 93.7% 72,302.8 93,438.6 87.6% 133,760.3 187,676.1 
1992 84.8% 50,172.7 70,927.7 87.5% 88,874.6 101,562.2 87.4% 152,402.8 212,102.1 
1995 87.4% 63,751.0 80,061.7 90.2% 96,006.0 113,604.0 86.1% 149,663.0 202,722.6 
1998 87.3% 82,912.3 102,487.4 89.6% 121,866.7 129,176.8 88.1% 180,391.4 247,269.8 
2001 85.6% 83,888.3 99,547.9 91.4% 126,856.7 144,520.5 85.3% 192,399.3 279,502.0 
2004 86.6% 114,361.6 133,332.2 91.9% 167,707.3 193,085.6 86.3% 257,726.7 366,913.2 
2007 90.9% 125,304.0 156,732.1 89.6% 204,236.5 231,164.5 87.6% 265,428.9 387,699.7 
2010 86.9% 114,671.4 138,768.0 88.9% 175,758.1 204,508.1 84.5% 286,357.1 403,304.6 
2013 87.2% 99,900.0 122,107.5 87.2% 180,000.0 202,151.7 84.5% 271,000.0 358,224.8 
Growth rate (percent) 
1989-2013 1.2 95.5 72.4 -6.9 149.0 116.3 -3.5 102.6 90.9 
1989-2007 5.5 145.2 121.3 -4.4 182.5 147.4 0.0 98.4 106.6 















(Table A1.6 continued)                                                                                                    Instalment debt 
 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-100 
Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 33.4%  4,193.7  40.2%  6,175.6  53.5%  10,967.0  64.0%  14,133.0  63.3%  11,900.8  48.3%  16,847.7  
1992 31.1%  4,255.2  42.4%  6,266.0  54.5%  8,396.2  54.2%  8,514.0  54.4%  8,993.1  40.9%  11,724.9  
1995 27.4%  4,853.9  40.3%  5,824.4  49.3%  8,447.1  60.4%  10,328.1  60.5%  13,091.7  44.3%  11,428.5  
1998 27.3%  6,537.7  36.5%  7,299.5  51.6%  10,656.4  51.6%  14,743.1  58.3%  14,531.0  45.4%  19,629.7  
2001 25.5%  5,990.7  43.0%  8,518.5  52.1%  10,836.7  56.8%  13,173.9  55.8%  14,620.9  41.7%  19,793.9  
2004 27.1%  7,778.6  39.6% 10,387.9  52.3%  11,471.6  58.3%  16,700.5  59.3%  18,063.7  45.9%  21,977.0  
2007 27.9%  8,631.7  42.4% 10,417.6  53.9%  13,259.2  59.3%  17,161.9  57.2%  17,139.3  45.1%  21,910.7  
2010 34.1% 15,674.5  40.4%  9,862.0  50.3%  13,927.2  56.7%  15,741.6  58.5%  19,829.3  42.0%  22,771.8  
2013 32.4% 15,944.8  41.3% 11,230.2  52.7%  12,966.2  56.4%  16,612.8  61.2%  23,291.7  45.0%  20,573.2  
 
Credit card balances 
 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-100 
Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 15.0%  304.5  28.2%  1,008.4  48.8%  1,848.3  57.4%  2,323.9  57.7%  2,473.5  40.3%  3,257.7  
1992 23.4%  987.6  42.0%  1,669.8  51.8%  2,031.0  55.6%  2,882.4  53.1%  2,812.1  38.4%  3,080.4  
1995 26.6%  1,458.1  42.9%  2,347.3  52.6%  2,756.5  60.0%  2,902.3  61.2%  3,667.8  47.3%  4,695.6  
1998 24.4%  1,534.4  41.5%  2,684.0  49.3%  3,783.3  57.7%  4,286.7  53.0%  3,740.7  42.2%  4,606.6  
2001 30.4%  1,691.6  44.2%  2,261.9  53.2%  3,198.3  52.2%  3,667.1  50.6%  5,369.0  33.2%  3,315.9  
2004 29.1%  1,839.6  42.5%  2,883.1  55.0%  4,158.3  56.2%  4,400.6  57.5%  5,010.3  38.6%  4,714.1  
2007 25.7%  1,897.3  39.4%  2,770.5  55.0%  4,152.2  62.0%  6,570.7  55.9%  8,026.6  40.5%  6,811.1  
2010 23.2%  1,779.3  33.5%  2,394.7  44.7%  3,351.1  53.4%  4,495.7  51.0%  7,152.5  33.6%  6,136.2  
2013 19.5%  1,120.2  34.2%  1,906.6  46.8%  2,922.6  49.8%  3,311.6  48.7%  4,642.7  32.2%  4,248.3  
Other unsecured lines of credit 
 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-100 
Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 0.9%  41.4  1.9%  106.3  1.7%  63.9  4.2%  273.9  8.5%  1,796.7  5.8%  7,224.0  
1992 0.6%  16.8  1.2%  476.8  2.5%  185.2  2.9%  191.8  5.0%  335.8  4.3%  3,106.3  
1995 0.1%  4.7  1.1%  47.3  2.2%  346.4  2.3%  169.6  3.4%  494.1  4.2%  2,075.3  
1998 0.8%  25.9  1.7%  101.9  2.7%  202.5  3.1%  207.6  4.2%  334.2  2.5%  1,239.6  
2001 1.3%  216.2  1.5%  189.2  1.5%  70.0  1.5%  406.7  2.6%  443.5  1.3%  2,265.4  
2004 0.2%  113.2  1.5%  174.1  1.7%  78.1  1.8%  412.3  2.6%  1,184.2  2.5%  5,444.6  
2007 1.2%  370.4  1.6%  151.2  1.4%  313.4  2.2%  513.8  2.4%  400.1  2.1%  2,578.3  
2010 1.3%  2,854.2  2.1%  742.4  2.1%  335.5  1.9%  375.3  2.0%  1,376.7  3.7%  4,910.4  


















 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-100 
Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 5.9%  899.6  5.2%  509.4  4.8%  416.7  6.1%  982.9  7.9%  1,988.7  14.9%  6,050.9  
1992 4.7%  1,269.8  6.0%  317.4  9.0%  1,754.4  9.6%  953.4  9.2%  1,055.8  16.0%  6,315.9  
1995 6.7%  1,441.3  7.8%  767.2  8.0%  952.4  8.9%  804.5  8.6%  916.8  13.2%  11,047.2  
1998 5.5%  484.7  6.6%  647.3  7.7%  800.4  10.8%  2,579.0  12.5%  2,303.0  13.7%  18,048.3  
2001 5.7%  323.6  6.0%  928.7  7.5%  744.1  7.6%  741.2  9.6%  1,539.9  8.8%  13,104.4  
2004 4.5%  843.5  5.8%  876.9  8.0%  797.4  8.2%  672.9  12.2%  2,921.8  10.9%  9,767.0  
2007 3.8%  518.5  6.9%  861.4  6.5%  684.2  8.7%  1,099.0  9.4%  2,427.5  7.1%  5,350.2  
2010 4.2%  787.2  4.2%  349.1  6.7%  761.8  7.9%  1,147.9  11.7%  1,736.6  6.7%  5,776.8  
2013 4.2%  572.0  5.3%  442.1  5.3%  483.2  9.1%  1,042.1  10.5%  1,575.1  7.9%  5,255.8  
Note: All median and mean figures in 2013 USD. Holders represents the proportion of all households holding debt. All values are conditional on holding debt. 
 
Table A1.7 Mean of income sources by income group, USA 1989-2013 
 Wages  Business and farm income 
 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-100  0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-100 
1989 5,386.6 15,965.5 35,948.7 61,543.1 94,086.1 167,338.3  121.3 1,411.1 2,795.4 7,064.5 9,007.5 52,418.0 
1992 4,642.9 16,743.6 34,345.7 60,609.1 92,859.7 159,272.0  128.4 1,235.2 2,000.1 4,668.1 24,184.4 61,651.4 
1995 4,557.8 16,345.4 36,414.7 61,033.3 92,134.3 183,702.9  -127.8 1,487.6 2,083.3 4,075.5 7,157.2 61,341.5 
1998 6,294.2 20,083.0 39,648.7 67,228.3 94,965.7 185,506.4  16.0 1,110.5 3,830.9 3,960.2 8,185.4 76,435.8 
2001 6,152.0 21,896.9 42,826.8 71,332.6 108,654.6 240,244.9  229.9 1,203.2 1,494.5 3,792.6 10,438.7 81,831.5 
2004 5,978.5 20,970.1 39,959.9 67,720.2 109,534.8 226,978.1  363.1 1,020.1 2,230.2 3,606.2 8,560.3 73,393.7 
2007 4,986.1 19,765.5 38,877.5 66,669.3 106,418.3 236,708.6  501.9 1,292.2 2,968.4 6,541.4 8,264.0 99,751.9 
2010 5,471.1 16,537.4 34,231.1 59,431.8 96,366.6 236,683.3  488.6 1,214.1 2,611.5 5,510.2 9,149.9 79,960.8 
2013 4,509.4 15,638.0 31,252.8 58,587.6 98,319.5 221,307.8  567.6 1,040.3 2,349.3 4,604.8 7,894.4 87,169.3 
    
 Interest and dividend income  Capital gains/losses 
 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-100  0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-100 
1989 255.5 1,445.0 2,082.9 3,665.6 4,655.9 29,440.8  34.9 152.6 203.0 934.6 1,872.9 37,129.7 
1992 371.4 1,018.5 2,073.7 2,670.1 4,356.7 23,594.9  -67.0 47.3 22.8 228.9 1,059.6 12,805.7 
1995 390.4 1,209.2 1,281.8 1,713.3 3,474.1 26,841.6  183.3 376.4 409.6 759.8 2,047.5 13,213.5 
1998 289.4 1,060.0 1,084.1 1,757.8 3,545.8 21,574.0  15.3 166.9 479.3 1,354.6 1,667.5 30,534.6 
2001 405.2 644.5 1,580.5 2,282.6 3,126.2 25,446.9  -262.2 161.4 408.1 1,149.2 2,073.9 57,363.9 
2004 214.1 582.4 823.3 1,560.3 2,193.3 21,656.8  -655.8 -17.8 105.7 184.8 1,870.7 26,153.5 
2007 258.7 395.0 634.3 1,764.6 2,426.6 25,730.2  -590.0 143.9 342.9 652.5 2,409.1 58,344.0 
2010 460.2 454.5 567.7 1,162.8 2,214.0 22,186.6  -1,566.7 -96.8 -32.3 194.0 355.8 13,140.1 
2013 278.4 229.8 449.4 791.7 2,376.4 23,739.9  28.5 -120.3 129.0 452.9 1,156.8 37,462.4 
 























Social security and retirement income  Transfer and other income 
 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-100  0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-100 
1989 4,669.9 7,780.8 7,057.6 5,638.9 3,212.1 8,667.2  3,412.4 2,091.6 1,499.5 1,611.3 5,818.8 4,301.7 
1992 4,658.8 7,320.7 6,770.7 4,993.0 6,102.3 5,988.4  4,414.5 6,331.1 8,707.7 4,309.9 6,341.4 15,532.9 
1995 4,023.4 7,620.6 7,315.3 5,798.9 5,280.8 8,350.2  2,175.7 1,786.9 1,372.3 1,029.4 906.0 3,886.0 
1998 4,713.9 7,687.0 6,734.1 5,887.9 6,894.2 7,805.7  1,646.7 1,009.4 943.3 1,021.0 1,374.2 4,037.1 
2001 6,068.2 8,016.8 7,116.5 7,279.1 5,378.4 8,192.4  1,298.7 938.3 1,032.7 1,126.3 1,961.8 3,741.7 
2004 5,695.8 8,569.0 9,565.4 11,463.7 8,071.7 15,830.7  1,955.6 1,384.8 1,268.4 1,073.5 1,395.8 2,762.4 
2007 6,182.5 8,735.1 8,780.8 8,665.3 10,341.2 14,515.0  2,508.4 1,596.9 1,436.7 1,723.0 1,165.5 2,593.6 
2010 5,398.6 9,418.9 10,368.1 10,710.2 12,544.8 14,680.7  3,638.2 2,661.8 2,159.9 1,833.2 2,113.5 4,405.3 
2013 5,438.2 9,176.4 11,053.0 12,273.6 13,728.9 22,588.9  2,915.7 2,474.0 1,831.4 1,744.6 1,948.1 10,902.2 
Note: All figures in 2013 USD. 
 





















Note: All figures in 2013 USD. Values given for all households. 
 Mortgages  Consumer debt 
 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-100  0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-100 
1989 525.4 1,543.9 3,453.9 6,893.4 11,524.1 19,415.8  1,066.2 1,585.2 3,715.2 4,811.8 5,186.0 4,559.9 
1992 810.2 1,937.8 3,908.1 7,606.2 11,721.4 22,376.3  787.1 1,734.9 2,733.5 3,333.3 3,666.3 4,294.6 
1995 891.3 2,442.7 3,752.4 8,075.9 11,798.7 20,013.6  801.0 1,679.0 2,558.0 3,748.2 4,663.6 3,984.6 
1998 985.8 2,579.8 5,014.5 9,467.5 13,050.2 24,879.8  917.2 1,655.5 3,062.8 4,137.7 4,763.0 6,380.9 
2001 1,027.1 2,378.3 5,255.6 9,107.2 15,090.0 25,646.2  819.8 1,995.8 3,106.1 4,232.7 4,875.3 5,237.5 
2004 1,352.3 2,953.6 6,266.7 10,449.1 15,892.2 26,544.2  772.7 1,817.7 3,069.2 4,168.4 5,500.0 6,106.4 
2007 1,348.5 2,980.4 6,473.8 12,479.8 18,662.1 30,542.8  765.0 1,871.7 3,012.2 4,392.9 4,798.0 5,246.2 
2010 1,626.4 2,942.1 6,295.9 10,309.3 15,458.3 28,211.2  1,053.7 1,544.4 2,462.2 3,711.0 4,781.6 4,805.7 
2013 1,152.6 2,324.5 4,499.6 8,607.0 14,350.5 23,637.4  736.0 1,459.5 2,418.7 3,426.9 4,975.0 4,892.1 
 Revolving debt 
 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-90 90-100 
1989 58.1 222.5 474.6 715.5 1,102.7 1,575.6 
1992 150.0 385.7 557.0 806.0 874.2 1,136.3 
1995 218.2 499.1 738.7 833.6 1,210.9 1,515.7 
1998 235.5 574.5 970.2 1,297.8 1,147.8 1,403.7 
2001 277.1 526.5 821.0 980.9 1,972.0 1,172.8 
2004 293.4 624.8 1,084.7 1,243.2 1,483.9 2,492.6 
2007 322.8 622.8 1,073.6 1,887.0 2,238.5 2,034.6 
2010 568.4 551.4 883.1 1,230.2 2,014.8 1,903.5 
2013 197.5 415.2 738.6 1,000.6 1,339.4 1,645.2 
















Table A1.9 Household characteristics of the bottom 20% and the top 10% of income distribution 
Bottom 20%  
Wave Educational 
attainment 
Female Ethnic group Married Self-
employed 
Retired Out of labour 
force 
Aged 
below 35 White Black Hispanic Other 
1989 10th grade 60.5% 50.2% 29.9% 14.5% 5.4% 19.5% 5.2% 45.9% 58.4% 30.5% 
1992 11th grade 57.7% 60.2% 23.1% 12.4% 4.3% 20.8% 5.3% 48.6% 59.0% 28.7% 
1995 11th grade 61.2% 61.9% 25.8% 7.8% 4.6% 22.9% 7.1% 45.6% 54.4% 27.0% 
1998 11th grade 57.2% 63.7% 23.5% 8.9% 3.9% 24.5% 5.9% 46.0% 51.9% 31.4% 
2001 11th grade 56.9% 59.7% 23.6% 12.4% 4.3% 25.1% 5.1% 48.0% 54.1% 26.9% 
2004 12th grade 58.4% 59.4% 23.5% 13.5% 3.7% 21.8% 7.5% 45.2% 49.8% 28.1% 
2007 12th grade 56.0% 64.0% 21.2% 12.2% 2.6% 25.4% 5.7% 52.4% 56.0% 25.0% 
2010 12th grade 51.2% 60.7% 22.2% 12.8% 4.4% 25.2% 8.3% 43.1% 46.8% 28.2% 
2013 12th grade 53.5% 57.0% 24.3% 13.9% 4.8% 20.2% 5.8% 46.8% 50.8% 28.1% 
  
Top 10%  
Wave Educational 
attainment 
Female Ethnic group Married Self-
employed 
Retired Out of labour 
force 
Aged 
below 35 White Black Hispanic Other 
1989 3 years of college 5.3% 91.5% 3.4% 2.1% 3.0% 88.9% 30.0% 11.0% 12.1% 10.9% 
1992 3 years of college 4.2% 84.9% 6.7% 2.3% 6.1% 89.3% 31.0% 7.2% 7.8% 12.3% 
1995 3 years of college 3.4% 90.0% 2.6% 2.7% 4.7% 91.4% 21.0% 10.8% 10.8% 7.9% 
1998 3 years of college 3.4% 89.8% 3.6% 1.6% 5.0% 90.5% 28.9% 11.3% 11.9% 9.9% 
2001 4 years of college 5.8% 89.7% 4.7% 2.3% 3.4% 90.9% 31.1% 10.4% 11.3% 9.1% 
2004 4 years of college 4.8% 88.6% 2.9% 2.4% 6.1% 93.0% 29.5% 10.6% 10.9% 5.9% 
2007 3 years of college 3.8% 88.1% 3.2% 2.9% 5.9% 89.0% 28.8% 11.0% 11.6% 8.5% 
2010 4 years of college 4.4% 85.5% 3.5% 3.1% 7.9% 91.1% 26.2% 8.1% 8.3% 7.6% 
2013 4 years of college 4.2% 87.7% 3.3% 2.5% 6.4% 91.0% 24.8% 10.8% 11.8% 5.3% 
Appendix to Section 1.3.2. Detailed balance sheet analysis by gender (source for all tables: own calculations based on U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances 
1989-2013) 













Gender Race Age groups 
Male Female White Black Hispanic Other <35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+ 
1989 71.9% 28.1% 74.8% 12.7% 7.9% 4.5% 28.1% 21.5% 15.2% 13.9% 12.5% 8.9% 
1992 72.3% 27.7% 75.3% 12.7% 7.5% 4.6% 25.8% 22.8% 16.2% 13.2% 12.6% 9.4% 
1995 71.1% 28.9% 77.6% 12.8% 5.7% 3.9% 24.8% 23.0% 17.9% 12.5% 12.0% 9.8% 
1998 72.0% 28.0% 77.7% 11.9% 7.2% 3.2% 23.3% 23.3% 19.2% 12.8% 11.2% 10.2% 
2001 73.2% 26.8% 76.2% 13.0% 8.0% 2.8% 22.7% 22.3% 20.6% 13.2% 10.7% 10.4% 
2004 72.0% 28.0% 73.6% 13.6% 9.2% 3.7% 22.2% 20.6% 20.8% 15.2% 10.5% 10.7% 
2007 72.4% 27.6% 73.9% 12.6% 9.4% 4.1% 21.6% 19.6% 20.8% 16.8% 10.5% 10.6% 
2010 72.9% 27.1% 70.8% 13.8% 10.8% 4.6% 21.0% 18.2% 21.1% 17.5% 11.5% 10.7% 













































 Male  Female  
Holders Median Mean  Holders Median Mean 
1989 97.6%  180,847.5   496,659.3   87.1%  59,649.8   167,625.8  
1992 97.9%  170,762.7   438,760.1   90.4%  75,389.0   178,758.7  
1995 98.6%  184,103.8   472,337.2   91.0%  79,157.5   181,513.6  
1998 98.3%  221,704.5   584,137.2   93.2%  86,057.2   226,799.9  
2001 98.4%  254,238.7   742,905.5   92.2%  87,263.2   237,659.5  
2004 98.8%  283,622.7   816,594.0   95.6%  91,696.4   263,555.9  
2007 98.5%  311,598.2   912,296.2   95.7%  122,609.3   316,570.2  
2010 98.2%  241,990.0   788,507.5   95.5%  97,749.4   273,546.5  
2013 98.8%  220,190.0   786,823.2   95.8%  72,000.0   232,033.4  
Growth rate (percent) 
1989-2013 1.2 21.8 58.4  10.0 20.7 38.4 
1989-2007 0.9 72.3 83.7  9.8 105.6 88.9 
2007-2013 0.3 -29.3 -13.8  0.2 -41.3 -26.7 
 Primary residence  Other property  Business equity 
 Male Female  Male Female  Male Female 
Holders Mean Holders Mean  Holders Mean Holders Mean  Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 71.2% 148,512.7 45.1% 75,247.0  24.2% 67,137.3 10.3% 20,401.7  16.8% 100,606.3 4.5% 8,762.3 
1992 68.4% 133,103.4 52.3% 79,300.5  22.7% 59,805.5 10.7% 19,004.1  18.1% 86,826.3 4.6% 10,310.0 
1995 70.1% 133,209.8 51.5% 74,905.4  21.2% 47,101.2 10.1% 17,710.9  16.1% 91,670.0 4.5% 7,072.9 
1998 72.0% 156,599.5 51.3% 78,535.1  22.4% 57,244.6 8.9% 19,277.0  16.3% 109,040.0 3.4% 10,590.1 
2001 74.1% 194,705.1 50.3% 84,425.5  19.3% 70,603.7 10.0% 20,949.6  17.0% 131,522.9 4.2% 13,786.8 
2004 74.8% 251,415.9 54.2% 117,193.8  21.1% 92,275.2 10.3% 24,879.4  16.7% 146,446.1 4.7% 13,473.2 
2007 74.0% 274,056.7 54.7% 142,860.3  22.1% 101,558.1 10.9% 29,116.7  17.0% 189,249.6 4.5% 30,408.5 
2010 71.6% 221,302.2 55.6% 115,477.5  21.1% 87,562.5 12.1% 31,723.9  16.4% 149,966.3 4.7% 13,486.2 
2013 69.7% 204,834.5 53.6% 96,309.5  20.9% 80,856.4 8.8% 14,527.9  14.3% 150,896.2 5.1% 12,264.6 
 Vehicles and other non-financial assets  Transaction accounts  Financial investment assets 
 Male Female  Male Female  Male Female 
Holders Mean Holders Mean  Holders Mean Holders Mean  Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 92.5%  26,268.7  64.1%  9,616.8   89.5%  27,811.8  75.6%  11,925.3   58.1%  83,155.0  39.2% 31,654.5  
1992 93.1%  21,822.5  68.9%  7,872.6   90.0%  22,209.1  78.8%  15,158.6   53.2%  67,830.5  43.2% 37,384.9  
1995 90.9%  27,740.2  70.3%  10,606.5   90.4%  22,813.3  80.1%  12,909.5   54.7%  85,933.3  40.3% 40,810.6  
1998 89.7%  28,118.3  67.7%  9,837.0   92.7%  25,745.3  85.3%  13,668.1   54.6% 124,101.9  45.0% 69,763.5  
2001 91.1%  31,658.1  70.5%  11,527.5   93.6%  36,194.8  85.6%  12,837.5   56.2% 169,856.8  39.2% 61,927.1  
2004 91.9%  33,925.0  74.7%  13,005.1   92.7%  37,911.9  87.8%  13,649.6   54.0% 146,527.1  39.4% 60,071.8  
2007 92.3%  33,039.0  75.6%  10,855.2   93.3%  33,621.0  88.9%  13,029.4   50.3% 159,822.6  40.1% 54,693.0  
2010 91.5%  29,873.3  75.6%  13,969.6   93.6%  39,762.5  89.4%  13,591.1   42.9% 133,816.8  31.7% 54,780.5  
























Table A1.12 Debt holdings by gender, USA 1989-2013 
 
Retirement and insurance assets 
 Male Female 
Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 61.2%  43,167.6  33.7%  10,018.3  
1992 61.0%  47,162.8  42.1%  9,728.0  
1995 65.0%  63,869.4  42.8%  17,497.9  
1998 65.6%  83,287.5  44.5%  25,129.1  
2001 67.8%  108,364.0  44.9%  32,205.5  
2004 64.1%  108,092.9  43.7%  21,283.1  
2007 65.5%  120,949.3  48.6%  35,607.0  
2010 62.8%  126,223.9  43.6%  30,517.7  
2013 60.6%  134,434.2  46.1%  39,392.6  
Total debt 
 Male  Female  
Holders Median Mean  Holders Median Mean 
1989 78.0%  37,217.9   75,770.1   57.5%  7,953.3   29,118.3  
1992 77.9%  36,882.1   80,361.5   61.1%  9,358.6   36,134.8  
1995 79.2%  44,777.5   85,887.5   62.9%  12,325.2   37,321.5  
1998 79.7%  61,326.5   103,291.4   59.6%  14,238.0   47,287.9  
2001 79.5%  65,660.8   108,803.0   63.2%  17,781.0   48,913.0  
2004 80.1%  92,485.7   147,617.5   66.9%  25,649.4   66,051.9  
2007 81.2%  94,314.8   163,210.8   66.0%  29,192.7   71,510.8  
2010 77.8%  91,683.6   159,001.4   67.2%  32,150.9   79,291.8  
2013 77.8%  82,200.0   141,211.8   66.2%  25,000.0   66,189.8  
Growth rate (percent) 
1989-2013 -0.3 120.9 86.4  15.1 214.3 127.3 
1989-2007 4.1 153.4 115.4  14.7 267.1 145.6 
2007-2013 -4.2 -12.9 -13.5  0.4 -14.4 -7.4 
 Mortgages secured by primary residence  Mortgages secured by other property  Instalment debt 
 Male Female  Male Female  Male Female 
Holders Mean Holders Mean  Holders Mean Holders Mean  Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 47.0%  52,518.5  20.2%  18,179.4   6.6%  5,871.1  1.6%  2,056.1   53.6%  12,033.9  38.6%  6,875.5  
1992 45.1%  57,667.5  23.7%  26,527.1   7.1%  8,622.6  2.0%  2,388.7   49.6%  8,753.9  36.5%  5,297.0  
1995 48.0%  62,458.6  23.6%  27,601.5   5.9%  7,265.5  1.9%  1,387.2   50.6%  10,003.2  34.5%  5,232.8  
1998 50.7%  73,973.8  23.4%  32,444.0   6.2%  8,022.3  1.9%  2,768.3   48.6%  13,316.9  31.4%  7,574.2  
2001 51.8%  82,818.0  25.0%  33,472.7   5.5%  6,850.3  2.2%  2,661.9   48.9%  12,471.0  35.2%  9,414.1  
2004 54.2%  110,522.7  31.8%  50,450.8   4.9%  13,815.3  1.8%  2,699.8   49.7%  15,484.7  36.5%  9,154.5  
2007 55.5%  121,384.5  30.6%  54,751.1   6.9%  17,789.4  1.9%  3,300.8   50.7%  16,094.4  37.0%  9,266.7  
2010 52.2%  118,251.3  33.2%  57,742.7   6.3%  16,268.6  2.8%  5,503.5   49.1%  16,618.4  39.1%  12,293.5  
2013 48.4%  104,477.4  29.2%  47,856.8   6.4%  13,547.2  2.4%  3,410.4   49.9%  17,303.1  40.4%  12,140.2  
      
 Credit card balances  Other unsecured lines of credit  Other debt 
 Male Female  Male Female  Male Female 
(Table A1.11 continued) 
Note: All median and mean figures in 2013 USD. 
Asset components given in means. Holders 
represents the proportion of all households 





























Table A1.13 Mean of income sources receipts by gender, USA 1989-2013 
Note: All figures in 2013 USD. Values given for all households. 










Note: All figures in 2013 USD. Values given for all households. 
Holders Mean Holders Mean  Holders Mean Holders Mean  Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 43.1%  1,960.6  30.9%  1,569.4   3.5%  1,497.8  2.3%  211.7   7.8%  1,888.2  3.6%  226.3  
1992 46.1%  2,436.3  37.4%  1,597.9   2.8%  736.1  1.3%  78.1   9.7%  2,145.1  5.0%  246.0  
1995 50.5%  3,116.1  39.3%  2,143.0   2.1%  530.4  1.4%  89.2   8.8%  2,513.6  7.6%  867.8  
1998 46.8%  3,774.1  37.2%  2,592.6   2.7%  321.7  1.3%  235.2   10.1%  3,882.7  5.2%  1,673.6  
2001 45.3%  3,358.5  41.7%  2,706.0   1.5%  578.9  1.6%  155.5   7.8%  2,726.4  5.6%  502.8  
2004 47.0%  4,025.2  44.1%  3,215.7   1.8%  1,186.3  1.0%  84.0   8.2%  2,583.3  6.1%  447.0  
2007 47.7%  5,400.6  41.8%  3,378.9   1.8%  763.5  1.6%  100.8   7.2%  1,778.4  5.9%  712.5  
2010 41.4%  4,375.9  34.2%  2,795.7   2.4%  1,734.5  1.1%  397.3   7.1%  1,752.8  4.7%  559.1  
2013 39.7%  3,202.3  34.1%  2,130.1   2.0%  1,093.3  1.5%  252.2   7.2%  1,588.4  5.2%  400.2  
 Wages  Business income  Interest and dividend  Capital gains  Social security  Transfer and other 
 Male Female  Male Female  Male Female  Male Female  Male Female  Male Female 
1989 62,165.8 18,630.1  9,984.0 4,431.9  5,759.5 2,704.3  5,555.3 615.7  5,555.3 615.7  1,399.1 6,148.9 
1992 60,001.6 18,495.6  13,471.7 1,654.0  4,469.5 2,860.4  1,808.9 456.0  1,808.9 456.0  7,584.2 5,264.1 
1995 64,003.9 19,918.0  10,954.3 1,964.9  4,582.5 2,399.1  2,120.0 1,263.1  2,120.0 1,263.1  1,484.0 2,411.3 
1998 67,644.8 21,360.7  13,435.9 2,032.4  3,871.2 2,009.8  4,785.6 631.5  4,785.6 631.5  1,313.6 1,856.1 
2001 77,568.2 24,600.8  13,477.0 2,679.7  4,541.9 1,935.3  8,127.0 1,099.7  8,127.0 1,099.7  1,247.5 2,001.1 
2004 74,727.9 24,272.0  12,420.9 2,504.9  3,632.2 1,453.8  3,515.1 701.8  3,515.1 701.8  1,272.7 2,270.0 
2007 74,728.5 22,814.5  16,661.5 3,655.6  4,252.8 1,266.4  8,269.4 738.1  8,269.4 738.1  1,514.5 2,652.6 
2010 69,300.2 21,872.5  13,873.3 2,821.8  3,615.1 1,233.4  1,347.9 247.0  1,347.9 247.0  2,229.3 4,004.3 
2013 66,997.1 21,140.4  14,846.5 2,087.6  3,717.1 1,060.0  5,294.4 601.5  5,294.4 601.5  2,947.5 3,407.8 
 Mortgage  Consumer debt  Revolving debt 
Wave Male Female  Male Female  Male Female 
1989 7,008.6 1,924.0  3,770.1 1,780.9  645.9 347.8 
1992 7,653.6 2,641.4  2,895.4 1,520.1  682.7 315.4 
1995 7,675.5 2,620.6  3,131.7 1,369.2  850.3 436.3 
1998 9,116.4 2,989.3  3,674.2 1,510.5  995.4 549.7 
2001 9,324.3 3,008.9  3,539.1 1,688.6  940.7 549.0 
2004 10,222.5 3,895.2  3,720.5 1,601.4  1,195.2 666.3 
2007 11,661.1 4,123.7  3,553.7 1,596.8  1,405.5 693.1 
2010 10,195.9 4,316.7  3,143.4 1,556.0  1,202.8 596.7 
2013 8,604.2 3,367.7  3,029.3 1,501.2  892.9 456.6 
Note: All median and mean figures in 2013 USD. Holders represent the proportion of all households holding debt. All values are conditional on holding debt. 
 















Table A1.15 Socio-economic characteristics by gender 
 
Wave 
Out of labour force Single 
Number of children per 100 
single families 
Black or Hispanic 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
1989 22.6% 43.4% 19.0% 100.0% 12 64 15.9% 32.8% 
1992 23.1% 45.0% 20.6% 99.2% 19 63 16.8% 28.9% 
1995 22.2% 42.9% 18.5% 98.1% 19 62 14.9% 27.3% 
1998 20.3% 40.8% 19.8% 97.2% 18 57 16.5% 25.6% 
2001 21.1% 35.0% 18.6% 97.2% 17 66 16.8% 32.4% 
2004 20.5% 36.8% 20.5% 97.4% 20 59 19.5% 30.9% 
2007 21.1% 39.4% 19.4% 98.3% 22 64 19.7% 28.1% 
2010 22.5% 37.7% 21.2% 97.8% 17 68 21.6% 32.7% 
2013 24.7% 39.0% 21.2% 97.3% 17 63 21.4% 34.9% 
 
 
Appendix to Section 1.3.3 Detailed balance sheet analysis by race (source for all tables: own calculations based on the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances) 
 
Table A1.16 Asset holdings by race, USA 1989-2013 
Total assets 
 White  Black  Hispanic  Other 
 Holders Median Mean  Holders Median Mean  Holders Median Mean  Holders Median Mean 
1989 98.4% 179,726.8 477,933.6  76.7% 48,497.1 123,998.8  86.5% 29,282.7 137,535.0  97.4% 87,305.7 364,556.1 
1992 98.9% 170,681.4 424,393.6  85.4% 49,392.8 119,179.5  84.1% 39,644.2 145,319.3  94.3% 97,485.8 405,749.3 
1995 98.6% 180,779.6 449,655.8  86.6% 45,582.0 109,227.7  87.6% 83,787.0 151,483.2  96.7% 93,197.9 394,212.4 
1998 98.8% 207,566.6 560,624.4  89.7% 51,591.4 142,461.1  88.4% 48,746.7 184,462.3  93.8% 160,177.9 496,284.3 
2001 99.0% 242,551.0 723,789.2  89.7% 78,622.3 158,518.8  88.1% 42,403.8 184,739.3  93.3% 182,747.2 619,626.1 
2004 99.3% 272,277.8 797,350.5  92.9% 67,082.9 203,588.3  94.0% 54,258.3 235,458.6  98.9% 288,801.9 627,117.8 
2007 98.9% 295,744.4 881,188.7  92.5% 76,013.3 245,351.5  94.9% 79,303.1 322,496.0  100.0% 328,754.5 804,212.1 
2010 98.9% 247,829.6 800,383.2  91.9% 63,230.1 174,449.8  94.2% 53,713.4 196,104.0  98.7% 204,050.9 710,311.7 
2013 99.3% 231,500.0 786,532.3  93.0% 44,120.0 157,721.5  95.6% 39,870.0 175,513.4  98.9% 190,200.0 717,767.8 
Percentage change 
1989-2013 0.9 28.8 64.6  21.2 -9.0 27.2  10.6 36.2 27.6  1.6 117.9 96.9 
1989-2007 0.5 64.6 84.4  20.6 56.7 97.9  9.7 170.8 134.5  2.7 276.6 120.6 






















Other real estate 
 White  Black  Hispanic  Other  White  Black  Hispanic  Other 
 Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean 
1989 70.5% 143,956.5  42.4% 61,635.5  41.9% 72,629.8  53.9% 127,826.4  22.8%  62,837.0   11.0%  17,790.3   9.7%  23,124.2   22.6%  56,936.9  
1992 70.3% 133,016.9  43.4% 54,366.1  39.9% 65,214.7  54.6% 118,516.4  22.1%  54,236.8   10.2%  16,041.2   7.8%  20,415.3   18.2%  86,202.6  
1995 70.6% 129,226.1  42.7% 52,576.6  42.9% 72,236.5  51.8% 124,655.1  20.1%  44,898.1   10.5%  10,467.4   7.2%  7,124.7   14.7%  47,086.7  
1998 71.8% 149,603.8  46.3% 62,211.5  44.2% 76,741.0  54.2% 161,657.0  20.3%  51,906.7   12.6%  11,714.3   10.1%  24,574.0   17.9%  94,698.7  
2001 74.1% 188,112.6  47.4% 66,514.3  44.3% 79,810.4  53.0% 222,274.2  19.3%  67,802.4   8.9%  19,368.1   7.7%  10,864.4   10.6%  70,582.2  
2004 75.8% 244,721.9  50.1% 92,991.8  47.7% 115,587.9  57.5% 267,322.5  19.9%  85,721.4   12.3%  25,254.9   12.0%  31,584.3   19.6%  103,197.1  
2007 74.8% 263,464.6  48.6% 124,714.8  49.2% 159,945.3  63.4% 289,683.9  21.0%  91,270.7   12.2%  29,492.4   12.9%  59,107.0   18.3%  115,013.5  
2010 74.7% 223,315.4  47.7% 84,847.0  47.3% 101,163.1  58.5% 236,872.2  21.2%  89,291.6   13.2%  27,271.1   8.7%  16,592.1   18.3%  69,737.3  
2013 73.1% 202,565.6  44.0% 70,604.8  43.9% 86,779.1  60.0% 254,371.0  20.7%  77,793.8   8.8%  13,429.0   8.0%  14,057.8   17.1%  81,477.5  
             
Business equity  Vehicles and other non-financial assets 
 White  Black  Hispanic  Other  White  Black  Hispanic  Other 
 Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean 
1989 15.5%  91,126.9   5.5%  5,069.6   4.8%  6,244.3   14.5%  106,673.4   89.9%  24,282.3   57.6%  13,116.3   77.0%  11,329.9   83.3%  19,256.0  
1992 16.4%  77,001.6   5.3%  13,478.3   6.7%  28,151.3   18.4%  81,337.7   91.2%  20,023.6   66.6%  10,422.9   72.9%  9,842.4   84.6%  17,870.4  
1995 14.7%  81,894.8   3.8%  5,559.7   8.1%  12,650.0   10.5%  57,307.4   89.2%  25,306.3   62.0%  10,780.0   79.7%  13,852.6   82.9%  25,738.3  
1998 14.5%  99,529.3   5.6%  4,949.3   4.0%  17,311.9   13.3%  61,271.5   88.0%  25,896.8   62.4%  10,196.1   71.7%  12,980.8   79.7%  21,896.9  
2001 16.1%  121,974.6   3.3%  4,334.7   5.3%  27,605.9   15.7%  139,753.3   90.0%  29,688.3   70.4%  14,871.3   72.4%  14,014.5   71.3%  20,195.6  
2004 15.6%  136,188.4   6.0%  23,396.5   4.8%  26,489.4   15.6%  82,746.0   91.0%  32,131.0   71.2%  12,688.4   80.6%  18,921.3   82.7%  24,859.2  
2007 15.6%  176,695.4   6.0%  18,819.6   7.8%  41,219.0   13.6%  195,359.7   90.4%  30,037.8   73.5%  15,569.7   84.3%  17,973.6   90.9%  25,901.5  
2010 15.7%  145,946.2   5.6%  6,295.8   6.0%  24,174.9   15.5%  116,785.0   91.1%  29,249.4   72.2%  13,286.7   80.6%  17,402.5   86.5%  23,095.2  
2013 13.7%  139,222.3   6.3%  22,449.2   6.1%  31,184.9   11.3%  151,040.3   90.4%  28,477.3   73.7%  12,542.5   81.0%  14,949.1   84.6%  23,819.6  
   
Transaction accounts  Financial investment assets 
 White  Black  Hispanic  Other  White  Black  Hispanic  Other 
 Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean 
1989 92.6%  28,045.6   56.7%  6,534.3   63.5%  8,365.4   89.3%  13,008.2   61.8%  86,848.1   23.0%  9,444.5   23.8%  5,414.3   38.8%  19,504.6  
1992 93.2%  24,280.7   68.6%  4,925.3   55.8%  3,599.1   85.8%  15,999.3   58.3%  72,474.8   27.1%  6,210.0   16.0%  8,034.0   42.5%  52,599.9  
1995 92.8%  23,153.5   62.2%  4,900.9   69.7%  5,857.0   88.6%  21,817.9   57.5%  88,016.5   25.7%  6,593.9   15.2%  5,432.7   45.4%  68,323.0  
1998 94.9%  25,538.5   73.5%  6,719.9   74.3%  13,321.3   87.4%  19,957.9   58.3%  132,340.9   30.2%  17,170.5   20.6%  16,044.1   48.0%  49,631.0  
2001 95.3%  35,977.3   81.6%  7,507.3   72.2%  6,381.1   87.6%  29,486.7   58.1%  175,933.5   30.7%  16,906.2   25.0%  21,150.1   49.2%  54,412.6  
2004 95.4%  38,776.6   78.6%  7,273.1   75.8%  5,916.0   95.3%  23,640.2   58.1%  157,294.1   27.4%  12,104.7   19.6%  20,723.2   45.3%  56,575.3  
2007 95.4%  33,813.6   81.0%  7,515.8   79.1%  6,747.5   96.7%  30,088.3   54.3%  167,845.5   25.8%  12,805.5   20.2%  12,631.5   53.5%  76,850.6  
2010 96.1%  40,805.2   80.9%  6,190.2   83.2%  6,945.2   93.3%  41,662.2   47.0%  146,174.5   23.9%  13,285.4   13.9%  8,711.0   37.8%  109,219.4  



























Note: All median and mean figures in 2013 USD. Holders represents the proportion of all households holding assets. All values are conditional on holding assets. 
 
 
Table A1.17 Debt holdings by race, USA 1989-2013 
 
Total debt 
 White  Black  Hispanic  Other 
 Holders Median Mean  Holders Median Mean  Holders Median Mean  Holders Median Mean 
1989 73.2% 34,036.6 71,274.6  65.1% 9,037.9 30,972.4  72.4% 15,942.8 51,347.1  76.6% 19,883.3 76,441.2 
1992 74.3% 35,744.8 76,955.4  69.2% 9,098.7 33,960.4  69.3% 14,541.6 49,524.7  73.9% 23,039.2 82,841.7 
1995 75.4% 40,208.7 79,902.0  71.1% 9,410.9 39,181.3  75.4% 23,678.9 52,042.1  67.7% 43,001.6 99,383.0 
1998 74.9% 56,752.0 98,691.9  68.6% 18,154.9 52,300.6  72.3% 21,442.8 53,700.0  78.0% 42,885.7 106,355.4 
2001 75.8% 58,569.4 104,570.5  74.0% 26,264.3 56,542.9  71.3% 20,354.9 59,518.0  72.2% 63,428.3 115,024.1 
2004 77.9% 84,790.9 137,300.0  71.5% 36,131.1 73,815.2  70.2% 34,774.6 92,953.2  80.4% 59,745.7 191,276.7 
2007 77.1% 83,266.5 146,625.0  77.2% 32,561.1 98,621.1  74.1% 58,834.5 131,970.5  82.6% 89,823.6 198,233.8 
2010 76.2% 89,379.4 153,565.1  71.3% 32,579.6 77,495.2  72.1% 32,258.0 94,476.3  73.1% 109,313.0 202,026.9 
2013 75.1% 80,000.0 135,830.5  75.4% 25,540.0 68,216.1  70.6% 25,000.0 78,705.5  72.5% 83,000.0 184,280.1 
Growth rate (percent) 
1989-2013 2.6 135.0 90.6  15.9 182.6 120.3  -2.50 56.8 53.28  -5.4 317.4 141.1 
1989-2007 5.3 144.6 105.7  18.7 260.3 218.4  2.35 269.0 157.02  7.7 351.8 159.3 








Retirement and insurance assets 
 White  Black  Hispanic  Other 
 Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean 
1989 60.5%  40,837.2   33.0%  10,408.2   26.0%  10,427.1   43.9%  21,350.6  
1992 61.6%  43,359.3   41.4%  13,735.7   27.4%  10,062.7   45.9%  33,223.0  
1995 62.1%  57,160.7   46.1%  18,349.2   43.6%  34,329.8   50.5%  49,283.9  
1998 64.5%  75,808.4   49.9%  29,499.5   28.1%  23,489.3   50.4%  87,171.3  
2001 65.8%  104,300.6   53.7%  29,016.9   37.1%  24,913.1   54.6%  82,921.5  
2004 64.3%  102,517.0   46.1%  29,878.8   29.6%  16,236.5   56.4%  68,777.5  
2007 65.5%  118,061.1   50.5%  36,433.7   35.2%  24,872.1   67.1%  71,314.5  
2010 64.3%  125,600.9   44.2%  23,273.5   30.5%  21,115.2   58.3%  112,940.5  
2013 63.2%  139,924.9   44.4%  23,002.7   28.7%  13,520.5   56.6%  85,450.1  















(Table A1.17 continued) 
Mortgages secured by primary residence  Mortgages secured by other real estate 
 White  Black  Hispanic  Other  White  Black  Hispanic  Other 
 Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean 
1989 43.0%  49,049.2   24.8%  18,785.0   31.0%  36,133.1   36.6%  54,723.4   5.8%  5,506.0   2.7%  1,144.2   3.3%  3,582.1   5.7%  8,899.5  
1992 42.8%  55,314.6   27.4%  23,545.8   25.2%  36,529.2   33.2%  61,550.6   6.4%  8,145.6   2.4%  1,866.7   2.1%  3,342.4   7.9%  10,922.7  
1995 44.1%  58,299.1   26.1%  25,817.3   33.9%  40,695.2   37.9%  75,728.7   5.1%  6,646.9   3.6%  2,920.5   2.1%  682.4   5.3%  6,108.8  
1998 46.6%  70,211.5   30.2%  38,089.0   27.9%  36,879.3   39.1%  78,816.0   5.3%  7,655.5   3.8%  3,125.2   3.2%  2,836.3   5.5%  8,280.5  
2001 47.6%  79,103.8   36.5%  39,735.5   31.9%  45,890.6   37.5%  84,191.9   5.3%  6,672.2   2.3%  2,636.7   2.6%  2,575.9   2.9%  8,912.3  
2004 51.7%  103,732.7   36.0%  52,062.1   34.9%  71,339.6   48.2%  138,091.4   4.4%  11,328.9   2.4%  4,553.2   3.0%  7,381.5   4.0%  35,952.3  
2007 51.7%  109,429.6   38.2%  73,884.6   37.0%  92,606.6   51.9%  159,397.5   5.8%  14,517.1   3.1%  8,166.3   6.4%  18,567.8   5.8%  20,833.7  
2010 51.5%  114,437.6   32.2%  50,037.4   37.9%  73,269.6   43.7%  155,239.5   5.9%  15,862.1   4.2%  6,770.9   2.9%  3,591.4   6.1%  21,539.7  
2013 47.9%  99,886.2   30.1%  45,820.3   29.1%  60,810.1   40.4%  149,088.6   6.1%  13,169.3   3.5%  4,585.8   2.4%  3,368.6   5.7%  14,831.5  
             
Instalment debt  Credit card balances 
 White  Black  Hispanic  Other  White  Black  Hispanic  Other 
 Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean 
1989 49.3%  11,634.5   47.4%  8,447.6   52.1%  7,879.1   51.6%  9,709.5   41.4%  1,864.1   33.4%  1,966.8   34.7%  1,585.1   36.9%  2,262.7  
1992 46.2%  8,482.6   42.5%  6,186.2   49.6%  5,905.2   45.0%  6,949.0   44.2%  2,366.2   43.3%  1,730.4   39.8%  2,149.8   42.9%  1,663.2  
1995 46.1%  8,902.8   46.4%  7,868.5   45.2%  7,713.9   41.7%  12,543.0   47.1%  3,042.7   45.3%  1,970.3   56.1%  2,195.3   44.8%  3,471.4  
1998 44.4%  12,831.3   39.3%  7,326.6   44.8%  10,394.1   42.7%  11,939.0   44.3%  3,824.4   42.3%  2,175.1   46.3%  2,646.9   40.2%  2,284.1  
2001 45.4%  12,199.9   47.2%  10,611.4   43.2%  7,700.7   36.5%  16,864.0   43.3%  3,287.7   52.1%  2,864.5   43.5%  2,942.0   39.8%  3,433.4  
2004 46.8%  14,609.6   47.1%  13,398.8   38.1%  10,133.9   46.4%  10,767.5   46.0%  4,047.4   47.0%  2,720.0   46.9%  3,090.5   43.9%  4,775.4  
2007 46.3%  15,079.2   51.2%  12,111.2   48.1%  13,948.1   42.8%  12,239.3   45.5%  5,248.5   49.8%  3,666.3   46.6%  4,342.8   42.6%  4,222.7  
2010 46.6%  15,358.8   48.1%  16,861.0   45.3%  13,824.8   39.7%  19,113.5   39.6%  4,333.6   39.0%  2,866.7   42.1%  3,019.1   31.6%  4,050.1  
2013 46.1%  16,701.1   55.7%  15,720.1   43.1%  11,278.2   45.5%  16,480.1   38.6%  3,323.4   36.0%  1,666.9   41.8%  2,511.9   29.0%  1,884.4  
   
Other unsecured lines of credit  Other debt 
 White  Black  Hispanic  Other  White  Black  Hispanic  Other 
 Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean  Holders Mean 
1989 3.0%  1,527.1   2.8%  114.3   3.8%  178.0   5.2%  279.2   7.2%  1,693.7   3.4%  412.3   6.8%  1,989.7   7.1%  567.1  
1992 2.6%  710.6   1.5%  119.9   1.4%  311.9   1.9%  107.5   8.2%  1,935.7   9.5%  511.4   7.2%  1,286.2   11.2%  1,648.7  
1995 2.1%  522.3   0.8%  40.2   1.2%  54.4   3.2%  135.8   8.5%  2,488.3   8.7%  564.5   8.2%  700.8   8.4%  1,395.4  
1998 2.4%  348.1   1.5%  64.7   2.4%  247.1   1.9%  120.5   8.8%  3,821.1   9.8%  1,520.1   6.8%  696.4   9.5%  4,915.3  
2001 1.7%  581.4   1.0%  233.6   1.2%  72.1   1.4%  21.8   7.4%  2,725.6   4.9%  461.1   7.6%  336.6   10.8%  1,600.6  
2004 1.7%  1,121.4   1.2%  32.4   0.8%  477.4   1.3%  775.6   7.8%  2,460.1   8.6%  1,048.8   6.1%  530.3   4.7%  914.6  
2007 1.7%  691.2   1.5%  51.6   2.5%  709.7   0.9%  563.7   6.8%  1,659.4   7.8%  741.2   6.5%  1,795.5   4.3%  977.0  
2010 2.5%  1,885.1   0.9%  230.5   0.8%  47.7   1.9%  380.4   6.3%  1,687.9   8.3%  728.7   5.7%  723.7   5.0%  1,703.6  
2013 2.0%  1,152.1   1.7%  65.3   1.3%  45.1   2.4%  1,176.3   6.6%  1,598.5   7.7%  357.8   5.6%  691.7   5.6%  819.2  
















Table A1.18 Mean of income source receipts by race, USA 1989-2013 
 Wages  Business income  Interest and dividends 
 White Black Hispanic Other  White Black Hispanic Other  White Black Hispanic Other 
1989 55,448.7 28,705.5 34,886.6 44,486.2  10,238.4 688.8 2,911.1 9,786.6  6,231.8 434.9 1,298.1 1,756.0 
1992 52,690.9 32,657.8 30,243.4 53,085.5  12,304.2 1,351.8 2,316.9 12,862.0  5,049.3 338.0 325.8 3,392.1 
1995 54,901.3 29,832.6 42,644.1 61,487.5  10,078.4 820.8 2,692.9 7,046.0  4,967.7 99.9 119.8 1,960.9 
1998 58,152.1 35,164.3 41,632.1 72,627.1  12,257.6 2,302.9 1,908.4 9,597.7  4,161.7 290.3 333.8 1,779.5 
2001 69,485.1 40,989.5 42,966.2 58,302.8  12,552.9 756.6 5,779.5 16,218.2  4,875.6 418.8 227.7 1,904.4 
2004 66,286.0 39,047.3 39,687.9 77,993.8  11,696.1 2,178.1 4,158.9 9,697.9  3,974.7 187.3 181.0 1,474.1 
2007 65,071.5 38,973.7 43,698.0 79,931.2  15,820.3 3,758.7 4,809.4 10,955.3  4,484.3 306.4 238.2 1,267.4 
2010 61,229.2 33,720.4 44,769.0 78,287.6  13,627.3 1,668.9 3,515.9 13,437.9  3,981.3 269.7 193.7 2,007.1 
2013 60,837.6 29,032.9 35,258.6 71,540.3  14,156.3 2,096.2 4,693.7 10,584.8  4,003.6 318.9 58.1 2,214.6 
`               
 Capital gains or losses  Social security and retirement income  Transfer and other income 
 White Black Hispanic Other  White Black Hispanic Other  White Black Hispanic Other 
1989 5,456.4 185.4 586.9 298.4  7,147.0 4,479.0 1,924.8 3,250.2  2,733.6 2,973.2 1,445.0 4,345.2 
1992 1,822.8 12.7 -47.1 1,388.3  6,851.5 4,080.0 1,910.3 3,063.8  6,637.9 8,443.1 7,854.0 6,265.2 
1995 2,399.4 97.5 43.5 -109.7  7,130.4 3,515.5 3,045.5 4,053.7  1,599.7 1,974.8 3,462.4 1,566.8 
1998 4,436.1 62.2 1,621.7 1,604.2  7,368.7 4,928.3 1,576.6 1,516.3  1,468.0 1,636.2 1,278.3 1,187.1 
2001 7,984.9 270.2 579.0 2,612.2  8,138.7 4,509.0 2,181.5 3,172.5  1,438.4 1,620.7 1,204.7 1,661.5 
2004 3,626.2 46.3 171.6 966.5  11,274.8 5,490.4 3,003.9 3,573.0  1,424.9 1,750.7 2,321.5 1,451.4 
2007 8,117.5 1,003.0 795.7 -325.8  10,645.5 5,201.2 2,757.8 4,297.3  1,721.9 2,584.0 1,806.2 1,493.8 
2010 1,481.5 -6.8 -520.4 1,246.3  11,826.7 7,062.3 2,634.4 5,825.0  2,686.3 2,804.6 2,881.6 2,401.9 
2013 5,524.6 140.9 52.5 1,340.0  13,649.2 7,446.4 3,384.3 4,409.9  3,253.6 2,835.0 2,115.6 3,404.3 
Note: All figures in 2013 USD. 
 
Table A1.19 Mean of debt payments receipts by race, USA 1989-2013 
 Mortgages  Consumer debt  Revolving debt 
 White Black Hispanic Other  White Black Hispanic Other  White Black Hispanic Other 
1989 6,220.3 2,513.4 3,962.9 6,410.2  3,320.9 3,047.3 2,712.9 2,717.0  587.6 462.7 435.7 640.2 
1992 6,988.2 2,981.5 3,802.2 7,458.8  2,617.9 2,231.2 2,080.3 2,295.7  623.4 416.1 529.8 419.3 
1995 6,714.3 3,222.9 4,909.3 7,955.1  2,702.2 2,098.4 2,297.0 3,212.9  791.7 437.2 534.3 763.1 
1998 8,024.4 4,311.3 4,068.3 11,251.6  3,212.8 2,136.0 3,024.5 3,139.1  957.2 490.5 671.0 629.5 
2001 8,409.3 4,597.1 4,640.9 9,001.3  3,172.7 2,737.8 2,339.5 2,909.4  884.1 683.0 650.0 751.7 
2004 9,214.8 4,779.1 5,909.0 12,991.2  3,288.9 2,609.6 2,553.2 3,209.4  1,158.2 608.9 727.2 1,232.7 
2007 9,971.3 6,833.4 8,274.7 13,925.2  3,083.5 2,557.2 3,135.1 2,859.0  1,288.7 872.6 1,079.5 1,091.9 
2010 9,591.8 4,518.6 6,057.0 11,584.2  2,865.9 2,272.1 2,522.6 2,133.1  1,175.7 639.4 677.9 969.1 
2013 7,983.4 3,970.2 4,421.4 10,095.9  2,713.8 2,253.8 2,287.8 2,580.4  894.7 413.6 551.7 485.7 
















Appendix to Section 1.3.4. Detailed balance sheet analysis by age group (source for all tables: own calculations based on U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances 
1989-2013) 
 





















<35 35-44 45-54 
Holders Median Mean Holders Median Mean Holders Median Mean 
1989 92.3% 36,512.9 147,260.2 95.0% 191,060.3 364,209.0 94.9% 254,325.2 604,960.2 
1992 92.9% 38,182.0 126,931.0 96.7% 159,226.8 306,668.7 96.8% 200,008.4 527,932.7 
1995 94.4% 48,374.9 119,730.4 96.2% 167,816.9 306,654.0 97.3% 227,682.1 558,621.2 
1998 94.8% 41,370.4 156,799.2 97.6% 183,121.7 383,590.5 96.7% 255,026.7 637,662.3 
2001 93.2% 51,478.1 184,422.1 97.4% 207,356.8 452,396.3 98.1% 278,533.2 760,338.9 
2004 96.5% 48,055.6 175,302.3 97.7% 213,888.5 511,473.1 98.3% 289,665.1 826,073.5 
2007 97.1% 42,789.7 220,011.0 96.9% 249,597.5 526,187.2 97.6% 343,530.5 910,350.4 
2010 95.5% 38,388.1 151,207.8 97.4% 167,592.9 380,563.9 98.3% 264,065.8 773,744.7 
2013 92.2% 29,520.0 143,166.1 97.9% 162,900.0 488,723.7 99.7% 215,000.0 664,111.7 
Percentage change 
1989-2013 -0.1 -19.2 -2.8 3.1 -14.7 34.2 5.1 -15.5 9.8 
1989-2007 5.2 17.2 49.4 2.0 30.6 44.5 2.9 35.1 50.5 
2007-13 -5.1 -31.0 -34.9 1.0 -34.7 -7.1 2.2 -37.4 -27.1 
(Table A1.20 continued)          
Wave 
55-64 65-74 75+ 
Holders Median Mean Holders Median Mean Holders Median Mean 
1989 95.0% 221,282.8 628,786.1 97.4% 153,282.0 557,853.6 96.4% 146.7 458 
1992 96.9% 229,091.7 618,590.7 96.8% 173,606.0 505,076.4 97.5% 145.5 366.2 
1995 96.4% 243,619.9 662,085.4 97.7% 190,038.7 566,606.0 98.4% 146.2 403.4 
1998 98.2% 283,331.2 852,550.8 98.5% 234,584.5 711,594.8 96.4% 192.9 471.2 
2001 98.4% 299,544.6 1,058,720.0 97.1% 282,341.5 955,240.9 97.8% 224.5 641.6 
2004 97.5% 435,052.5 1,181,396.0 99.5% 287,445.4 904,332.7 99.6% 228.4 680.7 
2007 99.1% 391,294.3 1,183,012.0 98.4% 340,117.2 1,236,515.0 98.1% 246.2 747.2 
2010 98.3% 303,611.4 1,076,835.0 97.1% 298,467.3 1,008,400.0 98.7% 254.8 765.8 
2013 100.0% 260,700.0 916,863.1 100.0% 303,600.0 1,132,184.0 100.0% 217 675.8 
Percentage change          
1989-2013 5.3 17.8 45.8 2.7 98.1 103.0 3.7 46.1 40.1 
1989-2007 4.3 76.8 88.1 1.0 121.9 121.7 1.8 66.0 63.4 















 <35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+ 
Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 39.3%  63,879.2  66.1% 145,459.4  76.4%  187,224.0  80.1%  173,065.0  77.8%  134,800.9  69.9%  119,714.2  
1992 36.8%  58,423.6  64.5% 124,482.5  75.5%  161,246.2  77.5%  155,702.9  79.3%  135,551.7  77.2%  118,483.9  
1995 37.9%  50,901.9  64.7% 120,275.8  75.3%  161,527.9  82.0%  162,902.0  79.5%  133,083.2  72.8%  115,401.4  
1998 38.9%  59,742.9  67.1% 132,988.7  74.4%  173,424.8  80.3%  187,391.0  81.5%  164,311.1  77.0%  141,669.4  
2001 39.9%  71,669.5  67.8% 164,116.3  76.3%  208,828.7  83.2%  221,836.4  82.5%  207,413.1  76.2%  171,999.8  
2004 41.6%  91,372.4  68.3% 204,034.2  77.3%  265,297.0  79.1%  318,986.6  81.3%  230,869.4  85.2%  224,151.4  
2007 40.6% 109,781.5  66.1% 220,920.3  77.3%  298,846.1  81.0%  293,914.1  85.5%  335,514.0  77.0%  228,116.4  
2010 37.5%  71,677.7  63.8% 167,024.7  75.2%  241,164.4  78.1%  260,228.8  82.6%  246,961.6  81.9%  206,906.3  
2013 35.6%  61,443.2  61.7% 172,742.6  69.1%  195,466.0  74.2%  224,916.2  85.8%  256,579.1  80.2%  169,778.1  
Other real estate 
 <35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+ 
Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 7.5%  8,861.9  20.5%  28,958.1  29.6%  104,468.3  31.6%  116,002.3  27.5%  77,134.2  16.7%  48,964.0  
1992 8.2%  10,383.5  16.6%  24,695.4  25.3%  82,537.7  35.6%  91,392.5  25.4%  83,747.2  15.8%  46,485.9  
1995 7.1%  6,514.7  14.6%  20,030.5  25.0%  52,411.7  27.1%  85,704.1  28.1%  75,391.5  16.2%  35,096.4  
1998 5.6%  6,657.7  18.0%  26,442.7  24.3%  60,535.0  25.6%  93,210.7  28.3%  86,095.2  19.5%  56,470.6  
2001 5.7%  10,099.0  15.1%  28,287.7  21.6%  59,038.0  24.3%  107,280.0  22.9%  154,636.7  19.4%  55,954.5  
2004 7.7%  15,326.8  13.9%  50,555.3  23.8%  89,252.8  27.6%  139,603.0  26.2%  123,583.3  15.3%  65,364.9  
2007 7.9%  15,533.1  17.2%  55,096.6  22.0%  90,656.7  28.0%  146,863.6  26.5%  136,876.7  17.5%  89,402.9  
2010 6.4%  9,146.7  12.2%  24,300.8  21.1%  71,974.7  28.0%  139,048.8  28.1%  131,586.9  22.9%  105,409.4  
2013 6.2%  9,168.8  13.1%  31,426.1  20.2%  62,680.0  22.9%  99,063.8  28.2%  125,863.0  18.9%  72,691.4  
Business equity 
 <35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+ 
Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 10.3%  27,587.8  19.4%  72,433.0  18.2%  116,623.5  13.4%  114,198.4  9.4%  112,423.5  5.4%  61,611.9  
1992 10.6%  17,983.7  19.5%  66,265.2  18.2%  103,761.4  18.9%  127,298.8  10.4%  86,725.8  4.6%  21,222.4  
1995 9.6%  11,677.5  16.7%  60,179.8  18.0%  115,073.9  13.3%  138,857.5  9.9%  87,157.0  5.0%  31,486.5  
1998 7.8%  26,468.3  15.5%  67,098.8  19.2%  136,424.7  16.2%  161,485.5  10.6%  86,950.1  3.0%  36,165.7  
2001 8.1%  22,646.8  15.5%  91,020.6  19.5%  144,566.5  18.7%  199,023.0  13.1%  137,131.9  3.4%  39,850.6  
2004 8.5%  20,073.7  15.4%  95,332.7  18.2%  169,841.6  17.8%  209,398.7  10.3%  115,806.2  6.5%  59,866.0  
2007 8.0%  42,730.7  18.2%  96,590.7  17.2%  191,870.0  18.1%  248,896.6  11.2%  230,795.5  4.5%  108,494.9  
2010 8.4%  23,492.8  11.1%  53,564.1  16.8%  162,946.8  19.6%  194,954.6  15.8%  166,456.6  6.0%  100,493.5  
2013 6.5%  21,276.6  15.6% 117,768.4  14.6%  140,359.7  15.5%  161,901.2  11.0%  159,472.7  4.4%  83,674.4  
Vehicles and other non-financial assets 
 <35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+ 
Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 82.1%  14,036.1  89.5%  28,126.2  91.0%  31,330.0  86.5%  27,419.4  82.9%  19,209.7  68.0%  11,104.0  
1992 84.1%  13,287.7  89.3%  19,289.8  93.0%  23,976.1  87.2%  22,038.6  86.3%  19,109.6  73.3%  11,652.3  
1995 84.6%  17,103.6  85.6%  21,919.3  88.6%  29,948.1  89.3%  29,486.9  83.7%  25,153.8  73.2%  17,148.0  
1998 79.4%  14,708.8  86.2%  22,211.7  88.1%  30,487.5  88.9%  33,601.4  84.2%  25,442.5  70.5%  14,911.2  
2001 79.6%  17,802.6  89.8%  24,785.6  90.8%  33,888.1  91.2%  37,179.3  82.5%  30,842.2  74.6%  15,493.9  
2004 84.1%  16,065.4  89.9%  25,769.9  89.2%  32,910.7  89.3%  40,294.9  89.5%  32,760.6  77.9%  26,794.6  
2007 86.1%  19,102.0  88.1%  24,330.8  91.1%  31,269.9  92.4%  34,633.6  90.7%  39,312.9  72.9%  15,364.7  

































Note: All median and mean figures in 2013 USD. Holders represents the proportion of all households holding assets. All values are conditional on holding assets. 
 
2010 80.1%  16,117.8  89.0%  21,808.9  91.2%  29,843.0  90.8%  34,730.3  87.4%  34,336.5  83.7%  17,938.6  
2013 83.1%  14,800.6  89.9%  24,836.0  88.2%  26,203.1  89.5%  29,381.1  90.3%  35,525.5  76.6%  18,925.2  
Transaction accounts 
 <35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+ 
Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 80.2%  6,363.6  86.1%  13,329.8  87.9%  29,147.8  85.6%  37,274.6  90.5%  38,832.4  90.3%  49,383.8  
1992 81.3%  7,440.7  86.8%  13,295.0  88.9%  22,285.6  90.2%  31,404.2  88.9%  30,375.2  91.8%  39,016.8  
1995 80.9%  4,699.0  87.6%  11,167.8  89.2%  24,567.6  88.8%  32,268.0  91.7%  35,655.6  93.2%  35,759.2  
1998 84.7%  8,011.6  90.5%  14,668.5  94.1%  27,770.7  93.9%  36,008.9  94.1%  35,869.0  90.0%  30,733.3  
2001 87.1%  8,035.9  91.1%  19,540.6  92.7%  35,660.7  93.8%  48,208.2  93.8%  53,006.2  93.7%  42,023.0  
2004 86.4%  8,483.6  90.8%  24,024.0  91.8%  31,282.4  93.2%  50,864.5  93.9%  41,544.4  96.4%  53,312.1  
2007 87.3%  7,948.1  91.2%  17,626.8  91.7%  35,589.8  96.4%  41,616.1  94.6%  44,577.8  95.3%  34,755.8  
2010 89.0%  8,608.4  90.6%  19,477.0  92.5%  37,123.3  94.2%  53,782.3  95.8%  52,206.1  96.3%  37,832.0  
2013 90.2%  9,365.1  91.8%  27,287.9  91.8%  29,008.8  94.6%  51,396.7  97.1%  53,834.9  96.7%  50,197.4  
Financial investment assets 
 <35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+ 
Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 43.6%  18,107.3  59.1%  38,556.5  56.5%  73,604.4  52.1%  92,781.4  56.4%  18,060.7  56.2%  157,527.8  
1992 42.4%  8,598.6  50.3%  28,170.2  52.5%  65,226.7  55.5%  110,773.4  54.2%  111,901.0  57.1%  120,133.7  
1995 44.3%  9,923.8  50.9%  33,068.9  53.7%  79,634.7  50.9%  126,582.7  52.8%  150,815.3  56.1%  149,655.8  
1998 42.4%  20,836.6  52.7%  58,305.9  52.9%  113,366.1  53.5%  207,583.1  59.3%  226,940.7  59.6%  161,259.4  
2001 42.0%  32,428.0  52.6%  58,949.7  55.0%  148,826.2  54.3%  271,062.4  53.6%  254,139.1  58.8%  256,261.9  
2004 41.0%  9,507.5  46.7%  58,459.3  53.7%  126,154.0  55.6%  237,317.5  54.2%  235,705.4  55.3%  195,891.9  
2007 36.8%  10,755.7  43.8%  53,066.8  48.6%  136,738.0  53.3%  216,145.3  54.0%  278,481.3  58.1%  224,988.1  
2010 31.2%  8,502.4  32.6%  43,133.3  39.4%  110,443.0  46.1%  193,789.4  44.9%  201,402.6  54.0%  206,005.8  
2013 28.3%  14,414.0  32.9%  46,122.0  36.2%  104,176.2  37.4%  167,832.7  43.5%  269,153.9  42.8%  168,772.7  
Retirement and insurance assets 
 <35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+ 
Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 38.5%  8,424.3  67.3%  37,346.0  67.3%  62,562.2  61.8%  68,045.2  52.4%  34,156.3  32.5%  9,588.4  
1992 44.6%  10,813.2  62.8%  30,470.7  66.6%  68,899.0  66.1%  79,980.3  55.2%  37,665.9  36.2%  9,314.8  
1995 51.6%  18,909.9  64.4%  40,012.0  68.4%  95,457.3  64.6%  86,284.2  54.9%  59,349.7  41.9%  21,752.4  
1998 48.2%  20,373.4  66.2%  61,874.2  68.0%  95,653.6  69.8%  133,270.3  61.4%  85,986.3  41.1%  29,304.2  
2001 50.4%  21,740.2  67.6%  65,695.7  71.8%  129,530.7  68.8%  174,130.7  60.0%  118,071.6  45.7%  58,143.9  
2004 44.4%  14,473.0  61.8%  53,297.7  64.4%  111,334.9  71.9%  184,931.2  57.4%  124,063.4  50.9%  52,430.1  
2007 46.4%  14,159.8  62.4%  58,555.2  69.2%  125,379.9  72.6%  200,942.3  64.5%  170,956.4  48.9%  46,883.8  
2010 45.1%  13,662.1  56.0%  51,255.1  64.9%  120,249.4  68.0%  200,300.9  60.4%  175,450.2  50.2%  69,739.2  
2013 42.6%  12,697.7  58.9%  68,540.6  61.6%  106,218.0  66.2%  182,371.4  60.2%  231,755.1  48.9%  77,662.5  

























Mortgages secured by primary residence 
 <35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+ 
Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 34.8%  42,606.5  57.9%  63,613.3  58.3%  48,585.4  37.0%  35,190.4  21.8%  13,103.4  6.3%  10,757.7  
1992 30.9%  39,163.1  55.5%  72,657.5  61.4%  63,371.2  40.9%  42,585.2  18.5%  19,770.4  8.6%  15,152.7  
1995 33.0%  39,825.3  54.3%  69,477.3  61.8%  73,657.2  45.2%  52,360.5  24.7%  25,649.8  6.8%  8,741.4  
1998 33.2%  43,985.7  58.7%  82,592.0  58.8%  80,423.7  49.3%  66,814.5  26.0%  36,885.7  11.5%  24,448.9  
2001 35.7%  51,583.0  59.6%  87,659.2  59.8%  93,913.8  49.0%  68,467.1  32.0%  48,207.1  9.5%  22,119.0  
2004 37.7%  74,203.4  62.8% 118,915.1  64.6%  121,670.5  51.0%  97,241.1  32.1%  51,765.6  18.7%  35,070.4  
Total debt 
Wave <35 35-44 45-54 
Holders Median Mean Holders Median Mean Holders Median Mean 
1989 80.0% 20,642.5 57,530.6 88.6% 54,769.4 87,383.0 85.3% 43,381.7 75,333.0 
1992 81.5% 16,930.0 54,082.6 86.3% 58,491.5 92,575.3 85.4% 44,356.1 86,689.9 
1995 83.5% 22,874.5 56,718.6 87.0% 56,541.1 87,739.9 86.3% 59,197.4 100,974.5 
1998 81.2% 27,375.3 65,008.6 87.6% 79,510.0 107,030.7 87.0% 68,617.1 111,635.5 
2001 82.7% 32,830.4 72,658.9 88.6% 81,156.8 112,182.8 84.6% 71,018.7 118,071.1 
2004 79.8% 41,926.8 98,258.1 88.6% 107,530.0 146,748.4 88.4% 102,350.8 159,740.5 
2007 83.6% 40,577.8 113,109.9 86.2% 119,016.3 165,910.1 86.8% 107,709.8 166,970.9 
2010 77.8% 42,792.8 95,924.2 86.0% 115,743.1 160,847.2 84.1% 98,596.0 177,666.4 
2013 77.1% 31,000.0 82,506.0 84.8% 96,500.0 152,371.4 82.3% 100,000.0 150,544.3 
Growth rate (percent)          
1989-2013 -3.6 50.2 43.4 -4.3 50.2 43.4 -3.5 130.5 99.8 
1989-2007 4.5 96.6 96.6 -2.7 96.6 96.6 1.8 148.3 121.6 
2007-13 -7.8 -23.6 -27.1 -1.6 -23.6 -27.1 -5.2 -7.2 -9.8 
(Table A1.21continued) 
         
Wave 55-64 65-74 75+ 
Holders Median Mean Holders Median Mean Holders Median Mean 
1989 70.8% 17,171.9 57,230.0 49.6% 9,037.9 30,950.8 21.0% 5,332.3 22,383.2 
1992 70.1% 31,033.0 68,511.5 51.4% 7,961.3 40,043.3 31.6% 3,818.2 28,881.9 
1995 73.7% 31,875.5 77,872.4 53.4% 10,670.7 41,425.8 28.4% 2,884.0 17,519.8 
1998 76.4% 49,175.6 98,241.5 51.4% 17,154.3 65,830.5 24.6% 11,436.2 39,781.4 
2001 75.4% 45,174.6 98,553.5 56.8% 17,203.1 68,908.3 29.2% 6,566.1 36,669.1 
2004 76.3% 57,957.7 140,255.3 58.8% 30,828.6 79,168.0 40.3% 18,990.4 65,105.0 
2007 81.8% 67,637.2 147,954.7 65.5% 45,057.8 120,822.2 31.4% 14,596.3 50,359.7 
2010 77.7% 82,520.6 149,505.5 65.2% 47,797.6 117,176.8 38.5% 32,150.9 76,554.7 
2013 78.7% 63,400.0 131,883.6 66.4% 44,000.0 108,718.7 41.4% 20,000.0 57,457.6 
Growth rate (percent)          
1989-2013 11.2 269.2 130.4 33.9 386.8 251.3 97.1 275.1 156.7 
1989-2007 15.5 293.9 158.5 32.1 398.5 290.4 49.5 173.7 125.0 















2007 37.3%  83,444.9  59.5% 127,479.0  65.5%  129,045.6  55.3%  103,867.6  42.9%  86,024.3  13.9%  36,105.9  
2010 34.0%  67,269.7  57.6% 127,832.7  60.4%  132,291.8  53.6%  108,881.8  40.5%  81,668.9  24.2%  53,412.7  
2013 28.6%  52,727.7  53.5% 117,194.7  56.1%  114,436.1  48.9%  96,416.4  42.2%  82,985.9  19.9%  40,867.3  
Mortgages secured by other real estate 
 <35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+ 
Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 1.6%  1,398.5  7.0%  6,115.8  10.6%  7,685.7  7.4%  9,428.8  4.1%  3,500.1  0.7%  789.6  
1992 3.0%  2,808.8  7.1%  6,231.5  9.4%  11,122.4  9.8%  12,997.4  3.1%  7,454.0  0.7%  7,253.1  
1995 2.1%  1,659.3  5.0%  4,597.4  8.4%  9,939.3  8.4%  11,578.8  3.5%  5,717.5  1.0%  4,167.1  
1998 1.8%  1,806.7  6.6%  7,329.7  6.6%  7,853.1  7.8%  10,970.3  5.2%  12,350.2  1.8%  5,238.5  
2001 2.7%  3,003.3  4.9%  5,162.3  6.4%  6,239.3  7.7%  10,458.0  3.4%  9,625.0  2.0%  4,297.1  
2004 1.9%  3,252.3  4.0%  7,233.2  6.3%  18,742.8  6.1%  20,087.0  3.2%  10,203.5  1.5%  3,951.3  
2007 3.3%  5,364.3  6.5%  16,573.2  8.0%  15,704.3  7.8%  22,699.8  5.0%  17,597.9  0.6%  3,540.4  
2010 2.9%  4,028.0  5.1%  8,300.7  7.7%  21,561.5  7.6%  18,629.4  5.0%  20,318.3  2.8%  9,375.2  
2013 2.4%  3,898.1  5.0%  10,550.8  7.9%  15,688.1  7.8%  15,046.4  4.8%  11,729.3  2.7%  5,975.2  
Instalment debt 
 <35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+ 
Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 60.7%  10,920.4  67.5%  13,545.3  59.2%  12,758.4  38.5%  8,226.5  21.4%  4,123.3  9.8%  6,716.7  
1992 61.7%  9,601.3  57.8%  9,196.2  49.9%  6,708.2  38.8%  7,222.3  22.9%  5,000.9  8.3%  2,664.3  
1995 62.5%  11,146.8  59.8%  8,895.8  53.3%  10,976.4  34.8%  5,483.7  16.5%  3,695.2  8.8%  2,437.6  
1998 60.0%  15,536.1  53.3%  11,787.2  51.4%  12,771.4  37.9%  10,633.1  20.2%  5,866.7  4.2%  2,153.1  
2001 63.8%  14,105.7  57.1%  14,486.9  45.9%  11,088.6  39.7%  10,115.2  21.1%  4,678.7  9.5%  3,481.7  
2004 59.4%  16,846.7  55.7%  14,461.4  50.2%  11,876.3  42.8%  13,050.6  27.5%  8,038.4  13.9%  19,233.3  
2007 65.2%  20,189.3  56.3%  14,944.7  51.9%  14,555.2  44.6%  12,700.2  26.1%  7,432.5  7.0%  2,628.7  
2010 61.9%  21,822.9  60.0%  18,161.7  49.9%  14,913.6  40.8%  12,276.3  30.4%  8,211.5  12.3%  8,057.9  
2013 63.5%  23,713.1  58.2%  19,673.7  52.8%  14,270.8  43.3%  14,371.0  29.3%  6,685.1  15.7%  5,683.8  
Credit card balances 
 <35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+ 
Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 44.5%  1,899.5  50.5%  2,095.8  49.3%  2,246.6  32.9%  1,534.5  27.1%  1,252.0  10.1%  169.6  
1992 51.8%  1,979.9  50.9%  2,605.6  49.0%  2,780.5  37.1%  1,863.4  32.1%  1,505.0  20.1%  1,980.8  
1995 54.6%  2,831.2  55.9%  3,160.4  56.4%  3,633.3  43.2%  2,570.0  30.5%  1,596.9  17.5%  1,007.1  
1998 50.7%  2,899.5  51.3%  3,920.6  52.5%  3,634.4  45.6%  4,302.3  29.2%  3,138.3  11.2%  1,658.4  
2001 49.6%  3,170.1  54.1%  3,464.4  50.4%  3,295.7  41.6%  2,942.2  30.0%  3,535.3  18.4%  1,564.7  
2004 47.5%  2,712.7  58.8%  4,268.9  54.0%  4,693.4  42.1%  3,858.2  31.9%  3,584.2  23.5%  3,095.1  
2007 48.5%  3,351.3  51.7%  5,094.8  53.6%  5,766.9  49.9%  6,002.6  37.0%  5,364.4  18.8%  2,622.0  
2010 38.7%  2,277.2  45.7%  4,861.8  46.2%  5,263.0  41.4%  4,224.8  31.9%  3,162.4  21.7%  2,743.4  
2013 36.8%  1,626.6  41.7%  3,010.4  44.3%  3,167.3  43.4%  3,718.7  32.8%  3,259.6  21.1%  3,275.6  
 
 














Other unsecured lines of credit 
 <35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+ 
Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 4.4%  199.5  4.7%  810.8  4.0%  1,423.8  1.5%  473.2  0.7%  6,911.0  0.1%  764.3  
1992 2.8%  133.1  3.3%  125.1  2.7%  841.0  1.6%  1,391.8  1.0%  1,693.6  1.1%  661.1  
1995 2.7%  325.1  2.1%  157.7  2.2%  693.7  1.7%  458.2  1.3%  907.9  0.0%  317.0  
1998 2.4%  142.2  3.6%  267.4  3.6%  415.7  1.6%  313.9  0.3%  720.5  0.0%  26.1  
2001 1.7%  125.1  1.7%  124.7  1.5%  372.2  3.1%  1,722.7  0.2%  1,119.2  0.4%  308.6  
2004 2.2%  657.1  1.5%  357.2  2.9%  986.8  0.7%  1,352.5  0.4%  2,213.3  0.1%  1,007.1  
2007 2.1%  148.2  2.2%  582.9  1.9%  448.4  1.2%  370.3  1.5%  2,336.4  0.8%  1,470.9  
2010 1.8%  212.0  2.2%  435.0  2.7%  1,451.3  3.0%  2,908.3  1.2%  2,937.0  0.5%  1,930.8  
2013 2.1%  125.8  2.6%  544.6  1.7%  1,423.7  1.7%  1,036.7  2.1%  1,333.6  0.7%  1,349.9  
Other debt 
 <35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+ 
Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean Holders Mean 
1989 6.1%  506.3  8.5%  1,202.1  9.4%  2,633.2  8.1%  2,376.6  3.3%  2,061.1  1.9%  2,804.6  
1992 6.4%  396.4  11.5%  1,759.4  10.4%  1,866.6  9.6%  2,451.3  6.0%  4,619.4  4.4%  1,169.7  
1995 7.4%  931.0  10.5%  1,451.2  13.0%  2,074.7  7.8%  5,421.1  5.4%  3,858.5  2.9%  849.6  
1998 9.6%  638.3  11.4%  1,133.8  11.1%  6,537.2  8.3%  5,207.4  4.1%  6,869.1  2.0%  6,256.4  
2001 8.8%  671.6  8.0%  1,285.3  7.4%  3,161.5  7.4%  4,848.3  5.0%  1,742.9  3.6%  4,898.0  
2004 6.2%  586.0  11.3%  1,512.5  9.4%  1,770.7  8.4%  4,665.9  4.0%  3,362.9  2.5%  2,747.9  
2007 5.9%  611.8  7.5%  1,235.4  9.8%  1,450.5  8.7%  2,314.2  4.4%  2,066.8  1.3%  3,991.9  
2010 5.5%  314.3  8.6%  1,255.4  9.7%  2,185.2  6.7%  2,584.9  2.3%  878.9  2.0%  1,034.8  
2013 5.7%  414.6  7.7%  1,397.2  9.7%  1,558.2  7.7%  1,294.4  4.2%  2,725.2  2.0%  305.7  
Note: All median and mean figures in 2013 USD. Holders represents the proportion of all households holding debt. All values are conditional on holding debt. 
 
Table A1.22 Mean of income sources by age group, USA 1989-2013 
 Wages  Business and farm income 
 <35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+  <35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+ 
1989 46,592.0 76,044.0 77,914.2 49,520.1 11,286.6 4,823.9  1,900.9 10,726.0 13,088.5 10,459.8 8,009.4 12,968.3 
1992 46,942.4 64,927.0 76,339.2 58,078.5 10,753.1 2,050.5  3,408.9 18,193.9 12,567.6 13,645.2 7,509.0 4,081.6 
1995 46,272.6 67,067.0 83,053.1 55,640.8 19,649.8 2,157.4  1,316.6 8,010.2 17,669.8 10,886.1 9,303.5 5,594.9 
1998 48,303.1 73,628.1 81,365.0 65,249.0 18,957.1 2,062.2  3,165.7 10,555.9 14,613.8 22,298.6 9,705.4 2,911.8 
2001 53,320.5 85,125.4 95,206.2 74,964.3 19,318.6 6,006.0  2,341.2 8,760.6 16,626.0 20,871.7 13,523.8 4,337.0 
2004 50,809.6 76,747.6 90,728.0 79,217.4 20,050.1 4,398.1  2,511.8 8,172.0 15,274.4 18,175.9 9,907.3 3,909.5 
2007 51,899.3 74,045.5 91,293.9 75,501.3 25,437.4 2,633.9  3,844.5 11,421.0 19,242.6 21,066.2 15,667.7 7,558.0 
2010 45,345.9 72,607.7 83,547.3 71,736.2 27,249.4 3,733.2  3,018.6 8,615.9 17,330.5 18,018.3 11,499.0 5,030.3 




























 Interest and dividend income  Capital gains/losses 
 <35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+  <35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+ 
1989 534.7 2,164.8 4,218.4 7,650.9 10,524.6 14,262.1  1,641.9 1,223.3 9,102.2 7,056.2 6,199.5 3,467.3 
1992 588.9 1,864.2 3,971.6 7,250.8 7,247.3 9,887.8  277.1 1,244.4 3,099.9 2,680.7 1,145.7 818.0 
1995 228.8 1,414.2 2,955.8 7,300.1 8,630.2 11,090.8  284.3 1,047.7 1,905.5 3,694.2 3,746.6 3,129.6 
1998 390.2 1,715.7 3,171.3 5,043.4 8,284.2 6,610.7  1,016.7 2,426.1 2,905.1 8,086.2 7,613.9 3,649.8 
2001 593.6 2,329.4 3,443.0 6,631.3 6,856.8 8,323.9  998.0 3,548.8 13,671.1 10,063.6 6,389.9 3,724.0 
2004 216.3 1,314.8 2,683.4 6,331.8 5,401.1 5,734.6  183.4 2,488.8 4,189.7 5,243.3 1,745.8 2,992.1 
2007 190.1 1,033.3 3,451.3 5,795.2 8,090.1 6,021.6  309.5 3,748.6 6,921.1 7,534.6 20,103.2 5,314.7 
2010 164.7 1,005.7 2,580.1 5,361.0 5,568.7 5,848.9  118.1 991.2 41.3 3,254.7 1,143.0 1,253.0 
2013 148.7 1,238.6 2,232.0 4,223.4 7,402.6 4,984.6  486.1 1,444.3 3,473.2 8,719.8 6,700.4 4,028.2 
    
 Social security and retirement income  Transfer and other income 
 <35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+  <35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+ 
1989 262.3 877.3 2,265.7 8,183.1 22,469.6 18,676.8  2,031.1 2,571.6 4,232.5 3,026.6 971.2 4,852.5 
1992 255.7 741.1 1,609.7 7,682.3 20,327.4 19,997.3  7,325.9 5,862.7 6,545.9 11,065.1 2,897.3 8,822.2 
1995 274.7 744.2 2,630.6 8,613.2 20,899.8 20,486.7  1,813.6 2,211.1 2,047.8 1,768.1 1,434.7 352.8 
1998 324.4 761.0 1,962.8 8,259.0 23,087.7 21,492.2  1,424.2 1,513.2 1,397.0 1,871.5 1,986.1 494.4 
2001 250.7 703.8 1,887.8 8,379.6 26,519.2 24,024.1  1,264.5 1,644.2 1,405.7 1,902.2 1,651.6 738.6 
2004 286.2 908.3 2,280.4 11,906.9 33,933.5 31,321.1  1,947.6 2,206.1 1,937.6 1,031.0 702.9 300.5 
2007 200.6 1,226.4 2,325.6 11,420.2 32,369.9 26,952.3  1,987.2 2,370.0 1,759.3 2,476.3 1,034.6 404.0 
2010 392.2 829.2 2,613.8 10,855.4 32,659.8 32,237.7  2,919.2 3,223.7 3,160.5 3,400.7 1,502.2 717.2 
2013 357.3 1,105.9 3,226.1 11,684.6 36,732.2 31,746.0  3,145.8 3,170.7 3,350.5 3,819.3 3,445.7 561.0 
Note: All figures in 2013 USD. 
 
Table A1.23 Mean debt payments by age group, USA 1989-2013 
Note: All figures in 2013 USD. Values given for all households. 
 Mortgages  Consumer debt  Revolving debt 
 <35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+  <35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+  <35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+ 
1989 5,074.4 9,214.5 8,278.4 4,827.3 1,652.0 505.0  3,438.5 4,743.2 4,255.3 2,585.3 1,457.7 455.8  582.0 819.2 838.1 390.8 306.2 35.3 
1992 4,633.2 9,734.7 9,973.6 6,452.2 2,367.9 884.3  3,147.7 3,252.5 2,900.6 2,418.7 1,074.0 390.0  547.4 772.6 846.2 509.0 289.7 241.4 
1995 4,302.8 8,601.6 10,580.4 7,097.0 2,756.8 616.4  3,344.4 3,315.0 3,551.0 1,991.8 969.3 317.6  804.7 866.9 1,119.7 637.4 357.4 93.4 
1998 4,656.4 10,157.5 11,173.2 9,789.7 3,795.0 1,264.8  3,452.1 3,862.9 4,074.3 2,863.0 1,654.5 311.7  785.5 1,126.8 1,124.1 1,080.8 524.2 122.2 
2001 5,432.1 10,286.2 11,185.9 8,592.2 5,031.8 1,126.7  3,748.1 4,073.0 3,570.8 2,751.3 1,197.4 512.6  832.7 943.2 958.3 1,131.5 686.0 144.0 
2004 5,954.8 11,642.9 12,689.9 9,802.2 3,939.6 1,727.6  3,271.5 3,797.7 3,831.0 3,592.1 1,727.4 873.2  705.4 1,208.6 1,408.8 970.5 745.4 1,145.1 
2007 6,983.9 12,350.6 13,700.2 11,231.2 7,088.5 1,532.3  3,599.2 3,722.9 3,717.3 3,005.6 1,701.4 441.1  886.9 1,415.4 1,561.5 1,525.6 1,208.3 290.0 
2010 5,293.1 10,847.2 12,812.2 10,314.6 6,708.2 2,215.0  2,822.0 3,792.8 3,300.0 2,642.0 1,694.9 725.0  576.9 1,321.7 1,564.8 1,231.8 767.0 400.4 
2013 3,915.3 9,625.2 10,312.8 8,656.2 6,235.3 1,776.6  2,920.8 3,432.3 3,098.1 2,623.9 1,618.6 814.9  427.9 846.7 993.1 950.6 854.4 472.5 
(Table A1.22 continued) 
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Appendix II  
Stock-flow consistent model in Chapter 3 
Table A2.1 Exogenous parameter values in the stock-flow consistent model 
Parameter Value Source 
sw Wage share of output 0.57 AMECO Database, USA 2014 
rcb Federal funds rate 0.0025 
Federal Reserve, USA Dec 2008–
Dec 2015  𝛼1 Premium on the central 
bank interest rate 
0.0075 
Interest rate on deposits in 
Dafermos/Papatheodorou 2015 𝛼2 Premium on the deposit 
interest rate  
0.02 World Bank, USA 2014 
c1 
Propensity to consume 




Propensity to consume 




Propensity to consume 
out of wealth 
0.1  
c5 
Propensity to consume 
out of income of the 
rentier class 
0.6  
gk Growth rate of capital 0.025  
sf 
Profit retention rate of 
firms 
0.32 
Dividend payout ratio for S&P500 
companies, 2014 (Factset) 
β 
Parameter in the loan 
function pf the middle 
class and rentiers 
0.1 Setterfield/Kim 2013 
βw 
Parameter in the loan 




Proportion of investment 
financed by equity 
issuance 
0.045 Dafermos/Papatheodorou 2015 
λ10= λ20=λ30 
Parameters in the rentier 
portfolio equation 
0.3333 
Own calculations (cf. Godley/Lavoie 
2005) 
λ11= λ12= λ21 0.1 
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η Emulation parameter 0.29 Setterfield/Kim 2013 





π2 Parameters in the 
mortgage spread equation 
0.1  
π3 0.002  
s0 
Parameter in the 
securitisation function 
0.6 FRB and SIFMA, USA 2006 
spreadMBS MBS spread 0.0121 Bloomberg, USA 2005-2006 
h1 Parameters in the housing 
functions 
0.5  
h3 0.5  𝜃10 Parameters in the price of 
MBS function 
0.3  𝜃11 0.1  
mw 
Parameter in the wage 
premium function 
1.6 




Parameter in the wage 
premium function 
0.2/𝜌 + 0.3 
       
Table A2.2 Initial values for endogenous variables 
Variable Value Additional information 
Nw Number of working class households 128 
US Census Bureau, millions, USA 
2014 
Nm Number of middle class households 160 
Nr Number of rentier households 32 
Y Output 17000 BEA NIPA Data, bn USD, USA 2014 
Capital-output ratio 3 BEA NIPA Data, USA 2014 
u Capacity utilisation rate 0.78 Federal Reserve, USA 2014 
E Value of equities outstanding 14000 Fed Z.1 Tables, bn USD, USA 2014 
Hm Housing demand by the middle class 1000  
Hr Housing demand by the rentier class 1500  
H Housing supply by firms 2500  
HU Stock on unsold houses 0  
SH Shares of institutional investors 6600 Fed Z.1 Tables, bn USD, USA 2014 
pe Price of equity 1  
ph Price of housing 1  
pMBS Price of MBS 1  
rlm Interest rate on mortgages 0.06 
Freddie Mac Data, 30-year fixed-rate 
mortgage annual average 2000-2008 𝛾 Parameter in the housing rent 
function 
0.3 Zezza 2008 
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Table A2.3 Sensitivity analysis – key parameter values 
Parameter Baseline value Sensitivity analysis value 
sw Wage share of output 0.57 0.5 
mw 
Parameter in the wage premium 
function 
1.6 1.8 𝜌 Parameter in the wage premium 
function 
0.3 0.2 
rcb Federal funds rate 0.0025 0.005 𝛼1 Premium on the central bank 
interest rate 
0.0075 0.01 𝛼2 Premium on the deposit interest rate  0.02 0.04 








Parameter in the risk premium 
function 
0.03 0.04 
c4 Propensity to consume out of wealth 0.1 0.05 
c1 
Propensity to consume out of 
income of the working class 
0.9 0.95 
c3 
Propensity to consume out of 
income of the middle class 
0.75 0.8 
c5 
Propensity to consume out of 
income of the rentier class 
0.6 0.5 
λ30 Parameters in the rentier portfolio 
equation 
0.333 0.222 
λ10 0.333 0.444 
sf Profit retention rate of firms 0.32 0.5  
β Parameter in the loan function of 
the middle class and rentiers 
0.1 0.05 
βw 
Parameter in the loan function of 
the working class 
0.05 0.025 
 
Note: The adding-up constraint requires that λ10 + λ20 + λ30 = 1. Therefore, change in the value of  λ20 
and λ30 in the univariate sensitivity analysis forces a change in the value of λ10 and λ30 as well as λ10 and 


















Figure A2.1 Univariate sensitivity analysis results 
a) Fall in sw 
b) Rise in sf 
 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































r) Rise in η 
Gini index 
Atkinson index 



































































Squared coefficient of variation 
Gini income  
Gini wealth 
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Appendix III 
Empirical analysis in Chapter 4 
Appendix to Section 4.3.1. Methodology 
(source for all tables: own calculations based on the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances) 
 





deviation Minimum Maximum 
Median income ratio  38,078  165.99 633.437 0 790361.6 
Age  41,523  49.40 17.300 17 95 
Education  41,484  13.126 2.936 1 17 
Female  41,528  0.279 0.448 0 1 
Black or Hispanic  41,528  0.217 0.412 0 1 
Single  41,528  0.417 0.493 0 1 
Self-employed  41,528  0.109 0.312 0 1 
Out of labour force  41,528  0.270 0.444 0 1 
Number of children  41,528  0.835 1.159 0 10 
Financial assets/Assets  35,205  31.180 30.785 -254.9 8839.2 
Primary residence/Assets  35,205  39.826 34.640 -1111.8 2162.2 
Vehicles and other/Assets  35,204  20.610 29.497 -222.9 213.7 
Business Equity/Assets  35,204  3.617 13.561 -400.1 4331.5 
Liquid assets/Assets  35,205  10.024 20.666 -28.6 129 
Financial investment/Assets  35,205  8.523 17.773 -110.5 8308.5 
Retirement accounts/Assets 35,205 12.633 19.954 -158.7 831.9 
Unsecured debt/Debt  28,146  45.138 43.733 0 100 
Secured Debt/Debt  28,146  51.997 44.153 0 100 
Secured by primary residence/Debt  28,146  48.776 43.705 0 100 
Secured by other real estate/Debt  28,147  3.221 14.533 0 100 
Instalment Debt/Debt  28,147  29.524 38.705 0 100 
Credit Card Balances/Debt  28,147  14.945 30.552 0 100 
Debt-service-to-income ratio (DSY)  38,280  0.198 1.875 0   2152.6 
DSY>40%  41,316  0.092 0.289 0 1 
Note: Shares of balance sheet variables in total assets or total debt are calculated only for respondents 



















Table A3.2 Correlation matrix 
  
Median 
income ratio Age Education Female Black/Hispanic Single 
Self-
employed Out of labour force 
Median income ratio 1.000 
       
Age 0.0660 1.000 
      
Education 0.0891 -0.0024 1.000 
     
Female -0.0522 -0.0002 -0.0928 1.000 
    
Black/Hispanic -0.0459 -0.1166 -0.2372 0.1680 1.000 
   
Single -0.0547 -0.0572 -0.0804 0.7053 0.1457 1.000 
  
Self-employed 0.1108 0.1303 0.2006 -0.1859 -0.1490 -0.1721 1.000 
 
Out of labour force -0.0225 0.4321 -0.1756 0.1234 0.0102 0.1087 -0.2396 1.000 
Number of children 0.0079 -0.2759 -0.0265 -0.1013 0.0841 -0.2428 0.019 -0.222 
Financial assets/Assets 0.0254 0.0540 0.1567 0.0312 -0.0380 0.0506 -0.0689 0.0356 
Primary residence/Assets -0.0859 0.0765   -0.1248 0.0005 0.0010   -0.0600 -0.1667 0.0547 
Vehicles and other/Assets -0.0633 -0.3343 -0.2471 0.1401 0.1902 0.1751 -0.2270 -0.0227 
Business Equity/assets 0.1351 0.0897 0.1373 -0.1426 -0.1152 -0.1357 0.4729 -0.1104 
Liquid assets/Assets -0.0230 -0.1188 -0.0178 0.1268 0.0918 0.1693 -0.0971 0.0539 
Financial investment/Assets 0.0776 0.1138 0.1352 -0.0247 -0.0913 -0.0197 0.0509 0.0606 
Retirement accounts/Assets -0.0463 0.0310 0.1133   -0.0058 -0.0120 -0.0102 -0.1267 -0.0635 
Unsecured debt/debt -0.0544 -0.1849 -0.2496 0.2048 0.1928 0.2465 -0.2079 0.0841 
Secured Debt/Debt 0.0277 0.1477 0.2393 -0.1926 -0.1830 -0.2435 0.1853 -0.0977 
Secured by primary residence -0.0149 0.0812 0.1726   -0.1535  -0.1475 -0.2050 0.1069 -0.0957 
Secured by other real estate 0.0898   0.1432   0.1466 -0.0875 -0.0797 -0.0878 0.1693   -0.0071 
Instalment Debt/Debt -0.0443 -0.2519 -0.1821 0.1197 0.1543   0.1567 -0.1666 0.0077 
Credit Card Balances/Debt -0.0400 0.0369 -0.1483 0.1611 0.0967 0.1721 -0.1137 0.1183 
Debt-service-to-income ratio 
(DSY) 
-0.0045 0.0107 0.0116 -0.0101 -0.0066 -0.0102 0.0310 0.0043 







































Number of children 1.000 
 
      
Financial assets/Assets -0.0986 1.000 
      
Primary residence/Assets 0.0892 -0.2383 1.000 
     
Vehicles and other/Assets 0.0153 -0.1752 -0.3716 1.000 
    
Business Equity/assets 0.0390 0.1470 -0.1901 -0.1938 1.000    
Liquid assets/Assets -0.0815 0.3538 -0.2563 0.0027 -0.1089 1.000   
Financial investment/Assets -0.0514 0.7581 -0.0563 -0.1168 0.3157 -0.0346 1.000  
Retirement accounts/Assets -0.0466 0.5048 -0.164 -0.1629 -0.0943 -0.0751 0.0067 1.000 
Unsecured debt/debt -0.0920 0.1011 -0.4052 0.5537 -0.1249 0.2753 -0.0398 0.0301 
Secured Debt/Debt 0.1072 -0.1408 0.4543 -0.5453 0.0998 -0.2738 -0.0031 -0.0440 
Secured by primary residence 0.1296 -0.1400 0.5498 -0.4743 0.0400 -0.2478 -0.0321 -0.0211 
Secured by other real estate -0.0434 -0.0060 -0.1854 -0.1650 0.1279 -0.0627 0.0604 -0.0491 
Instalment Debt/Debt -0.0264 0.0285 -0.3269 0.5260 -0.1021 0.1576 -0.0525 0.0051 
Credit Card Balances/Debt -0.0976 0.1122 -0.1581 0.1501 -0.0778 0.2127 -0.0020 0.0457 
DSY ratio 0.0000 -0.0084 -0.0139 -0.0148 0.0312 -0.0116 0.0061 -0.0155 












Balances/Debt DSY ratio DSY>40% 
 
Unsecured debt/debt 1.000 
       
Secured Debt/Debt -0.9258 1.000       
Secured by primary residence -0.8186 0.8870       
Secured by other real estate -0.2523 0.2666 1.000      
Instalment Debt/Debt 0.7463 -0.6900 -0.1923 1.000     
Credit Card Balances/Debt 0.5033 -0.4666 -0.1277 -0.1646 1.000    
DSY ratio 0.0014 -0.0031 0.0174 0.0007 -0.0138 1.000   
DSY>40% -0.1162 0.1310 0.0446 -0.0682 -0.0872 0.0846 1.000  


















Appendix to Section 4.3.3. Detailed non-parametric sensitivity analysis by subgroup 
Table A3.3 Theil-Sen median slope by subgroups 
Median income ratio 
Gender  Race  Generations  Subperiod 
Male Female  White/Other Black/Hispanic  Aged ≥ 35 Aged < 35  1989-1998 2001-2007 2010-2013 
Socio-economic controls             
Age 0.26 -0.10  -0.36 -0.01  -1.39 5.80  -0.20 -0.10 0.04 
Age squared 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  -0.01 0.11  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Educational attainment 16.60 7.87  15.78 7.14  16.02 8.79  12.89 15.23 15.21 
Female (omitted)  -70.62 -37.91  -72.92 -48.07  -66.71 -66.26 -60.64 
Black/Hispanic -46.38 -14.12  (omitted)  -42.47 -31.86  -43.97 -38.75 -39.98 
Single -65.30 -33.36  -82.34 -45.76  -83.99 -55.58  -75.81 -76.47 -77.72 
Number of children 15.18 0.09  21.65 5.17  19.24 3.32  14.77 12.68 11.59 
Number of children squared 5.71 0.03  9.07 1.64  7.81 1.13  5.77 4.92 4.45 
Self-employed 42.99 16.62  52.31 16.67  58.62 12.58  50.02 54.43 44.46 
Out of labour force -55.61 -28.70  -63.16 -37.32  -69.36 -48.91  -58.93 -54.62 -46.71 
Share of total assets 
            
Primary residence 0.22 0.10  0.16 0.23  -0.05 0.73  0.23 0.22 0.26 
Other property 2.98 1.05  2.95 1.99  2.95 1.47  2.46 3.33 3.46 
Vehicles and other non-financial assets -1.11 0.03  -0.68 -0.05  -0.46 -0.47  -0.33 -0.56 -0.59 
Business equity 2.49 1.88  2.91 2.40  3.48 1.15  2.44 3.55 3.59 
Financial investment assets 3.62 0.79  2.06 3.97  2.70 1.96  2.08 2.99 3.83 
Transaction accounts 0.66 0.07  0.04 0.29  0.42 0.04  0.26 0.13 0.18 
Retirement and insurance assets 2.99 1.36  3.00 1.58  2.86 2.55  2.86 2.88 2.88 
Share of total debt 
            
Debt secured by primary residence 0.75 0.38  0.75 0.49  0.67 0.76  0.79 0.72 0.68 
Debt secured by other property 2.41 0.97  2.39 1.79  2.35 1.46  2.14 2.56 2.58 
Instalment debt -0.56 -0.16  -0.48 -0.21  -0.31 -0.48  -0.46 -0.37 -0.47 
Credit card balances -0.50 -0.04  -0.59 0.11  -0.56 0.02  -0.37 -0.53 -0.21 
Other unsecured lines of credit 1.55 0.37  1.23 0.59  2.10 0.32  2.37 0.26 0.80 
Other debt 0.35 -0.05  0.34 0.09  0.46 -0.24  0.22 0.14 0.46 
Leverage measures             
Debt-service-to-income ratio (DSY) 74.90 73.97  94.11 124.74  107.73 125.70  124.08 95.84 108.43 
DSY > 40% -44.79 -8.60  -39.29 -8.33  -36.49 -18.33  -33.35 -30.92 -29.40 
Debt-to-asset ratio 19.30 14.51  28.61 27.72  54.22 8.43  41.52 24.13 14.14 















Note: Values in italics indicate overlapping confidence intervals across subgroups. 
Appendix to Section 4.4.1. Detailed Shorrocks decomposition results 
Table A3.4 Shorrocks decomposition for net wealth 
 
 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 
 
Share of  
inequality 
Mean share  
of income 
Share of  
inequality 
Mean share  
of income 













Primary residence 4.74 36.39 3.62 37.87 3.89 34.74 3.65 33.08 5.43 30.83 
Other property 21.99 14.96 32.99 15.96 9.07 11.60 6.53 11.36 10.98 10.51 
Vehicles and other non-financial assets 2.36 6.29 1.03 5.86 2.70 6.79 1.33 5.65 1.47 4.95 
Business equity 48.53 21.41 45.52 20.05 43.98 20.62 52.98 18.96 41.16 18.88 
Transaction accounts 3.06 6.51 2.26 6.60 5.47 6.14 2.42 5.53 4.05 5.61 
Financial investment assets 18.75 19.07 14.84 19.07 32.11 21.77 31.61 25.96 34.00 26.45 
Retirement and insurance 2.29 9.33 1.95 11.69 4.51 15.23 3.64 16.35 4.47 16.50 
Secured debt -0.99 -10.63 -0.91 -13.99 -1.18 -13.66 -0.88 -13.28 -0.98 -11.21 
Unsecured debt -0.56 -3.01 -1.14 -2.72 -0.19 -2.78 -0.30 -2.94 -0.37 -2.20 




















Mean share of 
income 
Primary residence 6.06 38.36 5.51 37.22 5.28 35.73 4.34 32.19 
Other property 16.17 13.09 6.99 12.86 10.59 13.34 6.55 11.55 
Vehicles and other non-financial assets 3.32 5.07 1.36 4.23 1.58 4.73 2.29 4.52 
Business equity 41.55 19.30 51.36 23.23 50.61 20.69 51.47 20.98 
Transaction accounts 2.42 5.49 2.57 4.37 3.70 5.90 3.09 6.37 
Financial investment assets 29.04 21.64 29.96 20.33 26.81 20.68 28.70 21.58 
Retirement and insurance 3.25 14.84 3.62 15.19 4.01 18.78 4.25 19.94 
Secured debt -1.29 -14.88 -1.04 -14.78 -1.46 -16.66 -0.91 -14.18 
Unsecured debt -0.36 -2.63 -0.19 -2.47 -0.93 -2.98 0.29 -2.77 
Other debt -0.17 -0.28 -0.14 -0.18 -0.18 -0.20 -0.07 -0.18 




















Table A3.5 Shorrocks decomposition for income 
 
 
1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 
 
Share of  
inequality 
Mean share  
of income 
Share of  
inequality 
Mean share  
of income 
Share of  
inequality 
Mean share of 
income 
Share of  
inequality 




Mean share of 
income 
Wage income 6.01 73.87 29.46 73.85 27.88 80.17 19.84 80.72 24.50 78.23 
Business and farm income 58.73 11.98 38.24 13.22 27.72 13.11 26.95 14.08 30.25 13.17 
Interest and dividend income 6.12 7.40 9.00 5.95 37.84 5.97 7.41 4.82 4.36 4.71 
Capital gains 28.39 7.40 9.81 2.30 6.93 3.00 19.20 5.35 41.56 7.54 
Social security and retirement 0.15 9.30 0.25 9.00 0.10 9.96 0.06 9.57 0.40 8.72 
Transfer and other 0.91 4.01 16.41 9.94 0.54 2.79 26.71 2.13 0.25 1.77 
Debt payments -0.31 -13.97 -3.16 -14.26 -1.01 -15.00 -0.18 -16.67 -1.32 -14.14 
                     Mortgages         -0.09         -8.33       -2.39         -9.56        -0.68         -9.69        -0.16       -10.92         -0.90       -9.39 
                     Consumer debt         -0.03         -4.80       -0.43         -3.81        -0.26         -4.15        -0.02       -4.48         -0.33       -3.72 
                     Revolving debt         -0.20         -0.84       -0.35         -0.89        -0.07         -1.16        0.00       -1.28         -0.09       -1.03 
 
 
(Table A3.5 continued) 2004 2007 2010 2013 
 Share of  
inequality 
Mean share  
of income 
Share of  
inequality 
Mean share 
 of income 
Share of  
inequality 
Mean share of 
income 
Share of  
inequality 
Mean share of 
income 
Wage income 31.14 -9.39 19.92 75.57 32.35 78.78 22.09 71.17 
Business and farm income 41.44 -3.72 36.91 16.25 36.78 15.15 34.55 14.84 
Interest and dividend income 6.95 -1.03 7.22 4.26 10.17 4.12 7.62 3.88 
Capital gains 19.20 -9.39 36.38 7.78 20.67 1.56 35.50 5.15 
Social security and retirement 1.31 -3.72 0.51 11.15 0.29 13.88 0.59 14.70 
Transfer and other 0.22 -1.03 0.06 2.30 0.75 3.79 0.44 4.04 
Debt payments -0.25 -9.39 -1.00 -17.31 -1.01 -17.28 -0.79 -13.78 
                      Mortgages           -0.05              -11.35          -0.76          -12.03          -0.40         -12.04            -0.50        -9.37 
                      Consumer debt           -0.06              -4.21          -0.17           -3.78          -0.53         -3.80            -0.21        -3.40 
                      Revolving debt           -0.14              -1.35          -0.06           -1.50          -0.08         -1.44            -0.08        -1.01 
 
 
